The Strange Case of General Aniline and Film
Standard Oil (New Jersey) felt it could not afford the luxury of waiting for a change of climate. It had good reason to believe that Crowley, under pressure from the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division, was about to issue licenses under the vested Jasco and Standard-I.G. Company’s patents. It decided “to take the bull by the horns.” On July 13, 1944, Standard and its affiliates, Standard Oil Development Co., Standard Catalytic Co., and Jasco, filed a complaint under section 9 (a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act against the alien property custodian in U.S. district court for the Southern District of New York.
The companies charged that the patents and stock of the Standard-I.G. Company and Jasco had been wrongfully seized and demanded their return. After all the preliminaries were out of the way, the trial began on May 21, 1945, two weeks after Germany surrendered unconditionally. There were some voices within Standard who urged delay until the emotional climate became more favorable. It was hardly the time to be defending relations with an “enemy” company. But those who argued that time would work against Standard prevailed.
These would include papers involving the Hague agreement as well as correspondence about the transaction between I.G. and the German High Command. All this material was intact because when the bombing of Frankfurt had begun, Knieriem had moved all his files to a farm outside of Heidelberg, which as a protected university city had not been bombed by Allied air forces. Amram arranged for Knieriem to bring these papers to New York for the trial.
Beside the preamble stating that under the original 1930 agreement Jasco was the owner of certain patent rights including the Buna process, Knieriem had written “Nachkrieg Camouflage” (“Postwar camouflage”)!
After strong objections by the Standard lawyers, Judge Wyzanski finally admitted Knieriem’s documents. In Amram’s view, this evidence,
Five months later, on November 7, 1945, Judge Wyzanski rendered his verdict. He held that all transfers of assets from I.G. to Standard after the Hague agreement were a sham designed to create the false appearance of Standard ownership of property interests that both parties continued to regard as owned by I.G.
Judge Wyzanski concluded:
The Jasco stock and patents, including the Buna patents, were therefore to be retained by the custodian. But the government did not win a complete victory. Wyzanski found that the transactions between I.G. and Standard that took place before the Hague conference had been in good faith and had not contemplated later substantial readjustments. The securities and patents involved must be returned to Standard since they were not to be construed as the property of an enemy.
On September 22, 1947, the circuit court upheld the decision and findings of Judge Wyzanski. 7 Judge Charles Clark, who wrote the opinion, sharpened the findings of the lower court. For example, in connection with the initial transfer of title of I.G.’s Jasco stock to Walter Duisberg, Clark wrote that “the inference is inescapable that Duisberg was just another dummy used to hide the real ownership of I.G. property.” 8
In a footnote in the opinion, Judge Clark volunteered a startling observation—that Standard Oil could have been considered an enemy national in view of its relationship with I.G. Farben after the United States and Germany had become active enemies:
Clark’s decision became final on April 19, 1948, when the U.S. Supreme Court denied all writs of certiorari. This date marked the end of the disastrous I.G.-Standard marriage. As a result of the lawsuit, the Alien Property Custodian turned over to Standard Oil the prewar interests of I.G. in the Standard-I.G. Company but retained I.G.’s half interest in Jasco, along with almost all of the patents that presumably had been transferred to Jasco by I.G. after the beginning of the war, including the Buna patents.
However, Standard’s fears, expressed back in 1939, that I. G.’s interests would “fall into unfriendly hands” were not realized. In April 1953, the Alien Property Custodian offered the Jasco stock at auction to the highest bidder. After receiving six sealed bids, he announced that the Standard Oil Development Company was the high bidder at $1.2 million.
Neutral nations likewise were required to liquidate known German assets found within their borders and transfer proceeds to the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency, which was to divide the assets among claimants in accordance with a fixed quota—the United States and Great Britain were each to receive twenty-eight percent with the remaining forty-four percent to be divided among the other Allies.
Of frightening significance to I.G. Chemie was the fact that German assets cloaked in neutral countries were included:
No one doubted that I.G. Chemie and its alleged offspring, General Aniline and Film, were prime targets of this resolution. While the reparations conference was under way, a special meeting of I.G. Chemie stockholders was held in Basel to take protective measures against the decision of the Paris conference. The climate of German defeat pervaded the atmosphere of the meeting, whose purpose was to obliterate, as far as possible, any taint of I.G. Farben.
