"NSSM 200 - Dr. Henry Kissinger's Malthusian study for population control. |
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National
Security Study Memorandum 200
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
April 24, 1974
National
Security Study Memorandum 200 --------------------------------------
TO:
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Deputy Secretary of State
Administrator, Agency for International Development
SUBJECT:
Implications of Worldwide Population Growth for U.S.
Security and Overseas Interests
The
President has directed a study of the impact of world population growth
on U.S. security and overseas interests.
The study should look forward
at least until the year 2000, and use several alternative reasonable
projections of population growth.
In
terms of each projection, the study should assess:
- the corresponding pace of development, especially in poorer
countries;
- the demand for US exports, especially of food, and the trade
problems the US may face arising from competition for re-
sources; and
- the likelihood that population growth or imbalances will
produce disruptive foreign policies and international
instability.
The
study should focus on the international political and economic implications
of population growth rather than its ecological, socio- logical
or other aspects.
The
study would then offer possible courses of action for the United States
in dealing with population matters abroad, particularly in developing
countries, with special attention to these questions:
- What, if any, new initiatives by the United States are needed
to focus international attention on the population problem?
- Can technological innovations or development reduce
growth or ameliorate its effects?
- Could the United States improve its assistance in the
population
field and if so, in what form and through which agencies --
bilateral, multilateral, private?
The
study should take into account the President's concern that population
policy is a human concern intimately related to the dignity
of the individual and the objective of the United States is to work
closely with others, rather than seek to impose our views on others.
The
President has directed that the study be accomplished by the NSC
Under Secretaries Committee. The
Chairman, Under Secretaries Committee,
is requested to forward the study together with the Committee's
action recommendations no later than May 29, 1974
for consideration by the President.
HENRY A. KISSINGER
cc:
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
NSSM 200:
IMPLICATIONS OF WORLDWIDE POPULATION GROWTH
FOR U.S. SECURITY AND OVERSEAS INTERESTS
December 10, 1974
CLASSIFIED BY Harry C. Blaney, III
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 AUTOMATICALLY DOWN-
GRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED
ON DECEMBER 31, 1980.
This
document can only be declassified by the White House. ----------------------------------------------------------
Declassified/Released on
7/3/89
-----------
under provisions of E.O. 12356
by F. Graboske, National Security Council EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 1.
World Population growth since World War II is quantitatively and
qualitatively different from any previous epoch in human history. The
rapid reduction in death rates, unmatched by corresponding birth rate
reductions, has brought total growth rates close to 2 percent a year,
compared with about 1 percent before World War II, under 0.5 percent
in 1750-1900, and far lower rates before 1750. The effect is to double
the world's population in 35 years instead of 100 years. Almost 80
million are now being added each year, compared with 10 million in
1900. 2. The
second new feature of population trends is the sharp differentiation
between rich and poor countries. Since 1950, population in the former
group has been growing at 0 to 1.5 percent per year, and in the latter
at 2.0 to 3.5 percent (doubling in 20 to 35 years). Some of the
highest rates of increase are in areas already densely populated and
with a weak resource base. 3.
Because of the momentum of population dynamics, reductions in birth
rates affect total numbers only slowly. High birth rates in the recent
past have resulted in a high proportion in the youngest age groups, so
that there will continue to be substantial population increases over
many years even if a two-child family should become the norm in the
future. Policies to reduce fertility will have their main effects on
total numbers only after several decades. However, if future numbers
are to be kept within reasonable bounds, it is urgent that measures to
reduce fertility be started and made effective in the 1970's and
1980's. Moreover, programs started now to reduce birth rates will have
short run advantages for developing countries in lowered demands on
food, health and educational and other services and in enlarged
capacity to contribute to productive investments, thus accelerating
development. 4.
U.N. estimates use the 3.6 billion population of 1970 as a base (there
are nearly 4 billion now) and project from about 6 billion to 8
billion people for the year 2000 with the U.S. medium estimate at 6.4
billion. The U.S. medium projections show a world population of 12
billion by 2075 which implies a five-fold increase in south and
southeast Asia and in Latin American and a seven-fold increase in
Africa, compared with a doubling in east Asia and a 40% increase in
the presently developed countries (see Table
I <TABLE1.html>). Most demographers, including the
U.N. and the U.S. Population Council, regard the range of 10 to 13
billion as the most likely level for world population stability, even
with intensive efforts at fertility control. (These figures assume,
that sufficient food could be produced and distributed to avoid
limitation through famines.) Adequacy
of World Food Supplies 5.
Growing populations will have a serious impact on the need for food
especially in the poorest, fastest growing LDCs. While under normal
weather conditions and assuming food production growth in line with
recent trends, total world agricultural production could expand faster
than population, there will nevertheless be serious problems in food
distribution and financing, making shortages, even at today's poor
nutrition levels, probable in many of the larger more populous LDC
regions. Even today 10 to 20 million people die each year due,
directly or indirectly, to malnutrition. Even more serious is the
consequence of major crop failures which are likely to occur from time
to time. 6. The
most serious consequence for the short and middle term is the
possibility of massive famines in certain parts of the world,
especially the poorest regions. World needs for food rise by 2-1/2
percent or more per year (making a modest allowance for improved diets
and nutrition) at a time when readily available fertilizer and
well-watered land is already largely being utilized. Therefore,
additions to food production must come mainly from higher yields.
Countries with large population growth cannot afford constantly
growing imports, but for them to raise food output steadily by 2 to 4
percent over the next generation or two is a formidable challenge.
Capital and foreign exchange requirements for intensive agriculture
are heavy, and are aggravated by energy cost increases and fertilizer
scarcities and price rises. The institutional, technical, and economic
problems of transforming traditional agriculture are also very
difficult to overcome. 7. In
addition, in some overpopulated regions, rapid population growth
presses on a fragile environment in ways that threaten longer-term
food production: through cultivation of marginal lands, overgrazing,
desertification, deforestation, and soil erosion, with consequent
destruction of land and pollution of water, rapid siltation of
reservoirs, and impairment of inland and coastal fisheries. Minerals
and Fuel 8.
Rapid population growth is not in itself a major factor in pressure on
depletable resources (fossil fuels and other minerals), since demand
for them depends more on levels of industrial output than on numbers
of people. On the other hand, the world is increasingly dependent on
mineral supplies from developing countries, and if rapid population
frustrates their prospects for economic development and social
progress, the resulting instability may undermine the conditions for
expanded output and sustained flows of such resources. 9.
There will be serious problems for some of the poorest LDCs with rapid
population growth. They will increasingly find it difficult to pay for
needed raw materials and energy. Fertilizer, vital for their own
agricultural production, will be difficult to obtain for the next few
years. Imports for fuel and other materials will cause grave problems
which could impinge on the U.S., both through the need to supply
greater financial support and in LDC efforts to obtain better terms of
trade through higher prices for exports. Economic
Development and Population Growth 10.
Rapid population growth creates a severe drag on rates of economic
development otherwise attainable, sometimes to the point of preventing
any increase in per capita incomes. In addition to the overall impact
on per capita incomes, rapid population growth seriously affects a
vast range of other aspects of the quality of life important to social
and economic progress in the LDCs. 11.
Adverse economic factors which generally result from rapid population
growth include:
·
reduced family savings and domestic investment;
·
increased need for large amounts of foreign exchange for food imports;
·
intensification of severe unemployment and underemployment;
·
the need for large expenditures for services such as dependency support,
education, and health which would be used for more productive
investment;
·
the concentration of developmental resources on increasing food
production to ensure survival for a larger population, rather than on
improving living conditions for smaller total numbers. 12.
While GNP increased per annum at an average rate of 5 percent in LDCs
over the last decade, the population increase of 2.5 percent reduced
the average annual per capita growth rate to only 2.5 percent. In many
heavily populated areas this rate was 2 percent or less. In the LDCs
hardest hit by the oil crisis, with an aggregate population of 800
million, GNP increases may be reduced to less than 1 percent per
capita per year for the remainder of the 1970's. For the poorest half
of the populations of these countries, with average incomes of less
than $100, the prospect is for no growth or retrogression for this
period. 13. If
significant progress can be made in slowing population growth, the
positive impact on growth of GNP and per capita income will be
significant. Moreover, economic and social progress will probably
contribute further to the decline in fertility rates. 14.
High birth rates appear to stem primarily from: a. inadequate information about and availability of means of fertility
control; b. inadequate motivation for reduced numbers of children combined with
motivation for many children resulting from still high infant and
child mortality and need for support in old age; and c. the slowness of change in family preferences in response to changes in
environment. 15.
The universal objective of increasing the world's standard of living
dictates that economic growth outpace population growth. In many high
population growth areas of the world, the largest proportion of GNP is
consumed, with only a small amount saved. Thus, a small proportion of
GNP is available for investment -- the "engine" of economic
growth. Most experts agree that, with fairly constant costs per
acceptor, expenditures on effective family planning services are
generally one of the most cost effective investments for an LDC
country seeking to improve overall welfare and per capita economic
growth. We cannot wait for overall modernization and development to
produce lower fertility rates naturally since this will undoubtedly
take many decades in most developing countries, during which time
rapid population growth will tend to slow development and widen even
more the gap between rich and poor. 16.
The interrelationships between development and population growth are
complex and not wholly understood. Certain aspects of economic
development and modernization appear to be more directly related to
lower birth rates than others. Thus certain development programs may
bring a faster demographic transition to lower fertility rates than
other aspects of development. The World Population Plan of Action
adopted at the World Population Conference recommends that countries
working to affect fertility levels should give priority to development
programs and health and education strategies which have a decisive
effect on fertility. International cooperation should give priority to
assisting such national efforts. These programs include: (a) improved
health care and nutrition to reduce child mortality, (b) education and
improved social status for women; (c) increased female employment; (d)
improved old-age security; and (e) assistance for the rural poor, who
generally have the highest fertility, with actions to redistribute
income and resources including providing privately owned farms.
However, one cannot proceed simply from identification of
relationships to specific large-scale operational programs. For
example, we do not yet know of cost-effective ways to encourage
increased female employment, particularly if we are concerned about
not adding to male unemployment. We do not yet know what specific
packages of programs will be most cost effective in many situations. 17.
There is need for more information on cost effectiveness of different
approaches on both the "supply" and the "demand"
side of the picture. On the supply side, intense efforts are required
to assure full availability by 1980 of birth control information and
means to all fertile individuals, especially in rural areas.
Improvement is also needed in methods of birth control most acceptable
and useable by the rural poor. On the demand side, further
experimentation and implementation action projects and programs are
needed. In particular, more research is needed on the motivation of
the poorest who often have the highest fertility rates. Assistance
programs must be more precisely targeted to this group than in the
past. 18. It
may well be that desired family size will not decline to near
replacement levels until the lot of the LDC rural poor improves to the
extent that the benefits of reducing family size appear to them to
outweigh the costs. For urban people, a rapidly growing element in the
LDCs, the liabilities of having too many children are already becoming
apparent. Aid recipients and donors must also emphasize development
and improvements in the quality of life of the poor, if significant
progress is to be made in controlling population growth. Although it
was adopted primarily for other reasons, the new emphasis of AID's
legislation on problems of the poor (which is echoed in comparable
changes in policy emphasis by other donors and by an increasing number
of LDC's) is directly relevant to the conditions required for
fertility reduction. Political
Effects of Population Factors 19.
The political consequences of current population factors in the LDCs
-- rapid growth, internal migration, high percentages of young people,
slow improvement in living standards, urban concentrations, and
pressures for foreign migration -- are damaging to the internal
stability and international relations of countries in whose
advancement the U.S. is interested, thus creating political or even
national security problems for the U.S. In a broader sense, there is a
major risk of severe damage to world economic, political, and
ecological systems and, as these systems begin to fail, to our
humanitarian values. 20.
The pace of internal migration from countryside to over-swollen cities
is greatly intensified by rapid population growth. Enormous burdens
are placed on LDC governments for public administration, sanitation,
education, police, and other services, and urban slum dwellers (though
apparently not recent migrants) may serve as a volatile, violent force
which threatens political stability. 21.
Adverse socio-economic conditions generated by these and related
factors may contribute to high and increasing levels of child
abandonment, juvenile delinquency, chronic and growing underemployment
and unemployment, petty thievery, organized brigandry, food riots,
separatist movements, communal massacres, revolutionary actions and
counter-revolutionary coups. Such conditions also detract from the
environment needed to attract the foreign capital vital to increasing
levels of economic growth in these areas. If these conditions result
in expropriation of foreign interests, such action, from an economic
viewpoint, is not in the best interests of either the investing
country or the host government. 22. In
international relations, population factors are crucial in, and often
determinants of, violent conflicts in developing areas. Conflicts that
are regarded in primarily political terms often have demographic
roots. Recognition of these relationships appears crucial to any
understanding or prevention of such hostilities. General
Goals and Requirements for Dealing With Rapid Population Growth 23.
The central question for world population policy in the year 1974, is
whether mankind is to remain on a track toward an ultimate population
of 12 to 15 billion -- implying a five to seven-fold increase in
almost all the underdeveloped world outside of China -- or whether
(despite the momentum of population growth) it can be switched over to
the course of earliest feasible population stability -- implying
ultimate totals of 8 to 9 billions and not more than a three or
four-fold increase in any major region. 24.
What are the stakes? We do not know whether technological developments
will make it possible to feed over 8 much less 12 billion people in
the 21st century. We cannot be entirely certain that climatic changes
in the coming decade will not create great difficulties in feeding a
growing population, especially people in the LDCs who live under
increasingly marginal and more vulnerable conditions. There exists at
least the possibility that present developments point toward
Malthusian conditions for many regions of the world. 25.
But even if survival for these much larger numbers is possible, it
will in all likelihood be bare survival, with all efforts going in the
good years to provide minimum nutrition and utter dependence in the
bad years on emergency rescue efforts from the less populated and
richer countries of the world. In the shorter run -- between now and
the year 2000 -- the difference between the two courses can be some
perceptible material gain in the crowded poor regions, and some
improvement in the relative distribution of intra-country per
capita income between rich and poor, as against permanent poverty
and the widening of income gaps. A much more vigorous effort to slow
population growth can also mean a very great difference between
enormous tragedies of malnutrition and starvation as against only
serious chronic conditions. Policy
Recommendations 26.
There is no single approach which will "solve" the
population problem. The complex social and economic factors involved
call for a comprehensive strategy with both bilateral and multilateral
elements. At the same time actions and programs must be tailored to
specific countries and groups. Above all, LDCs themselves must play
the most important role to achieve success. 27.
Coordination among the bilateral donors and multilateral organizations
is vital to any effort to moderate population growth. Each kind of
effort will be needed for worldwide results. 28.
World policy and programs in the population field should incorporate
two major objectives: (a) actions to accommodate continued population growth up to 6 billions
by the mid-21st century without massive starvation or total
frustration of developmental hopes; and (b) actions to keep the ultimate level as close as possible to 8 billions
rather than permitting it to reach 10 billions, 13 billions, or more. 29.
While specific goals in this area are difficult to state, our aim
should be for the world to achieve a replacement level of fertility,
(a two-child family on the average), by about the year 2000. This will
require the present 2 percent growth rate to decline to 1.7 percent
within a decade and to 1.1 percent by 2000. Compared to the U.N medium
projection, this goal would result in 500 million fewer people in 2000
and about 3 billion fewer in 2050. Attainment of this goal will
require greatly intensified population programs. A basis for
developing national population growth control targets to achieve this
world target is contained in the World Population Plan of Action. 30.
The World Population Plan of Action is not self-enforcing and will
require vigorous efforts by interested countries, U.N. agencies and
other international bodies to make it effective. U.S. leadership is
essential. The strategy must include the following elements and
actions: (a) Concentration on key countries. Assistance for population
moderation should give primary emphasis to the largest and fastest
growing developing countries where there is special U.S. political and
strategic interest. Those countries are: India, Bangladesh, Pakistan,
Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia, Brazil, the Philippines, Thailand, Egypt,
Turkey, Ethiopia and Colombia. Together, they account for 47 percent
of the world's current population increase. (It should be recognized
that at present AID bilateral assistance to some of these countries
may not be acceptable.) Bilateral assistance, to the extent that funds
are available, will be given to other countries, considering such
factors as population growth, need for external assistance, long-term
U.S. interests and willingness to engage in self-help. Multilateral
programs must necessarily have a wider coverage and the bilateral
programs of other national donors will be shaped to their particular
interests. At the same time, the U.S. will look to the multilateral
agencies -- especially the U.N. Fund for Population Activities which
already has projects in over 80 countries -- to increase population
assistance on a broader basis with increased U.S. contributions. This
is desirable in terms of U.S. interests and necessary in political
terms in the United Nations. But progress nevertheless, must be made
in the key 13 and our limited resources should give major emphasis to
them. (b) Integration of population factors and population programs
into country development planning. As called for by the world
Population Plan of Action, developing countries and those aiding them
should specifically take population factors into account in national
planning and include population programs in such plans. (c) Increased
assistance for family planning services, information and technology.
This is a vital aspect of any world population program. (1) Family
planning information and materials based on present technology should
be made fully available as rapidly as possible to the 85% of the
populations in key LDCs not now reached, essentially rural poor who
have the highest fertility. (2) Fundamental and developmental research
should be expanded, aimed at simple, low-cost, effective, safe,
long-lasting and acceptable methods of fertility control. Support by
all federal agencies for biomedical research in this field should be
increased by $60 million annually. (d) Creating conditions
conducive to fertility decline. For its own merits and consistent
with the recommendations of the World Population Plan of Action,
priority should be given in the general aid program to selective
development policies in sectors offering the greatest promise of
increased motivation for smaller family size. In many cases pilot
programs and experimental research will be needed as guidance for
later efforts on a larger scale. The preferential sectors include:
·
Providing minimal levels of education, especially for women;
·
Reducing infant mortality, including through simple low-cost health care
networks;
·
Expanding wage employment, especially for women;
·
Developing alternatives to children as a source of old age security;
·
Increasing income of the poorest, especially in rural areas, including
providing privately owned farms;
·
Education of new generations on the desirability of smaller families. While AID has information on the relative importance of the new major
socio-economic factors that lead to lower birth rates, much more
research and experimentation need to be done to determine what cost
effective programs and policy will lead to lower birth rates. (e) Food and agricultural assistance is vital for any population
sensitive development strategy. The provision of adequate food
stocks for a growing population in times of shortage is crucial.
Without such a program for the LDCs there is considerable chance that
such shortage will lead to conflict and adversely affect population
goals and developmental efforts. Specific recommendations are included
in Section IV(c) of this study. (f) Development of a worldwide
political and popular commitment to population stabilization is
fundamental to any effective strategy. This requires the support
and commitment of key LDC leaders. This will only take place if they
clearly see the negative impact of unrestricted population growth and
believe it is possible to deal with this question through governmental
action. The U.S. should encourage LDC leaders to take the lead in
advancing family planning and population stabilization both within
multilateral organizations and through bilateral contacts with other
LDCs. This will require that the President and the Secretary of State
treat the subject of population growth control as a matter of
paramount importance and address it specifically in their regular
contacts with leaders of other governments, particularly LDCs. 31.
The World Population Plan of Action and the resolutions adopted by
consensus by 137 nations at the August 1974 U.N. World Population
Conference, though not ideal, provide an excellent framework for
developing a worldwide system of population/family planning programs.
We should use them to generate U.N. agency and national leadership for
an all-out effort to lower growth rates. Constructive action by the
U.S. will further our objectives. To this end we should: (a) Strongly support the World Population Plan of Action and the adoption
of its appropriate provisions in national and other programs. (b) Urge
the adoption by national programs of specific population goals
including replacement levels of fertility for DCs and LDCs by 2000.
(c) After suitable preparation in the U.S., announce a U.S. goal to
maintain our present national average fertility no higher than
replacement level and attain near stability by 2000. (d) Initiate an
international cooperative strategy of national research programs on
human reproduction and fertility control covering biomedical and
socio-economic factors, as proposed by the U.S. Delegation at
Bucharest. (e) Act on our offer at Bucharest to collaborate with other
interested donors and U.N. agencies to aid selected countries to
develop low cost preventive health and family planning services. (f)
Work directly with donor countries and through the U.N. Fund for
Population Activities and the OECD/DAC to increase bilateral and
multilateral assistance for population programs. 32. As
measures to increase understanding of population factors by LDC
leaders and to strengthen population planning in national development
plans, we should carry out the recommendations in Part II, Section VI,
including: (a) Consideration of population factors and population policies in all
Country Assistance Strategy Papers (CASP) and Development Assistance
Program (DAP) multi-year strategy papers. (b) Prepare projections of population growth individualized for countries
with analyses of development of each country and discuss them with
national leaders. (c) Provide for greatly increased training programs for senior officials
of LDCs in the elements of demographic economics. (d) Arrange for familiarization programs at U.N. Headquarters in New York
for ministers of governments, senior policy level officials and
comparably influential leaders from private life. (e) Assure assistance to LDC leaders in integrating population factors in
national plans, particularly as they relate to health services,
education, agricultural resources and development, employment,
equitable distribution of income and social stability. (f) Also assure assistance to LDC leaders in relating population policies
and family planning programs to major sectors of development: health,
nutrition, agriculture, education, social services, organized labor,
women's activities, and community development. (g) Undertake initiatives to implement the Percy Amendment regarding
improvement in the status of women. (h) Give emphasis in assistance to programs on development of rural
areas. Beyond
these activities which are essentially directed at national interests,
we must assure that a broader educational concept is developed to
convey an acute understanding to national leaders of the interrelation
of national interests and world population growth. 33. We
must take care that our activities should not give the appearance to
the LDCs of an industrialized country policy directed against
the LDCs. Caution must be taken that in any approaches in this field
we support in the LDCs are ones we can support within this country.
"Third World" leaders should be in the forefront and obtain
the credit for successful programs. In this context it is important to
demonstrate to LDC leaders that such family planning programs have
worked and can work within a reasonable period of time. 34. To
help assure others of our intentions we should indicate our emphasis
on the right of individuals and couples to determine freely and
responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have
information, education and means to do so, and our continued interest
in improving the overall general welfare. We should use the authority
provided by the World Population Plan of Action to advance the
principles that 1) responsibility in parenthood includes
responsibility to the children and the community and 2) that nations
in exercising their sovereignty to set population policies should take
into account the welfare of their neighbors and the world. To
strengthen the worldwide approach, family planning programs should be
supported by multilateral organizations wherever they can provide the
most efficient means. 35. To
support such family planning and related development assistance
efforts there is need to increase public and leadership information in
this field. We recommend increased emphasis on mass media, newer
communications technology and other population education and
motivation programs by the UN and USIA. Higher priority should be
given to these information programs in this field worldwide. 36. In
order to provide the necessary resources and leadership, support by
the U.S. public and Congress will be necessary. A significant amount
of funds will be required for a number of years. High level personal
contact by the Secretary of State and other officials on the subject
at an early date with Congressional counterparts is needed. A program
for this purpose should be developed by OES with H and AID. 37.
There is an alternate view which holds that a growing number of
experts believe that the population situation is already more serious
and less amenable to solution through voluntary measures than is
generally accepted. It holds that, to prevent even more widespread
food shortage and other demographic catastrophes than are generally
anticipated, even stronger measures are required and some fundamental,
very difficult moral issues need to be addressed. These include, for
example, our own consumption patterns, mandatory programs, tight
control of our food resources. In view of the seriousness of these
issues, explicit consideration of them should begin in the Executive
Branch, the Congress and the U.N. soon. (See the end of Section I for
this viewpoint.) 38.
Implementing the actions discussed above (in paragraphs 1-36), will
require a significant expansion in AID funds for population/family
planning. A number of major actions in the area of creating conditions
for fertility decline can be funded from resources available to the
sectors in question (e.g., education, agriculture). Other actions,
including family planning services, research and experimental
activities on factors affecting fertility, come under population
funds. We recommend increases in AID budget requests to the Congress
on the order of $35-50 million annually through FY 1980 (above the
$137.5 million requested for FY 1975). This funding would cover both
bilateral programs and contributions to multilateral organizations.
However, the level of funds needed in the future could change
significantly, depending on such factors as major breakthroughs in
fertility control technologies and LDC receptivities to population
assistance. To help develop, monitor, and evaluate the expanded
actions discussed above, AID is likely to need additional direct hire
personnel in the population/family planning area. As a corollary to
expanded AID funding levels for population, efforts must be made to
encourage increased contributions by other donors and recipient
countries to help reduce rapid population growth. Policy
Follow-up and Coordination 39.
This world wide population strategy involves very complex and
difficult questions. Its implementation will require very careful
coordination and specific application in individual circumstances.
Further work is greatly needed in examining the mix of our assistance
strategy and its most efficient application. A number of agencies are
interested and involved. Given this, there appears to be a need for a
better and higher level mechanism to refine and develop policy in this
field and to coordinate its implementation beyond this NSSM. The
following options are suggested for consideration: (a) That the NSC
Under Secretaries Committee be given responsibility for policy and
executive review of this subject: Pros:
·
Because of the major foreign policy implications of the recommended
population strategy a high level focus on policy is required for the
success of such a major effort.
·
With the very wide agency interests in this topic there is need for an
accepted and normal interagency process for effective analysis and
disinterested policy development and implementation within the N.S.C.
system.
