ADDITIONAL AND DISSENTING VIEWS

I wish to stress that support for dialogue and diplomatic and economic relations between Iran and the United States does not imply acquiescence in the violation by the Iranian government of the civil rights and liberties of its own citizens. Some Iranians understandably fear that relations with the United States will reinforce the status quo and therefore regime durability in Iran.

 

In fact, any study of Iranian history over the last century and more suggests that interaction with the outside world greatly accelerates, rather than hinders, the pace of internal political change. I believe enmeshing Iran with the international community, expanding trade, and improving economic opportunity and the conditions for the growth of the middle class will strengthen, not weaken, the democratic forces in Iran.

Shaul Bakhash
 


While I agree with the main thrust of the report I do not agree that the U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan may offer Iran new incentives to open a mutually beneficial dialogue. On the contrary, I believe Iran has few incentives for dialogue. They are convinced we intend to overthrow them, and they believe we are bogged down in Iraq and have lost what support we had in the Arab world. From their perspective, it is better to wait and let us stew in our own juice.

 

Overtures on our part, under these circumstances, are likely to be interpreted as a sign of weakness and be rebuffed.

Frank Carlucci


The Task Force report offers sound and insightful analysis of the evolution of the Islamic Republic’s internal politics, its foreign policy, and the range of U.S. interests at stake in America’s relationship with Iran. However, I must take exception with the report’s conclusion that a “grand bargain” between the United States and Iran is not a realistic goal. Indeed, I believe that a grand bargain may be the only realistic option for breaking out of the current impasse in U.S.-Iranian relations, which is increasingly dysfunctional for U.S. interests.

We have had considerable experience, over the years, with incremental or issue-specific approaches to seeking an improved U.S.-Iranian relationship. In Lebanon, Bosnia, and, most recently, in Afghanistan, U.S.-Iranian cooperation has been important to the achievement of U.S. policy goals in challenging environments. Yet, this cooperation has never been able to serve as the catalyst for more fundamental and strategic improvement in the U.S.-Iranian relationship.

 

Disagreements over other critical issues—especially terrorism and nonproliferation—have always undermined the strategic potential of U.S.-Iranian tactical cooperation. I see no reason, in the current climate, to believe that the kind of approach recommended in the report is more likely to succeed in improving the overall nature of the U.S.-Iranian relationship than earlier exercises in incremental, issue-specific cooperation.

I have assumed for some years that the biggest problem the United States faces in trying to get the Iranian government to change its approach toward proliferation and support for terrorism is that most Iranian citizens have heretofore had no clear reason to “connect the dots” between their government’s ending its support both for Hezbollah and for nuclear weapons development and having U.S. economic sanctions lifted as a result.

 

If such a connection were made, you might find the majority of Iranians demanding good behavior by their government on these issues because the vast majority wants a better relationship with the United States, as they believe that a normalized relationship with the United States is in their own economic and social self-interest.

Finally, the United States should make certain that the Iranian people clearly “hear” this offer of a grand bargain. We should make this offer to the Iranian government (I would suggest through Hassan Rohani, secretary general of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council), but also broadcast it directly to the Iranian people.

 

I believe the “conservatives” in Iran will also see such an approach as a chance for them to undertake a “Nixon to China” approach and, potentially achieve a goal that has benefits both internationally and, more important, domestically as they attempt to cement their political position long term.

H. P. Goldfield
 


In consideration of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s report of July 7, 2004, on Iraq and 9/11, I believe the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force report on Iran should be very circumspect on what it concludes is happening in Iran. Until such time as U.S. intelligence is confirmed reliable, or Americans can be assured the administration has not distorted the intelligence it receives, the report should be very cautious on what it recommends based on the assumption its intelligence is correct.

Furthermore, I would have preferred that the final report dealt with engagement, beginning with subjects of common interest to the United States and Iran, rather than suggesting that engagement selectively deal only with well-known but unconfirmed contentious subjects. It is certain Iran would have its own list of similar issues that the United States perceived to threaten its security. This is not a starting point for effective engagement.

In a relative sense, in the region, I do not agree that Iran is an unstable country. In fact, it well may be the most stable. Although not quantified, it appears that those who have long been supported most aggressively by the United States have a much higher potential for instability than does Iran.

