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			by Francesca de Bardin 
			May 04, 
			2017 
			from
			
			FrancescaDeBardin Website 
			  
			  
			  
			  
			
			 Vladivostok, Russia.
 
			
			Soldiers and sailors from many countries  
			are 
			lined up in front of the Allies Headquarters Building.  
			The 
			United States is represented.  
			
			Underwood & Underwood, 09/1918
 
			  
			Beginning in 1917, Western technology was the most important factor 
			in the early phase of economic development of the USSR.
 
			  
			The Western countries 
			which have been the prime technical subsidizers of the USSR, are 
			also the countries with the largest expenditures on armaments 
			against a presumably real threat from the Soviet Union. i
 To the average citizen, it seems like the East is aligned against 
			the West. The evidence reveals that an ideological battle has been 
			deliberately constructed to deceive the people of the world and to 
			deliberately create a so-called enemy.
 
			  
			The West not only created 
			the Soviet industrial and military systems but has subsidized it 
			since 1917.
 Dr. Antony C. Sutton (1925-2002), the former Research Fellow 
			at the Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace at 
			Stanford University from 1968 to 1973, was a British and American 
			economist, historian, and writer.
 
 He is the author of a three-volume exhaustive and scholarly work 
			titled,
 
				
			 
			...among others.
 Professor Richard Pipes, of Harvard, said this in his book,
			Survival Is Not Enough - Soviet Realities and America's Future:
 
				
				In his three-volume 
				detailed account of Soviet Purchases of Western Equipment and 
				Technology... Sutton comes to conclusions that are uncomfortable 
				for many businessmen and economists.    
				For this reason, his 
				work tends to be either dismissed out of hand as 'extreme' or, 
				more often, simply ignored. ii 
			
			
			Zbigniew Brzezinski, national 
			security adviser (1977-1981), in his book
			
			Between Two Ages - America's Role in the 
			Technetronic Era, wrote the following: 
				
				For impressive 
				evidence of Western participation in the early phase of Soviet 
				economic growth, see Antony C. Sutton's Western Technology and 
				Soviet Economic Development: 1917-1930, which argues that, 
					
					"Soviet economic 
					development for 1917-1930 was essentially dependent on 
					Western technological aid" (p. 283), and that "at least 95 
					percent of the industrial structure received this 
					assistance." (p. 348) iii 
			In 
			
			Western Technology and Soviet Economic 
			Development - 1945-1965, Sutton has this to say: 
				
				The Soviets employed 
				more than 350 foreign concessions during the 1920s.    
				These concessions 
				enabled foreign entrepreneurs to establish business operations 
				in the USSR. The Soviet intent was to introduce foreign capital 
				and skills, and the objective was to establish concessions in 
				all sectors of the economy and thereby introduce Western 
				techniques into the dormant post-revolutionary Russian economy.
				   
				The foreign 
				entrepreneur hoped to make a normal business profit in these 
				operations...
 Most of the 350 foreign concessions of the 1920s had been 
				liquidated by 1930... The concession was replaced by the 
				technical-assistance agreement, which together with imports of 
				foreign equipment and its subsequent standardization and 
				duplication, constituted the principal means of development 
				during the period 1930 to 1945.
 
 In the late 1950's the Soviets turned their attention to the 
				deficient chemical, computer, shipbuilding, and consumer 
				industries.
   
				A massive 
				complete-plant purchasing program was begun in the late 1950s - 
				for example, the Soviets bought at least 50 complete chemical 
				plants between 1959 and 1963 for chemicals not previously 
				produced in the USSR.    
				A gigantic 
				ship-purchasing program was then instituted so that by 1967 
				about two-thirds of the Soviet merchant fleet had been built in 
				the West. iv 
			In the chapter, "Economic 
			Aspects of Technical Transfers," Sutton writes, 
				
				In each case of 
				exceptional rates of growth between 1913 and 1967, in iron, 
				steel, chemicals, fertilizers there was a significant 
				acquisition of Western technology at the start of the rise in 
				growth.   
				It is a matter of 
				record that increments in output were planned to be at least 
				initially dependent on the West.    
				The planned increment 
				in production was achieved in a conscious manner, not by 
				internal technical resources, but by the purchase of 
				high-productivity advanced units in the West. v 
			More difficulty was met 
			in the acquisition of computers and similar advanced technologies, 
			but a gradual weakening of Western export control by the end of the 
			1960's enabled the Soviets to purchase almost the very largest and 
			fastest of Western computers.
 Throughout the period of 50 years from 1917 to 1970, there was a 
			persistent, powerful, and not clearly identifiable force in the West 
			to continue the transfers.
 