·
Staffing support for implementation of the NSSM-200 follow-on exists
within the USC framework including utilization of the Office of
Population of the Department of State as well as other.
·
USC has provided coordination and follow-up in major foreign policy areas
involving a number of agencies as is the case in this study. Cons:
·
The USC would not be within the normal policy-making framework for
development policy as would be in the case with the DCC.
·
The USC is further removed from the process of budget development and
review of the AID Population Assistance program. (b)
That when its establishment is authorized by the President, the
Development Coordination Committee, headed by the AID Administrator be
given overall responsibility:* Pros:
(Provided by AID)
·
It is precisely for coordination of this type of development issue
involving a variety of U.S. policies toward LDCs that the Congress
directed the establishment of the DCC.
·
The DCC is also the body best able to relate population issues to other
development issues, with which they are intimately related.
·
The DCC has the advantage of stressing technical and financial aspects of
U.S. population policies, thereby minimizing political complications
frequently inherent in population programs.
·
It is, in AID's view, the coordinating body best located to take an
overview of all the population activities now taking place under
bilateral and multilateral auspices. Cons:
·
While the DCC will doubtless have substantial technical competence, the
entire range of political and other factors bearing on our global
population strategy might be more effectively considered by a group
having a broader focus than the DCC.
·
The DCC is not within the N.S.C. system which provides a more direct
access to both the President and the principal foreign policy
decision-making mechanism.
·
The DCC might overly emphasize purely developmental aspects of population
and under emphasize other important elements. (c) That
the NSC/CIEP be asked to lead an Interdepartmental Group for this
subject to insure follow-up interagency coordination, and further
policy development. (No participating Agency supports this option,
therefore it is only included to present a full range of
possibilities). Option (a) is supported by State, Treasury, Option
(b) is supported by AID. Under
any of the above options, there should be an annual review of our
population policy to examine progress, insure our programs are in
keeping with the latest information in this field, identify possible
deficiencies, and recommend additional action at the appropriate
level.***
**
Department of Commerce supports the option of placing the population
policy formulation mechanism under the auspices of the USC but
believes that any detailed economic questions resulting from proposed
population policies be explored through existing domestic and
international economic policy channels. ***
AID believes these reviews undertaken only periodically might look at
selected areas or at the entire range of population policy depending
on problems and needs which arise. Introduction
The
present world population growth is unique. Rates of increase are much
higher than in earlier centuries, they are more widespread, and have a
greater effect on economic life, social justice, and -- quite likely
-- on public order and political stability. The significance of
population growth is enhanced because it comes at a time when the
absolute size and rate of increase of the global economy, need for
agricultural land, demand for and consumption of resources including
water, production of wastes and pollution have also escalated to
historically unique levels. Factors that only a short time ago were
considered separately now have interlocking relationships,
inter-dependence in a literal sense. The changes are not only
quantitatively greater than in the past but qualitatively different.
The growing burden is not only on resources but on administrative and
social institutions as well. Population
growth is, of course, only one of the important factors in this new,
highly integrated tangle of relationships. However, it differs from
the others because it is a determinant of the demand sector while
others relate to output and supply. (Population growth also
contributes to supply through provision of manpower; in most
developing countries, however, the problem is not a lack of but a
surfeit of hands.) It is, therefore, most pervasive, affecting what
needs to be done in regard to other factors. Whether other problems
can be solved depends, in varying degrees, on the extent to which
rapid population growth and other population variables can be brought
under control. Highlights of Current Demographic Trends Since 1950,
world population has been undergoing unprecedented growth. This growth
has four prominent features: 1. It
is unique, far more rapid than ever in history. 2. It
is much more rapid in less developed than in developed regions. 3.
Concentration in towns and cities is increasing much more rapidly than
overall population growth and is far more rapid in LDCs than in
developed countries. 4. It has a tremendous built-in momentum that
will inexorably double populations of most less developed countries by
2000 and will treble or quadruple their populations before leveling
off -- unless far greater efforts at fertility control are made than
are being made. Therefore,
if a country wants to influence its total numbers through population
policy, it must act in the immediate future in order to make a
substantial difference in the long run. For
most of man's history, world population grew very slowly. At the rate
of growth estimated for the first 18 centuries A.D., it required more
than 1,000 years for world population to double in size. With the
beginnings of the industrial revolution and of modern medicine and
sanitation over two hundred years ago, population growth rates began
to accelerate. At the current growth rate (1.9 percent) world
population will double in 37 years.
·
By about 1830, world population reached 1 billion. The second billion was
added in about 100 years by 1930. The third billion in 30 years by
1960. The fourth will be reached in 1975.
·
Between 1750-1800 less than 4 million were being added, on the average,
to the earth's population each year. Between 1850-1900, it was close
to 8 million. By 1950 it had grown to 40 million. By 1975 it will be
about 80 million. In the
developed countries of Europe, growth rates in the last century rarely
exceeded 1.0-1.2 percent per year, almost never 1.5 percent. Death
rates were much higher than in most LDCs today. In North America where
growth rates were higher, immigration made a significant contribution.
In nearly every country of Europe, growth rates are now below 1
percent, in many below 0.5 percent. The natural growth rate (births
minus deaths) in the United States is less than 0.6 percent. Including
immigration (the world's highest) it is less than 0.7 percent. In
less developed countries growth rates average about 2.4 percent. For
the People's Republic of China, with a massive, enforced birth control
program, the growth rate is estimated at under 2 percent. India's is
variously estimated from 2.2 percent, Brazil at 2.8 percent, Mexico at
3.4 percent, and Latin America at about 2.9 percent. African
countries, with high birth as well as high death rates, average 2.6
percent; this growth rate will increase as death rates go down. The
world's population is now about 3.9 billion; 1.1 billion in the
developed countries (30 percent) and 2.8 billion in the less developed
countries (70 percent). In
1950, only 28 percent of the world's population or 692 million, lived
in urban localities. Between 1950 and 1970, urban population expanded
at a rate twice as rapid as the rate of growth of total population. In
1970, urban population increased to 36 percent of world total and
numbered 1.3 billion. By 2000, according to the UN's medium variant
projection, 3.2 billion (about half of the total) of world inhabitants
will live in cities and towns. In
developed countries, the urban population varies from 45 to 85
percent; in LDCs, it varies from close to zero in some African states
to nearly 100 percent in Hong Kong and Singapore. In
LDCs, urban population is projected to more than triple in the
remainder of this century, from 622 million in 1970 to 2,087 in 2000.
Its proportion in total LDC population will thus increase from 25
percent in 1970 to 41 percent in 2000. This implies that by the end of
this century LDCs will reach half the level of urbanization projected
for DCs (82 percent) (See Table I
<TABLE-I.html>). The
enormous built-in momentum of population growth in the less
developed countries (and to a degree in the developed countries) is,
if possible, even more important and ominous than current population
size and rates of growth. Unlike a conventional explosion, population
growth provides a continuing chain reaction. This momentum springs
from (1) high fertility levels of LDC populations and (2) the very
high percentage of maturing young people in populations. The typical
developed country, Sweden for example, may have 25% of the population
under 15 years of age. The typical developing country has 41% to 45%
or its population under 15. This means that a tremendous number of
future parents, compared to existing parents, are already born. Even
if they have fewer children per family than their parents, the
increase in population will be very great. Three
projections (not predictions), based on three different
assumptions concerning fertility, will illustrate the generative
effect of this building momentum. a. Present
fertility continued: If present fertility rates were to remain
constant, the 1974 population 3.9 billion would increase to 7.8
billion by the hear 2000 and rise to a theoretical 103 billion
by 2075. b. U.N.
"Medium Variant": If present birth rates in the
developing countries, averaging about 38/1000 were further reduced to
29/1000 by 2000, the world's population in 2000 would be 6.4 billion,
with over 100 million being added each year. At the time stability
(non-growth) is reached in about 2100, world population would exceed
12.0 billion. c. Replacement
Fertility by 2000: If replacement levels of fertility were reached
by 2000, the world's population in 2000 would be 5.9 billion and at
the time of stability, about 2075, would be 8.4 billion.
("Replacement level" of fertility is not zero
population growth. It is the level of fertility when couples are
limiting their families to an average of about two children. For most
countries, where there are high percentages of young people, even the
attainment of replacement levels of fertility means that the
population will continue to grow for additional 50-60 years to much
higher numbers before leveling off.) It is
reasonable to assume that projection (a) is unreal since significant
efforts are already being made to slow population growth and because
even the most extreme pro-natalists do not argue that the earth could
or should support 103 billion people. Famine, pestilence, war, or
birth control will stop population growth far short of this figure. The
U.N. medium variant (projection (b) has been described in a
publication of the U.N. Population Division as "a synthesis of
the results of efforts by demographers of the various countries and
the U.N. Secretariat to formulate realistic assumptions with regard to
future trends, in view of information about present conditions and
past experiences." Although by no means infallible, these
projections provide plausible working numbers and are used by U.N.
agencies (e.g., FAO, ILO) for their specialized analyses. One major
shortcoming of most projections, however, is that "information
about present conditions" quoted above is not quite up-to-date.
Even in the United States, refined fertility and mortality rates
become available only after a delay of several years. Thus,
it is possible that the rate of world population growth has actually
fallen below (or for that matter increased from) that assumed under
the U.N. medium variant. A number of less developed countries with
rising living levels (particularly with increasing equality of income)
and efficient family planning programs have experienced marked
declines in fertility. Where access to family planning services has
been restricted, fertility levels can be expected to show little
change. It is
certain that fertility rates have already fallen significantly in Hong
King, Singapore, Taiwan, Fiji, South Korea, Barbados, Chile, Costa
Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Mauritius (See Table
1 <TABLE1.html>). Moderate declines have also been
registered in West Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Egypt. Steady increases in
the number of acceptors at family planning facilities indicate a
likelihood of some fertility reduction in Thailand, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Colombia, and other countries which have family planning
programs. On the other hand, there is little concrete evidence of
significant fertility reduction in the populous countries of India,
Bangladesh, Pakistan, etc.<nssmnotes.html>
Projection
(c) is attainable if countries recognize the gravity of their
population situation and make a serious effort to do something about
it. The
differences in the size of total population projected under the three
variants become substantial in a relatively short time. By
1985,
the medium variant projects some 342 million fewer people than the
constant fertility variant and the replacement variant is 75 million
lower than the medium variant. By
the year 2000 the difference between constant and medium fertility variants rises to
1.4 billion and between the medium and replacement variants, close to
500 million. By the year 2000, the span between the high and low
series -- some 1.9 billion -- would amount to almost half the present
world population. Most
importantly, perhaps, by 2075 the constant variant would have
swamped the earth and the difference between the medium and
replacement variants would amount to 3.7 billion. (Table
2 <TABLE2.html>.) The significance of the alternative
variants is that they reflect the difference between a manageable
situation and potential chaos with widespread starvation, disease, and
disintegration for many countries. Furthermore,
after replacement level fertility is reached, family size need not
remain at an average of two children per family. Once this level is
attained, it is possible that fertility will continue to decline below
replacement level. This would hasten the time when a stationary
population is reached and would increase the difference between the
projection variants. The great momentum of population growth can be
seen even more clearly in the case of a single country -- for example,
Mexico. Its 1970 population was 50 million. If its 1965-1970 fertility
were to continue, Mexico's population in 2070 would theoretically
number 2.2 billion. If its present average of 6.1 children per family
could be reduced to an average of about 2 (replacement level
fertility) by 1980-85, its population would continue to grow for about
sixty years to 110 million. If the two-child average could be reached
by 1990-95, the population would stabilize in sixty more years at
about 22 percent higher -- 134 million. If the two-child average
cannot be reached for 30 years (by 2000-05), the population at
stabilization would grow by an additional 24 percent to 167 million. Similar
illustrations for other countries are given below. As Table
3 <TABLE3.html>. indicates, alternative rates of
fertility decline would have significant impact on the size of a
country's population by 2000. They would make enormous differences in
the sizes of the stabilized populations, attained some 60 to 70 years
after replacement level fertility is reached. Therefore, it is of the
utmost urgency that governments now recognize the facts and
implications of population growth determining the ultimate population
sizes that make sense for their countries and start vigorous programs
at once to achieve their desired goals. FUTURE
GROWTH IN MAJOR REGIONS AND COUNTRIES Throughout
the projected period 1970 to 2000, less developed regions will grow
more rapidly than developed regions. The rate of growth in LDCs will
primarily depend upon the rapidity with which family planning
practices are adopted. Differences
in the growth rates of DCs and LDCs will further aggravate the
striking demographic imbalances between developed and less developed
countries. Under the U.N. medium projection variant, by the year 2000
the population of less developed countries would double, rising from
2.5 billion in 1970 to 5.0 billion (Table
4 <TABLE4.html>). In contrast, the overall growth of
the population of the developed world during the same period would
amount to about 26 percent, increasing from 1.08 to 1.37 billion.
Thus, by the year 2000 almost 80 percent of world population would
reside in regions now considered less developed and over 90 percent of
the annual increment to world population would occur there. The
paucity of reliable information on all Asian communist countries and
the highly optimistic assumptions concerning China's fertility trends
implicit in U.N. medium projections<nssmnotes.html>
argue for disaggregating the less developed countries into centrally
planned economies and countries with market economies. Such
disaggregation reflects more accurately the burden of rapidly growing
populations in most LDCs. As Table
4 <TABLE4.html>. shows, the population of countries
with centrally planned economies, comprising about 1/3 of the 1970 LDC
total, is projected to grow between 1970 and 2000 at a rate well below
the LDC average of 2.3 percent. Over the entire thirty-year period,
their growth rate averages 1.4 percent, in comparison with 2.7 percent
for other LDCs. Between 1970 and 1985, the annual rate of
growth in Asian communist LDCs is expected to average 1.6 percent and
subsequently to decline to an average of 1.2 percent between 1985
and 2000. The growth rate of LDCs with market economies, on the
other hand, remains practically the same, at 2.7 and 2.6 percent,
respectively. Thus, barring both large-scale birth control efforts
(greater than implied by the medium variant) or economic or political
upheavals, the next twenty-five years offer non-communist LDCs little
respite from the burdens of rapidly increasing humanity. Of
course, some LDCs will be able to accommodate this increase with less
difficulty than others. Moreover,
short of Draconian measures there is no possibility that any LDC
can stabilize its population at less than double its present size. For
many, stabilization will not be short of three times their present
size. NATO
and Eastern Europe. In the west, only France and Greece have a policy of
increasing population growth -- which the people are successfully
disregarding. (In a recent and significant change from traditional
positions, however, the French Assembly overwhelmingly endorsed a law
not only authorizing general availability of contraceptives but also
providing that their cost be borne by the social security system.)
Other western NATO members have no policies.<nssmnotes.html>
Most provide some or substantial family planning services. All appear
headed toward lower growth rates. In two NATO member countries (West
Germany and Luxembourg), annual numbers of deaths already exceed
births, yielding a negative natural growth rate. Romania,
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia have active policies to increase
their population growth rates -- despite the reluctance of their
people to have larger families. Within the USSR, fertility rates in
RSFSR and the republics of Ukraine, Latvia, and Estonia are below
replacement level. This situation has prevailed at least since
1969-1970 and, if continued, will eventually lead to negative
population growth in these republics. In the United States, average
fertility also fell below replacement level in the past two years
(1972 and 1973). There is a striking difference, however, in the
attitudes toward this demographic development in the two countries.
While in the United States the possibility of a stabilized
(non-growing) population is generally viewed with favor, in the USSR
there is perceptible concern over the low fertility of Slavs and Balts
(mostly by Slavs and Balts). The Soviet government, by all
indications, is studying the feasibility of increasing their sagging
birth rates. The entire matter of fertility-bolstering policies is
circumscribed by the relatively high costs of increasing fertility
(mainly through increased outlays for consumption goods and services)
and the need to avoid the appearance of ethnic discrimination between
rapidly and slowly growing nationalities. U.N.
medium projections to the year 2000 show no significant changes in the
relative demographic position of the western alliance countries as
against eastern Europe and the USSR. The population of the Warsaw Pact
countries will remain at 65 percent of the populations of NATO member
states. If Turkey is excluded, the Warsaw Pact proportion rises
somewhat from 70 percent in 1970 to 73 percent by 2000. This change is
not of an order of magnitude that in itself will have important
implications for east-west power relations. (Future growth of manpower
in NATO and Warsaw Pact nations has not been examined in this
Memorandum.) Of
greater potential political and strategic significance are prospective
changes in the populations of less developed regions both among
themselves and in relation to developed countries. Africa.
Assessment of future demographic trends in Africa is severely impeded
by lack of reliable base data on the size, composition, fertility and
mortality, and migration of much of the continent's population. With
this important limitation in mind, the population of Africa is
projected to increase from 352 million in 1970 to 834 million in 2000,
an increase of almost 2.5 times. In most African countries, population
growth rates are likely to increase appreciably before they begin to
decline. Rapid population expansion may be particularly burdensome to
the "least developed" among Africa's LDCs including --
according to the U.N. classification -- Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania,
Uganda, Upper Volta, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Burundi, Guinea, Chad,
Rwanda, Somalia, Dahomey, Lesotho, and Botswana. As a group, they
numbered 104 million in 1970 and are projected to grow at an average
rate of 3.0 percent a year, to some 250 million in 2000. This rate of
growth is based on the assumption of significant reductions in
mortality. It is questionable, however, whether economic and social
conditions in the foreseeable future will permit reductions in
mortality required to produce a 3 percent growth rate. Consequently,
the population of the "least developed" of Africa's LDCs may
fall short of the 250 million figure in 2000. African
countries endowed with rich oil and other natural resources may be in
a better economic position to cope with population expansion. Nigeria
falls into this category. Already the most populous country on the
continent, with an estimated 55 million people in 1970 (see footnote
to Table 4 <TABLE4.html>),
Nigeria's population by the end of this century is projected to number
135 million. This suggests a growing political and strategic role for
Nigeria, at least in Africa south of the Sahara. In
North Africa, Egypt's population of 33 million in 1970 is projected to
double by 2000. The large and increasing size of Egypt's population
is, and will remain for many years, an important consideration in the
formulation of many foreign and domestic policies not only of Egypt
but also of neighboring countries. Latin
America. Rapid population growth is projected for tropical South American which
includes Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia.
Brazil, with a current population of over 100 million, clearly
dominates the continent demographically; by the end of this century,
its population is projected to reach the 1974 U.S. level of about 212
million people. Rapid economic growth prospects -- if they are not
diminished by demographic overgrowth -- portend a growing power status
for Brazil in Latin America and on the world scene over the next 25
years. The
Caribbean which includes a number of countries with promising family
planning programs (Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Cuba, Barbados and
also Puerto Rico) is projected to grow at 2.2 percent a year between
1970 and 2000, a rate below the Latin American average of 2.8 percent.
Perhaps
the most significant population trend from the viewpoint of the United
States is the prospect that Mexico's population will increase from 50
million in 1970 to over 130 million by the year 2000. Even under most
optimistic conditions, in which the country's average fertility falls
to replacement level by 2000, Mexico's population is likely to exceed
100 million by the end of this century. South
Asia.
Somewhat slower rates are expected for Eastern and Middle South Asia
whose combined population of 1.03 billion in 1970 is projected to more
than double by 2000 to 2.20 billion. In the face of continued rapid
population growth (2.5 percent), the prospects for the populous Indian
subregion, which already faces staggering economic problems, are
particularly bleak. South and Southeast Asia's population will
substantially increase relative to mainland China; it appears
doubtful, however, that this will do much to enhance their relative
power position and political influence in Asia. On the contrary,
preoccupation with the growing internal economic and social problems
resulting from huge population increases may progressively reduce the
ability of the region, especially India, to play an effective regional
and world power role. Western
South Asia, demographically dominated by Turkey and seven oil-rich
states (including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait) is projected to be
one of the fastest growing LDC regions, with an annual average growth
rate of 2.9 percent between 1970 and 2000. Part of this growth will be
due to immigration, as for example, into Kuwait. The
relatively low growth rate of 1.8 percent projected for East Asian
LDCs with market economics reflects highly successful family planning
programs in Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong. The
People's Republic of China (PRC). The People's Republic of China has by far the
world's largest population and, potentially, severe problems of
population pressure, given its low standard of living and quite
intensive utilization of available farm land resources. Its last
census in 1953 recorded a population of 583 million, and PRC officials
have cited a figure as high as 830 million for 1970. The Commerce
Department's Bureau of Economic Analysis projects a slightly higher
population, reaching 920 million by 1974. The present population
growth rate is about two percent. Conclusion Rapid population growth
in less developed countries has been mounting in a social milieu of
poverty, unemployment and underemployment, low educational attainment,
widespread malnutrition, and increasing costs of food production.
These countries have accumulated a formidable "backlog" of
unfinished tasks. They include economic assimilation of some 40
percent of their people who are pressing at, but largely remain
outside the periphery of the developing economy; the amelioration of
generally low levels of living; and in addition, accommodation of
annually larger increments to the population. The accomplishment of
these tasks could be intolerably slow if the average annual growth
rate in the remainder of this century does not slow down to well below
the 2.7 percent projected, under the medium variant, for LDCs with
market economics. How rapid population growth impedes social and
economic progress is discussed in subsequent chapters. CHAPTER
II. POPULATION AND WORLD FOOD SUPPLIES Rapid
population growth and lagging food production in developing countries,
together with the sharp deterioration in the global food situation in
1972 and 1973, have raised serious concerns about the ability of the
world to feed itself adequately over the next quarter century and
beyond. As a
result of population growth, and to some extent also of increasing
affluence, world food demand has been growing at unprecedented rates.
In 1900, the annual increase in world demand for cereals was about 4
million tons. By 1950, it had risen to about 12 million tons per year.