The report’s conclusion that isolation, containment sanctions, and the like have failed as foreign policy practices by the United States is welcomed. And the conclusion that the United States should adopt measures to broaden political, cultural, and economic linkages with the people of Iran is even more welcomed.

Richard H. Matzke
 


The report proposes a framework agreement under which Iran would cease permanently all enrichment and reprocessing activities under international verification, in exchange for guaranteed access to nuclear fuel and assured return of spent fuel to the country of origin. Russia could play a central role in advancing this kind of approach, having enacted legislation permitting it to import spent fuel from other countries, with a view to generating substantial revenues from reactor operators in countries seeking a way to facilitate the difficult task of managing growing stocks of spent fuel.

 

It would be in the interest of the United States to engage Russia in early discussions to negotiate an agreement of peaceful nuclear cooperation that would permit Russia to import spent fuel of U.S. origin, to reinforce U.S. efforts to persuade Moscow to conclude and implement its proposed agreement with Iran for the return to Russia of the spent fuel from the Bushehr nuclear reactor. It is worth noting that the nonproliferation benefits of this kind of approach—essentially providing cradle-to-grave fuel services to countries that forswear dangerous fuel-cycle activities—could extend well beyond Iran.

Also, the report properly notes that Iran is permitted to enrich uranium and engage in other nuclear fuel-cycle facilities under its international treaty obligations, but it should be remembered that, according to Article IV of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the grant of the inalienable right to develop nuclear energy is qualified by the phrase “for peaceful purposes.”

 

Thus if the international community should conclude that Iranian efforts to enrich uranium or obtain plutonium were intended, in fact, to support the development of nuclear weapons, then those Iranian efforts would not be permissible under its international treaty obligations.

Daniel B. Poneman

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TASK FORCE MEMBERS

  • PETER ACKERMAN is Managing Director of Rockport Capital and Chairman of the Board Overseers of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is the co-author of A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict and Executive Producer of “Bringing Down a Dictator,” the Peabody Award–winning documentary on the fall of Slobodan Milosevic.
     

  • DAVID ALBRIGHT is President and founder of the Institute for Science and International Security. He is a physicist who specializes in nuclear nonproliferation. For over a decade he has assessed and published widely on Iran’s secret nuclear efforts. In the 1990s, he worked with the IAEA Action Team mandated by the UN Security Council to dismantle and monitor against any reconstitution of Iraq’s nuclear weapons programs.
     

  • SHAUL BAKHASH * is Clarence J. Robinson Professor of History at George Mason University. He is the author of Iran: Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform under the Oajars, 1858–1896; The Politics of Oil and Revolution in Iran; and Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution. His articles have appeared in the New York Review of Books, the New Republic, Foreign Policy, the Journal of Democracy, and in scholarly books and journals. He has written opinion pieces for the New York Times, the Washington Post, the LA Times, and other newspapers.

     

    He worked for many years as a journalist in Iran, writing for the Tehran-based Kayhan Newspapers as well as for the London Times, the Financial Times, and the Economist. Before coming to George Mason University in 1985, he taught at Princeton University. He spent the past year as a Visiting Fellow at the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution, working on a book on the reform movement in Iran.

    Note: Task Force members participate in their individual and not institutional capacities.

    * The individual has endorsed the report and submitted an additional or a dissenting view.
     

  • ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI is Co-Chair of the Task Force and served as National Security Adviser to President Carter from 1977 to 1981. He is the author of, most recently, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership.
     

  • FRANK CARLUCCI * is Chairman Emeritus of the Carlyle Group, having served as Chairman for eleven years. His government background includes service as Secretary of Defense, National Security Adviser, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Ambassador, Deputy Director of OMB, and Undersecretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
     

  • ROBERT EINHORN is Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and served as Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation from 1999 to August 2001.
     

  • ROBERT M. GATES is Co-Chair of the Task Force and President of Texas A&M University. Dr. Gates served as Director of Central Intelligence from 1991 to 1993. In this position, he headed all foreign intelligence agencies of the United States and directed the Central Intelligence Agency. Dr. Gates has been awarded the National Security Medal and the Presidential Citizens Medal, has twice received the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal, and has three times received the CIA’s highest award, the Distinguished Intelligence Medal.
     