The famous I.G. initials were dropped as the corporation formally changed its name to Internationale Industrie und Handelsbeteiligungen A.G. From now on I.G. Chemie would be known as Inter-handel. The bylaws were amended to eliminate the use of bearer shares, one of the traditional mechanisms used by I.G. Farben to exercise hidden control. Finally Albert Gadow, managing director since 1935 and brother-in-law of Hermann Schmitz, resigned. Gadow was succeeded by Walter Germann, a Swiss citizen, and a nephew of the late Eduard Greutert.
When the inquiry was completed, the Swiss Compensation Office concluded that I.G. Chemie (Interhandel) was not controlled or owned by I.G. Farben and was indeed a genuine Swiss company owned and operated by Swiss interests. In Allied circles the decision met with disbelief, and it was entirely unacceptable to the United States government.
Fortified by thousands of captured I.G. Farben documents, the United States stood its ground that Interhandel was a German controlled concern. There was a growing impression among U.S. officials concerned with the matter that the Swiss government was more and more dominated in this matter by internal pressures than by the need for a legally valid adjudication.
In the event of a disagreement between the Swiss Compensation Office and the Joint Commission, the dispute was to be submitted to the Swiss Authority of Review. Almost immediately Interhandel became the subject of a major disagreement. The Swiss Compensation Office continued to hold that Interhandel was truly a Swiss company and not a camouflaged holding of I.G. The Joint Commission vigorously disputed this finding and appealed to the Swiss Authority of Review, which supported the Swiss Compensation Office.
After the prescribed period of thirty days, the Swiss government declared the Swiss Authority of Review decision final, removed the freeze on Interhandel’s assets in Switzerland, and presented the United States government with a demand that the General Aniline and Film stock be released to Interhandel. Two could play this game, however, and the United States refused. The Americans replied that the Washington Accord dealt only with assets located in Switzerland and did not affect assets in the United States: non-enemies such as Swiss nationals seeking the release of property vested in the United States were to rely on the legal remedies provided for in the Trading with the Enemy Act.
For practical purposes United States law would govern the disposition of the General Aniline property. By July 1948, this proposition was strengthened by an amendment to the Trading with the Enemy Act providing that no enemy assets were to be returned to their former owners. Instead, they were to be deposited in a special fund for the payment of war claims.
Since the Office of the Alien Property Custodian had been transferred some two years earlier to the Department of Justice, the suit named Attorney General Tom C. Clark as the defendant. It is a matter of historical interest that the suit was filed not in Interhandel’s German name, under which it did business in German-speaking Basel, but in the rarely used French name, Société Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales S.A.
It contended, however, that
after that date, changes had occurred that cut all ties to I.G.
Farben. What Interhandel was alluding to were the de-Farbenization
measures undertaken in 1940, just before G.A.F. informed the
Securities and Exchange Commission that I.G. Chemie was its
corporate parent. These included the cancellation of the dividend
option agreement, the resignation of Hermann Schmitz from I.G.
Chemie, and I.G. Chemie’s purchase of a large portion of its own
stock held by German shareholders.
Moreover, the government
charged, the real and beneficial owner of the G.A.F. shares was I.G.
Nevertheless, several times a settlement appeared to be a real possibility. In 1950, for example, Interhandel offered to accept $14 million to compromise its G.A.F. claim. The assistant attorney general in charge of alien property recommended U.S. government acceptance. However, Attorney General Tom Clark rejected the $14 million figure and countered with an offer of $12 million. The Justice staff, which argued that principle rather than money should be the determining factor, heatedly objected to any settlement. Only a legal adjudication in court would satisfy them. Now in possession of captured Nazi and I.G. documents, they could prove in a court of law that G.A.F. and Interhandel were camouflaged I.G. Farben properties.
In fact, they contended that the present Interhandel suit was controlled by the very stockholders whose background and conduct had caused the U.S. alien property custodian to seize the G.A.F. assets in the first place. The Kaufmans charged that the management, fearing permanent confiscation of its enemy-tainted interests, was about to settle the claim for a great deal less than the true value of the non-enemy holdings. Finally, the Kaufmans alleged that this “enemy” group in control of Interhandel could not be expected to protect the interests of non-enemy shareholders.
