
by Fyodor Lukyanov
July 30, 2025
from
RossiyskayaGazeta Website
translation by the RT Team
August 04, 2025
from
RT Website
Original version in Russian
Fyodor Lukyanov,
the editor-in-chief
of Russia in Global Affairs, chairman of the Presidium
of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and
research director of the Valdai International Discussion
Club. |

FILE PHOTO.
© AP Photo /
Heinz-Peter Bader
The
spirit of Helsinki is gone,
and so is
the old idea of
European
security...
This week marks the 50th anniversary of a landmark event
in European diplomacy.
In 1975, the leaders of 35 countries, including
the United States, Canada, and almost all of Europe, gathered in the
Finnish capital
Helsinki to sign the
Final Act of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
The agreement capped years of negotiation over
peaceful coexistence between two rival systems that had dominated
world affairs since the end of the Second World War.
At the time, many believed the Final Act would solidify the
postwar status quo.
It formally recognized existing borders -
including those of Poland, the two Germanys, and the Soviet Union -
and acknowledged the spheres of influence that had shaped Europe
since 1945.
More than just a diplomatic document, it was seen
as a framework for managing ideological confrontation.
Fifty years later, the legacy of Helsinki is
deeply paradoxical.
On the one hand, the Final Act laid out a
set of high-minded principles:
In many ways, it offered a vision of ideal
interstate relations.
Who could object to such goals?
Yet these principles were not born in a vacuum. They were
underpinned by a stable balance of power between the NATO and the
Warsaw Pact.
The Cold War, for all its dangers, provided a
kind of structure.
It was a continuation of the Second World War
by other means - and its rules, however harsh, were understood
and largely respected.
That system no longer exists...
The global order that emerged after 1945 has
disintegrated, with no clear replacement.
The post-Cold War attempts to graft a
Western-led system onto the rest of Europe succeeded only
briefly.
The
OSCE (Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe), which evolved from the
CSCE, became a vehicle for imposing Western norms on others - a
role it can no longer credibly perform.
Despite the growing need for cooperation in an
unstable world, the OSCE today exists mostly in theory.
The notion of 'pan-European security' that
underpinned the Helsinki Process has become obsolete.
Processes are now fragmented and asymmetric;
rivals are unequal and numerous.
There is no longer a shared framework to
manage disagreements.
That hasn't stopped calls to revive the OSCE
as a political mediator, particularly amid recent European
crises.

But can an institution forged in a bipolar
world adapt to the multipolar disorder of today?
History suggests otherwise.
Most institutions created in the mid-20th
century have lost relevance in periods of upheaval.
Even
NATO and
the EU, long considered
pillars of the West, face mounting internal and external
pressures.
Whether they endure or give way to new, more
flexible groupings remains to be seen.
The fundamental problem is that the idea of
European security itself has changed - or perhaps disappeared.
Europe is no longer the center of the world
it once was.
It has become a theater, not a director, of
global affairs.
For Washington, Europe is increasingly a
secondary concern, viewed through the lens of its rivalry with
China.
American strategic planning now sees Europe
mainly as a market and an auxiliary partner, not a driver of
global policy.
The
Trump administration's economic
policies highlight this shift.
Measures targeting Russia, for example, are
often less about Moscow and more about Beijing or other major
powers.
Even the conflict in Ukraine, while grave, is
treated by many in Washington as a pawn in broader geopolitical
chess.
Consider, too, the OSCE's diminished role in
managing real-world conflicts.
One recent case illustrates the point:
proposals to establish an
extraterritorial corridor through Armenia, protected by an
American private military company.
This idea may never materialize, but it
reflects the mindset now prevalent in the West - one in which
legitimacy can be manufactured as needed, with or without
traditional institutions like the OSCE.
The Final Act of 1975 was, in retrospect,
the zenith of Europe's geopolitical stature.
Much of Europe were no longer the main actors,
but it remained the primary arena.
Even that is no longer true.
The
continent's fate is increasingly shaped by external powers and
shifting alliances.
New agreements are needed, ones that reflect
today's realities and involve new players.
But whether such agreements can be reached is far
from certain.
The 'spirit of Helsinki' has not disappeared - but it no longer
animates the institutions it once created. The principles remain
appealing, but the context that made them meaningful is gone.
If collective Europe wants a new era of security
and cooperation, it will have to begin not by reviving the past, but
by accepting its end...!
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