  • H.P. GOLDFIELD * is Vice Chairman of Stonebridge International, LLC, an international strategic advisory firm based in Washington, DC, and a Senior International Adviser to the law firm of Hogan & Hartson LLP. Previously, Mr. Goldfield served as Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Trade Development and as Associate Counsel to President Ronald Reagan. Mr. Goldfield also serves on the Boards of Directors of Black & Veatch Holding Company, the Middle East Institute, and the Israel Policy Forum.
     

  • STEPHEN B. HEINTZ is President of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Prior to joining RBF, he was founding President of Demos, a public policy research and advocacy network. After fifteen years in public service, he served as Executive Vice President of the EastWest Institute, based in Prague, from 1990 to 1997.
     

  • BRUCE HOFFMAN is Director of the RAND Corporation’s Washington Office and Acting Director of RAND’s Center for Middle East Public Policy. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at the U.S. Military Academy, in West Point, NY.
     

  • JOHN H. KELLY was Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asia from 1989 to 1991, Ambassador to Lebanon from 1986 to 1988, and Ambassador to Finland from 1991 to 1994. Since then, he has been an international consultant and Ambassador-in-Residence at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, at Georgia Tech.
     

  • WILLIAM H. LUERS is President of the United Nations Association of USA and served as an American diplomat for thirty years, including serving as Ambassador to Venezuela and Czechoslovakia. He subsequently served as President of the Metropolitan Museum of Art for thirteen years. In his current position, which he has held for five years, he has been involved in high-level discussions on U.S. policy toward Iran.
     

  • SUZANNE MALONEY, Director of this Task Force, has served as Middle East adviser for a major international oil company and as Olin Fellow at the Brookings Institution. She is the author of a forthcoming book, Ayatollah Gorbachev: The Politics of Change in Khatami’s Iran.
     

  • RICHARD H. MATZKE * is President of NESW Solutions; a member of the Board of Directors of OAO LUKoil, Russia’s largest oil company; former Vice Chairman of the Chevron Texaco Corporation; and Co-Chairman of the American Iranian Council.

     

    * The individual has endorsed the report and submitted an additional or a dissenting view.
     

  • LOUIS PERLMUTTER has been an investment banker and has participated in various second-track diplomatic discussions over the past twenty years.
     

  • JAMES PLACKE served much of his twenty-seven-year Foreign Service career in Middle East oil-exporting countries, concluding as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, with responsibility for Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf states, and for U.S. economic relations with the Arab region. He has since been a consultant on Middle East energy economics and strategy affiliated with Cambridge Energy Research Associates.
     

  • NICHOLAS PLATT is President Emeritus of the Asia Society. He served as Ambassador to Pakistan, the Philippines, and Zambia in the course of a thirty-four-year Foreign Service career.The Asia Society organized Iran-related policy programs, cultural events, and in-country travel during his tenure as President.
     

  • DANIEL B. PONEMAN,* former Special Assistant to the President for Nonproliferation and Export Controls, served on the National Security Council staff under Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton. A Senior Fellow at the Forum for International Policy, he is co-author of Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis.

     

    * The individual has endorsed the report and submitted an additional or a dissenting view.
     

  • ELAHÉ SHARIFPOUR-HICKS is an independent human rights activist. She spent ten years working as the Iran researcher for Human Rights Watch. She has also worked for the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and for Human Rights First. Sharifpour-Hicks has traveled repeatedly to Iran on human rights missions. She is a frequent commentator on human rights and related policy issues on the Farsi services of the BBC, VOA, RFI, and RFE. She is a graduate of Tehran University Faculty of Law and Political Science. She received her LLM in international law at Fordham Law School in New York.
     

  • STEPHEN J. SOLARZ served in public office for twenty-four years, both in the New York State Assembly and in the U.S. House of Representatives. Mr. Solarz served for eighteen years on the U.S. House of Representatives International Affairs Committee, emerging as a leading spokesman on behalf of democracy and human rights. He co-authored the resolution authorizing the use of force in the first Persian Gulf War and led the successful fight for its passage on the House floor.
     

