by Gareth Porter
June 7, 2011
Gareth Porter is an
investigative historian and journalist specializing in U.S. national
security policy. The paperback edition of his latest book, "Perils
of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam",
was published in 2006.
Al-Qaeda strategists have been
assisting the Taliban fight against U.S.-NATO forces in
Afghanistan because they believe that foreign occupation has
been the biggest factor in generating Muslim support for
uprisings against their governments, according to the
just-published book by Syed Saleem Shahzad, the Pakistani
journalist whose body was found in a canal outside Islamabad
last week with evidence of having been tortured.
That Al-Qaeda view of the U.S.-NATO war in
Afghanistan, which Shahzad reports in the book based on conversations with
several senior Al- Qaeda commanders, represents the most authoritative
picture of the organization's thinking available to the public.
Shahzad's book "Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban" was published on May 24 -
only three days before he went missing from Islamabad on his way to a
television interview. His body was found May 31.
Shahzad, who had been the Pakistan bureau chief for the Hong Kong- based
Asia Times, had unique access to senior Al-Qaeda commanders and cadres, as
well as those of the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban organizations.
His account of Al-Qaeda strategy is particularly valuable because of the
overall ideological system and strategic thinking that emerged from many
encounters Shahzad had with senior officials over several years.
Shahzad’s account reveals that Osama bin Laden was a "figurehead" for public
consumption, and that it was Dr. Ayman Zawahiri who formulated the
organization's ideological line or devised operational plans.
Shahzad summarizes the Al-Qaeda strategy as being to "win the war against
the West in Afghanistan" before shifting the struggle to Central Asia and
He credits Al-Qaeda and its militant allies in
North and South
Waziristan with having transformed the tribal areas of Pakistan into the
main strategic base for the Taliban resistance to U.S.-NATO forces.
But Shahzad's account makes it clear that the real objective of Al- Qaeda in
strengthening the Taliban struggle against U.S.-NATO forces in Afghanistan
was to continue the U.S.-NATO occupation as an indispensable condition for
the success of Al-Qaeda's global strategy of polarizing the Islamic world.
Shahzad writes that Al-Qaeda strategists believed its terrorist attacks on
9/11 would lead to a U.S. invasion of Afghanistan which would in turn cause
a worldwide "Muslim backlash". That "backlash" was particularly important to
what emerges in Shahzad's account as the primary Al-Qaeda aim of stimulating
revolts against regimes in Muslim countries.
Shahzad reveals that the strategy behind
the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the
large Al-Qaeda ambitions to reshape the Muslim world came from Zawahiri's
"Egyptian camp" within Al-Qaeda.
That group, under Zawahiri's leadership, had
already settled on a strategic vision by the mid-1990s, according to Shahzad.
The Zawahiri group's strategy, according to Shahzad, was to,
"speak out against corrupt and despotic
Muslim governments and make them targets to destroy their image in the
eyes of the common people".
But they would do so by linking those regimes to
the United States.
In a 2004 interview cited by Shahzad, one of bin Laden's collaborators,
Saudi opposition leader Saad al-Faqih, said Zawahiri had convinced bin Laden
in the late 1990s that he had to play on,
the U.S. "cowboy" mentality that would
elevate him into an "implacable enemy" and "produce the Muslim longing
for a leader who could successfully challenge the West."
Shahzad makes it clear that the U.S. occupations
of Afghanistan and Iraq were the biggest break Al-Qaeda had ever gotten.
Muslim religious scholars had issued decrees for
the defense of Muslim lands against the non-Muslim occupiers on many
occasions before the U.S.-NATO war in Afghanistan, Shahzad points out.
But once such religious decrees were extended to Afghanistan, Zawahiri could
exploit the issue of the U.S. occupation of Muslim lands to organize a
worldwide "Muslim insurgency". That strategy depended on being able to
provoke discord within societies by discrediting regimes throughout the
Muslim world as not being truly Muslim.
Shahzad writes that the Al-Qaeda strategists became aware that Muslim
regimes - particularly Saudi Arabia - had become active in trying to end the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan by 2007, because they feared that as long as
"there was no way of stopping Islamist
revolts and rebellions in Muslim countries."
What Al-Qaeda leaders feared most, as Shahzad's
account makes clear, was any move by the Taliban toward a possible
negotiated settlement - even based on the complete withdrawal of U.S.
Al-Qaeda strategists portrayed the first
"dialogue" with the Afghan Taliban sponsored by the Saudi king in 2008 as an
extremely dangerous U.S. plot - a view scarcely supported by the evidence
from the U.S. side.
Shahzad's book confirms previous evidence of fundamental strategic
differences between Taliban leadership and Al-Qaeda.
Those differences surfaced in 2005, when Mullah Omar sent a message to all
factions in North and South Waziristan to abandon all other activities and
join forces with the Taliban in Afghanistan. And when Al-Qaeda declared the
"khuruj" (popular uprising against a Muslim ruler for un-Islamic governance)
against the Pakistani state in 2007, Omar opposed that strategy, even though
it was ostensibly aimed at deterring U.S. attacks on the Taliban.
Shahzad reports that the one of Al-Qaeda's purposes in creating the
Pakistani Taliban in early 2008 was to,
"draw the Afghan Taliban away from Mullah
The Shahzad account refutes the official U.S.
military rationale for the war in Afghanistan, which is based on the
presumption that Al- Qaeda is primarily interested in getting the U.S. and
NATO forces out of Afghanistan and that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are locked
in a tight ideological and strategic embrace.
Shahzad's account shows that despite cooperative relations with Pakistan's
ISI in the past, Al-Qaeda leaders decided after 9/11 that the Pakistani
military would inevitably become a full partner in the U.S. "war on terror"
and would turn against Al-Qaeda.
The relationship did not dissolve immediately after the terror attacks,
according to Shahzad. He writes that ISI chief Mehmood Ahmed assured
Al-Qaeda when he visited Kandahar in September 2011 that the Pakistani
military would not attack Al-Qaeda as long it didn't attack the military.
He also reports that Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf held a series of
meetings with several top jihadi and religious leaders and asked them to lie
low for five years, arguing that the situation could change after that
period. According to Shahzad's account, Al-Qaeda did not intend at the
beginning to launch a jihad in Pakistan against the military but was left
with no other option when the Pakistani military sided with the U.S. against
The major turning point was an October 2003 Pakistani military helicopter
attack in North Waziristan which killed many militants.
In apparent retaliation in December 2003, there
were two attempts on Musharraf's life, both organized by a militant whom
Shahzad says was collaborating closely with Al-Qaeda.
In his last interview with The Real News Network, however, Shahzad appeared
to contradict that account, reporting that ISI had wrongly told Musharraf
that Al-Qaeda was behind the attempts, and even that there was some
Pakistani Air Force involvement in the plot.