By 1970, the annual increase in demand was 30 million tons (on
a base of over 1,200 million tons). This is roughly equivalent to the
annual wheat crop of Canada, Australia, and Argentina combined. This annual
increase in food demand is made up of a 2% annual increase in
population and a 0.5% increased demand per capita. Part of the rising
per capita demand reflects improvement in diets of some of the peoples
of the developing countries. In the less developed countries about 400
pounds of grain is available per person per year and is mostly eaten
as cereal. The average North American, however, uses nearly a ton of
grain a year, only 200 pounds directly and the rest in the form of
meat, milk, and eggs for which several pounds of cereal are required
to produce one pound of the animal product (e.g., five pounds of grain
to produce one pound of beef). During
the past two decades, LDCs have been able to keep food production
ahead of population, notwithstanding the unprecedentedly high rates of
population growth. The basic figures are summarized in the following
table: [calculated from data in USDA, The World Agricultural
Situation, March 1974]:
INDICES OF WORLD POPULATION AND FOOD PRODUCTION
(excluding Peoples Republic of China)
1954=100
+--------------------+--------------------+------------------------+
| WORLD
| DEVELOPED COUNTRIES|LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES|
| Food
|
Food |
Food
|
| production
| production |
production
|
|
|
|
|
| Popu- Per
| Popu-
Per | Popu-
Per
|
|lation Total Capita|lation Total Capita|lation
Total Capita
| +------+--------------------+--------------------+------------------------+ |
1954 | 100
100 100
| 100
100 100
| 100
100 100
| |
1973 | 144
170 119
| 124
170 138
| 159
171 107
| |
|
| |
Compound Annual Increase (%):
| |
| 1.9
2.8 0.9
| 1.1
2.8 1.7
| 2.5
2.9 0.4
| +------+--------------------+--------------------+------------------------+
General
requirements have been projected for the years 1985 and 2000, based on
the UN Medium Variant population estimates and allowing for a very
small improvement in diets in the LDCs. A
recent projection made by the Department of Agriculture indicates a
potential productive capacity more than adequate to meet world cereal
requirements (the staple food of the world) of a population of 6.4
billion in the year 2000 (medium fertility variant) at roughly current
relative prices. This
overall picture offers little cause for complacency when broken down
by geographic regions. To support only a very modest improvement in
current cereal consumption levels (from 177 kilograms per capita in
1970 to 200-206 kilograms in 2000) the projections show an alarming
increase in LDC dependency on imports. Such imports are projected to
rise from 21.4 million tons in 1970 to 102-122 million tons by the end
of the century. Cereal imports would increase to 13-15 percent of
total developing country consumption as against 8 percent in 1970. As
a group, the advanced countries cannot only meet their own needs but
will also generate a substantial surplus. For the LDCs, analyses of
food production capacity foresee the physical possibility of meeting
their needs, provided that (a) weather conditions are normal,
(b) yields per unit of area continue to improve at the rates of the
last decade, bringing the average by 1985 close to present yields in
the advanced countries, and (c) a substantially larger annual transfer
of grains can be arranged from the surplus countries (mainly North
America), either through commercial sales or through continuous and
growing food aid. The estimates of production capacity do not rely on
major new technical breakthroughs in food production methods, but they
do require the availability and application of greatly increased
quantities of fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation water, and other
inputs to modernized agriculture, together with continued
technological advances at past rates and the institutional and
administrative reforms (including vastly expanded research and
extension services) essential to the successful application of these
inputs. They also assume normal weather conditions. Substantial
political will is required in the LDCs to give the necessary priority
to food production. There
is great uncertainty whether the conditions for achieving food balance
in the LDCs can in fact be realized. Climatic changes are poorly
understood, but a persistent atmospheric cooling trend since 1940 has
been established. One respectable body of scientific opinion believes
that this portends a period of much wider annual frosts, and possibly
a long-term lowering of rainfall in the monsoon areas of Asia and
Africa. Nitrogen fertilizer will be in world short supply into the
late 1970s, at least; because of higher energy prices, it may also be
more costly in real terms than in the 1960s. Capital investments for
irrigation and infrastructure and the organizational requirements for
securing continuous improvements in agricultural yields may well be
beyond the financial and administrative capacity of many LDCs. For
some of the areas under heaviest population pressure, there is little
or no prospect for foreign exchange earnings to cover constantly
increasing imports of food. While
it is always unwise to project the recent past into the long-term
future, the experience of 1972-73 is very sobering. The coincidence of
adverse weather in many regions in 1972 brought per capita production
in the LDCs back to the level of the early 1960s. At the same time,
world food reserves (mainly American) were almost exhausted, and they
were not rebuilt during the high production year of 1973. A repetition
under these conditions of 1972 weather patterns would result in
large-scale famine of a kind not experienced for several decades -- a
kind the world thought had been permanently banished. Even
if massive famine can be averted, the most optimistic forecasts of
food production potential in the more populous LDCs show little
improvement in the presently inadequate levels and quality of
nutrition. As long as annual population growth continues at 2 to 3
percent or more, LDCs must make expanded food production the top
development priority, even though it may absorb a large fraction of
available capital and foreign exchange. Moderation
of population growth rates in the LDCs could make some difference to
food requirements by 1985, a substantial difference by 2000, and a
vast difference in the early part of the next century. From the
viewpoint of U.S. interests, such reductions in LDC food needs would
be clearly advantageous. They would not reduce American commercial
markets for food since the reduction in LDC food requirements that
would result from slowing population growth would affect only requests
for concessional or grant food assistance, not commercial sales. They
would improve the prospects for maintaining adequate world food
reserves against climatic emergencies. They would reduce the
likelihood of periodic famines in region after region, accompanied by
food riots and chronic social and political instability. They would
improve the possibilities for long-term development and integration
into a peaceful world order. Even
taking the most optimistic view of the theoretical possibilities of
producing enough foods in the developed countries to meet the
requirements of the developing countries, the problem of increased
costs to the LDCs is already extremely serious and in its future may
be insurmountable. At current prices the anticipated import
requirements of 102-122 million tons by 2000 would raise the cost of
developing countries' imports of cereals to $16-20<nssmnotes.html>
billion by that year compared with $2.5 billion in 1970. Large as they
may seem even these estimates of import requirements could be on the
low side if the developing countries are unable to achieve the
Department of Agriculture's assumed increase in the rate of growth of
production. The
FAO in its recent "Preliminary Assessment of the World Food
Situation Present and Future" has reached a similar conclusion: What
is certain is the enormity of the food import bill which might face
the developing countries . . . In addition [to cereals] the developing
countries . . . would be importing substantial amounts of other
foodstuffs. clearly the financing of international food trade on this
scale would raise very grave problems. At
least three-quarters of the projected increase in cereal imports of
developing countries would fall in the poorer countries of South Asia
and North and Central Africa. The situation in Latin America which is
projected to shift from a modest surplus to a modest deficit area is
quite different. Most of this deficit will be in Mexico and Central
America, with relatively high income and easily exploitable
transportation links to the U.S. The
problem in Latin America, therefore, appears relatively more
manageable. It
seems highly unlikely, however, that the poorer countries of Asia and
Africa will be able to finance nearly like the level of import
requirements projected by the USDA. Few of them have dynamic
export-oriented industrial sectors like Taiwan or South Korea or rich
raw material resources that will generate export earnings fast enough
to keep pace with food import needs. Accordingly, those countries
where large-scale hunger and malnutrition are already present face the
bleak prospect of little, if any, improvement in the food intake in
the years ahead barring a major foreign financial food aid program,
more rapid expansion of domestic food production, reduced population
growth or some combination of all three. Worse yet, a series of crop
disasters could transform some of them into classic Malthusian cases
with famines involving millions of people. While
foreign assistance probably will continue to be forthcoming to meet
short-term emergency situations like the threat of mass starvation, it
is more questionable whether aid donor countries will be prepared to
provide the sort of massive food aid called for by the import
projections on a long-term continuing basis. Reduced
population growth rates clearly could bring significant relief over
the longer term. Some analysts maintain that for the post-1985 period
a rapid decline in fertility will be crucial to adequate diets
worldwide. If, as noted before, fertility in the developing countries
could be made to decline to the replacement level by the year 2000,
the world's population in that year would be 5.9 billion or 500
million below the level that would be attained if the UN medium
projection were followed. Nearly all of the decline would be in the
LDCs. With such a reduction the projected import gap of 102-122
million tons per year could be eliminated while still permitting a
modest improvement in per capita consumption. While such a rapid
reduction in fertility rates in the next 30 years is an optimistic
target, it is thought by some experts that it could be obtained by
intensified efforts if its necessity were understood by world and
national leaders. Even more modest reductions could have significant
implications by 2000 and even more over time. Intensive
programs to increase food production in developing countries beyond
the levels assumed in the U.S.D.A. projections probably offer the best
prospect for some reasonably early relief, although this poses major
technical and organizational difficulties and will involve substantial
costs. It must be realized, however, that this will be difficult in
all countries and probably impossible in some -- or many. Even with
the introduction of new inputs and techniques it has not been possible
to increase agricultural output by as much as 3 percent per annum in
many of the poorer developing countries. Population growth in a number
of these countries exceeds that rate. Such a
program of increased food production would require the widespread use
of improved seed varieties, increased applications of chemical
fertilizers and pesticides over vast areas and better farm management
along with bringing new land under cultivation. It has been estimated,
for example, that with better varieties, pest control, and the
application of fertilizer on the Japanese scale, Indian rice yields
could theoretically at least, be raised two and one-half times current
levels. Here again very substantial foreign assistance for imported
materials may be required for at least the early years before the
program begins to take hold. The
problem is clear. The solutions, or at least the directions we must
travel to reach them are also generally agreed. What will be required
is a genuine commitment to a set of policies that will lead the
international community, both developed and developing countries, to
the achievement of the objectives spelled out above. CHAPTER
III - MINERALS AND FUEL Population
growth per se is not likely to impose serious constraints on
the global physical availability of fuel and non-fuel minerals to the
end of the century and beyond. This
favorable outlook on reserves does not rule out shortage situations
for specific minerals at particular times and places. Careful planning
with continued scientific and technological progress (including the
development of substitutes) should keep the problems of physical
availability within manageable proportions. The
major factor influencing the demand for non-agricultural raw materials
is the level of industrial activity, regional and global. For example,
the U.S., with 6% of the world's population, consumes about a third of
its resources. The demand for raw materials, unlike food, is not a
direct function of population growth. The current scarcities and high
prices for most such materials result mainly from the boom conditions
in all industrialized regions in the years 1972-73. The
important potential linkage between rapid population growth and
minerals availability is indirect rather than direct. It flows from
the negative effects of excessive population growth in economic
development and social progress, and therefore on internal stability,
in overcrowded under-developed countries. The United States has become
increasingly dependent on mineral imports from developing countries in
recent decades, and this trend is likely to continue. The location of
known reserves of higher-grade ores of most minerals favors increasing
dependence of all industrialized regions on imports from less
developed countries. The real problems of mineral supplies lie, not in
basic physical sufficiency, but in the politico-economic issues of
access, terms for exploration and exploitation, and division of the
benefits among producers, consumers, and host country governments. In the
extreme cases where population pressures lead to endemic famine, food
riots, and breakdown of social order, those conditions are scarcely
conducive to systematic exploration for mineral deposits or the
long-term investments required for their exploitation. Short of
famine, unless some minimum of popular aspirations for material
improvement can be satisfied, and unless the terms of access and
exploitation persuade governments and peoples that this aspect of the
international economic order has "something in it for them,"
concessions to foreign companies are likely to be expropriated or
subjected to arbitrary intervention. Whether through government
action, labor conflicts, sabotage, or civil disturbance, the smooth
flow of needed materials will be jeopardized. Although population
pressure is obviously not the only factor involved, these types of
frustrations are much less likely under conditions of slow or zero
population growth. Reserves.
Projections
made by the Department of Interior through the year 2000 for those
fuel and non-fuel minerals on which the U.S. depends heavily for
imports<nssmnotes.html>
support these conclusions on physical resources (see Annex). Proven
reserves of many of these minerals appear to be more than adequate to
meet the estimated accumulated world demand at 1972 relative prices at
least to the end of the century. While petroleum (including natural
gas), copper, zinc, and tin are probable exceptions, the extension of
economically exploitable reserves as a result of higher prices, as
well as substitution and secondary recovery for metals, should avoid
long-term supply restrictions. In many cases, the price increases that
have taken place since 1972 should be more than sufficient to bring
about the necessary extension of reserves. These
conclusions are consistent with a much more extensive study made in
1972 for the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future.<nssmnotes.html>
As
regards fossil fuels, that study foresees adequate world reserves for
at least the next quarter to half century even without major
technological breakthroughs. U.S. reserves of coal and oil shale are
adequate well into the next century, although their full exploitation
may be limited by environmental and water supply factors. Estimates of
the U.S. Geological Survey suggest recoverable oil and gas reserves
(assuming sufficiently high prices) to meet domestic demand for
another two or three decades, but there is also respectable expert
opinion supporting much lower estimates; present oil production is
below the peak of 1970 and meets only 70 percent of current demands.<nssmnotes.html>
Nevertheless, the U.S. is in a relatively strong position on fossil
fuels compared with the rest of the industrialized world, provided
that it takes the time and makes the heavy investments needed to
develop domestic alternatives to foreign sources. In the
case of the 19 non-fuel minerals studied by the Commission it was
concluded there were sufficient proven reserves of nine to meet
cumulative world needs at current relative prices through the year
2020.<nssmnotes.html> For
the ten others<nssmnotes.html>
world proven reserves were considered inadequate. However, it was
judged that moderate price increases, recycling and substitution could
bridge the estimated gap between supply and requirements. The
above projections probably understate the estimates of global
resources. "Proved Reserves," that is known supplies that
will be available at present or slightly higher relative costs 10 to
25 years from now, rarely exceed 25 years' cumulative requirements,
because industry generally is reluctant to undertake costly
exploration to meet demands which may or may not materialize in the
more distant future. Experience has shown that additional reserves are
discovered as required, at least in the case of non-fuel minerals, and
"proved reserves" have generally remained constant in
relation to consumption. The
adequacy of reserves does not of course assure that supplies will be
forthcoming in a steady stream as required. Intermediate problems may
develop as a result of business miscalculations regarding the timing
of expansion to meet requirements. With the considerable lead time
required for expanding capacity, this can result in periods of serious
shortage for certain materials and rising prices as in the recent
past. Similarly, from time to time there will be periods of
overcapacity and falling prices. Necessary technical adjustments
required for the shift to substitutes or increased recycling also may
be delayed by the required lead time or by lack of information. An
early warning system designed to flag impending surpluses and
shortages, could be very helpful in anticipating these problems. Such
a mechanism might take the form of groups of experts working with the
UN Division of Resources. Alternatively, intergovernmental commodity
study groups might be set up for the purpose of monitoring those
commodities identified as potential problem areas. Adequate
global availability of fuel and non-fuel minerals is not of much
benefit to countries who cannot afford to pay for them. Oil supplies
currently are adequate to cover world needs, but the quadrupling of
prices in the past year has created grave financial and payment
problems for developed and developing countries alike. If similar
action to raise prices were undertaken by supplies of other important
minerals, an already bad situation would be intensified. Success in
such efforts is questionable, however; there is no case in which the
quantities involved are remotely comparable to the cases of energy;
and the scope for successful price-gouging or cartel tactics is much
smaller. Although
the U.S. is relatively well off in this regard, it nonetheless depends
heavily on mineral imports from a number of sources which are not
completely safe or stable. It may therefore be necessary, especially
in the light of our recent oil experience, to keep this dependence
within bounds, in some cases by developing additional domestic
resources and more generally by acquiring stock-piles for economic as
well as national defense emergencies. There are also possible dangers
of unreasonable prices promoted by producer cartels and broader policy
questions of U.S. support for commodity agreements involving both
producers and consumers. Such matters, however, are in the domain of
commodity policy rather than population policy. At
least through the end of this century, changes in population growth
trends will make little difference to total levels of requirements for
fuel and other minerals. Those requirements are related much more
closely to levels of income and industrial output, leaving the demand
for minerals substantially unaffected. In the longer run, a lower
ultimate world population (say 8 to 9 billion rather than 12 to 16
billion) would require a lower annual input of depletable resources
directly affected by population size as well as a much lower volume of
food, forest products, textiles, and other renewable resources. Whatever
may be done to guard against interruptions of supply and to develop
domestic alternatives, the U.S. economy will require large and
increasing amounts of minerals from abroad, especially from less
developed countries.10 <nssmnotes.html>
That fact gives the U.S. enhanced interest in the political, economic,
and social stability of the supplying countries. Wherever a lessening
of population pressures through reduced birth rates can increase the
prospects for such stability, population policy becomes relevant to
resource supplies and to the economic interests of the United States. ANNEX OUTLOOK FOR RAW MATERIALS I.
Factors Affecting Raw Material Demand and Supply Some
of the key factors that must be considered in evaluating the future
raw materials situation are the stage of a country's economic
development and the responsiveness of the market to changes in the
relative prices of the raw materials. Economic
theory indicates that the pattern of consumption of raw materials
varies with the level of economic activity. Examination of the
intensity-of-use of raw materials (incremental quantity of raw
material needed to support an additional unit of GNP) show that after
a particular level of GNP is reached, the intensity of use of raw
materials starts to decline. Possible explanations for this decline
are: 1. In
industrialized countries, the services component of GNP expands
relative to the non-services components as economic growth occurs. 2.
Technological progress, on the whole, tends to lower the
intensity-of-use through greater efficiency in the use of raw
materials and development of alloys. 3.
Economic growth continues to be characterized by substitution of one
material by another and substitution of synthetics for natural
materials.11 <nssmnotes.html>
Most
developed countries have reached this point of declining
intensity-of-use.12 <nssmnotes.html>
For other countries that have not reached this stage of economic
development, their population usually goes through a stage of rapid
growth prior to industrialization. This is due to the relative ease in
the application of improved health care policies and the resulting
decline in their death rates, while birth rates remain high. Then the
country's economy does begin to industrialize and grow more rapidly,
the initial rapid rise in industrial production results in an
increasing intensity-of-use of raw materials, until industrial
production reached the level where the intensity-of-use begins to
decline. As was
discussed above, changes in the relative prices of raw materials
change the amount of economically recoverable reserves. Thus, the
relative price level, smoothness of the adjustment process, and
availability of capital for needed investment can also be expected to
significantly influence raw materials' market conditions. In addition,
technological improvement in mining and metallurgy permits lower grade
ores to be exploited without corresponding increases in costs. The
following table presents the 1972 net imports and the ratio of imports
to total demand for nine commodities. The net imports of these nine
commodities represented 99 percent of the total trade deficit in
minerals.
+--------------------------+--------------+------------------+
|
| 1972
| Ratio of Imports |
| Commodity
| Net Imports | to
Total Demand |
|
| ($Millions)* |
|
+--------------------------+--------------+------------------+
| Aluminum
| 48.38
|
.286 |
| Copper
| 206.4
|
.160 |
| Iron
| 424.5
| .049
|
| Lead
| 102.9
|
.239 |
| Nickel
| 477.1
|
.704 |
| Tin
| 220.2
|
.943 |
| Titanium
| 256.5
|
.469 |
| Zinc
| 294.8
|
.517 |
| Petroleum
| 5,494.5
|
.246 |
| (including natural gas)
|
|
|
+--------------------------+--------------+------------------+
+-------------------------------------------------------------+
| Commodity Source
& %
|
+-------------------------------------------------------------+
| Aluminum -
Canada 76%
|
| Copper
- Canada 31%, Peru 27%, Chile 22%
|
| Iron
- Canada 50%, Venezuela 31%
|
| Lead
- Canada
29%, Peru 21%, Australia 21%
|
| Nickel
- Canada 82%, Norway 8%
|
| Tin
- Malaysia 64%, Thailand 27%
|
| Titanium -
Japan 73%, USSR 19%
|
| Zinc (Ore) - Canada 60%,
Mexico 24%
|
| Zinc (Metal) - Canada 48%, Australia
10% |
| Pertroleum (crude) -
Canada 42%
|
| Petroleum (crude)
- Venezuela 17%
|
+-------------------------------------------------------------+
The
following table shows estimates of the world reserve position for
these commodities. As mentioned earlier, the quantity of economically
recoverable reserves increases with higher prices. The following
tables, based on Bureau of Mines information, provide estimates of
reserves at various prices. (All prices are in constant 1972 dollars.)
Aluminum
(Bauxite)
Price (per pound primary aluminum)
Price A
Price B Price
C Price D
.23
.29 .33
.36
Reserves (billion short tons, aluminum content)
World 3.58
3.76
4.15 5.21
U.S. .01
.02
.04
.09
Copper
Price (per pound refined copper)
.51
.60 .75
Reserves (million short tons)
World 370
418
507
U.S. 83
93
115
Gold
Price (per troy ounce)
58.60
90 100
150
Reserves (million troy ounce)
World 1,000
1,221
1,588 1,850
U.S. 82
120
200 240
Iron
Price (per short ton of primary iron contained in ore)
17.80
20.80 23.80
Reserves (billion short tons iron content)
World 96.7
129.0
206.0
U.S. 2.0
2.7
18.0
Lead
Price (per pound primary lead metal)
.15
.18 .20
Reserves (million short tons, lead content)
World 96.0
129.0
144.0
U.S. 36.0
51.0
56.0
Nickel
Price (per pound of primary metal)
1.53
1.75 2.00
2.25
Reserves (millions short tons)
World 46.2
60.5
78.0 99.5
U.S. .2
.2
.5 .5
Tin
Price (per pound primary tin metal)
1.77
2.00 2.50
3.00
Reserves (thousands of long tons - tin content)
World 4,180
5,500
7,530 9,290
U.S. 5
9
100 200
Titanium
Price (per pound titanium in pigment)
.45
.55 .60
Reserves (thousands short tons titanium content)
World 158,000 222,000
327,000
U.S. 32,400 45,000
60,000
Zinc
Price (per pound, prime western zinc delivered)
.18
.25 .30
Reserves (million short tons, zinc content)
World 131
193
260
U.S. 30
40
50
Data
necessary to quantify reserve-price relationships are not available.
For planning purposes, however, the Bureau of Mines used the rough
assumption that a 100% increase in price would increase reserves by
10%. The average 1972 U.S. price was $3.39/bbl. with proven world
reserves of 666.9 billion bbls. and U.S. reserves of 36.3 billion
barrels. Using the Bureau of Mines assumption, therefore, a doubling
in world price (a U.S. price of $6.78/bbl.) would imply world reserves
of 733.5 billion bbls. and U.S. reserves of 39.9 billion barrels. Natural
Gas:
Price (wellhead price per thousand cubic feet)
.186
.34 .44
.55
Reserves (trillion cubic feet)
World 1,156
6,130
10,240 15,599
U.S. 266
580
900 2,349 It
should be noted that these statistics represent a shift in 1972
relative prices and assume constant 1972 technology. The development
of new technology or a more dramatic shift in relative prices can have
a significant impact on the supply of economically recoverable
reserves. Aluminum is a case in point. It is the most abundant
metallic element in the earth's crust and the supply of this resource
is almost entirely determined by the price. Current demand and
technology limit economically recoverable reserves to bauxite sources.
Alternate sources of aluminum exist (e.g., alunite) and if improved
technology is developed making these alternate sources commercially
viable, supply constraints will not likely be encountered. The
above estimated reserve figures, while representing approximate orders
of magnitude, are adequate to meet projected accumulated world demand
(also very rough orders of magnitude) through the year 2000. In some
cases, modest price increases above the 1972 level may be required to
attract the necessary capital investment.
National
Security Study Memorandum 200 Chapter IV - Economic Development and Population Growth Rapid
population growth adversely affects every aspect of economic and
social progress in developing countries. It absorbs large amounts of
resources needed for more productive investment in development. It
requires greater expenditures for health, education and other social
services, particularly in urban areas. It increases the dependency
load per worker so that a high fraction of the output of the
productive age group is needed to support dependents. It reduces
family savings and domestic investment. It increases existing severe
pressures on limited agricultural land in countries where the world's
"poverty problem" is concentrated. It creates a need for use
of large amounts of scarce foreign exchange for food imports (or the
loss of food surpluses for export). Finally, it intensifies the
already severe unemployment and underemployment problems of many
developing countries where not enough productive jobs are created to
absorb the annual increments to the labor force. Even
in countries with good resource/population ratios, rapid population
growth causes problems for several reasons: First, large capital
investments generally are required to exploit unused resources.
Second, some countries already have high and growing unemployment and
lack the means to train new entrants to their labor force. Third,
there are long delays between starting effective family planning
programs and reducing fertility, and even longer delays between
reductions in fertility and population stabilization. Hence there is
substantial danger of vastly overshooting population targets if
population growth is not moderated in the near future. During
the past decade, the developing countries have raised their GNP at a
rate of 5 percent per annum as against 4.8 percent in developed
countries. But at the same time the LDCs experienced an average annual
population growth rate of 2.5 percent. Thus their per capita income
growth rate was only 2.5 percent and in some of the more highly
populated areas the increase in per capita incomes was less than 2
percent. This stands in stark contrast to 3.6 percent in the rich
countries. Moreover, the low rate means that there is very little
change in those countries whose per capita incomes are $200 or less
per annum. The problem has been further exacerbated in recent months
by the dramatic increases in oil and fertilizer prices. The World Bank
has estimated that the incomes of the 800 million inhabitants of the
countries hardest hit by the oil crisis will grow at less than 1% per
capita per year of the remainder of the 1970s. Taking account of
inequalities in income distribution, there will be well over 500
million people, with average incomes of less than $100 per capita, who
will experience either no growth or negative growth in that period. Moderation
of population growth offers benefits in terms of resources saved for
investment and/or higher per capita consumption. If resource
requirements to support fewer children are reduced and the funds now
allocated for construction of schools, houses, hospitals and other
essential facilities are invested in productive activities, the impact
on the growth of GNP and per capita income may be significant. In
addition, economic and social progress resulting from population
control will further contribute to the decline in fertility rates. The
relationship is reciprocal, and can take the form of either a vicious
or a virtuous circle. This
raises the question of how much more efficient expenditures for
population control might be than in raising production through direct
investments in additional irrigation and power projects and factories.
While most economists today do not agree with the assumptions that
went into early overly optimistic estimates of returns to population
expenditures, there is general agreement that up to the point when
cost per acceptor rises rapidly, family planning expenditures are
generally considered the best investment a country can make in its own
future. II.
Impact of Population Growth on Economic Development In
most, if not all, developing countries high fertility rates impose
substantial economic costs and restrain economic growth. The main
adverse macroeconomic effects may be analyzed in three general
categories: (1) the saving effect, (2) "child quality"
versus "child quantity", and (3) "capital
deepening" versus "capital widening." These three
categories are not mutually exclusive, but they highlight different
familial and social perspectives. In addition, there are often
longer-run adverse effects on agricultural output and the balance of
payments. (1) The
saving effect. A high fertility economy has perforce a larger
"burden of dependency" than a low fertility economy, because
a larger proportion of the population consists of children too young
to work. There are more non-working people to feed, house and rear,
and there is a smaller surplus above minimum consumption available for
savings and investment. It follows that a lower fertility rate can
free resources from consumption; if saved and invested, these
resources could contribute to economic growth. (There is much
controversy on this; empirical studies of the savings effect have
produced varying results.) (2) Child
quality versus quantity. Parents make investment decisions, in a
sense, about their children. Healthier and better-educated children
tend to be economically more productive, both as children and later as
adults. In addition to the more-or-less conscious trade-offs parents
can make about more education and better health per child, there are
certain biologic adverse effects suffered by high birth order children
such as higher mortality and limited brain growth due to higher
incidence of malnutrition. It must be emphasized, however, that
discussion of trade-offs between child quality and child quantity will
probably remain academic with regard to countries where child
mortality remains high. When parents cannot expect most children to
survive to old age, they probably will continue to
"over-compensate", using high fertility as a form of hedge
to insure that they will have some living offspring able to
support the parents in the distant future. (3) Capital
deepening versus widening. From the family's viewpoint high
fertility is likely to reduce welfare per child; for the economy one
may view high fertility as too rapid a growth in labor force relative
to capital stock. Society's capital stock includes facilities such as
schools and other educational inputs in addition to capital
investments that raise workers' outputs in agriculture and
manufacturing. For any given rate of capital accumulation, a lower
population growth rate can help increase the amount of capital and
education per worker, helping thereby to increase output and income
per capita. The problem of migration to cities and the derived demand
for urban infrastructure can also be analyzed as problems of capital
widening, which draw resources away from growth-generating
investments. In a
number of the more populous countries a fourth aspect of rapid growth
in numbers has emerged in recent years which has profound long-run
consequences. Agricultural output was able to keep pace or exceed
population growth over the many decades of population rise prior to
the middle of this century, primarily through steady expansion of
acreage under cultivation. More recently, only marginal unused land
has been available in India, Thailand, Java, Bangladesh, and other
areas. As a result (a) land holdings have declined in size, and (b)
land shortage has led to deforestation and overgrazing, with
consequent soil erosion and severe water pollution and increased urban
migration. Areas that once earned foreign exchange through the export
of food surpluses are now in deficit or face early transition to
dependence on food imports. Although the scope for raising
agricultural productivity is very great in many of these areas, the
available technologies for doing so require much higher capital costs
per acre and much larger foreign exchange outlays for
"modern" inputs (chemical fertilizer, pesticides, petroleum
fuels, etc.) than was the case with the traditional technologies. Thus
the population growth problem can be seen as an important long-run, or
structural, contributor to current LDC balance of payments problems
and to deterioration of their basic ecological infrastructure. Finally,
high fertility appears to exacerbate the maldistribution of income
which is a fundamental economic and social problem in much of the
developing world. Higher income families tend to have fewer children,
spend more on the health and education of these children, have more
wealth to pass on to these children in contrast to the several
disadvantages that face the children of the poor. The latter tend to
be more numerous, receiving less of an investment per child in their
"human capital", leaving the children with economic,
educational and social constraints similar to those which restrict the
opportunities of the parents. In short, high fertility contributes to
the intergenerational continuity of maldistributions of income and
related social and political problems. III.