  • RAY TAKEYH is a Professor of National Security Studies at the National Defense University.
     

  • MORTIMER ZUCKERMAN is Editor-in-Chief of U.S. News & World Report and Publisher of New York’s Daily News and served as a Middle East adviser to President Bill Clinton.

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TASK FORCE OBSERVERS

  • RACHEL BRONSON Council on Foreign Relations

  • STEVEN A. COOK Council on Foreign Relations

  • RYAN C. CROCKER National Defense University

  • LEE FEINSTEIN Council on Foreign Relations

  • JUDITH KIPPER Council on Foreign Relations

  • DAVID L. PHILLIPS Council on Foreign Relations

  • KIM SAVIT Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

  • PUNEET TALWAR Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

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APPENDIXES
 

 

APPENDIX A - IMPORTANT DATES IN U.S.-IRANIAN HISTORY
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


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APPENDIX B - IRAN AT A GLANCE *

* Unless otherwise noted, the source for all information is the CIA World Factbook, 2003.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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APPENDIX C - IRANIAN STATE INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL ACTORS

 

 

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IRANIAN POLITICAL ACTORS

1.) Hard-liners and ultraconservatives

Agenda: Represent the doctrinaire extremist fringe of the conservative camp. Committed to imposing stringent cultural and political restrictions on society in order to achieve their vision of Islamic government and, most importantly, retain their hold on power. Traditionalist Islamic stance on the economy: e.g., antipathy toward government intervention in the market and reliance on Islamic values to address socioeconomic needs. Worldview envisions Iran as the leader of the Islamic world and equates Iranian interests with Islamic interests.

Parties and Organizations:

  • Society of Combatant Clerics ( Jame-ye Rouhaniyat-e Mobarez)

  • Society of the Qom Seminary Teachers ( Jame-ye Modareseen-e Hoze-ye Elmiyehh-ye Qom)

  • Devotees of the Party of God (Ansar-e Hezbollah)

  • Hojjatiyeh Society (Anjoman-e Hojjatiyeh)

  • Islamic Coalition Society ( Jameyat-e Motalefe-ye Eslami)

Leading Figures:

  • Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi: Former head of the judiciary and member of the Council of Guardians

  • Ayatollah Ali Meshkini: Head of the Assembly of Experts

  • Habibollah Asgarowladi: Secretary general of Motalefe and former commerce minister and MP in 4th Majlis; involved with leadership of the Foundation of the Oppressed and the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation

  • Alinaghi Khamoushi: Former deputy commerce minister and current head of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry


2.) Moderates and/or “pragmatic” conservatives Agenda:

 

Favor political moderation, free markets, and cultural tolerance within limits. Prioritize national interests over ideology and economic development above all other issues. Sometimes referred to as the “modern right wing.” Rhetoric and policies advocated tend to be centered on socioeconomic development. Downplay religious ideology in favor of republican and pro-market positions. Tend to swing to the right (traditional conservatives) and to the left (reformists) to maximize influence.

Parties and Organizations:

  • Servants of Construction (Hezb-e Kargozaran-e Sazandegi)

  • Islamic Iran Developers’ Council (Etelaf-e Abadgaran-e Iran-e Eslami)

  • Development and Moderation Party (Hezb-e Etedal va Tose’e)

Leading Figures:

  • Hojjatoleslam Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani: Former president

  • Hojjatoleslam Hassan Rouhani: Secretary of the National Security Council and former deputy speaker of parliament

  • Ahmad Tavakoli: Former labor minister and leading vote-getter in 2004 parliamentary elections


3.) Mainstream reformists Agenda:

 

Encompasses a broad ideological spectrum and a multiplicity of organizations and advocates. Generally, mainstream reformists favor mass political participation, sociocultural tolerance and liberalization, and international engagement. Until recently, they were united in a commitment to achieve these objectives within the limitations of the current constitution.

 

On the economy, some reformist organizations and leaders remain heavily imprinted with the ideological baggage of revolutionary populism and support redistributive policies and a strong state role. Today, however, most recognize the state’s limitations in improving Iran’s economic predicament.