Their intention to divide the proceeds of such a settlement equally among enemy and non-enemy stockholders would deprive the non-enemy stockholders of their rightful interest in the assets. Moreover, it would result in a substantial benefit to a former enemy. 13 Both the Interhandel management and the United States government opposed the Kaufman intervention, each insisting that the interest of all stockholders be treated alike.
These rumors were soon given substance. 17 On January 2, 1952, the Supreme Court heard the argument on the Kaufmans’ right to intervene 18--the first time the Supreme Court had ever considered the complicated question of safeguarding the rights of minority stockholders in a company alleged to be enemy controlled. During the course of the proceeding, the Department of Justice lawyer was asked how high a sum had been named in the compromise settlement discussions between Interhandel and the United States. The Justice lawyer replied that no figure had yet been reached. 19
It was the first public intimation that the settlement was being negotiated seriously.
On April 7, 1952, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Kaufman petition to intervene 21 on behalf of the minority stockholders of Interhandel, almost burying any chance for a United States—Interhandel settlement. Continued litigation seemed the only solution in sight.
Interhandel’s attorney, John J. Wilson, appealed the decision and for the next five years he battled the Justice Department through the courts on the procedural question of whether the case could be tried without the Sturzenegger papers. In the meantime, another route was opened for Interhandel to recover G.A.F. In 1954 Senator Everett M. Dirksen introduced a bill in the United States Senate providing for the return of vested enemy property to its former owners. 23 The Department of Justice, under Attorney General Herbert Brownell, vigorously opposed the Dirksen bill. 24
But now John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower’s secretary of
state, made his presence known.
The Dulles testimony sent shock waves through the Allied capitals. If the United States repudiated its obligations on reparations, Germany, it was feared, would demand similar concessions from the other Allied countries. The Dutch were particularly disturbed. They had acquired as reparation more than $100 million worth of German assets in Holland—actually a fraction of the value of what had been destroyed by the Germans.
One high Dutch official, in a New York Times interview, said, “We believe in honoring agreements” 26 and then added ruefully that in the future the Netherlands would have to be very careful in concluding agreements with the United States. Dulles’s support notwithstanding, the opposition of the Department of Justice prevailed and the legislation was killed.
They were replaced by four prominent members of the Swiss banking community with impeccable reputations and no links to I.G. Farben. The new directors were the president of the Swiss Bankers Association and the general managers of the three most important Swiss deposit banks—Swiss Bank, Crédit Suisse, and Union Bank. Union Bank, the smallest of the three, was reported in the press to have made large-scale purchases of Interhandel stock during the preceding few months. 29
These purchases had an especial meaning. They were composed of the bulk of the shares owned by Hans Sturzenegger, which eliminated the last remaining important link to I.G. Farben. Sturzenegger, in fact, had resigned from the board earlier when the Swiss banks yielded to “pressure from conservative Swiss circles that insisted on the eradication of all vestiges of doubt about the real ownership of Interhandel.” 30
But until Sturzenegger sold his remaining stock, I.G. Farben influence in Interhandel was suspected.
At the end of World War II, immediately after his discharge from the U.S. Navy, Schmitz had gone to Switzerland with his father to confer with Sturzenegger as to the best way to try to recover the vested G.A.F. stock from the U.S. alien property custodian. The Schmitzes recommended that the only hope for Interhandel to recoup the value of General Aniline was to sell the company to an American purchaser acceptable to the United States government. Sturzenegger agreed that the proposal was worth pursuing. The Schmitzes thereupon began the search for a buyer.
He counseled a new approach. Interhandel should convey full and irrevocable powers of negotiation and final settlement to an outstanding American who “would be above politics and yet would have entree to every door of the administration.” 32
Schmitz’s recommendation was Charles E.
Wilson. Schmitz pointed out that Wilson had served two Democratic
administrations in positions of the most vital importance to the
country’s safety (high official of the War Production Board in World
War II and defense mobilizer during the police action in Korea.)
Wilson’s Republican connections were even more impressive: he was a
close friend of both Vice-President Nixon and President Eisenhower.
In late April 1960, Wilson and Schaefer met in Paris. The conference was kept secret since Schaefer was afraid that the highly volatile G.A.F. stock would plummet if Wilson refused the trusteeship. Not even John J. Wilson, who was in charge of the litigation, knew about either the meeting or the Schmitz plan to obtain the services of Charles E. Wilson as a trustee. Shortly after the meeting Charles Wilson accepted the trusteeship.