 And it continues:
 
				
				In 2013, the U.S. 
				government approved the sale of 20% of America's uranium 
				production capacity to
				
				Rosatom, the nuclear energy arm 
				of the Russian state.
 Rosatom's acquisition of Toronto-based miner Uranium One Inc. 
				made the Russian agency, which also builds nuclear weapons, one 
				the world's top five producers of the radioactive metal and gave 
				it ownership of a mine in Wyoming.
 
 In view of the aggressive nature of declared Soviet world 
				objectives, such policies seem incomprehensible if the West's 
				objective was to survive as an alliance of non-communist 
				nations.
 
 One barrier to understanding recent history is the notion that 
				all capitalists are the bitter and unswerving enemies of all 
				Marxists and socialists. This idea is erroneous.
   
				In fact, an alliance 
				between international political capitalists and international 
				revolutionary socialists is to their mutual benefit. This 
				alliance has gone unobserved largely because historians are 
				locked into the impossibility of any such alliance existing.
				   
				One should bear two 
				clues in mind: monopoly capitalists are the bitter enemies of 
				free enterprise entrepreneurs; and, given the weaknesses of 
				socialist central planning, the totalitarian socialist state is 
				a perfect captive market for monopoly capitalists.   
				If American monopoly 
				capitalists were able to reduce a planned USSR. to the status of 
				a captive technical colony would not this be the logical 
				twentieth-century internationalist extension of the Morgan 
				monopolies and the Rockefeller petroleum trust of the late 
				nineteenth century? vi 
			That the Soviets had 
			openly and consistently advocated the overthrow of Western 
			democratic systems from 1917 is a fundamental starting point for the 
			development of U.S. national security policies.  
				
				Rationality suggests, 
				therefore, that either the West's policy regarding technical 
				transfers to the USSR was in error or the USA's inflated annual 
				defense expenditure was unnecessary.    
				Either there is no 
				valid rationale for much of our technical transfers to with the 
				Soviets, or there is no valid rationale for the armaments 
				expenditures to defend against the Soviets.    
				The two policies are 
				incompatible... vii 
			There is adequate reason 
			to believe that Western policy toward the USSR in the field of 
			economic relations is based on an inadequate observation of facts, 
			and on invalid assumptions.  
			  
			In no other way can one 
			explain the 50 years of policies which prescribe first the 
			establishment and then the continuing subsidy of the technological 
			development of the USSR that simultaneously calls forth massive 
			armaments expenditures against a threat from the USSR.  
			  
			Those countries which 
			have been the prime technical subsidizers of the USSR are also the 
			countries with the largest expenditures on armaments against a 
			presumably real threat from the Soviet Union...
 The choice, therefore, is clear:
 
				
					
					
					either the West 
					should have abandoned its massive armaments expenditures 
					because the USSR, was not an enemy of the West, 
					
					or it should have 
					abandoned the technical transfers that made it possible for 
					the USSR, to pose the threat to the Free World which was the
					raison d'être for such a large share of Western 
					expenditures viii 
			What motive explains this 
			coalition of Western capitalists and the USSR?
 The simplest explanation is that a syndicate of Wall Street 
			financiers and corporations enlarged their monopoly ambitions and 
			broadened horizons on a global scale.
 
			  
			The gigantic Russian 
			market was to be converted into a captive market and a technical 
			colony to be exploited by a few high-powered American financiers and 
			the corporations under their control... 
			A legacy of no-win wars has been costly in dollars and lives, with 
			no other major purpose but to generate multi-billion-dollar 
			armaments contracts.
 
 
			  
			  
			  
			
			References 
				
					
					
					Sutton Western 
					Technology and Soviet Economic Development: 1945-1965, 
					Hoover Institution of War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford 
					University, 381.
					
					Richard Pipes, 
					Survival Is Not Enough: Soviet Realities and America's 
					Future (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 290.
					
					Zbigniew 
					Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America's Role in the 
					Technetronic Era (New York: Viking, 1970), 56, note.
					
					Sutton Western 
					Technology and Soviet Economic Development: 1945-1965, 410, 
					412-413, 414-415, 418, 416.
					
					Sutton Western 
					Technology and Soviet Economic Development: 1945-1965, 
					400,402
					
					Antony C. Sutton, 
					Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution (New Rochelle, NY: 
					Arlington House, 1974), 17.
					
					Sutton Western 
					Technology and Soviet Economic Development: 1945-1965, 381  
					
					Sutton Western 
					Technology and Soviet Economic Development: 1945-1965, 400. 
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