The Effect of Development on Population Growth The
determinants of population growth are not well understood, especially
for low income societies. Historical data show that declining
fertility in Europe and North America has been associated with
declining mortality and increasing urbanization, and generally with
"modernization." Fertility declined substantially in the
West without the benefit of sophisticated contraceptives. This
movement from high fertility and high mortality to low fertility and
low mortality is known as the "demographic transition". In
many low income countries mortality has declined markedly since World
War II (in large part from reduction in epidemic illness and famine),
but fertility has remained high. Apart from a few pockets of low
fertility in East Asia and the Caribbean, a significant demographic
transition has not occurred in the third world. (The Chinese, however,
make remarkable claims about their success in reducing birth rates,
and qualified observers are persuaded that they have had unusual
success even though specific demographic information is lacking.) There
is considerable, incontestable evidence in many developing countries
that a larger (though not fully known) number of couples would like to
have fewer children than possible generally there -- and that there is
a large unsatisfied demand by these couples for family planning
services. It is also now widely believed that something more that
family planning services will be needed to motivate other couples to
want smaller families and all couples to want replacement levels
essential to the progress and growth of their countries. There
is also evidence, although it is not conclusive, that certain aspects
of economic development and modernization are more directly related to
lowered birth rates than others, and that selective developmental
policies may bring about a demographic transition at substantially
lower per capita income levels than in Europe, North America, and
Japan.13 <nssmnotes.html>
Such selective policies would focus on improved health care and
nutrition directed toward reduced infant and child mortality;
universal schooling and adult literacy, especially for women;
increasing the legal age of marriage; greater opportunities for female
employment in the money economy; improved old-age social security
arrangements; and agricultural modernization focussed on small
farmers. It is important that this focus be made in development
programs because, given today's high population densities, high birth
rates, and low income levels in much of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America, if the demographic transition has to await overall
development and modernization, the vicious circle of poverty, people,
and unemployment may never be broken. The
causes of high birth rates in low income societies are generally
explained in terms of three factors: a. Inadequacy
of information and means. Actual family size in many societies is
higher than desired family size owing to ignorance of acceptable birth
control methods or unavailability of birth control devices and
services. The importance of this factor is evidenced by many
sociological investigations on "desired family size" versus
actual size, and by the substantial rates of acceptance for
contraceptives when systematic family planning services are
introduced. This factor has been a basic assumption in the family
planning programs of official bilateral and multilateral programs in
many countries over the past decade. Whatever the actual weight of
this factor, which clearly varies from country to country and which
shifts with changes in economic and social conditions, there remains
without question a significant demand for family planning services. b. Inadequacy
of motivation for reduced numbers of children. Especially in the
rural areas of underdeveloped countries, which account for the major
share of today's population growth, parents often want large numbers
of children (especially boys) (i) to ensure that some will survive
against the odds of high child mortality, (ii) to provide support for
the parents in their old age, and (iii) to provide low cost farm
labor. While these elements are present among rural populace,
continued urbanization may reduce the need for sons in the longer
term. The absence of educational and employment opportunities for
young women intensifies these same motivations by encouraging early
marriage and early and frequent maternity. This factor suggests the
crucial importance of selective development policies as a means of
accelerating the reduction of fertility. c. The
"time lag". Family preferences and social institutions
that favor high fertility change slowly. Even though mortality and
economic conditions have improved significantly since World War II in
LDCs, family expectations, social norms, and parental practice are
slow to respond to these altered conditions. This factor leads to the
need for large scale programs of information, education, and
persuasion directed at lower fertility. The
three elements are undoubtedly intermixed in varying proportions in
all underdeveloped countries with high birth rates. In most LDCs, many
couples would reduce their completed family size if appropriate birth
control methods were more easily available. The extent of this
reduction, however, may still leave their completed family size at
higher than mere replacement levels -- i.e., at levels implying
continued but less rapid population growth. Many other couples would
not reduce their desired family size merely if better contraceptives
were available, either because they see large families as economically
beneficial, or because of cultural factors, or because they misread
their own economic interests. Therefore,
family planning supply (contraceptive technology and delivery systems)
and demand (the motivation for reduced fertility) would not be viewed
as mutually exclusive alternatives; they are complementary and may be
mutually reinforcing. The selected point of focus mentioned earlier --
old age security programs, maternal and child health programs,
increased female education, increasing the legal age of marriage,
financial incentives to "acceptors", personnel, -- are
important, yet better information is required as to which measures are
most cost-effective and feasible in a given situation and how their
cost-effectiveness compares to supply programs. One
additional interesting area is receiving increasing attention: the
distribution of the benefits of development. Experience in several
countries suggests that the extent to which the poor, with the highest
fertility rates, reduce their fertility will depend on the extent to
which they participate in development. In this view the average level
of economic development and the average amount of modernization are
less important determinants of population growth than is the specific
structure of development. This line of investigation suggests that
social development activities need to be more precisely targeted than
in the past to reach the lowest income people, to counteract their
desire for high fertility as a means of alleviating certain adverse
conditions. IV.
Employment and Social Problems Employment,
aside from its role in production of goods and services, is an
important source of income and of status or recognition to workers and
their families. The inability of large segments of the economically
active population in developing countries to find jobs offering a
minimum acceptable standard of living is reflected in a widening of
income disparities and a deepening sense of economic, political and
social frustration. The
most economically significant employment problems in LDCs
contributed to by excessive population growth are low worker
productivity in production of traditional goods and services produced,
the changing aspirations of the work force, the existing distribution
of income, wealth and power, and the natural resource endowment of a
country. The
political and social problems of urban overcrowding are directly
related to population growth. In addition to the still-high fertility
in urban areas of many LDC's, population pressures on the land, which
increases migration to the cities, adds to the pressures on urban job
markets and political stability, and strains, the capacity to provide
schools, health facilities, and water supplies. It
should be recognized that lower fertility will relieve only a portion
of these strains and that its most beneficial effects will be felt
only over a period of decades. Most of the potential migrants from
countryside to city over the coming 15 to 20 years have already been
born. Lower birth rates do provide some immediate relief to health and
sanitation and welfare services, and medium-term relief to pressures
on educational systems. The largest effects on employment, migration,
and living standards, however, will be felt only after 25 or 30 years.
The time lags inherent in all aspects of population dynamics only
reinforce the urgency of adopting effective policies in the years
immediately ahead if the formidable problems of the present decade are
not to become utterly unmanageable in the 1990s and beyond the year
2000. Chapter
V -- Implications of Population Pressures for National Security It
seems well understood that the impact of population factors on the
subjects already considered -- development, food requirements,
resources, environment -- adversely affects the welfare and progress
of countries in which we have a friendly interest and thus indirectly
adversely affects broad U.S. interests as well. The
effects of population factors on the political stability of these
countries and their implications for internal and international order
or disorder, destructive social unrest, violence and disruptive
foreign activities are less well understood and need more analysis.
Nevertheless, some strategists and experts believe that these effects
may ultimately be the most important of those arising from population
factors, most harmful to the countries where they occur and seriously
affecting U.S. interests. Other experts within the U.S. Government
disagree with this conclusion. A
recent study14 <nssmnotes.html>
of forty-five local conflicts involving Third World countries examined
the ways in which population factors affect the initiation and course
of a conflict in different situations. The study reached two major
conclusions: 1.
". . . population factors are indeed critical in, and often
determinants of, violent conflict in developing areas. Segmental
(religious, social, racial) differences, migration, rapid population
growth, differential levels of knowledge and skills, rural/urban
differences, population pressure and the spacial location of
population in relation to resources -- in this rough order of
importance -- all appear to be important contributions to conflict and
violence... 2.
Clearly, conflicts which are regarded in primarily political terms
often have demographic roots: Recognition of these relationships
appears crucial to any understanding or prevention of such
hostilities." It
does not appear that the population factors act alone or,
often, directly to cause the disruptive effects. They act through
intervening elements -- variables. They also add to other causative
factors turning what might have been only a difficult situation into
one with disruptive results. This
action is seldom simple. Professor Philip Hauser of the University of
Chicago has suggested the concept of "population complosion"
to describe the situation in many developing countries when (a) more
and more people are born into or move into and are compressed in the
same living space under (b) conditions and irritations of different
races, colors, religions, languages, or cultural backgrounds, often
with differential rates of population growth among these groups, and
(c) with the frustrations of failure to achieve their aspirations for
better standards of living for themselves or their children. To these
may be added pressures for and actual international migration. These
population factors appear to have a multiplying effect on other
factors involved in situations of incipient violence. Population
density, the "overpopulation" most often thought of in this
connection, is much less important. These
population factors contribute to socio-economic variables including
breakdowns in social structures, underemployment and unemployment,
poverty, deprived people in city slums, lowered opportunities for
education for the masses, few job opportunities for those who do
obtain education, interracial, religious, and regional rivalries, and
sharply increased financial, planning, and administrative burdens on
governmental systems at all levels. These
adverse conditions appear to contribute frequently to harmful
developments of a political nature: Juvenile delinquency, thievery and
other crimes, organized brigandry, kidnapping and terrorism, food
riots, other outbreaks of violence; guerilla warfare, communal
violence, separatist movements, revolutionary movements and
counter-revolutionary coups. All of these bear upon the weakening or
collapse of local, state, or national government functions. Beyond
national boundaries, population factors appear to have had operative
roles in some past politically disturbing legal or illegal mass
migrations, border incidents, and wars. If current increased
population pressures continue they may have greater potential for
future disruption in foreign relations. Perhaps
most important, in the last decade population factors have impacted
more severely than before on availabilities of agricultural land and
resources, industrialization, pollution and the environment. All this
is occurring at a time when international communications have created
rising expectations which are being frustrated by slow development and
inequalities of distribution. Since
population factors work with other factors and act through intervening
linkages, research as to their effects of a political nature is
difficult and "proof" even more so. This does not
mean, however, that the causality does not exist. It means only that
U.S. policy decisions must take into account the less precise and
programmatic character of our knowledge of these linkages. Although
general hypotheses are hard to draw, some seem reasonably sustainable:
1. Population
growth and inadequate resources. Where population size is greater
than available resources, or is expanding more rapidly than the
available resources, there is a tendency toward internal disorders and
violence and, sometimes, disruptive international policies or
violence. The higher the rate of growth, the more salient a factor
population increase appears to be. A sense of increasing crowding,
real or perceived, seems to generate such tendencies, especially if it
seems to thwart obtaining desired personal or national goals. 2. Populations
with a high proportion of growth. The young people, who are in
much higher proportions in many LDCs, are likely to be more volatile,
unstable, prone to extremes, alienation and violence than an older
population. These young people can more readily be persuaded to attack
the legal institutions of the government or real property of the
"establishment," "imperialists," multinational
corporations, or other -- often foreign -- influences blamed for their
troubles. 3. Population
factors with social cleavages. When adverse population factors of
growth, movement, density, excess, or pressure coincide with racial,
religious, color, linguistic, cultural, or other social cleavages,
there will develop the most potentially explosive situations for
internal disorder, perhaps with external effects. When such factors
exist together with the reality or sense of relative deprivation among
different groups within the same country or in relation to other
countries or peoples, the probability of violence increases
significantly. 4. Population
movements and international migrations. Population movements
within countries appear to have a large role in disorders. Migrations
into neighboring countries (especially those richer or more sparsely
settled), whether legal or illegal, can provoke negative political
reactions or force. There
may be increased propensities for violence arising simply from
technological developments making it easier -- e.g., international
proliferation and more ready accessibility to sub-national groups of
nuclear and other lethal weaponry. These possibilities make the
disruptive population factors discussed above even more dangerous. Some
Effects of Current Population Pressures In the
1960s and 1970s, there have been a series of episodes in which
population factors have apparently had a role -- directly or
indirectly -- affecting countries in which we have an interest. El
Salvador-Honduras War. An example was the 1969 war between El Salvador and
Honduras. Dubbed the "Soccer War", it was sparked by a riot
during a soccer match, its underlying cause was tension resulting from
the large scale migration of Salvadorans from their rapidly growing,
densely populated country to relatively uninhabited areas of Honduras.
The Hondurans resented the presence of migrants and in 1969 began to
enforce an already extant land tenancy law to expel them. El Salvador
was angered by the treatment given its citizens. Flaring tempers on
both sides over this issue created a situation which ultimately led to
a military clash. Nigeria.
The Nigerian civil war seriously retarded the progress of Africa's
most populous nations and caused political repercussions and pressures
in the United States. It was fundamentally a matter of tribal
relationships. Irritations among the tribes caused in part by rapidly
increasing numbers of people, in a situation of inadequate opportunity
for most of them, magnified the tribal issues and may have helped
precipitate the war. The migration of the Ibos from Eastern Nigeria,
looking for employment, led to competition with local peoples of other
tribes and contributed to tribal rioting. This unstable situation was
intensified by the fact that in the 1963 population census returns
were falsified to inflate the Western region's population and hence
its representation in the Federal Government. The Ibos of the Eastern
region, with the oil resources of the country, felt their resources
would be unjustly drawn on and attempted to establish their
independence. Pakistan-India-Bangladesh
1970-71. This religious and nationalistic conflict contains several points where
a population factor at a crucial time may have had a causal effect in
turning events away from peaceful solutions to violence. The Central
Government in West Pakistan resorted to military suppression of the
East Wing after the election in which the Awami League had an
overwhelming victory in East Pakistan. This election had followed two
sets of circumstances. The first was a growing discontent in East
Pakistan at the slow rate of economic and social progress being made
and the Bengali feeling that West Pakistan was dealing unequally and
unfairly with East Pakistan in the distribution of national revenues.
The first population factor was the 75 million Bengalis whom the 45
million West Pakistanis sought to continue to dominate. Some observers
believe that as a recent population factor the rapid rate of
population growth in East Pakistan seriously diminished the per capita
improvement from the revenues made available and contributed
significantly to the discontent. A special aspect of the population
explosion in East Pakistan (second population factor) was the fact
that the dense occupation of all good agricultural land forced
hundreds of thousands of people to move into the obviously unsafe
lowlands along the southern coast. They became victims of the
hurricane in 1970. An estimated 300,000 died. The Government was
unable to deal with a disaster affecting so many people. The leaders
and people of East Pakistan reacted vigorously to this failure of the
Government to bring help. It
seems quite likely that these situations in which population factors
played an important role led to the overwhelming victory of the Awami
League that led the Government to resort to force in East Pakistan
with the massacres and rapes that followed. Other experts believe the
effects of the latter two factors were of marginal influence in the
Awami League's victory. It
further seems possible that much of the violence was stimulated or
magnified by population pressures. Two groups of Moslems had been
competing for jobs and land in East Bengal since the 1947 partition.
"Biharis" are a small minority of non-Bengali Moslems who
chose to resettle in East Pakistan at that time. Their integration
into Bengali society was undoubtedly inhibited by the deteriorating
living conditions of the majority Bengalis. With the Pakistan army
crackdown in March, 1971, the Biharis cooperated with the authorities,
and reportedly were able thereby to improve their economic conditions
at the expense of the persecuted Bengalis. When the tables were turned
after independence, it was the Biharis who were persecuted and whose
property and jobs were seized. It seems likely that both these
outbursts of violence were induced or enlarged by the population
"complosion" factor. The
violence in East Pakistan against the Bengalis and particularly the
Hindu minority who bore the brunt of Army repression led to the next
population factor, the mass migration during one year of nine or ten
million refugees into West Bengal in India. This placed a tremendous
burden on the already weak Indian economy. As one Indian leader in the
India Family Planning Program said, "The influx of nine million
people wiped out the savings of some nine million births which had
been averted over a period of eight years of the family planning
program." There
were other factors in India's invasion of East Bengal, but it is
possible that the necessity of returning these nine or ten million
refugees to east Bengal -- getting them out of India -- may have
played a part in the Indian decision to invade. Certainly, in a
broader sense, the threat posed by this serious, spreading instability
on India's eastern frontier -- an instability in which population
factors were a major underlying cause -- a key reason for the Indian
decision. The
political arrangements in the Subcontinent have changed, but all of
the underlying population factors which influenced the dramatic acts
of violence that took place in 1970-71 still exist, in worsening
dimensions, to influence future events. Additional
illustrations. Population factors also appear to have had indirect causal relations,
in varying degrees, on the killings in Indonesia in 1965-6, the
communal slaughter in Rwanda in 1961-2 and 1963-4 and in Burundi
in 1972, the coup in Uganda in 1972, and the insurrection in Sri
Lanka in 1971. Some
Potential Effects of Future Population Pressures Between
the end of World War II and 1975 the world's population will have
increased about one and a half billion -- nearly one billion of that
from 1960 to the present. The rate of growth is increasing and between
two and a half and three and a half billion will be added by the year
2000, depending partly on the effectiveness of population growth
control programs. This increase of the next 25 years will, of course,
pyramid on the great number added with such rapidity in the last 25.
The population factors which contributed to the political pressures
and instabilities of the last decades will be multiplied. PRC
- The demographic factors of the PRC are referred to on page 79 above.
The Government of the PRC has made a major effort to feed its growing
population. Cultivated
farm land, at 107 million hectares, has not increased significantly
over the past 25 years, although farm output has substantially kept
pace with population growth through improved yields secured by land
improvement, irrigation extension, intensified cropping, and rapid
expansion in the supply of fertilizers. In
1973 the PRC adopted new, forceful population control measures. In the
urban areas Peking claimed its birth control measures had secured a
two-child family and a one percent annual population growth, and it
proposes to extend this development throughout the rural areas by
1980. The
political implications of China's future population growth are
obviously important but are not dealt with here. Israel
and the Arab States. If a peace settlement can be reached, the central
issue will be how to make it last. Egypt with about 37 million today
is growing at 2.8% per year. It will approximate 48 million by 1985,
75 million by 1995, and more than 85 million by 2000. It is doubtful
that Egypt's economic progress can greatly exceed its population
growth. With Israel starting at today's population of 3.3 million, the
disparity between its population and those of the Arab States will
rapidly increase. Inside Israel, unless Jewish immigration continues,
the gap between the size of the Arab and Jewish populations will
diminish. Together with the traditional animosities -- which will
remain the prime determinants of Arab-Israeli conflict -- these
population factors make the potential for peace and for U.S. interests
in the area ominous. India-Bangladesh.
The Subcontinent will be for years the major focus of world concern
over population growth. India's population is now approximately 580
million, adding a million by each full moon. Embassy New Delhi (New
Delhi 2115, June 17, 1974) reports: "There seems no way of turning off the faucet this side of 1 billion
Indians, which means India must continue to court economic and social
disaster. It is not clear how the shaky and slow-growing Indian
economy can bear the enormous expenditures on health, housing,
employment, and education, which must be made if the society is even
to maintain its current low levels." Death
rates have recently increased in parts of India and episodes like the
recent smallpox epidemic have led Embassy New Delhi to add: "A future failure of the India food crop could cause widespread
death and suffering which could not be overcome by the GOI or foreign
assistance. The rise in the death rate in several rural areas suggests
that Malthusian pressures are already being felt." And
further: "Increasing political disturbances should be expected in the future,
fed by the pressures of rising population in urban areas, food
shortages, and growing scarcities in household commodities. The GOI
has not been very successful in alleviating unemployment in the
cities. The recent disturbances in Gujarat and Bihar seem to be only
the beginning of chronic and serious political disorders occurring
throughout India." There
will probably be a weakening, possibly a breakdown, of the control of
the central government over some of the states and local areas. The
democratic system will be taxed and may be in danger of giving way to
a form of dictatorship, benevolent or otherwise. The existence of
India as a democratic buttress in Asia will be threatened. Bangladesh,
with appalling population density, rapid population growth, and
extensive poverty will suffer even more. Its population has increased
40% since the census 13 years ago and is growing at least 3% per year.
The present 75 million, or so, unless slowed by famine, disease, or
massive birth control, will double in 23 years and exceed 170 million
by 2000. Requirements
for food and other basic necessities of life are growing at a faster
rate than existing resources and administrative systems are providing
them. In the rural areas, the size of the average farm is being
reduced and there is increasing landlessness. More and more people are
migrating to urban areas. The government admits a 30% rate of
unemployment and underemployment. Already, Embassy Dacca reports
(Dacca 3424, June 19, 1974) there are important economic-population
causes for the landlessness that is rapidly increasing and
contributing to violent crimes of murder and armed robbery that
terrorize the ordinary citizen. "Some of the vast army of unemployed and landless, and those
strapped by the escalating cost of basic commodities, have doubtless
turned to crime." Three
paragraphs of Embassy Dacca's report sharply outline the effect on
U.S. political interests we may anticipate from population factors in
Bangladesh and other countries that, if present trends are not
changed, will be in conditions similar to Bangladesh in only a few
years. "Of concern to the U.S. are several probable outcomes as the basic
political, economic and social situation worsens over the coming
decades. Already afflicted with a crisis mentality by which they look
to wealthy foreign countries to shore up their faltering economy, the
BDG will continue to escalate its demands on the U.S. both bilaterally
and internationally to enlarge its assistance, both of commodities and
financing. Bangladesh is now a fairly solid supporter of third world
positions, advocating better distribution of the world's wealth and
extensive trade concessions to poor nations. As its problems grow and
its ability to gain assistance fails to keep pace, Bangladesh's
positions on international issues likely will become radicalized,
inevitably in opposition to U.S. interests on major issues as it seeks
to align itself with others to force adequate aid. "U.S. interests in Bangladesh center on the development of an
economically and politically stable country which will not threaten
the stability of its neighbors in the Subcontinent nor invite the
intrusion of outside powers. Surrounded on three sides by India and
sharing a short border with Burma, Bangladesh, if it descends into
chaos, will threaten the stability of these nations as well. Already
Bengalis are illegally migrating into the frontier provinces of Assam
and Tripura, politically sensitive areas of India, and into adjacent
Burma. Should expanded out-migration and socio-political collapse in
Bangladesh threaten its own stability, India may be forced to consider
intervention, although it is difficult to see in what way the Indians
could cope with the situation. "Bangladesh is a case study of the effects of few resources and
burgeoning population not only on national and regional stability but
also on the future world order. In a sense, if we and other richer
elements of the world community do not meet the test of formulating a
policy to help Bangladesh awaken from its economic and demographic
nightmare, we will not be prepared in future decades to deal with the
consequences of similar problems in other countries which have far
more political and economic consequences to U.S. interests." Africa
-- Sahel Countries. The current tragedy of the Sahel countries, to which
U.S. aid in past years has been minimal, has suddenly cost us an
immense effort in food supplies at a time when we are already hard
pressed to supply other countries, and domestic food prices are
causing strong political repercussions in the U.S. The costs to us and
other donor countries for aid to help restore the devastated land will
run into hundreds of millions. Yet little attention is given to the
fact that even before the adverse effect of the continued drought, it
was population growth and added migration of herdsmen to the edge of
the desert that led to cutting the trees and cropping the grass,
inviting the desert to sweep forward. Control of population growth and
migration must be a part of any program for improvement of lasting
value. Panama.
The troublesome problem of jurisdiction over the Canal Zone is
primarily due to Panamanian feelings of national pride and a desire to
achieve sovereignty over its entire territory. One Panamanian
agreement in pursuing its treaty goals is that U.S. control over the
Canal Zone prevents the natural expansion of Panama City, an expansion
needed as a result of demographic pressures. In 1908, at the time of
the construction of the Canal, the population of the Zone was about
40,000. Today it is close to the same figure, 45,000. On the other
hand, Panama City, which had some 20,000 people in 1908, has received
growing migration from rural areas and now has over 500,000. A new
treaty which would give Panama jurisdiction over land now in the Zone
would help alleviate the problems caused by this growth of Panama
City. Mexico
and the U.S. Closest to home, the combined population growth of Mexico and the U.S.
