by Francesca de Bardin
Soldiers and sailors from many countries
lined up in front of the Allies Headquarters Building.
United States is represented.
Underwood & Underwood, 09/1918
Beginning in 1917, Western technology was the most important factor
in the early phase of economic development of the USSR.
The Western countries
which have been the prime technical subsidizers of the USSR, are
also the countries with the largest expenditures on armaments
against a presumably real threat from the Soviet Union. i
To the average citizen, it seems like the East is aligned against
the West. The evidence reveals that an ideological battle has been
deliberately constructed to deceive the people of the world and to
deliberately create a so-called enemy.
The West not only created
the Soviet industrial and military systems but has subsidized it
Dr. Antony C. Sutton (1925-2002), the former Research Fellow
at the Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace at
Stanford University from 1968 to 1973, was a British and American
economist, historian, and writer.
He is the author of a three-volume exhaustive and scholarly work
Professor Richard Pipes, of Harvard, said this in his book,
Survival Is Not Enough - Soviet Realities and America's Future:
In his three-volume
detailed account of Soviet Purchases of Western Equipment and
Technology... Sutton comes to conclusions that are uncomfortable
for many businessmen and economists.
For this reason, his
work tends to be either dismissed out of hand as 'extreme' or,
more often, simply ignored. ii
Zbigniew Brzezinski, national
security adviser (1977-1981), in his book
Between Two Ages - America's Role in the
Technetronic Era, wrote the following:
evidence of Western participation in the early phase of Soviet
economic growth, see Antony C. Sutton's Western Technology and
Soviet Economic Development: 1917-1930, which argues that,
development for 1917-1930 was essentially dependent on
Western technological aid" (p. 283), and that "at least 95
percent of the industrial structure received this
assistance." (p. 348) iii
Western Technology and Soviet Economic
Development - 1945-1965, Sutton has this to say:
The Soviets employed
more than 350 foreign concessions during the 1920s.
enabled foreign entrepreneurs to establish business operations
in the USSR. The Soviet intent was to introduce foreign capital
and skills, and the objective was to establish concessions in
all sectors of the economy and thereby introduce Western
techniques into the dormant post-revolutionary Russian economy.
entrepreneur hoped to make a normal business profit in these
Most of the 350 foreign concessions of the 1920s had been
liquidated by 1930... The concession was replaced by the
technical-assistance agreement, which together with imports of
foreign equipment and its subsequent standardization and
duplication, constituted the principal means of development
during the period 1930 to 1945.
In the late 1950's the Soviets turned their attention to the
deficient chemical, computer, shipbuilding, and consumer
complete-plant purchasing program was begun in the late 1950s -
for example, the Soviets bought at least 50 complete chemical
plants between 1959 and 1963 for chemicals not previously
produced in the USSR.
ship-purchasing program was then instituted so that by 1967
about two-thirds of the Soviet merchant fleet had been built in
the West. iv
In the chapter, "Economic
Aspects of Technical Transfers," Sutton writes,
In each case of
exceptional rates of growth between 1913 and 1967, in iron,
steel, chemicals, fertilizers there was a significant
acquisition of Western technology at the start of the rise in
It is a matter of
record that increments in output were planned to be at least
initially dependent on the West.
The planned increment
in production was achieved in a conscious manner, not by
internal technical resources, but by the purchase of
high-productivity advanced units in the West. v
More difficulty was met
in the acquisition of computers and similar advanced technologies,
but a gradual weakening of Western export control by the end of the
1960's enabled the Soviets to purchase almost the very largest and
fastest of Western computers.
Throughout the period of 50 years from 1917 to 1970, there was a
persistent, powerful, and not clearly identifiable force in the West
to continue the transfers.
And it continues:
In 2013, the U.S.
government approved the sale of 20% of America's uranium
production capacity to
Rosatom, the nuclear energy arm
of the Russian state.
Rosatom's acquisition of Toronto-based miner Uranium One Inc.
made the Russian agency, which also builds nuclear weapons, one
the world's top five producers of the radioactive metal and gave
it ownership of a mine in Wyoming.
In view of the aggressive nature of declared Soviet world
objectives, such policies seem incomprehensible if the West's
objective was to survive as an alliance of non-communist
One barrier to understanding recent history is the notion that
all capitalists are the bitter and unswerving enemies of all
Marxists and socialists. This idea is erroneous.
In fact, an alliance
between international political capitalists and international
revolutionary socialists is to their mutual benefit. This
alliance has gone unobserved largely because historians are
locked into the impossibility of any such alliance existing.
One should bear two
clues in mind: monopoly capitalists are the bitter enemies of
free enterprise entrepreneurs; and, given the weaknesses of
socialist central planning, the totalitarian socialist state is
a perfect captive market for monopoly capitalists.
If American monopoly
capitalists were able to reduce a planned USSR. to the status of
a captive technical colony would not this be the logical
twentieth-century internationalist extension of the Morgan
monopolies and the Rockefeller petroleum trust of the late
nineteenth century? vi
That the Soviets had
openly and consistently advocated the overthrow of Western
democratic systems from 1917 is a fundamental starting point for the
development of U.S. national security policies.
therefore, that either the West's policy regarding technical
transfers to the USSR was in error or the USA's inflated annual
defense expenditure was unnecessary.
Either there is no
valid rationale for much of our technical transfers to with the
Soviets, or there is no valid rationale for the armaments
expenditures to defend against the Soviets.
The two policies are
There is adequate reason
to believe that Western policy toward the USSR in the field of
economic relations is based on an inadequate observation of facts,
and on invalid assumptions.
In no other way can one
explain the 50 years of policies which prescribe first the
establishment and then the continuing subsidy of the technological
development of the USSR that simultaneously calls forth massive
armaments expenditures against a threat from the USSR.
Those countries which
have been the prime technical subsidizers of the USSR are also the
countries with the largest expenditures on armaments against a
presumably real threat from the Soviet Union...
The choice, therefore, is clear:
either the West
should have abandoned its massive armaments expenditures
because the USSR, was not an enemy of the West,
or it should have
abandoned the technical transfers that made it possible for
the USSR, to pose the threat to the Free World which was the
raison d'être for such a large share of Western
What motive explains this
coalition of Western capitalists and the USSR?
The simplest explanation is that a syndicate of Wall Street
financiers and corporations enlarged their monopoly ambitions and
broadened horizons on a global scale.
The gigantic Russian
market was to be converted into a captive market and a technical
colony to be exploited by a few high-powered American financiers and
the corporations under their control...
A legacy of no-win wars has been costly in dollars and lives, with
no other major purpose but to generate multi-billion-dollar
Technology and Soviet Economic Development: 1945-1965,
Hoover Institution of War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford
Survival Is Not Enough: Soviet Realities and America's
Future (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 290.
Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America's Role in the
Technetronic Era (New York: Viking, 1970), 56, note.
Technology and Soviet Economic Development: 1945-1965, 410,
412-413, 414-415, 418, 416.
Technology and Soviet Economic Development: 1945-1965,
Antony C. Sutton,
Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution (New Rochelle, NY:
Arlington House, 1974), 17.
Technology and Soviet Economic Development: 1945-1965, 381
Technology and Soviet Economic Development: 1945-1965, 400.