Parties and Organizations:

  • Association of Combatant Clerics (Majma-ye Rouhaniyun-e Mobarez)

  • Islamic Iran Participation Front ( Jebhe-ye Mosharekat-e Iran-e Eslami)

  • Mojahideen of the Islamic Revolution (Sazeman-e Mojahideen-e Enqelab-e Eslami)

  • Islamic Iran Solidarity Party (Hezb-e Hambastegi-e Iran-e Islami)

  • Islamic Labor Party (Hezb-e Islami Kar)

Leading Figures:

  • Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Khatami: President

  • Hojjatoleslam Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour: Former ambassador to Syria; former minister of intelligence; considered the founder of Lebanese Hezbollah

  • Mohammad Reza Khatami: Member and deputy speaker of the 6th Majlis; former publisher of IIPF’s now-banned newspaper Mosharekat (“Participation”); former deputy minister of health; former professor, Tehran University medical school; married to granddaughter of Ayatollah Khomeini

  • Saeed Hajarian: Former deputy minister of intelligence; close political adviser to President Khatami; elected member of the Tehran City Council until 2000 assassination attempt nearly cost him his life; editor of the now-banned daily Sobh-e Emrooz

  • Behzad Nabavi: Former minister of heavy industry; former vice speaker of the 6th Majlis; served as Iran’s lead negotiator during negotiations with the United States over hostage crisis; recently targeted in corruption scandal involving semiprivate oil company

  • Mohsen Mirdamadi: Member of the 6th Majlis and chairman of the Majlis National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee; former director of IIPF’s now-banned newspaper Norouz (“New Year”)


4.) Liberal opposition forces Agenda:

 

Despite government repression, a small corps of individuals and organizations have remained active opponents of the government from within Iran. Chief among these groups is the Freedom Movement, which played a leading role in the revolution and its early aftermath. Its leader, Mehdi Bazargan, resigned as head of the provisional government in 1979 to protest the seizure of the U.S. embassy.

 

The group survived as a unique and grudgingly tolerated critic of the Islamic regime but was officially banned as of July 2002. Its members remain vocal detractors of Iran’s system of religious governance through their writings and through other political organizations.

Parties and Organizations:

  • Freedom Movement of Iran (Nezhat-e Azadi-ye Iran)

  • Religious-Nationalist Alliance (Nirooha-ye Melli Mazhabi)

Leading Figures:

  • Dr. Ibrahim Yazdi: Former foreign minister in the provisional government; indicted while on an extended stay in the United States for cancer treatment and returned to Iran in April 2002 to face prosecution

  • Ezzatollah Sahabi: Son of one of the founding members of the Freedom Movement and active in the liberal opposition during the 1960s


5) Student organizations Agenda:

 

The Islamic government established student organizations as part of the cultural revolution that was promulgated during the 1980s. Today, these organizations have evolved to reflect the views of their membership, rather than inculcating regime loyalty, and are strident opponents of the Islamic regime. Many student leaders split early on from the mainstream reform movement in pressing for a more progressive agenda and a more aggressive effort to confront conservatives.

Parties and Organizations:

  • Office for Consolidation of Unity (Daftar-e Takhim-e Vahdat)

  • Union of Islamic Students (Ettehadi-ye Eslami-ye Daneshjuyan)

Leading Figures:

  • Ali Afshari: Sentenced for his participation in an April 2000 conference in Berlin and subsequently prosecuted for accusing the Revolutionary Guards of torturing him to gain a false confession

  • Ahmad Batebi: Serving a fifteen-year jail sentence for his role in the July 1999 student protests; Batebi was made famous in a photo on the cover of The Economist magazine


6) Dissident clerics

  • Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri: Designated Ayatollah Khomeini’s heir apparent in 1985, Montazeri was stripped of this post and shunned from active political life in 1989, after protesting a regime crackdown; spent years under house arrest until his release last year; Montazeri continues to inspire an active circle of adherents, who favor his emphasis on the democratic features of Iran’s Islamic system and who echo his frequent searing critiques of the regime

  • Ayatollah Jalaloddin Taheri: Former Friday prayer leader in Isfahan who resigned his position in July 2002 with a widely published appeal against the corruption and violence that had infected the senior ranks of the Islamic Republic; he also called for an end to Montazeri’s house arrest

  • Grand Ayatollah Yusef Sanei: Once a student of Ayatollah Khomeini, Sanei has been one of the most senior and outspoken proponents of a liberal interpretation of Islam; he is a member of the Council of Guardians and remains a defender of Montazeri.