It was also agreed in writing that Wilson would come to no settlement of the G.A.F. matter without first submitting the plan to Interhandel for approval. Wilson refused any compensation, asking only that his expenses be covered. His attorney, Charles Spofford, a senior partner in the prominent Davis, Polk law firm, however, was to receive compensation for legal services.
Spofford arranged for him to see a few senators and a number of government officials, none of higher rank than Orrick. Schaefer was appalled by the antagonistic reception he received from the government officials charged with resolution of the case. His meeting with Orrick was especially stormy. The assistant attorney general became so enraged by Schaefer’s attack on the U.S. government’s handling of the Interhandel case that he ordered Schaefer to leave his office immediately. According to Orrick’s testimony:
A month after Schaefer’s fruitless visit to the United States, a friend and lawyer, a Dr. Gutstein, made a suggestion to him. One of his clients was personally familiar with the new Democratic president. Why not ask this client to use his influence to arrange a meeting between Schaefer and the new attorney general, Robert F. Kennedy? Schaefer readily agreed.
Schaefer gave no indication as to the identity of the “third party” through whom contact with “one of the highest authorities” was to be made. A month later, on August 24, he wrote both John Wilson and Spofford asking them to suspend activities with the Department of Justice. He deliberately did not specify why he gave this order but said only that he was planning to be in Washington himself in connection with “a new proposal of ours.” At that time, he would discuss the matter with them. 37
It was obvious Schaefer had taken matters into his own hands. Spofford was in France on vacation, but Schaefer’s letter was forwarded to him.
Spofford was jolted by the news. Radziwill was not even a lawyer. But he was the brother-in-law of President Kennedy.
However, he recognized that Radziwill’s special relationship to President Kennedy was a powerful element. Therefore, despite his misgivings, he reluctantly agreed that this new and extraordinary development probably had to be pursued. Schaefer then told Spofford about Interhandel’s new proposal: the Department of Justice would return G.A.F. to Interhandel, which would sell it and with the proceeds establish a European development bank to supply credit to underdeveloped countries. 40
It was Prince Radziwill’s assignment to feel out the attorney general’s reaction to such a plan. The essence of the proposal was to benefit the poor of the world first and Interhandel second, if such a notion could be believed by the attorney general or anybody else.
On September 13, Charles Wilson received a cable from the Union Bank asking that he arrange an early conference between Schaefer and Robert Kennedy. Spofford immediately went to Washington and met with Orrick, who informed him that the attorney general did not even want to discuss the project of the European development bank. In Kennedy’s view it did not represent an appropriate solution to the G.A.F. problem. 42
Spofford cabled the discouraging news to Switzerland: “Advised that Attorney General does not believe conference useful at this time and cannot fix future date.” 43 Schaefer wrote in reply, “I heard from my friend in London that the Justice Department felt they could not entertain our proposal.” He had therefore asked “the party in question to contact Washington in order to solicit an appointment there for the next or following week, if possible.” 44
In the extensive correspondence between Schaefer and Spofford, never once did either of the men write the name Radziwill. Instead, such vague terms as “intermediary,” “friend in London,” “party in question,” and “third party” were used.
Spofford reported this conversation to Schaefer. He wrote that he assumed that the primary purpose of the meeting would be to discuss the European development bank, a proposal that Spofford now thought should be pursued:
Schaefer replied that the purpose of his visit was to find out why his proposal was rejected and to learn on what basis the Department of Justice would be interested in an arrangement. 47
Schaefer made it a point not to include Spofford, John Wilson, Charles Wilson, or Radziwill in the meeting with Attorney General Kennedy. According to Schaefer, he was told by “our mutual friend” that the attorney general would only see the Swiss banker alone—“no intermediary, no counselor, no advisor, because this must be a talk from man to man.” 48
The meeting was set up by a letter from Prince Radziwill to Robert Kennedy requesting an appointment for Alfred Schaefer. It was the prince’s first formal appearance in the case. According to the Justice lawyer who was present when the letter arrived, it looked like a royal wedding invitation, enclosed in two richly appointed envelopes and embossed with the Radziwill crest.
