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  by Tyler Durden
 May 27, 2016
 from 
			ZeroHedge Website
 
			  
			
 In a stunning reversal for an organization that rests at the bedrock 
			of the modern "neoliberal" (a term the IMF itself uses generously), 
			aka 
			
			capitalist system, overnight IMF authors Jonathan D. 
			Ostry, Prakash Loungani, and Davide Furceri issued 
			a research paper titled "Neoliberalism 
			- Oversold?" whose theme is 
			a stunning one:
 
				
				it accuses neoliberalism, and its 
				immediate offshoot, globalization and "financial openness", for 
				causing not only inequality, but also making capital markets 
				unstable. 
			To wit: 
				
				There are aspects of the neoliberal 
				agenda that have not delivered as expected. 
				 
				  
				Our assessment of 
				the agenda is confined to the effects of two policies: 
				 
					
						
						
						removing restrictions on the 
						movement of capital across a country's borders 
						(so-called capital account liberalization)
						
						fiscal consolidation, 
						sometimes called "austerity," which is shorthand for 
						policies to reduce fiscal deficits and debt levels 
				An assessment of these specific 
				policies (rather than the broad neoliberal agenda) reaches three 
				disquieting conclusions: 
					
						
						
						The benefits in terms of 
						increased growth seem fairly difficult to establish when 
						looking at a broad group of countries.
						
						The costs in terms of 
						increased inequality are prominent. Such costs epitomize 
						the trade-off between the growth and equity effects of 
						some aspects of the neoliberal agenda.
						
						Increased inequality in turn 
						hurts the level and sustainability of growth. Even if 
						growth is the sole or main purpose of the neoliberal 
						agenda, advocates of that agenda still need to pay 
						attention to the distributional effects. 
			Wait... you mean that 
			the IMF becoming, 
			gasp, Marxist?  
			  
			Did last summer's dramatic interaction 
			with Greece and its brief but memorable former Marxist finance 
			minister, Yanis Varoufakis, leave such a prominent mark on 
			the IMF's collective subconsciousness, that it is now overly 
			rejecting the tenets on which the IMF was originally founded?
 
			  
			 
			  
			Let's read on for the answer...
 
 Here is a very notable segment on "globalization" aka financial 
			openness:
 
				
				In addition to raising the odds of a crash, financial openness has 
			distributional effects, appreciably raising inequality. Moreover, 
			the effects of openness on inequality are much higher when a crash 
			ensues. 
			It gets better: 
			  
				
				The mounting evidence on the high 
				cost-to-benefit    
				The mounting evidence on the high 
				cost-to-benefit ratio of capital account openness, particularly 
				with respect to short-term flows, led the IMF's former First 
				Deputy Managing Director, Stanley Fischer, now the vice chair of 
				the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, to exclaim recently:  
					
					"What useful purpose is served 
					by short-term international capital flows?"  
				Among policymakers today, there is 
				increased acceptance of controls to limit short-term debt flows 
				that are viewed as likely to lead to - or compound - a financial 
				crisis.    
				While not the only tool available - 
				exchange rate and financial policies can also help - capital 
				controls are a viable, and sometimes the only, option when the 
				source of an unsustainable credit boom is direct borrowing from 
				abroad. 
			The IMF then goes full-Magic Money Tree 
			and reverts back to a mode first observed several years ago when it 
			said that not only is austerity bad, but that unlimited debt 
			issuance is probably good. 
				
				Markets generally attach very low 
				probabilities of a debt crisis to countries that have a strong 
				record of being fiscally responsible.  
				  
				Such a track record gives 
				them latitude to decide not to raise taxes or cut productive 
				spending when the debt level is high.    
				And for countries with a strong 
				track record, the benefit of debt reduction, in terms of 
				insurance against a future fiscal crisis, turns out to be 
				remarkably small, even at very high levels of debt to GDP.
				   
				For example, moving from a debt 
				ratio of 120 percent of GDP to 100 percent of GDP over a few 
				years buys the country very little in terms of reduced crisis 
				risk.
 But even if the insurance benefit is small, it may still be 
				worth incurring if the cost is sufficiently low. It turns out, 
				however, that the cost could be large - much larger than the 
				benefit.
   
				The reason is that, to get to a 
				lower debt level, taxes that distort economic behavior need to 
				be raised temporarily or productive spending needs to be cut - 
				or both. The costs of the tax increases or expenditure cuts 
				required to bring down the debt may be much larger than the 
				reduced crisis risk engendered by the lower debt.    
				This is not to deny that high debt 
				is bad for growth and welfare. It is...   
				But the key point is that the 
				welfare cost from the higher debt (the so-called 'burden of the 
				debt') is one that has already been incurred and cannot be 
				recovered; it is a sunk cost.    
				Faced with a choice between living 
				with the higher debt - allowing the debt ratio to decline 
				organically through growth - or deliberately running budgetary 
				surpluses to reduce the debt, governments with ample fiscal 
				space will do better by living with the debt. 
			Of course, what both the IMF and 
			the 
			Magic Money Tree lunatics fail to grasp, is that the only reason 
			debt interest hasn't exploded in a world that has never had more 
			debt (a process that inevitably ends in war) is thanks to central 
			bank monetization of said debt, and third party investors 
			front-running said central banks.  
			  
			Let's revert to the "low costs of debt" 
			if and when runaway inflation forces central banks to reverse what 
			has been a 30+ year process that started with the great moderation 
			and will end either with helicopter money (and thus hyperinflation) 
			or central banks owning every single assets (and thus the death of 
			capitalism.
 But back to the IMF's rant, just in case the IMF's dramatic U-turn 
			on its support for a neoliberal agenda was not clear, here is 
			another reiteration:
 
				
				In sum, the benefits of some 
				policies that are an important part of the neoliberal agenda 
				appear to have been somewhat overplayed. In the case of 
				financial openness, some capital flows, such as foreign direct 
				investment, do appear to confer the benefits claimed for them.
				   