  • Hojjatoleslam Mohsen Kadivar: Professor of philosophy at Tarbiat Modares University who was arrested in February 1999 for his scathing critique of the absolutist implementation of Islamic government; head of Society in Defense of Press Freedom; served eighteen months in prison

  • Hojjatoleslam Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari: Arrested and sentenced to death in connection with his participation at an April 2000 conference in Berlin; he was released in August 2002 but subsequently rearrested and sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment


7) Dissident intellectuals and journalists

  • Abbas Abdi: Former student leader (and central figure in seizure of U.S. hostages in 1979) turned liberal journalist; currently serving a four-year jail term for his role in conducting an October 2002 opinion poll that demonstrated widespread popular support for relations with the United States

  • Hashem Aghajari: Professor at Tarbiat Modarres University convicted for apostasy after a speech rejecting the notion of absolute clerical authority; his death sentence set off protests across the country and, after much high-level maneuvering, was revoked; Aghajari is currently in jail pending retrial

  • Emadeddin Baqi: Writer/journalist who has criticized the Islamic Republic from the standpoint of his seminary education; imprisoned in 2000 for “insulting Islam” and freed after serving nearly three years; Baqi was summoned again and convicted of anti-regime activities in December 2003

  • Akbar Ganji: Revolutionary bureaucrat turned writer who helped expose official complicity in the “serial murders” of dissidents; prior to the 2000 parliamentary elections he accused former President Hashemi Rafsanjani of masterminding the violence as well as prolonging the war with Iraq; arrested for participation in April 2000 conference in Berlin and sentenced to ten years in jail

  • Mohsen Sazegara: Prominent dissident journalist who was one of the early critics of the timidity of President Khatami and the reformists generally; arrested in connection with June 2003 student protests and released on health concerns after a hunger strike; his conviction was recently upheld

  • Mashallah Shamsolvaezin: Edited a string of daring reformist newspapers, reopening under a new name within days of judicial closures of each publication; jailed in 2000 for criticism of the Iranian policy of capital punishment and released after seventeen months in prison, he was recently summoned again by the judiciary for his articles on the parliamentary elections crisis

  • Abdolkarim Soroush: Once a leading agent of Iran’s post-revolutionary cultural revolution, Soroush has been dubbed the “Iranian Martin Luther” for his writings on Islamic interpretation, which reject the notion of religion as ideology; he has argued that Islam and democracy are fully compatible; Soroush was targeted in the mid-1990s by hard-line thugs


8) External opposition forces

  • Mojahideen-e Khalq Organization

    The MKO is a left-wing group, established in the 1960s, that initially supported the Islamic Republic and had a long history of working with clerical groups and leaders who opposed the shah. After the revolution, the MKO and clerics clashed violently, and Mojahideen leaders fled to conduct a resistance in exile. Their collaboration with Saddam Hussein throughout the Iran-Iraq War means that the group retains little if any viability as an alternative political movement among Iranians. The MKO and its political arm, the National Council of Resistance, were added to the

    U.S. State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations in 1997. Four thousand MKO members in Iraq have been officially “detained” in their camps by U.S. occupying forces, although how their situation will be ultimately handled remains uncertain.
     

  • Reza Pahlavi

    The son of the late shah has become more politically active in recent years, and he has been embraced by some U.S. policymakers and by a sizable minority of Iranian-Americans as a potential “catalyst” for democratic change. Nostalgia for what are now considered the halcyon days of the shah extends to the Islamic Republic, but some there question Pahlavi’s ambitions and consider him too long removed from the country to offer any prospect of leadership.
     