Kennedy immediately dismissed the idea of a European development bank. But he did not dismiss the idea of a settlement. He told Schaefer that a settlement would take a great deal of courage on his part because of the unanimous opposition of his staff. But if the General Aniline and Film matter was to be settled, it would have to be on at least a fifty-fifty basis. He gave his tentative approval, and the two men agreed that the details could be worked out by Interhandel and the Justice Staff. 50
A few days after the conference with Robert Kennedy, Schaefer met with Charles Wilson and Spofford in New York. It was a stormy meeting. Wilson complained that the injection of Prince Radziwill undermined his authority. Spofford agreed, complaining that the Radziwill action seemed “highly unusual, if not improper.” 51
Even if Schaefer used Prince Radziwill only as a Washington leg man, or to open doors,
The next week, after Schaefer returned to Zurich, he called Orrick to say that the Interhandel board had agreed to Kennedy’s offer. There followed an exchange of cables between the Department of Justice and Schaefer. In mid-December, Orrick was in Zurich and called Schaefer to discuss the settlement further. 53
In January Attorney General Kennedy and Schaefer talked about the terms of settlement by transatlantic telephone. Schaefer shortly thereafter received a cable from Kennedy confirming and clarifying their conversation:
The cordial relations developing between the Kennedy administration and Interhandel convinced Schaefer that Wilson’s position had become politically and practically untenable and the time had arrived to relieve him of the trusteeship. He wrote to Wilson on February 12, 1962, in effect revoking the latter’s authority. In setting forth the reasons for this decision, Schaefer pointedly reminded Wilson that the meeting with the attorney general had been arranged “through the intermediary of a mutual friend.”
The meetings and subsequent “repeated telephone conversations” indicated “that our negotiations are approaching a medium line and we are therefore hopeful to reach an agreement by continuing along this road, which, as you know, was opened for us direct.” So that there would be no doubts “as to Interhandel’s right to conduct... direct negotiations with Washington,” Schaefer asked Wilson “to consider the trusteeship you so kindly agreed to accept two years ago as being no longer valid.” 55 Six weeks later Wilson replied that he had decided to surrender his power of attorney as soon as the necessary formalities could be completed. The Radziwill matter still rankled.
In April, Orrick and Schaefer met in Munich and reached a general understanding. According to the Munich agreement the settlement terms were more or less those outlined in the Kennedy cable, the details to be negotiated later by both parties’ lawyers. Schaefer’s high hopes for a prompt disposal of the conflict were, however, premature. It was almost a year before a settlement was reached. Nevertheless, for Schaefer the climate had changed considerably, and it now seemed a long time since Orrick threw him out of his office.
To permit such a sale, however, required an amendment to the Trading with the Enemy Act. In fact, an amendment was then pending in Congress, introduced by Senator Kenneth Keating of New York, 57 against whom Robert Kennedy intended to run in the 1964 senatorial election in New York. For over a decade the Department of Justice had been trying to get this amendment passed by Congress but the Interhandel interests had always succeeded in blocking it.
With that stroke of the pen, the sole remaining company in active operation under the supervision of the office of alien property was now ready for disposal by the United States government. The New York Times commented, “The General Aniline provision is expected to open still another chapter in the long and tangled legal history of that corporation.” 59
The New York Times was right. There was still another chapter. It had been John Wilson’s understanding that before the government and Interhandel shared the net proceeds of the proposed sale of G.A.F., $24 million in tax and other claims would be deducted “off the top.” Katzenbach now insisted that such a formula was not acceptable: instead, Interhandel would have to bear the entire burden of the $24 million. 60
This turn of events led Wilson to remark, “It was my worst Christmas.” Upon reflection, however, Interhandel decided to accept Katzenbach’s new condition. Its share of the proceeds was still expected to be substantial. Attorney General Kennedy was informed of Interhandel’s acquiescence.
Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach also felt compelled to explain the reasons for the settlement to the press. If there had been a sale without a prior settlement, Interhandel would have fought the constitutionality of the 1962 sales amendment in the courts; if it lost in the U.S. courts, Interhandel would have carried the case to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. 62
The uneasiness betrayed by Kennedy and Katzenbach was warranted. The Department of Justice announcement of the G.A.F. settlement brought the anticipated storm of criticism. President Kennedy was questioned about it at his next press conference two days later.