Southwest presages major difficulties for the future. Mexico's
population is growing at some 3.5% per year and will double in 20
years with concomitant increases in demands for food, housing,
education, and employment. By 1995, the present 57 million will have
increased to some 115 million and, unless their recently established
family planning program has great success, by 2000 will exceed 130
million. More important, the numbers of young people entering the job
market each year will expand even more quickly. These growing numbers
will increase the pressure of illegal emigration to the U.S., and make
the issue an even more serious source of friction in our political
relations with Mexico. On our
side, the Bureau of the Census estimates that as more and more
Americans move to the Southwestern States the present 40,000,000
population may approximate 61,000,000 by 1995. The domestic use of
Colorado River water may again have increased the salinity level in
Mexico and reopened that political issue. Amembassy
Mexico City (Mexico 4953, June 14, 1974) summarized the influences of
population factors on U.S. interests as follows: "An indefinite continuation of Mexico's high population growth rate
would increasingly act as a brake on economic (and social)
improvement. The consequences would be noted in various ways. Mexico
could well take more radical positions in the international scene.
Illegal migration to the U.S. would increase. In a country where
unemployment and under-employment is already high, the entry of
increasing numbers into the work force would only intensify the
pressure to seek employment in the U.S. by whatever means. Yet another
consequence would be increased demand for food imports from the U.S.,
especially if the rate of growth of agricultural production continues
to lag behind the population growth rate. Finally, one cannot dismiss
the spectre of future domestic instability as a long term consequence,
should the economy, now strong, falter." UNCTAD,
the Special UNGA, and the UN. The developing countries, after several years of
unorganized maneuvering and erratic attacks have now formed tight
groupings in the Special Committee for Latin American Coordination,
the Organization of African States, and the Seventy-Seven. As
illustrated in the Declaration of Santiago and the recent Special
General Assembly, these groupings at times appear to reflect a common
desire to launch economic attacks against the United States and, to a
lesser degree, the European developed countries. A factor which is
common to all of them, which retards their development, burdens their
foreign exchange, subjects them to world prices for food, fertilizer,
and necessities of life and pushes them into disadvantageous trade
relations is their excessively rapid population growth. Until they are
able to overcome this problem, it is likely that their manifestations
of antagonism toward the United States in international bodies will
increase. Global Factors In
industrial nations, population growth increases demand for industrial
output. This over time tends to deplete national raw materials
resources and calls increasingly on sources of marginal profitability
and foreign supplies. To obtain raw materials, industrial nations seek
to locate and develop external sources of supply. The potential for
collisions of interest among the developing countries is obvious and
has already begun. It is visible and vexing in claims for territorial
waters and national sovereignty over mineral resources. It may become
intense in rivalries over exploring and exploiting the resources of
the ocean floor. In
developing countries, the burden of population factors, added to
others, will weaken unstable governments, often only marginally
effective in good times, and open the way for extremist regimes.
Countries suffering under such burdens will be more susceptible to
radicalization. Their vulnerability also might invite foreign
intervention by stronger nations bent on acquiring political and
economic advantage. The tensions within the Have-not nations are
likely to intensify, and the conflicts between them and the Haves may
escalate. Past
experience gives little assistance to predicting the course of these
developments because the speed of today's population growth,
migrations, and urbanization far exceeds anything the world has seen
before. Moreover, the consequences of such population factors can no
longer be evaded by moving to new hunting or grazing lands, by
conquering new territory, by discovering or colonizing new continents,
or by emigration in large numbers. The
world has ample warning that we all must make more rapid efforts at
social and economic development to avoid or mitigate these gloomy
prospects. We should be warned also that we all must move as rapidly
as possible toward stabilizing national and world population growth. CHAPTER
VI - WORLD POPULATION CONFERENCE From
the standpoint of policy and program, the focal point of the World
Population Conference (WPC) at Bucharest, Romania, in August 1974, was
the World Population Plan of Action (WPPA). The U.S. had contributed
many substantive points to the draft Plan. We had particularly
emphasized the incorporation of population factors in national
planning of developing countries' population programs for assuring the
availability of means of family planning to persons of reproductive
age, voluntary but specific goals for the reduction of population
growth and time frames for action. As the
WPPA reached the WPC it was organized as a demographic document. It
also related population factors to family welfare, social and economic
development, and fertility reduction. Population policies and programs
were recognized as an essential element, but only one element of
economic and social development programs. The sovereignty of nations
in determining their own population policies and programs was
repeatedly recognized. The general impression after five regional
consultative meetings on the Plan was that it had general support. There
was general consternation, therefore, when at the beginning of the
conference the Plan was subjected to a slashing, five-pronged attack
led by Algeria, with the backing of several African countries;
Argentina, supported by Uruguay, Brazil, Peru and, more limitedly,
some other Latin American countries; the Eastern European group (less
Romania); the PRC and the Holy See. Although the attacks were not
identical, they embraced three central elements relevant to U.S.
policy and action in this field: 1.Repeated
references to the importance (or as some said, the pre-condition) of
economic and social development for the reduction of high fertility.
Led by Algeria and Argentina, many emphasized the "new
international economic order" as central to economic and social
development. 2.Efforts
to reduce the references to population programs, minimize their
importance and delete all references to quantitative or time goals. 3.Additional
references to national sovereignty in setting population policies and
programs. The Plan of Action Despite the initial attack and continuing efforts to change the
conceptual basis of the world Population Plan of Action, the
Conference adopted by acclamation (only the Holy See stating a general
reservation) a complete World Population Plan of Action. It is less
urgent in tone than the draft submitted by the U.N. Secretariat but in
several ways more complete and with greater potential than that draft.
The final action followed a vigorous debate with hotly contested
positions and forty-seven votes. Nevertheless, there was general
satisfaction among the participants at the success of their efforts. a. Principles and Aims The Plan of Action lays down several important principles, some for the
first time in a U.N. document. 1.
Among the first-time statements is the assertion that the sovereign
right of each nation to set its own population policies is "to be
exercised ... taking into account universal solidarity in order to
improve the quality of life of the peoples of the world." (Para
13) This new provision opens the way toward increasing responsibility
by nations toward other nations in establishing their national
population policies. 2. The
conceptual relationship between population and development is stated
in Para 13(c): Population and development are interrelated: population variables
influence development variables and are also influenced by them; the
formulation of a World Population Plan of Action reflects the
international community's awareness of the importance of population
trends for socio-economic development, and the socio-economic nature
of the recommendations contained in this Plan of Action reflects its
awareness of the crucial role that development plays in affecting
population trends. 3. A
basic right of couples and individuals is recognized by Para 13(f),
for the first time in a single declarative sentence: All couples and individuals have the basic human right to decide freely
and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have
the information, education and means to do so; 4.
Also for the first time, a U.N. document links the responsibility of
child-bearers to the community [Para 13(f) continued]: The responsibility of couples and individuals in the exercise of this
right takes into account the needs of their living and future
children, and their responsibilities towards the community. It is
now possible to build on this newly-stated principle as the right of
couples first recognized in the Tehran Human Rights Declaration of
1968 has been built on. 5. A
flat declaration of the right of women is included in Para 13(h): Women have the right to complete integration in the development process
particularly by means of an equal participation in educational,
social, economic, cultural and political life. In addition, the
necessary measures should be taken to facilitate this integration with
family responsibilities which should be fully shared by both partners.
6. The
need for international action is accepted in Para 13(k): The growing interdependence of countries makes the adoption of measures
at the international level increasingly important for the solution of
problems of development and population problems. 7. The
"primary aim" of the Plan of Action is asserted to be
"to expand and deepen the capacities of countries to deal
effectively with their national and subnational population problems
and to promote an appropriate international response to their needs by
increasing international activity in research, the exchange of
information, and the provision of assistance on request." b. Recommendations The Plan of Action includes recommendations for: population goals and
policies; population growth; mortality and morbidity; reproduction;
family formation and the status of women; population distribution and
internal migration; international migration; population structure;
socio-economic policies; data collection and analysis; research;
development and evolution of population policies; the role of national
governments and of international cooperation; and monitoring, review
and appraisal. A
score of these recommendations are the most important: 1.
Governments should integrate population measures and programs into
comprehensive social and economic plans and programs and their
integration should be reflected in the goals, instrumentalities and
organizations for planning within the countries. A unit dealing with
population aspects should be created and placed at a high level of the
national administrative structure. (Para 94) 2.
Countries which consider their population growth hampers attainment of
their goals should consider adopting population policies -- through a
low level of birth and death rates. (Para 17, 18) 3.
Highest priority should be given to reduction in mortality and
morbidity and increase of life expectancy and programs for this
purpose should reach rural areas and underprivileged groups. (Para
20-25) 4.
Countries are urged to encourage appropriate education concerning
responsible parenthood and make available to persons who so desire
advice and means of achieving it. [Para 29(b)] 5.
Family planning and related services should aim at prevention of
unwanted pregnancies and also at elimination of involuntary sterility
or subfecundity to enable couples to achieve their desired number of
children. [Para 29 (c)] 6.
Adequately trained auxiliary personnel, social workers and
non-government channels should be used to help provide family planning
services. [Para 29(e)] 7.
Governments with family planning programs should consider coordinating
them with health and other services designed to raise the quality of
life. 8.
Countries wishing to affect fertility levels should give priority to
development programs and health and education strategies which have a
decisive effect upon demographic trends, including fertility. [Para
31] International cooperation should give priority to assisting such
national efforts. Such programs may include reduction in infant and
child mortality, increased education, particularly for females,
improvement in the status of women, land reform and support in old
age. [Para 32] 9.
Countries which consider their birth rates detrimental to their
national purposes are invited to set quantitative goals and implement
policies to achieve them by 1985. [Para 37] 10.
Developed countries are urged to develop appropriate policies in
population, consumption and investment, bearing in mind the need for
fundamental improvement in international equity. 11.
Because the family is the basic unit of society, governments should
assist families as far as possible through legislation and services.
[Para 39] 12.
Governments should ensure full participation of women in the
educational, economic, social and political life of their countries on
an equal basis with men. [Para 40] (A new provision, added at
Bucharest.) 13. A
series of recommendations are made to stabilize migration within
countries, particularly policies to reduce the undesirable
consequences of excessively rapid urbanization and to develop
opportunities in rural areas and small towns, recognizing the right of
individuals to move freely within their national boundaries. [Para
44-50] 14.
Agreements should be concluded to regulate the international migration
of workers and to assure non-discriminatory treatment and social
services for these workers and their families; also other measures to
decrease the brain drain from developing countries. [Para 51-62] 15. To
assure needed information concerning population trends, population
censuses should be taken at regular intervals and information
concerning births and deaths be made available at least annually.
[Para 72-77] 16.
Research should be intensified to develop knowledge concerning the
social, economic and political interrelationships with population
trends; effective means of reducing infant and childhood mortality;
methods for integrating population goals into national plans, means of
improving the motivation of people, analysis of population policies in
relation to socio-economic development, laws and institution; methods
of fertility regulation to meet the varied requirement of individuals
and communities, including methods requiring no medical supervision;
the interrelations of health, nutrition and reproductive biology; and
utilization of social services, including family planning services.
[Para 78-80] 17.
Training of management on population dynamics and administration, on
an interdisciplinary basis, should be provided for medical,
paramedical, traditional health personnel, program administrators,
senior government officials, labor, community and social leaders.
Education and information programs should be undertaken to bring
population information to all areas of countries. [Paras 81-92] 18. An
important role of governments is to determine and assess the
population problems and needs of their countries in the light of their
political, social, cultural, religious and economic conditions; such
an undertaking should be carried out systematically and periodically
so as to provide informed, rational and dynamic decision-making in
matters of population and development. [Para 97] 20.
The Plan of Action should be closely coordinated with the
International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations
Development Decade, reviewed in depth at five year intervals, and
modified as appropriate. [Paras 106-108] The
Plan of Action hedges in presenting specific statements of
quantitative goals or a time frame for the reduction of fertility.
These concepts are included, however, in the combination of Paras 16
and 36, together with goals [Para 37] and the review [Para 106]. Para
16 states that, according to the U.N low variant projections,
it is estimated that as a result of social and economic development
and population policies as reported by countries in the Second United
Nations Inquiry on Population and Development, population growth rates
in the developing countries as a whole may decline from the present
level of 2.4% per annum to about 2% by 1985; and below 0.7% per annum
in the developed countries. In this case the worldwide rate of
population growth would decline from 2% to about 1.7%. Para 36 says
that these projections and those for mortality decline are consistent
with declines in the birth rate of the developing countries as a whole
from the present level of 38 per thousand to 30 per thousand by 1985.
Para 36 goes on to say that "To achieve by 1985 these levels of
fertility would require substantial national efforts, by those
countries concerned, in the field of socio-economic development and
population policies, supported, upon request, by adequate
international assistance." Para 37 then follows with the
statement that countries which consider their birth rates detrimental
to their national purposes are invited to consider setting
quantitative goals and implementing policies that may lead to the
attainment of such goals by 1985. Para 106 recommends a comprehensive
review and appraisal of population trends and policies discussed in
the Plan of Action should be undertaken every five years and modified,
wherever needed, by ECOSOC. Usefulness of the Plan of Action The World Population Plan of Action, despite its wordiness and often
hesitant tone, contains all the necessary provisions for effective
population growth control programs at national and international
levels. It lacks only plain statements of quantitative goals with time
frames for their accomplishment. These will have to be added by
individual national action and development as rapidly as possible in
further U.N. documents. The basis for suitable goals exists in
paragraphs 16, 36, 37, and 106, referred to above. The U.N. low
variant projection used in these paragraphs is close to the goals
proposed by the United States and other ECAFE nations:
·
For developed countries -
·
For developing countries -
·
For the world - The
dangerous situation evidenced by the current food situation and
projections for the future make it essential to press for the
realization of these goals. The beliefs, ideologies and misconceptions
displayed by many nations at Bucharest indicate more forcefully than
ever the need for extensive education of the leaders of many
governments, especially in Africa and some in Latin America.
Approaches leaders of individual countries must be designed in the
light of their current beliefs and to meet their special concerns.
These might include: 1.
Projections of population growth individualized for countries and with
analyses of relations of population factors to social and economic
development of each country. 2.
Familiarization programs at U.N. Headquarters in New York for
ministers of governments, senior policy level officials and comparably
influential leaders from private life. 3.
Greatly increased training programs for senior officials in the
elements of demographic economics. 4.
Assistance in integrating population factors in national plans,
particularly as they relate to health services, education,
agricultural resources and development, employment, equitable
distribution of income and social stability. 5.
Assistance in relating population policies and family planning
programs to major sectors of development: health, nutrition,
agriculture, education, social services, organized labor, women's
activities, community development. 6.
Initiatives to implement the Percy amendment regarding improvement in
the status of women. 7.
Emphasis in assistance and development programs on development of
rural areas. All
these activities and others particularly productive are consistent
with the Plan of Action and may be based upon it. Beyond
these activities, essentially directed at national interests, a
broader educational concept is needed to convey an acute understanding
of the interrelation of national interests and world population
growth.
P A R T T W O Policy Recommendations
There
is no simple single approach to the population problem which will
provide a "technological fix." As the previous analysis
makes clear the problem of population growth has social, economic and
technological aspects all of which must be understood and dealt with
for a world population policy to succeed. With this in mind, the
following broad recommended strategy provides a framework for the
development of specific individual programs which must be tailored to
the needs and particularities of each country and of different sectors
of the population within a country. Essentially all its
recommendations made below are supported by the World Population Plan
of action drafted at the World Population Conference. A.
Basic Global Strategy The
following basic elements are necessary parts of a comprehensive
approach to the population problem which must include both bilateral
and multilateral components to achieve success. Thus, USG population
assistance programs will need to be coordinated with those of the
major multilateral institutions, voluntary organizations, and other
bilateral donors. The
common strategy for dealing with rapid population growth should
encourage constructive actions to lower fertility since population
growth over the years will seriously negate reasonable prospects for
the sound social and economic development of the peoples involved. While
the time horizon in this NSSM is the year 2000 we must recognize that
in most countries, especially the LDCs, population stability cannot be
achieved until the next century. There are too many powerful
socio-economic factors operating on family size decisions and too much
momentum built into the dynamics of population growth to permit a
quick and dramatic reversal of current trends. There is also even less
cause for optimism on the rapidity of socio-economic progress that
would generate rapid fertility reduction in the poor LDCs than on the
feasibility of extending family planning services to those in their
populations who may wish to take advantage of them. Thus, at this
point we cannot know with certainty when world population can feasibly
be stabilized, nor can we state with assurance the limits of the
world's ecological "carrying capability". But we can be
certain of the desirable direction of change and can state as a
plausible objective the target of achieving replacement fertility
rates by the year 2000. Over
the past few years, U.S. government-funded population programs have
played a major role in arousing interest in family planning in many
countries, and in launching and accelerating the growth of national
family planning programs. In most countries, there has been an initial
rapid growth in contraceptive "acceptors" up to perhaps 10%
of fertile couples in a few LDCs. The acceleration of previous trends
of fertility decline is attributable, at least in part, to family
planning programs. However,
there is growing appreciation that the problem is more long term and
complex than first appeared and that a short term burst of activity or
moral fervor will not solve it. The danger in this realization is that
the U.S. might abandon its commitment to assisting in the world's
population problem, rather than facing up to it for the long-run
difficult problem that it is. From
year to year we are learning more about what kind of fertility
reduction is feasible in differing LDC situations. Given the laws of
compound growth, even comparatively small reductions in fertility over
the next decade will make a significant difference in total numbers by
the year 2000, and a far more significant one by the year 2050. The
proposed strategy calls for a coordinated approach to respond to the
important U.S. foreign policy interest in the influence of population
growth on the world's political, economic and ecological systems. What
is unusual about population is that this foreign policy interest must
have a time horizon far beyond that of most other objectives. While
there are strong short-run reasons for population programs, because of
such factors as food supply, pressures on social service budgets,
urban migration and social and political instability, the major impact
of the benefits - or avoidance of catastrophe - that could be
accomplished by a strengthened U.S. commitment in the population area
will be felt less by those of us in the U.S. and other countries today
than by our children and grandchildren. B.
Ppriorities in U.S. and Multilateral Population Assistance One
issue in any global population strategy is the degree of emphasis in
allocation of program resources among countries. The options available
range from heavy concentration on a few vital large countries to a
geographically diverse program essentially involving all countries
willing to accept such assistance. All agencies believe the following
policy provides the proper overall balance. In
order to assist the development of major countries and to maximize
progress toward population stability, primary emphasis would be placed
on the largest and fastest growing developing countries where the
imbalance between growing numbers and development potential most
seriously risks instability, unrest, and international tensions. These
countries are: India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico,
Indonesia, Brazil, The Philippines, Thailand, Egypt, Turkey, Ethiopia,
and Colombia. Out of a total 73.3 million worldwide average increase
in population from 1970-75 these countries contributed 34.3 million or
47%. This group of priority countries includes some with virtually no
government interest in family planning and others with active
government family planning programs which require and would welcome
enlarged technical and financial assistance. These countries should be
given the highest priority within AID's population program in terms of
resource allocations and/or leadership efforts to encourage action by
other donors and organizations. However,
other countries would not be ignored. AID would provide population
assistance and/or undertake leadership efforts with respect to other,
lower priority countries to the extent that the availability of funds
and staff permits, taking into account of such factors as : long run
U.S. political interests; impact of rapid population growth on its
development potential; the country's relative contribution to world
population growth; its financial capacity to cope with the problem;
potential impact on domestic unrest and international frictions (which
can apply to small as well as large countries); its significance as a
test or demonstration case; and opportunities for expenditures that
appear particularly cost-effective (e.g. it has been suggested that
there may be particularly cost-effective opportunities for supporting
family planning to reduce the lag between mortality and fertility
declines in countries where death rates are still declining rapidly);
national commitment to an effective program. For
both the high priority countries and the lower priority ones to which
funds and staff permit aid, the form and content of our assistance or
leadership efforts would vary from country to country, depending on
each nation's particular interests, needs, and receptivity to various
forms of assistance. For example, if these countries are receptive to
U.S. assistance through bilateral or central AID funding, we should
provide such assistance at levels commensurate with the recipient's
capability to finance needed actions with its own funds, the
contributions of other donors and organizations, and the effectiveness
with which funds can be used. In
countries where U.S. assistance is limited either by the nature of
political or diplomatic relations with those countries or by lack of
strong government desire. In population reduction programs, external
technical and financial assistance (if desired by the countries) would
have to come from other donors and/or from private and international
organizations, many of which receive contributions from AID. The USG
would, however, maintain an interest (e.g. through Embassies) in such
countries' population problems and programs (if any) to reduce
population growth rates. Moreover, particularly in the case of high
priority countries, we should be alert to opportunities for expanding
our assistance efforts and for demonstrating to their leaders the
consequences of rapid population growth and the benefits of actions to
reduce fertility. In
countries to which other forms of U.S. assistance are provided but not
population assistance, AID will monitor progress toward achievement of
development objectives, taking into account the extent to which these
are hindered by rapid population growth, and will look for
opportunities to encourage initiation of or improvement in population
policies and programs. In
addition, the U.S. strategy should support in these LDC countries
general activities (e.g. bio-medical research or fertility control
methods) capable of achieving major breakthroughs in key problems
which hinder reductions in population growth. C.
Instruments and Modalities for Population Assistance Bilateral
population assistance is the largest and most invisible
"instrument" for carrying out U.S. policy in this area.
Other instruments include: support for and coordination with
population programs of multilateral organizations and voluntary
agencies; encouragement of multilateral country consortia and
consultative groups to emphasize family planning in reviews of overall
recipient progress and aid requests; and formal and informal
presentation of views at international gatherings, such as food and
population conferences. Specific country strategies must be worked out
for each of the highest priority countries, and for the lower priority
ones. These strategies will take account of such factors as: national
attitudes and sensitivities on family planning; which
"instruments" will be most acceptable, opportunities for
effective use of assistance; and need of external capital or operating
assistance. For
example, in Mexico our strategy would focus on working primarily
through private agencies and multilateral organizations to encourage
more government attention to the need for control of population
growth; in Bangladesh we might provide large-scale technical and
financial assistance, depending on the soundness of specific program
requests; in Indonesia we would respond to assistance requests but
would seek to have Indonesia meet as much of program costs from its
own resources (i.e. surplus oil earnings) as possible. In general we
would not provide large-scale bilateral assistance in the more
developed LDCs, such as Brazil or Mexico. Although these countries are
in the top priority list our approach must take account of the fact
that their problems relate often to government policies and decisions
and not to larger scale need for concessional assistance. Within
the overall array of U.S. foreign assistance programs, preferential
treatment in allocation of funds and manpower should be given to
cost-effective programs to reduce population growth; including both
family planning activities and supportive activities in other sectors.
While
some have argued for use of explicit "leverage" to
"force" better population programs on LDC governments, there
are several practical constraints on our efforts to achieve program
improvements. Attempts to use "leverage" for far less
sensitive issues have generally caused political frictions and often
backfired. Successful family planning requires strong local dedication
and commitment that cannot over the long run be enforced from the
outside. There is also the danger that some LDC leaders will see
developed country pressures for family planning as a form of economic
or racial imperialism; this could well create a serious backlash. Short
of "leverage", there are many opportunities, bilaterally and
multilaterally, for U.S. representations to discuss and urge the need
for stronger family planning programs. There is also some established
precedent for taking account of family planning performance in
appraisal of assistance requirements by AID and consultative groups.
Since population growth is a major determinant of increases in food
demand, allocation of scarce PL 480 resources should take account of
what steps a country is taking in population control as well as food
production. In these sensitive relationships, however, it is important
in style as well as substance to avoid the appearance of coercion. D.
Provision and Development of Family Planning Services, Information and
Technology Past
experience suggests that easily available family planning services are
a vital and effective element in reducing fertility rates in the LDCs.
Two
main advances are required for providing safe and effective fertility
control techniques in the developing countries: 1. Expansion
and further development of efficient low-cost systems to assure the
full availability of existing family planning services, materials and
information to the 85% of LDC populations not now effectively reached.
In developing countries willing to create special delivery systems for
family planning services this may be the most effective method. In
others the most efficient and acceptable method is to combine family
planning with health or nutrition in multi-purpose delivery systems. 2. Improving
the effectiveness of present means of fertility control, and
developing new technologies which are simple, low cost, effective,
safe, long-lasting and acceptable to potential users. This
involves both basic developmental research and operations research to
judge the utility of new or modified approaches under LDC conditions. Both
of these goals should be given very high priority with necessary
additional funding consistent with current or adjusted divisions of
labor among other donors and organizations involved in these areas of
population assistance. E.
Creating Conditions Conducive to Fertility Decline It is
clear that the availability of contraceptive services and information
is not a complete answer to the population problem. In view of the
importance of socio-economic factors in determining desired family
size, overall assistance strategy should increasingly concentrate on
selective policies which will contribute to population decline as well
as other goals. This strategy reflects the complementarity between
population control and other U.S. development objectives, particularly
those relating to AID's Congressional mandate to focus on problems of
the "poor majority" in LDC's. We
know that certain kinds of development policies -- e.g., those which
provide the poor with a major share in development benefits -- both
promote fertility reductions and accomplish other major development
objectives. There are other policies which appear to also promote
fertility reduction but which may conflict with non-population
objectives (e.g., consider the effect of bringing a large number of
women into the labor force in countries and occupations where
unemployment is already high and rising). However,
AID knows only approximately the relative priorities among the factors
that affect fertility and is even further away from knowing what
specific cost-effective steps governments can take to affect these
factors. Nevertheless,
with what limited information we have, the urgency of moving forward
toward lower fertility rates, even without complete knowledge of the
socio-economic forces involved, suggests a three-pronged strategy: 1.