  • Exiled student dissidents

    Since the violent demonstrations of July 1999 and June 2003, some students have fled and mobilized to oppose the regime in exile. Aryo Pirouznia and his group, the Student Committee for Coordination of Democracy in Iran, are frequently quoted—but it is unclear to what extent they remain networked to Iran’s student leadership.
     

  • Other opposition organizations

    Many small political organizations have emerged in recent years to promote political change in Iran, some as outgrowths of liberal opposition movements from the prerevolutionary period. Few appear able to sustain significant membership or activities, either abroad or in Iran, despite laudable agendas.
     

  • Satellite television

    Without powerful expatriate organizations, the most effective link among Iranians abroad and those still in the country is the medium of satellite television. Programs actively encourage anti- regime activities. They are popular in the United States and in Iran, but many dissidents within the country deride their agitation as emanating from “armchair revolutionaries.”

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SELECTED REPORTS OF INDEPENDENT TASK FORCES SPONSORED BY THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

  • Renewing the Atlantic Partnership (2004) Henry A. Kissinger and Lawrence H. Summers, Co-Chairs; Charles A. Kupchan, Project Director

  • Nonlethal Weapons and Capabilities (2004) Graham T. Allison and Paul X. Kelley, Co-Chairs; Richard L. Garwin, Project Director

  • New Priorities in South Asia: U.S. Policy Toward India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (2003) Frank G. Wisner II, Nicholas Platt, and Marshall M. Bouton, Co-Chairs; Dennis Kux and Mahnaz Ispahani, Project Co-Directors; Cosponsored with the Asia Society

  • Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy (2003) Peter G. Peterson, Chair; Jennifer Sieg, Project Director

  • Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared (2003) Warren B. Rudman, Chair; Richard A. Clarke, Senior Adviser; Jamie F. Metzl, Project Director

  • Burma: Time for Change (2003) Mathea Falco, Chair

  • Meeting the North Korean Nuclear Challenge (2003) Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, Co-Chairs; Eric Heginbotham, Project Director

  • Chinese Military Power (2003) Harold Brown, Chair; Joseph W. Prueher, Vice Chair; Adam Segal, Project Director

  • Iraq: The Day After (2003) Thomas R. Pickering and James R. Schlesinger, Co-Chairs; Eric P. Schwartz, Project Director

  • Threats to Democracy (2002) Madeleine K. Albright and Bronislaw Geremek, Co-Chairs; Morton H. Halperin, Project Director; Elizabeth Frawley Bagley, Associate Director

  • America—Still Unprepared, Still in Danger (2002) Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, Co-Chairs; Stephen Flynn, Project Director

  • Terrorist Financing (2002) Maurice R. Greenberg, Chair; William F. Wechsler and Lee S. Wolosky, Project Co-Directors

  • Enhancing U.S. Leadership at the United Nations (2002) David Dreier and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs; Lee Feinstein and Adrian Karatnycky, Project Co-Directors

  • Testing North Korea: The Next Stage in U.S. and ROK Policy (2001) Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, Co-Chairs; Robert A. Manning, Project Director

  • The United States and Southeast Asia: A Policy Agenda for the New Administration (2001) J. Robert Kerrey, Chair; Robert A. Manning, Project Director

  • Strategic Energy Policy: Challenges for the 21st Century (2001) Edward L. Morse, Chair; Amy Myers Jaffe, Project Director

  • State Department Reform (2001) Frank C. Carlucci, Chair; Ian J. Brzezinski, Project Coordinator; Cosponsored with the Center for Strategic and International Studies

  • U.S.-Cuban Relations in the 21st Century: A Follow-on Report (2001) Bernard W. Aronson and William D. Rogers, Co-Chairs; Julia Sweig and Walter Mead, Project Directors

  • A Letter to the President and a Memorandum on U.S. Policy Toward Brazil (2001) Stephen Robert, Chair; Kenneth Maxwell, Project Director

  • Toward Greater Peace and Security in Colombia (2000) Bob Graham and Brent Scowcroft, Co-Chairs; Michael Shifter, Project Director; Cosponsored with the Inter-American Dialogue

  • Future Directions for U.S. Economic Policy Toward Japan (2000) Laura D’Andrea Tyson, Chair; M. Diana Helweg Newton, Project Director

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