President Kennedy replied,
The explanations of President Kennedy, Attorney General Kennedy, and Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach did little to stem the criticism in the Congress, particularly from several members of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Subcommittee dealing with enemy assets and war claims. Representative John Dingell, second-ranking member of the Democratic majority of the subcommittee, fairly exploded: “I don’t think Interhandel has a nickel coming.” 65
As a lawyer, he said, he was aware of the general rule that a bad settlement is often better than a good lawsuit, but in this case “Interhandel has behaved shamefully and shamelessly. I don’t think there is any question that Interhandel is a cloak or a front.” 66
Representative Willard S. Curtin, a Republican member of the same subcommittee, pointed out that if G.A.F. were truly a Swiss asset, then it should have been returned to Interhandel. On the other hand, “if it were a completely German asset, as we have always thought, then I think it was not a good settlement.” 67
Another Republican member of the subcommittee, Hastings Keith, joined in the criticism. The three congressmen expressed their disappointment that the attorney general had not seen fit to inform their subcommittee of the settlement. 68
The proposed compromise of the litigation was presented to the U.S. district court. In April 1964 the court approved the settlement and authorized the sale. 70 During the next year, while the Department of Justice was preparing for the public auction of General Aniline and Film, criticism of the settlement continued in the press.
Pearson answered this question by suggesting two clues. The first had to do with the interest in General Aniline shown by Joseph P. Kennedy, father of the president and of the attorney general. Ever since the Justice officials who approved the settlement learned of the postelection visit of Charles Wilson to the Joseph Kennedy home in Palm Beach, they feared the active intrusion of America’s preeminent father.
In their view, the size of the financial stakes involved was far too great for Joseph Kennedy to leave the matter alone. This fear crystallized very early when Robert Kennedy appointed William Payton Marin vice-chairman of the board of G.A.F. Marin, Joseph Kennedy’s principal legal counsel, was acknowledged to be one of his closest advisers. Very swiftly Marin became the dominant figure on the General Aniline board.
The hand of the elder Kennedy was also seen in the appointment to the board of his public relations man, Harold E. Clancy, a former editor of the Boston Traveler. Pearson concluded his column with the second clue—a potential blockbuster that he indicated was leaked from the Department of Justice:
This was the only known time in his pursuit of G.A.F. that Schaefer took the risk of naming Radziwill* on paper. 73
* So sensitive about the name Radziwill were the various parties to the settlement negotiations that even four years later, when the matter had become academic, it still remained a fact to be suppressed. In 1968, in a deposition in a suit about a finder’s fee, Spofford found it difficult to mention the name. During his deposition, he was asked about the time Orrick had informed him that a new representative was appearing on behalf of Interhandel at the Department of Justice.
Surprisingly, this revelation was not followed up by any newspaper or by political opponents of the Kennedys such as Senator Keating. However, it created a commotion within the Department of Justice, where there was an intensive investigation to determine the source of the leak. In any event, Pearson’s mention of Radziwill’s role was the first public identification of the “royal intermediary” by name.
John J. Wilson, the attorney for Interhandel, on cross-examination, asked Spofford,
However, pointed questions about the settlement were being asked that could not be ignored—especially in view of Robert F. Kennedy’s plans to run for the Senate from New York. In July an official of the Jewish War Veterans asked the Justice Department if any of the proceeds from the sale of G.A.F. would find their way to former Nazis. Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach’s reply appeared in the July-August issue of the Jewish Veteran.
The Blyth & Company syndicate with a bid of $329,141,926.49-- almost a third of a billion dollars—was the winner! 75 The Blyth syndicate had no trouble selling the General Aniline and Film stock to the public. On the first day of trading, all of the 11,166,438 shares were sold for a total of $341 million. The stock opened at $30.60, traded as high as $36, and closed at $32, still five points over the issue price. Payment to Interhandel netted about $122 million—an impressive amount, especially in view of the fact that in 1950 Interhandel had been willing to settle for $14 million.
A few years later, on December 13, 1974, the now American-owned GAF, together with BASF, Bayer, Du Pont, and five other companies, was indicted for a conspiracy to fix the price of dyestuffs in the United States. With the exception of one smaller concern all the defendants, including GAF and BASF, pleaded guilty and were punished with heavy fines.
Once again, the wartime confiscation and peacetime recapture of I.G. Farben property has completed its cycle. Herman Schmitz can now rest content in his grave—mission accomplished.