High priority to large-scale implementation of programs affecting the
determinants of fertility in those cases where there is probable
cost-effectiveness, taking account of potential impact on population
growth rates; other development benefits to be gained; ethical
considerations; feasibility in light of LDC bureaucratic and political
concerns and problems; and timeframe for accomplishing objectives. 2.
High priority to experimentation and pilot projects in areas where
there is evidence of a close relationship to fertility reduction but
where there are serious questions about cost-effectiveness relating
either to other development impact (e.g., the female employment
example cited above) or to program design (e.g., what cost-effective
steps can be taken to promote female employment or literacy). 3.
High priority to comparative research and evaluation on the relative
impact on desired family size of the socio-economic determinants of
fertility in general and on what policy scope exists for affecting
these determinants. In all
three cases emphasis should be given to moving action as much as
possible to LDC institutions and individuals rather than to involving
U.S. researchers on a large scale. Activities
in all three categories would receive very high priority in allocation
of AID funds. The largest amounts required should be in the first
category and would generally not come from population funds. However,
since such activities (e.g., in rural development and basic education)
coincide with other AID sectoral priorities, sound project requests
from LDC's will be placed close to the top in AID's funding priorities
(assuming that they do not conflict with other major development and
other foreign policy objectives). The
following areas appear to contain significant promise in effecting
fertility declines, and are discussed in subsequent sections.
·
providing minimal levels of education especially for women;
·
reducing infant and child mortality;
·
expanding opportunities for wage employment especially for women;
·
developing alternatives to "social security" support provided
by children to aging parents;
·
pursuing development strategies that skew income growth toward the poor,
especially rural development focusing on rural poverty;
·
concentrating on the education and indoctrination of the rising
generation of children regarding the desirability of smaller family
size. The
World Population Plan of Action includes a provision (paragraph 31)
that countries trying for effective fertility levels should give
priority to development programs and health and education strategies
which have a decisive effect upon demographic trends, including
fertility. It calls for international information to give priority to
assisting such national efforts. Programs suggested (paragraph 32) are
essentially the same as those listed above. Food
is another of special concern in any population strategy. Adequate
food stocks need to be created to provide for periods of severe
shortages and LDC food production efforts must be reenforced to meet
increased demand resulting from population and income growth. U.S.
agricultural production goals should take account of the normal import
requirements of LDC's (as well as developed countries) and of likely
occasional crop failures in major parts of the LDC world. Without
improved food security, there will be pressure leading to possible
conflict and the desire for large families for "insurance"
purposes, thus undermining other development and population control
efforts. F.
Development of World-Wide Political and Popular Commitment to
Population Stabilization and Its Associated Improvement of Individual
Quality of Life. A
fundamental element in any overall strategy to deal with the
population problem is obtaining the support and commitment of key
leaders in the developing countries. This is only possible if they can
clearly see the negative impact of unrestricted population growth in
their countries and the benefits of reducing birth rates - and if they
believe it is possible to cope with the population problem through
instruments of public policy. Since most high officials are in office
for relatively short periods, they have to see early benefits or the
value of longer term statesmanship. In each specific case, individual
leaders will have to approach their population problems within the
context of their country's values, resources, and existing priorities.
Therefore,
it is vital that leaders of major LDCs themselves take the lead in
advancing family planning and population stabilization, not only
within the U.N. and other international organizations but also through
bilateral contacts with leaders of other LDCs. Reducing population
growth in LDCs should not be advocated exclusively by the developed
countries. The U.S. should encourage such a role as opportunities
appear in its high level contact with LDC leaders. The
most recent forum for such an effort was the August 1974 U.N. World
Population Conference. It was an ideal context to focus concerted
world attention on the problem. The debate views and highlights of the
World Population Plan of action are reviewed in Chapter VI. The
U.S. strengthened its credibility as an advocate of lower population
growth rates by explaining that, while it did not have a single
written action population policy, it did have legislation, Executive
Branch policies and court decisions that amounted to a national policy
and that our national fertility level was already below replacement
and seemed likely to attain a stable population by 2000. The
U.S. also proposed to join with other developed countries in an
international collaborative effort of research in human reproduction
and fertility control covering bio-medical and socio-economic factors.
The
U.S. further offered to collaborate with other interested donor
countries and organizations (e.g., WHO, UNFPA, World Bank, UNICEF) to
encourage further action by LDC governments and other institutions to
provide low-cost, basic preventive health services, including maternal
and child health and family planning services, reaching out into the
remote rural areas. The
U.S. delegation also said the U.S. would request from the Congress
increased U.S. bilateral assistance to population-family planning
programs, and additional amounts for essential functional activities
and our contribution to the UNFPA if countries showed an interest in
such assistance. Each
of these commitments is important and should be pursued by the U.S.
Government. It is
vital that the effort to develop and strengthen a commitment on the
part of the LDC leaders not be seen by them as an industrialized
country policy to keep their strength down or to reserve resources for
use by the "rich" countries. Development of such a
perception could create a serious backlash adverse to the cause of
population stability. Thus the U.S. and other "rich"
countries should take care that policies they advocate for the LDC's
would be acceptable within their own countries. (This may require
public debate and affirmation of our intended policies.) The
"political" leadership role in developing countries should,
of course, be taken whenever possible by their own leaders. The
U.S. can help to minimize charges of an imperialist motivation behind
its support of population activities by repeatedly asserting that such
support derives from a concern with: (a) the right of the individual couple to determine freely and
responsibly their number and spacing of children and to have
information, education, and 1means to do so; and (b) the fundamental social and economic development of poor countries in
which rapid population growth is both a contributing cause and a
consequence of widespread poverty. Furthermore,
the U.S. should also take steps to convey the message that the control
of world population growth is in the mutual interest of the developed
and developing countries alike. Family
planning programs should be supported by multilateral organizations
wherever they can provide the most efficient and acceptable means.
Where U.S. bilateral assistance is necessary or preferred, it should
be provided in collaboration with host country institutions -- as is
the case now. Credit should go to local leaders for the success of
projects. The success and acceptability of family planning assistance
will depend in large measure on the degree to which it contributes to
the ability of the host government to serve and obtain the support of
its people. In
many countries today, decision-makers are wary of instituting
population programs, not because they are unconcerned about rapid
population growth, but because they lack confidence that such programs
will succeed. By actively working to demonstrate to such leaders that
national population and family planning programs have achieved
progress in a wide variety of poor countries, the U.S. could help
persuade the leaders of many countries that the investment of funds in
national family planning programs is likely to yield high returns even
in the short and medium term. Several examples of success exist
already, although regrettably they tend to come from LDCs that are
untypically well off in terms of income growth and/or social services
or are islands or city states. We
should also appeal to potential leaders among the younger generations
in developing countries, focusing on the implications of continued
rapid population growth for their countries in the next 10-20 years,
when they may assume national leadership roles. Beyond
seeking to reach and influence national leaders, improved world-wide
support for population-related efforts should be sought through
increased emphasis on mass media and other population education and
motivation programs by the U.N., USIA, and USAID. We should give
higher priorities in our information programs world-wide for this area
and consider expansion of collaborative arrangements with multilateral
institutions in population education programs. Another
challenge will be in obtaining the further understanding and support
of the U.S. public and Congress for the necessary added funds for such
an effort, given the competing demands for resources. If an effective
program is to be mounted by the U.S., we will need to contribute
significant new amounts of funds. Thus there is need to reinforce the
positive attitudes of those in Congress who presently support U.S.
activity in the population field and to enlist their support in
persuading others. Public debate is needed now. Personal
approaches by the President, the Secretary of State, other members of
the Cabinet, and their principal deputies would be helpful in this
effort. Congress and the public must be clearly informed that the
Executive Branch is seriously worried about the problem and that it
deserves their further attention. Congressional representatives at the
World Population Conference can help. An
Alternative View The
above basic strategy assumes that the current forms of assistance
programs in both population and economic and social development areas
will be able to solve the problem. There is however, another view,
which is shared by a growing number of experts. It believes that the
outlook is much harsher and far less tractable than commonly
perceived. This holds that the severity of the population problem in
this century which is already claiming the lives of more than 10
million people yearly, is such as to make likely continued widespread
food shortage and other demographic catastrophes, and, in the words of
C.P. Snow, we shall be watching people starve on television. The
conclusion of this view is that mandatory programs may be needed and
that we should be considering these possibilities now. This
school of thought believes the following types of questions need to be
addressed:
·
Should the U.S. make an all out commitment to major limitation of world
population with all the financial and international as well as
domestic political costs that would entail?
·
Should the U.S. set even higher agricultural production goals which would
enable it to provide additional major food resources to other
countries? Should they be nationally or internationally controlled?
·
On what basis should such food resources then be provided? Would food be
considered an instrument of national power? Will we be forced to make
choices as to whom we can reasonably assist, and if so, should
population efforts be a criterion for such assistance?
·
Is the U.S. prepared to accept food rationing to help people who
can't/won't control their population growth?
·
Should the U.S. seek to change its own food consumption patterns toward
more efficient uses of protein?
·
Are mandatory population control measures appropriate for the U.S. and/or
for others?
·
Should the U.S. initiate a major research effort to address the growing
problems of fresh water supply, ecological damage, and adverse
climate? While
definitive answers to those questions are not possible in this study
given its time limitations and its implications for domestic policy,
nevertheless they are needed if one accepts the drastic and persistent
character of the population growth problem. Should the choice be made
that the recommendations and the options given below are not
adequate to meet this problem, consideration should be given to a
further study and additional action in this field as outlined above. Conclusion
The
overall strategy above provides a general approach through which the
difficulties and dangers of population growth and related problems can
be approached in a balanced and comprehensive basis. No single effort
will do the job. Only a concerted and major effort in a number of
carefully selected directions can provide the hope of success in
reducing population growth and its unwanted dangers to world economic
will-being and political stability. There are no
"quick-fixes" in this field. Below
are specific program recommendations which are designed to implement
this strategy. Some will require few new resources; many call for
major efforts and significant new resources. We cannot simply buy
population growth moderation for nearly 4 billion people "on the
cheap." II.
Action to Create Conditions for Fertility Decline: Population and a
Development Assistance Strategy II. A.
General Strategy and Resource Allocations for AID Assistance Discussion:
1.
Past Program Actions Since
inception of the program in 1965, AID has obligated nearly $625
million for population activities. These funds have been used
primarily to (1) draw attention to the population problem, (2)
encourage multilateral and other donor support for the worldwide
population effort, and (3) help create and maintain the means for
attacking the problem, including the development of LDC capabilities
to do so. In
pursuing these objectives, AID's population resources were focussed on
areas of need where action was feasible and likely to be effective.
AID has provided assistance to population programs in some 70 LDCs, on
a bilateral basis and/or indirectly through private organizations and
other channels. AID currently provides bilateral assistance to 36 of
these countries. State and AID played an important role in
establishing the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA)
to spearhead multilateral effort in population as a complement to the
bilateral actions of AID and other donor countries. Since the Fund's
establishment, AID has been the largest single contributor. Moreover,
with assistance from AID a number of private family planning
organizations (e.g., Pathfinder Fund, International Planned Parenthood
Foundation, Population Council) have significantly expanded their
worldwide population programs. Such organizations are still the main
supporters of family planning action in many developing countries. AID
actions have been a major catalyst in stimulating the flow of funds
into LDC population programs - from almost nothing ten years ago, the
amounts being spent from all sources in 1974 for programs in the
developing countries of Africa, Latin America, and Asia (excluding
China) will total between $400 and $500 million. About half of this
will be contributed by the developed countries bilaterally or through
multilateral agencies, and the balance will come from the budgets of
the developing countries themselves. AID's contribution is about
one-quarter of the total - AID obligated $112.4 million for population
programs in FY 1974 and plans for FY 1975 program of $137.5 million. While
world resources for population activities will continue to grow, they
are unlikely to expand as rapidly as needed. (One rough estimate is
that five times the current amount, or about $2.5 billion in constant
dollars, will be required annually by 1985 to provide the 2.5 billion
people in the developing world, excluding China, with full-scale
family planning programs). In view of these limited resources AID's
efforts (in both fiscal and manpower terms) and through its leadership
the efforts of others, must be focussed to the extent possible on high
priority needs in countries where the population problem is the most
acute. Accordingly, AID last year began a process of developing
geographic and functional program priorities for use in allocating
funds and staff, and in arranging and adjusting divisions of labor
with other donors and organizations active in the worldwide population
effort. Although this study has not yet been completed, a general
outline of a U.S. population assistance strategy can be developed from
the results of the priorities studied to date. The geographic and
functional parameters of the strategy are discussed under 2. and 3.
below. The implications for population resource allocations are
presented under 4. 2.
Geographic Priorities in U.S. Population Assistance The
U.S. strategy should be to encourage and support, through bilateral,
multilateral and other channels, constructive actions to lower
fertility rates in selected developing countries. Within this overall
strategy and in view of funding and manpower limitations, the U.S.
should emphasize assistance to those countries where the population
problem is the most serious. There
are three major factors to consider in judging the seriousness of the
problem:
·
The first is the country's contribution to the world's population
problem, which is determined by the size of its population, its
population growth rate, and its progress in the "demographic
transition" from high birth and high death rates to low ones.
·
The second is the extent to which population growth impinges on the
country's economic development and its financial capacity to cope with
its population problem.
·
The third factor is the extent to which an imbalance between growing
numbers of people and a country's capability to handle the problem
could lead to serious instability, international tensions, or
conflicts. Although many countries may experience adverse consequences
from such imbalances, the troublemaking regional or international
conditions might not be as serious in some places as they are in
others. Based
on the first two criteria, AID has developed a preliminary rank
ordering of nearly 100 developing countries which, after review and
refinement, will be used as a guide in AID's own funding and manpower
resource allocations and in encouraging action through AID leadership
efforts on the part of other population assistance instrumentalities.
Applying these three criteria to this rank ordering, there are 13
countries where we currently judge the problem and risks to be the
most serious. They are: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Indonesia,
Philippines, Thailand, Egypt, Turkey, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Brazil,
Mexico, and Colombia. Out of a total 67 million worldwide increase in
population in 1972 these countries contributed about 45%. These
countries range from those with virtually no government interest in
family planning to those with active government family planning
programs which require and would welcome enlarged technical and
financial assistance. These
countries should be given the highest priority within AID's population
program in terms of resource allocations and/or leadership efforts to
encourage action by other donors and organizations. The form and
content of our assistance or leadership efforts would vary from
country-to-country (as discussed in 3. below), depending on each
country's needs, its receptivity to various forms of assistance, its
capability to finance needed actions, the effectiveness with which
funds can be used, and current or adjusted divisions of labor among
the other donors and organizations providing population assistance to
the country. AID's population actions would also need to be consistent
with the overall U.S. development policy toward each country. While
the countries cited above would be given highest priority, other
countries would not be ignored. AID would provide population
assistance and/or undertake leadership efforts with respect to other
countries to the extent that the availability of funds and staff
permits, taking account of such factors as: a country's placement in
AID's priority listing of LDCs; its potential impact on domestic
unrest and international frictions (which can apply to small as well
as large countries); its significance as a test or demonstration case;
and opportunities for expenditures that appear particularly
cost-effective (e.g. its has been suggested that there may be
particularly cost-effective opportunities for supporting family
planning to reduce the lag between mortality and fertility declines in
countries where death rates are still declining rapidly). 3.
Mode and Content of U.S. Population Assistance In
moving from geographic emphases to strategies for the mode and
functional content of population assistance to both the higher and
lower priority countries which are to be assisted, various factors
need to be considered: (1) the extent of a country's understanding of
its population problem and interest in responding to it; (2) the
specific actions needed to cope with the problem; (3) the country's
need for external financial assistance to deal with the problem; and
(4) its receptivity to various forms of assistance. Some
of the countries in the high priority group cited above (e.g.
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand) and some lower
priority countries have recognized that rapid population growth is a
problem, are taking actions of their own to deal with it, and are
receptive to assistance from the U.S. (through bilateral or central
AID funding) and other donors, as well as to multilateral support for
their efforts. In these cases AID should continue to provide such
assistance based on each country's functional needs, the effectiveness
with which funds can be used in these areas, and current or adjusted
divisions of labor among other donors and organizations providing
assistance to the country. Furthermore, our assistance strategies for
these countries should consider their capabilities to finance needed
population actions. Countries which have relatively large surpluses of
export earning and foreign exchange reserves are unlikely to require
large-scale external financial assistance and should be encouraged to
finance their own commodity imports as well as local costs. In such
cases our strategy should be to concentrate on needed technical
assistance and on attempting to play a catalytic role in encouraging
better programs and additional host country financing for dealing with
the population problem. In
other high and lower priority countries U.S. assistance is limited
either by the nature of political or diplomatic relations with those
countries (e.g. India, Egypt), or by the lack of strong government
interest in population reduction programs (e.g. Nigeria, Ethiopia,
Mexico, Brazil). In such cases, external technical and financial
assistance, if desired by the countries, would have to come from other
donors and/or from private and international organizations (many of
which receive contributions from AID). The USG would, however,
maintain an interest (e.g. through Embassies) in such countries'
population problems and programs (if any) to reduce population growth
rates. Moreover, particularly in the case of high priority countries
to which U.S. population assistance is now limited for one reason or
another, we should be alert to opportunities for expanding our
assistance efforts and for demonstrating to their leaders the
consequences of rapid population growth and the benefits of actions to
reduce fertility. In
countries to which other forms of U.S. assistance are provided but not
population assistance, AID will monitor progress toward achievement of
development objectives, taking into account the extent to which these
are hindered by rapid population growth, and will look for
opportunities to encourage initiation of or improvement in population
policies and programs. In
addition, the U.S. strategy should support general activities capable
of achieving major breakthroughs in key problems which hinder
attainment of fertility control objectives. For example, the
development of more effective, simpler contraceptive methods through
bio-medical research will benefit all countries which face the problem
of rapid population growth; improvements in methods for measuring
demographic changes will assist a number of LDCs in determining
current population growth rates and evaluating the impact over time of
population/family planning activities. 4.
Resource Allocations for U.S. Population Assistance AID
funds obligated for population/family planning assistance rose
steadily since inception of the program ($10 million in the FY 1965-67
period) to nearly $125 million in FY 1972. In FY 1973, however, funds
available for population remained at the $125 million level; in FY
1974 they actually declined slightly, to $112.5 million because of a
ceiling on population obligations inserted in the legislation by the
House Appropriations Committee. With this plateau in AID population
obligations, worldwide resources have not been adequate to meet all
identified, sensible funding needs, and we therefore see opportunities
for significant expansion of the program. Some
major actions in the area of creating conditions for fertility
decline, as described in Section IIB, can be funded from AID resources
available for the sectors in question (e.g., education, agriculture).
Other actions come under the purview of population ("Title
X") funds. In this latter category, increases in projected budget
requests to the Congress on the order of $35-50 million annually
through FY 1980 -- above the $137.5 million requested by FY 1975 --
appear appropriate at this time. Such increases must be accompanied by
expanding contributions to the worldwide population effort from other
donors and organizations and from the LDCs themselves, if significant
progress is to be made. The USG should take advantage of appropriate
opportunities to stimulate such contributions from others.
National
Security Study Memorandum 200
Title X Funding for Population
+----------------------------------------------------+
| Year
Amount ($ million) |
+----------------------------------------------------+
| FY 1972 - Actual Obligations
123.3
|
| FY 1973 - Actual Obligations
125.6
|
| FY 1974 - Actual Obligations
112.4
|
| FY 1975 - Request to Congress
137.5
|
| FY 1976 - Projection
170
|
| FY 1977 - Projection
210
|
| FY 1978 - Projection
250
|
| FY 1979 - Projection
300
|
| FY 1980 - Projection
350
|
+----------------------------------------------------+
Our
objective should be to assure that developing countries make family
planning information, educational and means available to all their
peoples by 1980. Our efforts should include:
·
Increased A.I.D. bilateral and centrally-funded programs, consistent with
the geographic priorities cited above.
·
Expanded contributions to multilateral and private organizations that can
work effectively in the population area.
·
Further research on the relative impact of various socio-economic factors
on desired family size, and experimental efforts to test the
feasibility of larger-scale efforts to affect some of these factors.
·
Additional bio-medical research to improve the existing means of
fertility control and to develop new ones which are safe, effective,
inexpensive, and attractive to both men and women.
·
Innovative approaches to providing family planning services, such as the
utilization of commercial channels for distribution of contraceptives,
and the development of low-cost systems for delivering effective
health and family planning services to the 85% of LDC populations not
now reached by such services.
·
Expanded efforts to increase the awareness of LDC leaders and publics
regarding the consequences of rapid population growth and to stimulate
further LDC commitment to actions to reduce fertility. We
believe expansions in the range of 35-50 million annually over the
next five years are realistic, in light of potential LDC needs and
prospects for increased contributions from other population assistance
instrumentalities, as well as constraints on the speed with which AID
(and other donors) population funds can be expanded and effectively
utilized. These include negative or ambivalent host government
attitudes toward population reduction programs; the need for
complementary financial and manpower inputs by recipient governments,
which must come at the expense of other programs they consider to be
high priority; and the need to assure that new projects involve
sensible, effective actions that are likely to reduce fertility. We
must avoid inadequately planned or implemented programs that lead to
extremely high costs per acceptor. In effect, we are closer to
"absorptive capacity" in terms of year-to-year increases in
population programs than we are, for example, in annual expansions in
food, fertilizer or generalized resource transfers. It
would be premature to make detailed funding recommendations by
countries and functional categories in light of our inability to
predict what changes -- such as in host country attitudes to U.S.
population assistance and in fertility control technologies -- may
occur which would significantly alter funding needs in particular
geographic or functional areas. For example, AID is currently
precluded from providing bilateral assistance to India and Egypt, two
significant countries in the highest priority group, due to the nature
of U.S. political and diplomatic relations with these countries.
However, if these relationships were to change and bilateral aid could
be provided, we would want to consider providing appropriate
population assistance to these countries. In other cases, changing
U.S.-LDC relationships might preclude further aid to some countries.
Factors such as these could both change the mix and affect overall
magnitudes of funds needed for population assistance. Therefore,
proposed program mixes and funding levels by geographic and functional
categories should continue to be examined on an annual basis during
the regular USG program and budget review processes which lead to the
presentation of funding requests to the Congress. Recognizing
that changing opportunities for action could substantially affect
AID's resource requirements for population assistance, we anticipate
that, if funds are provided by the Congress at the levels projected,
we would be able to cover necessary actions related to the highest
priority countries and also those related to lower priority countries,
moving reasonably far down the list. At this point, however, AID
believes it would not be desirable to make priority judgments on which
activities would not be funded if Congress did not provide the levels
projected. If cuts were made in these levels we would have to make
judgments based on such factors as the priority rankings of countries,
then-existing LDC needs, and divisions of labor with other actors in
the population assistance area. If
AID's population assistance program is to expand at the general
magnitudes cited above, additional direct hire staff will likely be
needed. While the expansion in program action would be primarily
through grants and contracts with LDC or U.S. institutions, or through
contributions to international organizations, increases in direct hire
staff would be necessary to review project proposals, monitor their
implementation through such instrumentalities, and evaluate their
progress against pre-established goals. Specific direct hire manpower
requirements should continue to be considered during the annual
program and budget reviews, along with details of program mix and
funding levels by country and functional category, in order to
correlate staffing needs with projected program actions for a
particular year. Recommendations
1. The
U.S. strategy should be to encourage and support, through bilateral,
multilateral and other channels, constructive action to lower
fertility rates in selected developing countries. The U.S. should
apply each of the relevant provisions of its World Population Plan of
Action and use it to influence and support actions by developing
countries. 2.
Within this overall strategy, the U.S. should give highest priority,
in terms of resource allocation (along with donors) to efforts to
encourage assistance from others to those countries cited above where
the population problem is most serious, and provide assistance to
other countries as funds and staff permit. 3.
AID's further development of population program priorities, both
geographic and functional, should be consistent with the general
strategy discussed above, with the other recommendations of this paper
and with the World Population Plan of Action. The strategies should be
coordinated with the population activities of other donors countries
and agencies using the WPPA as leverage to obtain suitable action. 4.
AID's budget requests over the next five years should include a major
expansion of bilateral population and family planning programs (as
appropriate for each country or region), of functional activities as
necessary, and of contributions through multilateral channels,
consistent with the general funding magnitudes discussed above. The
proposed budgets should emphasize the country and functional
priorities outlined in the recommendations of this study and as
detailed in AID's geographic and functional strategy papers. II. B.