				But for others, particularly 
				short-term capital flows, the benefits to growth are difficult 
				to reap, whereas the risks, in terms of greater volatility and 
				increased risk of crisis, loom large.    
				In the case of fiscal consolidation, 
				the short-run costs in terms of lower output and welfare and 
				higher unemployment have been underplayed, and the desirability 
				for countries with ample fiscal space of simply living with high 
				debt and allowing debt ratios to decline organically through 
				growth is underappreciated. 
			The IMF's punch-line: 
				
				[S]ince both openness and austerity 
				are associated with increasing income inequality, this 
				distributional effect sets up an adverse feedback loop. 
				   
				The increase in inequality 
				engendered by financial openness and austerity might itself 
				undercut growth, the very thing that the neoliberal agenda is 
				intent on boosting.    
				There is now strong evidence that 
				inequality can significantly lower both the level and the 
				durability of growth. 
			And here is the IMF doing the 
			unthinkable, and waving to Marx: 
				
				The evidence of the economic damage 
				from inequality suggests that policymakers should be more open 
				to redistribution than they are. 
			As a reminder, this is taking place just 
			days after the St. Louis Fed admitted the Federal Reserve itself is, 
			indirectly, a primary reason for the current record wealth 
			inequality thanks with its focus on the "wealth effect" and boosting 
			asset prices.
 
			
  
			  
			What is the conclusion from all this?
 
			  
			Perhaps that the push for 
			global wealth redistribution, and an end to conventional capitalism, 
			is in the works.
 How this transition takes place is unknown:
 
				
				whether by government 
			decree, by regime change, by a - paradoxically - global government 
			(one in which the IMF would be delighted to administer global 
			monetary policy) to rein in globalization, or simplest of all, by 
				
				helicopter money, is still unclear. 
			Whatever it is, something is coming, because for a stunning paper 
			such as "Neoliberalism 
			- Oversold?" to be published, it certainly had to be vetted 
			not only at all executive levels of the IMF, but was surely 
			preapproved by all legacy financial institutions.
 And that should be the basis for great concern...
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
			  
			
			
			
 
			
 IMF Blames 
			Neoliberalism
 
			...for Low Growth 
			and Increased Inequalityby Dan Wright
 01 June 2016
 
			from
			
			ShadowProof Website 
			
 
 
			  
			
			 
			Screen shot of IMF 
			report on neoliberalism  
			showing Chile stock 
			exchange.
 
			  
			A new paper from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a pillar of 
			neoliberal globalization and neo-colonial domination of the 
			developing world, takes a rhetorical shot at the very system it 
			perpetuates.
 
 
			The paper, titled "Neoliberalism 
			- Oversold?," is published 
			in the June 2016 issue of the IMF's official journal, "Finance & 
			Development," and starts its analysis of the spread of neoliberalism 
			with post-1973 coup Chile where the military junta led by General 
			Augusto Pinochet adopted an economic program crafted by U.S. 
			economist Milton Friedman.   
			As the paper notes, in 1982, Friedman 
			called Chile an "economic miracle" and the policies Chile 
			implemented that had been proposed by Friedman and the
			
			Chicago Boys became a blueprint for 
			what would popularly become known as neoliberalism.   
			The IMF notes two main planks of 
			neoliberalism that went global after Chile:  
				
				"The first is increased competition 
				- achieved through deregulation and the opening up of domestic 
				markets, including financial markets, to foreign competition.
				   
				The second is a smaller role for the 
				state, achieved through privatization and limits on the ability 
				of governments to run fiscal deficits and accumulate debt." 
			While the IMF celebrates the 
			globalization of neoliberal policies overall (how could they not 
			given their institutional role), they do concede that there are, 
				
				"aspects of the neoliberal agenda 
				that have not delivered as expected." 
			Specifically, the IMF paper cites 
			removing capital controls and imposing austerity as particularly 
			problematic for growth and wealth distribution, leading them to 
			conclude: 
				
					
					
					The benefits in terms of 
					increased growth seem fairly difficult to establish when 
					looking at a broad group of countries.  
					
					The costs in terms of increased 
					inequality are prominent. Such costs epitomize the trade-off 
					between the growth and equity effects of some aspects of the 
					neoliberal agenda.  
					
					Increased inequality in turn 
					hurts the level and sustainability of growth. Even if growth 
					is the sole or main purpose of the neoliberal agenda, 
					advocates of that agenda still need to pay attention to the 
					distributional effects. 
			In other words, austerity and 
			unrestricted capital movements do not improve economic growth but do 
			exacerbate inequality.  
			  
			Though obvious to most, such an admission 
			from the IMF is noteworthy, as is the alternative perspective in the 
			paper's conclusion.   
			Rather than double down on deregulation 
			and embrace Friedman's vision of unrestricted capitalism, the paper 
			sides with economist Joseph Stiglitz on balancing market forces with 
			a stronger regulatory state.   
			If the IMF genuinely adopted such a view 
			then many of the loan packages given to countries around the world 
			would have to change considerably.   
			Currently, states accepting IMF loans 
			are typically required to deregulate their economy, privatize public 
			resources, and open themselves up to foreign capital flowing in and 
			out - the consequences of which have been continual financial and 
			economic crisis.   
			Under this new understanding the IMF 
			should, in theory, ask for more regulations, more stimulative state 
			spending, and tighter controls on capital flows.   
			Then again, if the IMF did take such an 
			approach, it would face intense resistance from its most prominent 
			backers in the corporate and 
			
			banking sectors that have benefited the 
			most from privatizing public assets and unrestrained financial 
			speculation. 
			  
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