Functional Assistance Programs to Create Conditions for Fertility
Decline Introduction
Discussion It
is clear that the availability of contraceptive services and
information, important as that is, is not the only element required to
address the population problems of the LDCs. Substantial evidence
shows that many families in LDCs (especially the poor) consciously
prefer to have numerous children for a variety of economic and social
reasons. For example, small children can make economic contributions
on family farms, children can be important sources of support for old
parents where no alternative form of social security exists, and
children may be a source of status for women who have few alternatives
in male-dominated societies. The
desire for large families diminishes as income rises. Developed
countries and the more developed areas in LDCs have lower fertility
than less developed areas. Similarly, family planning programs produce
more acceptors and have a greater impact on fertility in developed
areas than they do in less developed areas. Thus, investments in
development are important in lowering fertility rates. We know that
the major socio-economic determinants of fertility are strongly
interrelated. A change in any one of them is likely to produce a
change in the others as well. Clearly development per se is a
powerful determinant of fertility. However, since it is unlikely that
most LDCs will develop sufficiently during the next 25-30 years, it is
crucial to identify those sectors that most directly and powerfully
affect fertility. In
this context, population should be viewed as a variable which
interacts, to differing degrees, with a wide range of development
programs, and the U.S. strategy should continue to stress the
importance of taking population into account in "non-family
planning" activities. This is particularly important with the
increasing focus in the U.S. development program on food and
nutrition, health and population, and education and human resources;
assistance programs have less chance of success as long as the numbers
to be fed, educated, and employed are increasing rapidly. Thus,
to assist in achieving LDC fertility reduction, not only should family
planning be high up on the priority list for U.S. foreign assistance,
but high priority in allocation of funds should be given to programs
in other sectors that contribute in a cost-effective manner in
reduction in population growth. There
is a growing, but still quite small, body of research to determine the
socio-economic aspects of development that most directly and
powerfully affect fertility. Although the limited analysis to date
cannot be considered definitive, there is general agreement that the
five following factors (in addition to increases in per capita income)
tend to be strongly associated with fertility declines: education,
especially the education of women; reductions in infant mortality;
wage employment opportunities for women; social security and other
substitutes for the economic value of children; and relative equality
in income distribution and rural development. There are a number of
other factors identified from research, historical analysis, and
experimentation that also affect fertility, including delaying the
average age of marriage, and direct payments (financial incentive) to
family planning acceptors. There
are, however, a number of questions which must be addressed before one
can move from identification of factors associated with fertility
decline to large-scale programs that will induce fertility decline in
a cost-effective manner. For example, in the case of female education,
we need to consider such questions as: did the female education cause
fertility to decline or did the development process in some situations
cause parents both to see less economic need for large families and to
indulge in the "luxury" of educating their daughters? If
more female education does in fact cause fertility declines, will poor
high-fertility parents see much advantage in sending their daughters
to school? If so, how much does it cost to educate a girl to the point
where her fertility will be reduced (which occurs at about the
fourth-grade level)? What specific programs in female education are
most cost-effective (e.g., primary school, non-formal literacy
training, or vocational or pre-vocational training)? What, in rough
quantitative terms, are the non-population benefits of an additional
dollar spent on female education in a given situation in comparison to
other non-population investment alternatives? What are the population
benefits of a dollar spent on female education in comparison with
other population-related investments, such as in contraceptive
supplies or in maternal and child health care systems? And finally,
what is the total population plus non-population benefit of investment
in a given specific program in female education in comparison with the
total population plus non-population benefits of alternate feasible
investment opportunities? As a
recent research proposal from Harvard's Department of Population
Studies puts this problem: "Recent studies have identified more
specific factors underlying fertility declines, especially, the spread
of educational attainment and the broadening of non-traditional roles
for women. In situations of rapid population growth, however, these
run counter to powerful market forces. Even when efforts are made to
provide educational opportunities for most of the school age
population, low levels of development and restricted employment
opportunities for academically educated youth lead to high dropout
rates and non-attendance..." Fortunately,
the situation is by no means as ambiguous for all of the likely
factors affecting fertility. For example, laws that raise the minimum
marriage age, where politically feasible and at least partially
enforceable, can over time have a modest effect on fertility at
negligible cost. Similarly, there have been some controversial, but
remarkably successful, experiments in India in which financial
incentives, along with other motivational devices, were used to get
large numbers of men to accept vasectomies. In addition, there appear
to be some major activities, such as programs aimed to improve the
productive capacity of the rural poor, which can be well justified
even without reference to population benefits, but which appear to
have major population benefits as well. The
strategy suggested by the above considerations is that the volume and
type of programs aimed at the "determinants of fertility"
should be directly related to our estimate of the total benefits
(including non-population benefits) of a dollar invested in a given
proposed program and to our confidence in the reliability of that
estimate. There is room for honest disagreement among researchers and
policy-makers about the benefits, or feasibility, of a given program.
Hopefully, over time, with more research, experimentation and
evaluation, areas of disagreement and ambiguity will be clarified, and
donors and recipients will have better information both on what
policies and programs tend to work under what circumstances and how to
go about analyzing a given country situation to find the best feasible
steps that should be taken. Recommendations:
1. AID
should implement the strategy set out in the World Population Plan of
Action, especially paragraphs 31 and 32 and Section I
("Introduction - a U.S. Global Population Strategy") above,
which calls for high priority in funding to three categories of
programs in areas affecting fertility (family-size) decisions: a. Operational programs where there is proven cost-effectiveness,
generally where there are also significant benefits for non-population
objectives; b. Experimental programs where research indicates close relationships to
fertility reduction but cost-effectiveness has not yet been
demonstrated in terms of specific steps to be taken (i.e., program
design); and c. Research and evaluation on the relative impact on desired family size
of the socio-economic determinants of fertility, and on what policy
scope exists for affecting these determinants. 2.
Research, experimentation and evaluation of ongoing programs should
focus on answering the questions (such as those raised above, relating
to female education) that determine what steps can and should be taken
in other sectors that will in a cost-effective manner speed up the
rate of fertility decline. In addition to the five areas discussed in
Section II. B 1-5 below, the research should also cover the full range
of factors affecting fertility, such as laws and norms respecting age
of marriage, and financial incentives. Work of this sort should be
undertaken in individual key countries to determine the motivational
factors required there to develop a preference for small family size.
High priority must be given to testing feasibility and replicability
on a wide scale. 3. AID
should encourage other donors in LDC governments to carry out parallel
strategies of research, experimentation, and (cost-effective
well-evaluated) large-scale operations programs on factors affecting
fertility. Work in this area should be coordinated, and results
shared. 4. AID
should help develop capacity in a few existing U.S. and LDC
institutions to serve as major centers for research and policy
development in the areas of fertility-affecting social or economic
measures, direct incentives, household behavior research, and
evaluation techniques for motivational approaches. The centers should
provide technical assistance, serve as a forum for discussion, and
generally provide the "critical mass" of effort and
visibility which has been lacking in this area to date. Emphasis
should be given to maximum involvement of LDC institutions and
individuals. The
following sections discuss research experimental and operational
programs to be undertaken in the five promising areas mentioned above.
II. B.
1. Providing Minimal Levels of Education, Especially for Women Discussion
There
is fairly convincing evidence that female education especially of 4th
grade and above correlates strongly with reduced desired family size,
although it is unclear the extent to which the female education causes
reductions in desired family size or whether it is a faster pace of
development which leads both to increased demand for female education
and to reduction in desired family size. There is also a relatively
widely held theory -- though not statistically validated -- that
improved levels of literacy contribute to reduction in desired family
size both through greater knowledge of family planning information and
increasing motivational factors related to reductions in family size.
Unfortunately, AID's experience with mass literacy programs over the
past 15 years has yielded the sobering conclusion that such programs
generally failed (i.e. were not cost-effective) unless the population
sees practical benefits to themselves from learning how to read --
e.g., a requirement for literacy to acquire easier access to
information about new agricultural technologies or to jobs that
require literacy. Now,
however, AID has recently revised its education strategy, in line with
the mandate of its legislation, to place emphasis on the spread of
education to poor people, particularly in rural areas, and relatively
less on higher levels of education. This approach is focused on use of
formal and "non-formal" education (i.e., organized education
outside the schoolroom setting) to assist in meeting the human
resource requirements of the development process, including such
things as rural literacy programs aimed at agriculture, family
planning, or other development goals. Recommendations
1.
Integrated basic education (including applied literacy) and family
planning programs should be developed whenever they appear to be
effective, of high priority, and acceptable to the individual country.
AID should continue its emphasis on basic education, for women as well
as men. 2. A
major effort should be made in LDCs seeking to reduce birth rates to
assure at least an elementary school education for virtually all
children, girls as well as boys, as soon as the country can afford it
(which would be quite soon for all but the poorest countries).
Simplified, practical education programs should be developed. These
programs should, where feasible, include specific curricula to
motivate the next generation toward a two-child family average to
assure that level of fertility in two or three decades. AID should
encourage and respond to requests for assistance in extending basic
education and in introducing family planning into curricula.
Expenditures for such emphasis on increased practical education should
come from general AID funds, not population funds. II. B.
2. Reducing Infant and Child Mortality Discussion:
High
infant and child mortality rates, evident in many developing
countries, lead parents to be concerned about the number of their
children who are likely to survive. Parents may overcompensate for
possible child losses by having additional children. Research to date
clearly indicates not only that high fertility and high birth rates
are closely correlated but that in most circumstances low net
population growth rates can only be achieved when child mortality is
low as well. Policies and programs which significantly reduce infant
and child mortality below present levels will lead couples to have
fewer children. However, we must recognize that there is a lag of at
least several years before parents (and cultures and subcultures)
become confident that their children are more likely to survive and to
adjust their fertility behavior accordingly. Considerable
reduction in infant and child mortality is possible through
improvement in nutrition, inoculations against diseases, and other
public health measures if means can be devised for extending such
services to neglected LDC populations on a low-cost basis. It often
makes sense to combine such activities with family planning services
in integrated delivery systems in order to maximize the use of scarce
LDC financial and health manpowder (sic.) resources (See
Section IV). In addition, providing selected health care for both
mothers and their children can enhance the acceptability of family
planning by showing concern for the whole condition of the mother and
her children and not just for the single factor of fertility. The
two major cost-effective problems in maternal-child health care are
that clinical health care delivery systems have not in the past
accounted for much of the reduction in infant mortality and that, as
in the U.S., local medical communities tend to favor relatively
expensive quality health care, even at the cost of leaving large
numbers of people (in the LDC's generally over two-thirds of the
people) virtually uncovered by modern health services. Although
we do not have all the answers on how to develop inexpensive,
integrated delivery systems, we need to proceed with operational
programs to respond to ODC requests if they are likely to be
cost-effective based on experience to date, and to experiment on a
large scale with innovative ways of tackling the outstanding problems.
Evaluation mechanisms for measuring the impact of various courses of
action are an essential part of this effort in order to provide
feedback for current and future projects and to improve the state of
the art in this field. Currently,
efforts to develop low-cost health and family planning services for
neglected populations in the LDC's are impeded because of the lack of
international commitment and resources to the health side. For
example: A. The
World Bank could supply low-interest credits to LDCs for the
development of low-cost health-related services to neglected
populations but has not yet made a policy decision to do so. The Bank
has a population and health program and the program's leaders have
been quite sympathetic with the above objective. The Bank's staff has
prepared a policy paper on this subject for the Board but prospects
for it are not good. Currently, the paper will be discussed by the
Bank Board at its November 1974 meeting. Apparently there is some
reticence within the Bank's Board and in parts of the staff about
making a strong initiative in this area. In part, the Bank argues that
there are not proven models of effective, low-cost health systems in
which the Bank can invest. The Bank also argues that other sectors
such as agriculture, should receive higher priority in the competition
for scarce resources. In addition, arguments are made in some quarters
of the Bank that the Bank ought to restrict itself to "hard loan
projects" and not get into the "soft" area. A
current reading from the Bank's staff suggests that unless there is
some change in the thinking of the Bank Board, the Bank's policy will
be simply to keep trying to help in the population and health areas
but not to take any large initiative in the low-cost delivery system
area. The
Bank stance is regrettable because the Bank could play a very useful
role in this area helping to fund low-cost physical structures and
other elements of low-cost health systems, including rural health
clinics where needed. It could also help in providing low-cost loans
for training, and in seeking and testing new approaches to reaching
those who do not now have access to health and family planning
services. This would not be at all inconsistent with our and the
Bank's frankly admitting that we do not have all the
"answer" or cost-effective models for low-cost health
delivery systems. Rather they, we and other donors could work together
on experimentally oriented, operational programs to develop models for
the wide variety of situations faced by LDCs. Involvement
of the Bank in this area would open up new possibilities for
collaboration. Grant funds, whether from the U.S. or UNFPA, could be
used to handle the parts of the action that require short lead times
such as immediate provision of supplies, certain kinds of training and
rapid deployment of technical assistance. Simultaneously, for parts of
the action that require longer lead times, such as building clinics,
World Bank loans could be employed. The Bank's lending processes could
be synchronized to bring such building activity to a readiness
condition at the time the training programs have moved along far
enough to permit manning of the facilities. The emphasis should be on
meeting low-cost rather than high-cost infrastructure requirements. Obviously,
in addition to building, we assume the Bank could fund other
local-cost elements of expansion of health systems such as longer-term
training programs. AID is
currently trying to work out improved consultation procedures with the
Bank staff in the hope of achieving better collaborative efforts
within the Bank's current commitment of resources in the population
and health areas. With a greater commitment of Bank resources and
improved consultation with AID and UNFPA, a much greater dent could be
made on the overall problem. B. The
World Health Organization (WHO) and its counterpart for Latin America,
the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), currently provide
technical assistance in the development and implementation of health
projects which are in turn financed by international funding
mechanisms such as UNDP and the International Financial Institutions.
However, funds available for health actions through these
organizations are limited at present. Higher priority by the
international funding agencies to health actions could expand the
opportunities for useful collaborations among donor institutions and
countries to develop low-cost integrated health and family planning
delivery systems for LDC populations that do not now have access to
such services. Recommendations:
The
U.S. should encourage heightened international interest in and
commitment of resources to developing delivery mechanisms for
providing integrated health and family planning services to neglected
populations at costs which host countries can support within a
reasonable period of time. Efforts would include: 1.
Encouraging the World Bank and other international funding mechanisms,
through the U.S. representatives on the boards of these organizations,
to take a broader initiative in the development of inexpensive service
delivery mechanisms in countries wishing to expand such systems. 2.
Indicating U.S. willingness (as the U.S. did at the World Population
Conference) to join with other donors and organizations to encourage
and support further action by LDC governments and other institutions
in the low-cost delivery systems area. A. As
offered at Bucharest, the U.S. should join donor countries, WHO, UNFPA,
UNICEF and the World Bank to create a consortium to offer assistance
to the more needy developing countries to establish their own low-cost
preventive and curative public health systems reaching into all areas
of their countries and capable of national support within a reasonable
period. Such systems would include family planning services as an
ordinary part of their overall services. B. The
WHO should be asked to take the leadership in such an arrangement and
is ready to do so. Apparently at least half of the potential donor
countries and the EEC's technical assistance program are favorably
inclined. So is the UNFPA and UNICEF. The U.S., through its
representation on the World Bank Board, should encourage a broader
World Bank initiative in this field, particularly to assist in the
development of inexpensive, basic health service infrastructures in
countries wishing to undertake the development of such systems. 3.
Expanding Wage Employment Opportunities, Especially for Women Discussion
Employment
is the key to access to income, which opens the way to improved
health, education, nutrition, and reduced family size. Reliable job
opportunities enable parents to limit their family size and invest in
the welfare of the children they have. The
status and utilization of women in LDC societies is particularly
important in reducing family size. For women, employment outside the
home offers an alternative to early marriage and childbearing, and an
incentive to have fewer children after marriage. The woman who must
stay home to take care of her children must forego the income she
could earn outside the home. Research indicates that female wage
employment outside the home is related to fertility reduction.
Programs to increase the women's labor force participation must,
however, take account of the overall demand for labor; this would be a
particular problem in occupations where there is already widespread
unemployment among males. But other occupations where women have a
comparative advantage can be encouraged. Improving
the legal and social status of women gives women a greater voice in
decision-making about their lives, including family size, and can
provide alternative opportunities to childbearing, thereby reducing
the benefits of having children. The
U.S. Delegation to the Bucharest Conference emphasized the importance
of improving the general status of women and of developing employment
opportunities for women outside the home and off the farm. It was
joined by all countries in adopting a strong statement on this vital
issue. See Chapter VI for a fuller discussion of the conference. Recommendation:
1. AID
should communicate with and seek opportunities to assist national
economic development programs to increase the role of women in the
development process. 2. AID
should review its education/training programs (such as U.S.
participant training, in-country and third-country training) to see
that such activities provide equal access to women. 3. AID
should enlarge pre-vocational and vocational training to involve women
more directly in learning skills which can enhance their income and
status in the community (e.g. paramedical skills related to provision
of family planning services). 4. AID
should encourage the development and placement of LDC women as
decision-makers in development programs, particularly those programs
designed to increase the role of women as producers of goods and
services, and otherwise to improve women's welfare (e.g. national
credit and finance programs, and national health and family planning
programs). 5. AID
should encourage, where possible, women's active participation in the
labor movement in order to promote equal pay for equal work, equal
benefits, and equal employment opportunities. 6. AID
should continue to review its programs and projects for their impact
on LDC women, and adjust them as necessary to foster greater
participation of women - particularly those in the lowest classes - in
the development process. 4.
Developing Alternatives to the Social Security Role Provided By
Children to Aging Parents Discussion:
In
most LDCs the almost total absence of government or other
institutional forms of social security for old people forces
dependence on children for old age survival. The need for such support
appears to be one of the important motivations for having numerous
children. Several proposals have been made, and a few pilot
experiments are being conducted, to test the impact of financial
incentives designed to provide old age support (or, more tangentially,
to increase the earning power of fewer children by financing education
costs parents would otherwise bear). Proposals have been made for
son-insurance (provided to the parents if they have no more than three
children), and for deferred payments of retirement benefits (again
tied to specified limits on family size), where the payment of the
incentive is delayed. The intent is not only to tie the incentive to
actual fertility, but to impose the financial cost on the government
or private sector entity only after the benefits of the avoided births
have accrued to the economy and the financing entity. Schemes of
varying administrative complexity have been developed to take account
of management problems in LDCs. The economic and equity core of these
long-term incentive proposals is simple: the government offers to
return to the contracting couple a portion of the economic dividend
they generate by avoiding births, as a direct trade-off for the
personal financial benefits they forego by having fewer children. Further
research and experimentation in this area needs to take into account
the impact of growing urbanization in LDCs on traditional rural values
and outlooks such as the desire for children as old-age insurance. Recommendation:
AID
should take a positive stance with respect to exploration of social
security type incentives as described above. AID should encourage
governments to consider such measures, and should provide financial
and technical assistance where appropriate. The recommendation made
earlier to establish an "intermediary" institutional
capacity which could provide LDC governments with substantial
assistance in this area, among several areas on the "demand"
side of the problem, would add considerably to AID's ability to carry
out this recommendation. 5.
Pursuing Development Strategies that Skew Income Growth Toward the
Poor, Especially Rural Development Focusing on Rural Poverty Income
distribution and rural development: The higher a family's income, the fewer
children it will probably have, except at the very top of the income
scale. Similarly, the more evenly distributed the income in a society,
the lower the overall fertility rate seems to be since better income
distribution means that the poor, who have the highest fertility, have
higher income. Thus a development strategy which emphasizes the rural
poor, who are the largest and poorest group in most LDCs would be
providing income increases to those with the highest fertility levels.
No LDC is likely to achieve population stability unless the rural poor
participate in income increases and fertility declines. Agriculture
and rural development is already, along with population, the U.S.
Government's highest priority in provision of assistance to LDCs. For
FY 1975, about 60% of the $1.13 billion AID requested in the five
functional areas of the foreign assistance legislation is in
agriculture and rural development. The $255 million increase in the FY
1975 level authorized in the two year FY 1974 authorization bill is
virtually all for agriculture and rural development. AID's
primary goal in agriculture and rural development is concentration in
food output and increases in the rural quality of life; the major
strategy element is concentration on increasing the output of small
farmers, through assistance in provision of improved technologies,
agricultural inputs, institutional supports, etc. This
strategy addresses three U.S. interests: First, it increases
agricultural output in the LDCs, and speeds up the average pace of
their development, which, as has been noted, leads to increased
acceptance of family planning. Second, the emphasis on small farmers
and other elements of the rural poor spreads the benefits of
development as broadly as is feasible among lower income groups. As
noted above spreading the benefits of development to the poor, who
tend to have the highest fertility rates, is an important step in
getting them to reduce their family size. In addition, the
concentration on small farmer production (vs., for example, highly
mechanized, large-scale agriculture) can increase on and off farm
rural job opportunities and decrease the flow to the cities. While
fertility levels in rural areas are higher than in the cities,
continued rapid migration into the cities at levels greater than the
cities' job markets or services can sustain adds an important
destabilizing element to development efforts and goals of many
countries. Indeed, urban areas in some LDCs are already the scene of
urban unrest and high crime rates. Recommendation
AID
should continue its efforts to focus not just on agriculture and rural
development but specifically on small farmers and on labor-intensive
means of stimulating agricultural output and on other aspects of
improving the quality of life of the rural poor, so that agriculture
and rural development assistance, in addition to its importance for
increased food production and other purposes, can have maximum impact
on reducing population growth. 6.
Concentration on Education and Indoctrination of The Rising Generation
of Children Regarding the Desirability of Smaller Family Size Discussion:
Present
efforts at reducing birth rates in LDCs, including AID and UNFPA
assistance, are directed largely at adults now in their reproductive
years. Only nominal attention is given to population education or sex
education in schools and in most countries none is given in the very
early grades which are the only attainment of 2/3-3/4 of the children.
It should be obvious, however, that efforts at birth control directed
toward adults will with even maximum success result in acceptance of
contraception for the reduction of births only to the level of the
desired family size -- which knowledge, attitude and practice studies
in many countries indicate is an average of four or more children. The
great necessity is to convince the masses of the population that it is
to their individual and national interest to have, on the average,
only three and then only two children. There is little likelihood that
this result can be accomplished very widely against the background of
the cultural heritage of today's adults, even the young adults, among
the masses in most LDCs. Without diminishing in any way the effort to
reach these adults, the obvious increased focus of attention should be
to change the attitudes of the next generation, those who are now in
elementary school or younger. If this could be done, it would indeed
be possible to attain a level of fertility approaching replacement in
20 years and actually reaching it in 30. Because
a large percentage of children from high-fertility, low-income groups
do not attend school, it will be necessary to develop means to reach
them for this and other educational purposes through informal
educational programs. As the discussion earlier of the determinants of
family size (fertility) pointed out, it is also important to make
significant progress in other areas, such as better health care and
improvements in income distribution, before desired family size can be
expected to fall sharply. If it makes economic sense for poor parents
to have large families twenty years from now, there is no evidence as
to whether population education or indoctrination will have sufficient
impact alone to dissuade them. Recommendation
1.
That U.S. agencies stress the importance of education of the next
generation of parents, starting in elementary schools, toward a
two-child family ideal. 2. That AID stimulate specific efforts to
develop means of educating children of elementary school age to the
ideal of the two-child family and that UNESCO be asked to take the
lead through formal and informal education. General Recommendation for
UN Agencies As to
each of the above six categories State and AID should make specific
efforts to have the relevant UN agency, WHO, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, UNICEF,
and the UNFPA take its proper role of leadership in the UN family with
increased program effort, citing the World Population Plan of Action. II. C.
Food for Peace Program and Population Discussion:
One of
the most fundamental aspects of the impact of population growth on the
political and economic well-being of the globe is its relationship to
food. Here the problem of the interrelationship of population,
national resources, environment, productivity and political and
economic stability come together when shortages of this basic human
need occur. USDA
projections indicate that the quantity of grain imports needed by the
LDCs in the 1980s will grow significantly, both in overall and per
capita terms. In addition, these countries will face year-to-year
fluctuations in production due to the influence of weather and other
factors. This
is not to say that the LDCs need face starvation in the next two
decades, for the same projections indicate an even greater increase in
production of grains in the developed nations. It should be pointed
out, however, that these projections assume that such major problems
as the vast increase in the need for fresh water, the ecological
effects of the vast increase in the application of fertilizer,
pesticides, and irrigation, and the apparent adverse trend in the
global climate, are solved. At present, there are no solutions to
these problems in sight. The
major challenge will be to increase food production in the LDCs
themselves and to liberalize the system in which grain is transferred
commercially from producer to consumer countries. We also see food aid
as an important way of meeting part of the chronic shortfall and
emergency needs caused by year-to-year variation at least through the
end of this decade. Many outside experts predict just such
difficulties even if major efforts are undertaken to expand world
agricultural output, especially in the LDCs themselves but also in the
U.S. and in other major feed grain producers. In the longer run, LDCs
must both decrease population growth and increase agricultural
production significantly. At some point the "excess
capacity" of the food exporting countries will run out. Some
countries have already moved from a net food exporter to a net
importer of food. There
are major interagency studies now progressing in the food area and
this report cannot go deeply into this field. It can only point to
serious problems as they relate to population and suggest minimum
requirements and goals in the food area. In particular, we believe
that population growth may have very serious negative consequences on
food production in the LDCs including over-expectations of the
capacity of the land to produce, downgrading the ecological economics
of marginal areas, and overharvesting the seas. All of these
conditions may affect the viability of the world's economy and thereby
its prospects for peace and security. Recommendations:
Since
NSC/CIEP studies are already underway we refer the reader to them.
However the following, we believe, are minimum requirements for any
strategy which wishes to avoid instability and conflict brought on by
population growth and food scarcity: (1)
High priority for U.S. bilateral and multilateral LDC Agricultural
Assistance; including efforts by the LDCs to improve food production
and distribution with necessary institutional adjustments and economic
policies to stimulate efficient production. This must include a
significant increase in financial and technical aid to promote more
efficient production and distribution in the LDCs. (2)
Development of national food stocks15 <nssmnotes.html>
(including those needed for emergency relief) within an
internationally agreed framework sufficient to provide an adequate
level of world food security; (3)
Expansion of production of the input elements of food production
(i.e., fertilizer, availability of water and high yield seed stocks)
and increased incentives for expanded agricultural productivity. In
this context a reduction in the real cost of energy (especially fuel)
either through expansion in availability through new sources or
decline in the relative price of oil or both would be of great
importance; (4)
Significant expansion of U.S. and other producer country food crops
within the context of a liberalized and efficient world trade system
that will assure food availability to the LDCs in case of severe
shortage. New international trade arrangements for agricultural
products, open enough to permit maximum production by efficient
producers and flexible enough to dampen wide price fluctuations in
years when weather conditions result in either significant shortfalls
or surpluses. We believe this objective can be achieved by trade
liberalization and an internationally coordinated food reserve program
without resorting to price-oriented agreements, which have undesirable
effects on both production and distribution; (5)
The maintenance of an adequate food aid program with a clearer focus
on its use as a means to make up real food deficits, pending the
development of their own food resources, in countries unable to feed
themselves rather than as primarily an economic development or foreign
policy instrument; and (6) A
strengthened research effort, including long term, to develop new seed
and farming technologies, primarily to increase yields but also to
permit more extensive cultivation techniques, particularly in LDCs. III.
International Organizations and other Multilateral Population Programs
A. UN
Organization and Specialized Agencies Discussion
In the
mid-sixties the UN member countries slowly began to agree on a greater
involvement of the United Nations in population matters. In 1967 the
Secretary-General created a Trust Fund to finance work in the
population field. In 1969 the Fund was renamed the United Nations Fund
for Population Activities (UNFPA) and placed under the overall
supervision of the United Nations Development Program. During this
period, also, the mandates of the Specialized Agencies were modified
to permit greater involvement by these agencies in population
activities. UNFPA's
role was clarified by an ECOSOC resolution in 1973: (a) to build up
the knowledge and capacity to respond to the needs in the population
and family planning fields; (b) to promote awareness in both developed
and developing countries of the social, economic, and environmental
implications of population problems; (c) to extend assistance to
developing countries; and (d) to promote population programs and to
coordinate projects supported by the UNFPA. Most
of the projects financed by UNFPA are implemented with the assistance
of organizations of the Untied Nations system, including the regional
Economic Commission, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF),
International Labour Organization (ILO), Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), the World Health Organization (WHO).
Collaborative arrangements have been made with the International
Development Association (IDA), an affiliate of the World Bank, and
with the World Food Programme. Increasingly
the UNFPA is moving toward comprehensive country programs negotiated
directly with governments. This permits the governments to select the
implementing (executing) agency which may be a member of the UN system
or a non-government organization or company. With the development of
the country program approach it is planned to level off UNFPA funding
to the specialized agencies. UNFPA
has received $122 million in voluntary contributions from 65
governments, of which $42 million was raised in 1973. The Work Plan of
UNFPA for 1974-77 sets a $280 million goal for fund-raising, as
follows:
1974 - $54 million
1975 - $64 million
1976 - $76 million
1977 - $86 million
Through
1971 the U.S. had contributed approximately half of all the funds
contributed to UNFPA. In 1972 we reduced our matching contribution to
48 percent of other donations, and for 1973 we further reduced our
contribution to 45%. In 1973 requests for UNFPA assistance had begun
to exceed available resources. This trend has accelerated and demand
for UNFPA resources is now strongly outrunning supply. Documented need
for UNFPA assistance during the years 1974-77 is $350 million, but
because the UNFPA could anticipate that only $280 million will be
available it has been necessary to phase the balance to at least 1978.
Recommendations
The
U.S. should continue its support of multilateral efforts in the
population field by: a)
increasing, subject to congressional appropriation action, the
absolute contribution to the UNFPA in light of 1) mounting demands for
UNFPA Assistance, 2) improving UNFPA capacity to administer projects,
3) the extent to which UNFPA funding aims at U.S. objectives and will
substitute for U.S. funding, 4) the prospect that without increased
U.S. contributions the UNFPA will be unable to raise sufficient funds
for its budget in 1975 and beyond; b)
initiating or participating in an effort to increase the resources
from other donors made available to international agencies that can
work effectively in the population area as both to increase overall
population efforts and, in the UNFPA, to further reduce the U.S.
percentage share of total contributions; and c)
supporting the coordinating role which UNFPA plays among donor and
recipient countries, and among UN and other organizations in the
population field, including the World Bank. B.
Encouraging Private Organizations Discussion:
The
cooperation of private organizations and groups on a national,
regional and world-wide level is essential to the success of a
comprehensive population strategy. These groups provide important
intellectual contributions and policy support, as well as the delivery
of family planning and health services and information. In some
countries, the private and voluntary organizations are the only means
of providing family planning services and materials. Recommendations:
AID
should continue to provide support to those private U.S. and
international organizations whose work contributes to reducing rapid
population growth, and to develop with them, where appropriate,
geographic and functional divisions of labor in population assistance.
IV.
Provision and Development of Family Planning Services, Information and
Technology In
addition to creating the climate for fertility decline, as described
in a previous section, it is essential to provide safe and effective
techniques for controlling fertility. There
are two main elements in this task: (a) improving the effectiveness of
the existing means of fertility control and developing new ones; and
(b) developing low-cost systems for the delivery of family planning
technologies, information and related services to the 85% of LDC
populations not now reached. Legislation
and policies affecting what the U.S. Government does relative to
abortion in the above areas is discussed at the end of this section. IV. A.
Research to Improve Fertility Control Technology Discussion
The
effort to reduce population growth requires a variety of birth control
methods which are safe, effective, inexpensive and attractive to both
men and women. The developing countries in particular need methods
which do not require physicians and which are suitable for use in
primitive, remote rural areas or urban slums by people with relatively
low motivation. Experiences in family planning have clearly
demonstrated the crucial impact of improved technology on fertility
control. None
of the currently available methods of fertility control is completely
effective and free of adverse reactions and objectionable
characteristics. The ideal of a contraceptive, perfect in all these
respects, may never be realized. A great deal of effort and money will
be necessary to improve fertility control methods. The research to
achieve this aim can be divided into two categories: 1. Short-term approaches: These include applied and developmental
work which is required to perfect further and evaluate the safety and
role of methods demonstrated to be effective in family planning
programs in the developing countries. Other work is directed toward new methods based on well established
knowledge about the physiology of reproduction. Although short term
pay-offs are possible, successful development of some methods may take
5 years and up to $15 million for a single method. 2. Long-term approaches: The limited state of fundamental
knowledge of many reproductive processes requires that a strong
research effort of a more basic nature be maintained to elucidate
these processes and provide leads for contraceptive development
research. For example, new knowledge of male reproductive processes is
needed before research to develop a male "pill" can come to
fruition. Costs and duration of the required research are high and
difficult to quantify. With expenditures of about $30 million annually, a broad program of basic
and applied bio-medical research on human reproduction and
contraceptive development is carried out by the Center for Population
Research of the National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development. The Agency for International Development annually funds
about $5 million of principally applied research on new means of
fertility control suitable for use in developing countries. Smaller sums are spent by other agencies of the U.S. Government.
Coordination of the federal research effort is facilitated by the
activities of the Interagency Committee on Population Research. This
committee prepares an annual listing and analyses of all government
supported population research programs. The listing is published in
the Inventory of Federal Population Research. A variety of studies have been undertaken by non-governmental experts
including the U.S. Commission on Population Growth and the American
Future. Most of these studies indicate that the United States effort
in population research is insufficient. Opinions differ on how much
more can be spent wisely and effectively but an additional $25-50
million annually for bio-medical research constitutes a conservative
estimate. Recommendations:
A
stepwise increase over the next 3 years to a total of about $100
million annually for fertility and contraceptive research is
recommended. This is an increase of $60 million over the current $40
million expended annually by the major Federal Agencies for
bio-medical research. Of this increase $40 million would be spent on
short-term, goal directed research. The current expenditure of $20
million in long-term approaches consisting largely of basic
bio-medical research would be doubled. This increased effort would
require significantly increased staffing of the federal agencies which
support this work. Areas recommended for further research are: 1. Short-term approaches: These approaches include improvement and
field testing of existing technology and development of new
technology. It is expected that some of these approaches would be
ready for use within five years. Specific short term approaches worthy
of increased effort are as follows: a. Oral contraceptives have become popular and widely used; yet
the optimal steroid hormone combinations and doses for LDC populations
need further definition. Field studies in several settings are
required. Approx. Increased Cost: $3 million annually. b. Intra-uterine devices of differing size, shape, and bioactivity
should be developed and tested to determine the optimum levels of
effectiveness, safety, and acceptability. Approx. Increased Cost: $3
million annually. c. Improved methods for ovulation prediction will be important to
those couples who wish to practice rhythm with more assurance of
effectiveness than they now have. Approx. Increased Cost: $3 million
annually. d. Sterilization of men and women has received wide-spread acceptance in
several areas when a simple, quick, and safe procedure is readily
available. Female sterilization has been improved by technical
advances with laparoscopes, culdoscopes, and greatly simplifies
abdominal surgical techniques. Further improvements by the use of
tubal clips, trans-cervical approaches, and simpler techniques can be
developed. For men several current techniques hold promise but require
more refinement and evaluation. Approx. Increased Cost $6 million
annually. e. Injectable contraceptives for women which are effective for
three months or more and are administered by para-professionals
undoubtedly will be a significant improvement. Currently available
methods of this type are limited by their side effects and potential
hazards. There are reasons to believe that these problems can be
overcome with additional research. Approx. Increased Cost: $5 million
annually. f. Leuteolytic and anti-progesterone approaches to fertility
control including use of prostaglandins are theoretically attractive
but considerable work remains to be done. Approx. Increased Cost: $7
million annually. g. Non-Clinical Methods. Additional research on non-clinical
methods including foams, creams, and condoms is needed. These methods
can be used without medical supervision. Approx. Increased Cost; $5
million annually. h. Field studies. Clinical trials of new methods in use settings
are essential to test their worth in developing countries and to
select the best of several possible methods in a given setting.
Approx. Increased Cost: $8 million annually. 2. Long-term approaches: Increased research toward better
understanding of human reproductive physiology will lead to better
methods of fertility control for use in five to fifteen years. A great
deal has yet to be learned about basic aspects of male and female
fertility and how regulation can be effected. For example, an
effective and safe male contraceptive is needed, in particular an
injection which will be effective for specified periods of time.
Fundamental research must be done but there are reasons to believe
that the development of an injectable male contraceptive is feasible.
Another method which should be developed is an injection which will
assure a woman of regular periods. The drug would be given by para-professionals
once a month or as needed to regularize the menstrual cycle. Recent
scientific advances indicate that this method can be developed.
Approx. Increased Cost: $20 million annually. Development
of Low-cost Delivery Systems Discussion
Exclusive
of China, only 10-15% of LDC populations are currently effectively
reached by family planning activities. If efforts to reduce rapid
population growth are to be successful it is essential that the
neglected 85-90% of LDC populations have access to convenient,
reliable family planning services. Moreover, these people -- largely
in rural but also in urban areas -- not only tend to have the highest
fertility, they simultaneously suffer the poorest health, the worst
nutritional levels, and the highest infant mortality rates. Family
planning services in LDCs are currently provided by the following
means: 1. Government-run clinics or centers which offer family planning services
alone; 2. Government-run clinics or centers which offer family planning as part
of a broader based health service; 3. Government-run programs that emphasize door to door contact by family
planning workers who deliver contraceptives to those desiring them
and/or make referrals to clinics; 4. Clinics or centers run by private organizations (e.g., family planning
associations); 5. Commercial channels which in many countries sell condoms, oral
contraceptives, and sometimes spermicidal foam over the counter; 6. Private physicians. Two of
these means in particular hold promise for allowing significant
expansion of services to the neglected poor: 1. Integrated Delivery Systems. This approach involves the
provision of family planning in conjunction with health and/or
nutrition services, primarily through government-run programs. There
are simple logistical reasons which argue for providing these services
on an integrated basis. Very few of the LDCs have the resources, both
in financial and manpower terms, to enable them to deploy individual
types of services to the neglected 85% of their populations. By
combining a variety of services in one delivery mechanism they can
attain maximum impact with the scarce resources available. In addition, the provision of family planning in the context of broader
health services can help make family planning more acceptable to LDC
leaders and individuals who, for a variety of reasons (some
ideological, some simply humanitarian) object to family planning.
Family planning in the health context shows a concern for the
well-being of the family as a whole and not just for a couple's
reproductive function. Finally, providing integrated family planning and health services on a
broad basis would help the U.S. contend with the ideological charge
that the U.S. is more interested in curbing the numbers of LDC people
than it is in their future and well-being. While it can be argued, and
argued effectively, that limitation of numbers may well be one of the
most critical factors in enhancing development potential and improving
the chances for well-being, we should recognize that those who argue
along ideological lines have made a great deal of the fact that the
U.S. contribution to development programs and health programs has
steadily shrunk, whereas funding for population programs has steadily
increased. While many explanations may be brought forward to explain
these trends, the fact is that they have been an ideological liability
to the U.S. in its crucial developing relationships with the LDCs.
A.I.D. currently spends about $35 million annually in bilateral
programs on the provision of family planning services through
integrated delivery systems. Any action to expand such systems must
aim at the deployment of truly low-cost services. Health-related
services which involve costly physical structures, high skill
requirements, and expensive supply methods will not produce the
desired deployment in any reasonable time. The basic test of low-cost
methods will be whether the LDC governments concerned can assume
responsibility for the financial, administrative, manpower and other
elements of these service extensions. Utilizing existing indigenous
structures and personnel (including traditional medical practitioners
who in some countries have shown a strong interest in family planning)
and service methods that involve simply-trained personnel, can help
keep costs within LDC resource capabilities. 2. Commercial Channels. In an increasing number of LDCs,
contraceptives (such as condoms, foam and the Pill) are being made
available without prescription requirements through commercial
channels such as drugstores.16 <nssmnotes.html>
The commercial approach offers a practical, low-cost means of
providing family planning services, since it utilizes an existing
distribution system and does not involve financing the further
expansion of public clinical delivery facilities. Both A.I.D. and
private organizations like the IPPF are currently testing commercial
distribution schemes in various LDCs to obtain further information on
the feasibility, costs, and degree of family planning acceptance
achieved through this approach. A.I.D. is currently spending about $2
million annually in this area. In
order to stimulate LDC provision of adequate family planning services,
whether alone or in conjunction with health services, A.I.D. has
subsidized contraceptive purchases for a number of years. In FY 1973
requests from A.I.D. bilateral and grantee programs for contraceptive
supplies -- in particular for oral contraceptives and condoms --
increased markedly, and have continued to accelerate in FY 1974.
Additional rapid expansion in demand is expected over the next several
years as the accumulated population/family planning efforts of the
past decade gain momentum. While
it is useful to subsidize provision of contraceptives in the short
term in order to expand and stimulate LDC family planning programs, in
the long term it will not be possible to fully fund demands for
commodities, as well as other necessary family planning actions,
within A.I.D. and other donor budgets. These costs must ultimately be
borne by LDC governments and/or individual consumers. Therefore, A.I.D.
will increasingly focus on developing contraceptive production and
procurement capacities by the LDCs themselves. A.I.D. must, however,
be prepared to continue supplying large quantities of contraceptives
over the next several years to avoid a detrimental hiatus in program
supply lines while efforts are made to expand LDC production and
procurement actions. A.I.D. should also encourage other donors and
multilateral organizations to assume a greater share of the effort, in
regard both to the short-term actions to subsidize contraceptive
supplies and the longer-term actions to develop LDC capacities for
commodity production and procurement. Recommendations:
1. A.I.D. should aim its population assistance program to help achieve
adequate coverage of couples having the highest fertility who do not
now have access to family planning services. 2. The service delivery approaches which seem to hold greatest promise of
reaching these people should be vigorously pursued. For example: a. The U.S. should indicate its willingness to join with other donors and
organizations to encourage further action by LDC governments and other
institutions to provide low-cost family planning and health services
to groups in their populations who are not now reached by such
services. In accordance with Title X of the AID Legislation and
current policy, A.I.D. should be prepared to provide substantial
assistance in this area in response to sound requests. b. The services provided must take account of the capacities of the LDC
governments or institutions to absorb full responsibility, over
reasonable timeframes, for financing and managing the level of
services involved. c. A.I.D. and other donor assistance efforts should utilize to the extent
possible indigenous structures and personnel in delivering services,
and should aim at the rapid development of local (community) action
and sustaining capabilities. d. A.I.D. should continue to support experimentation with commercial
distribution of contraceptives and application of useful findings in
order to further explore the feasibility and replicability of this
approach. Efforts in this area by other donors and organizations
should be encouraged. Approx. U.S. Cost: $5-10 million annually. 3. In conjunction with other donors and organizations, A.I.D. should
actively encourage the development of LDC capabilities for production
and procurement of needed family planning contraceptives. 17
<nssmnotes.html> C.
Utilization of Mass Media and Satellite Communications Systems for
Family Planning 1.
Utilization of Mass Media for Dissemination of Family Planning
Services and Information The
potential of education and its various media is primarily a function
of (a) target populations where socio-economic conditions would permit
reasonable people to change their behavior with the receipt of
information about family planning and (b) the adequate development of
the substantive motivating context of the message. While dramatic
limitations in the availability of any family planning related message
are most severe in rural areas of developing countries, even more
serious gaps exist in the understanding of the implicit incentives in
the system for large families and the potential of the informational
message to alter those conditions. Nevertheless,
progress in the technology for mass media communications has led to
the suggestion that the priority need might lie in the utilization of
this technology, particularly with large and illiterate rural
populations. While there are on-going efforts they have not yet
reached their full potential. Nor have the principal U.S. agencies
concerned yet integrated or given sufficient priority to family
planning information and population programs generally. Yet
A.I.D.'s work suggests that radio, posters, printed material, and
various types of personal contacts by health/family planning workers
tend to be more cost-effective than television except in those areas
(generally urban) where a TV system is already in place which reaches
more than just the middle and upper classes. There is great scope for
use of mass media, particularly in the initial stages of making people
aware of the benefits of family planning and of services available; in
this way mass media can effectively complement necessary interpersonal
communications. In
almost every country of the world there are channels of communication
(media) available, such, as print media, radio, posters, and personal
contacts, which already reach the vast majority of the population. For
example, studies in India - with only 30% literacy, show that most of
the population is aware of the government's family planning program.
If response is low it is not because of lack of media to transmit
information. A.I.D.
believes that the best bet in media strategy is to encourage intensive
use of media already available, or available at relatively low cost.
For example, radio is a medium which in some countries already reaches
a sizeable percentage of the rural population; a recent A.I.D.
financed study by Stanford indicates that radio is as effective as
television, costs one-fifth as much, and offers more opportunities for
programming for local needs and for local feedback. Recommendations
USAID
and USIA should encourage other population donors and organizations to
develop comprehensive information and educational programs dealing
with population and family planning consistent with the geographic and
functional population emphasis discussed in other sections. Such
programs should make use of the results of AID's extensive experience
in this field and should include consideration of social, cultural and
economic factors in population control as well as strictly technical
and educational ones. 2. Use
of U.S. broadcast satellites for dissemination of family planning and
health information to key LDC countries Discussion:
One
key factor in the effective use of existing contraceptive techniques
has been the problem of education. In particular, this problem is most
severe in rural areas of the developing countries. There is need to
develop a cost-effective communications system designed for rural
areas which, together with local direct governmental efforts, can
provide comprehensive health information and in particular, family
planning guidance. One new supporting technology which has been under
development is the broadcast satellite. NASA and Fairchild have now
developed an ATS (Applied Technology Satellite), now in orbit, which
has the capability of beaming educational television programs to
isolated areas via small inexpensive community receivers. NASA's
sixth Applications Technology Satellite was launched into
geosynchronous orbit over the Galapagos Islands on May 30, 1974. It
will be utilized for a year in that position to deliver health and
educational services to millions of Americans in remote regions of the
Rocky Mountain States, Alaska and Appalachia. During this period it
will be made available for a short time to Brazil in order to
demonstrate how such a broadcast satellite may be used to provide
signals to 500 schools in their existing educational television
network 1400 miles northeast of Rio de Janeiro in Rio Grande do Norte.
In
mid-1975, ATS-6 will be moved to a point over the Indian Ocean to
begin beaming educational television to India. India is now developing
its broadcast program materials. Signals picked up from one of two
Indian ground transmitters will be rebroadcast to individual stations
in 2500 villages and to ground relay installations serving networks
comprising 3000 more. This operation over India will last one year,
after which time India hopes to have its own broadcast satellite in
preparation. Eventually
it will be possible to broadcast directly to individual TV sets in
remote rural areas. Such a "direct broadcast satellite,"
which is still under development, could one day go directly into
individual TV receivers. At present, broadcast satellite signals go to
ground receiving stations and are relayed to individual television
sets on a local or regional basis. The latter can be used in towns,
villages and schools. The
hope is that these new technologies will provide a substantial input
in family planning programs, where the primary constraint lies in
informational services. The fact, however, is that information and
education does not appear to be the primary constraint in the
development of effective family planning programs. AID itself has
learned from costly intensive inputs that a supply oriented approach
to family planning is not and cannot be fully effective until the
demand side - incentives and motivations - are both understood and
accounted for. Leaving
this vast problem aside, AID has much relevant experience in the
numerous problems encountered in the use of modern communications
media for mass rural education. First, there is widespread LDC
sensitivity to satellite broadcast, expressed most vigorously in the
Outer Space Committee of the UN. Many countries don't want broadcasts
of neighboring countries over their own territory and fear unwanted
propaganda and subversion by hostile broadcasters. NASA experience
suggests that the U.S. #notemust tread very softly when discussing
assistance in program content. International restrictions may be
placed on the types of proposed broadcasts and it remains technically
difficult to restrict broadcast area coverage to national boundaries.
To the extent programs are developed jointly and are appreciated and
wanted by receiving countries, some relaxation in their position might
occur. Agreement
is nearly universal among practitioners of educational technology that
the technology is years ahead of software or content development. Thus
cost per person reached tend to be very high. In addition, given the
current technology, audiences are limited to those who are willing to
walk to the village TV set and listen to public service messages and
studies show declining audiences over time with large audiences
primarily for popular entertainment. In addition, keeping village
receivers in repair is a difficult problem. The high cost of program
development remains a serious constraint, particularly since there is
so little experience in validifying program content for wide general
audiences. With
these factors it is clear that one needs to proceed slowly in
utilization of this technology for the LDCs in the population field. Recommendations:
1. The work of existing networks on population, education, ITV, and
broadcast satellites should be brought together to better consolidate
relative priorities for research, experimentation and programming in
family planning. Wider distribution of the broad AID experience in
these areas would probably be justified. This is particularly true
since specific studies have already been done on the experimental
ATS-6 programs in the U.S., Brazil, and India and each clearly
documents the very experimental character and high costs of the
effort. Thus at this point it is clearly inconsistent with U.S. or LDC
population goals to allocate large additional sums for a technology
which is experimental. 2. Limited donor and recipient family planning funds available for
education/motivation must be allocated on a cost-effectiveness basis.
Satellite TV may have opportunities for cost-effectiveness primarily
where the decision has already been taken -- on other than family
planning grounds -- to undertake very large-scale rural TV systems.
Where applicable in such countries satellite technology should be used
when cost-effective. Research should give special attention to costs
and efficiency relative to alternative media. 3. Where the need for education is established and an effective format
has been developed, we recommend more effective exploitation of
existing and conventional media: radio, printed material, posters,
etc., as discussed under part I above. V.
Action to Develop World-Wide Political and Popular Commitment to
Population Stability Discussion:
A far
larger, high-level effort is needed to develop a greater commitment of
leaders of both developed and developing countries to undertake
efforts, commensurate with the need, to bring population growth under
control. In the
United States, we do not yet have a domestic population policy despite
widespread recognition that we should -- supported by the
recommendations of the remarkable Report of the Commission on
Population Growth and the American Future. Although
world population growth is widely recognized within the Government as
a current danger of the highest magnitude calling for urgent measures,
it does not rank high on the agendas of conversations with leaders of
other nations. Nevertheless,
the United States Government and private organizations give more
attention to the subject than any donor countries except, perhaps,
Sweden, Norway and Denmark. France makes no meaningful contribution
either financially or verbally. The USSR no longer opposes efforts of
U.S. agencies but gives no support. In the
LDCs, although 31 countries, including China, have national population
growth control programs and 16 more include family planning in their
national health services -- at least in some degree -- the commitment
by the leadership in some of these countries is neither high nor wide.
These programs will have only modest success until there is much
stronger and wider acceptance of their real importance by leadership
groups. Such acceptance and support will be essential to assure that
the population information, education and service programs have vital
moral backing, administrative capacity, technical skills and
government financing. Recommendations:
1. Executive Branch a. The President and the Secretary of State should make a point of
discussing our national concern about world population growth in
meetings with national leaders where it would be relevant. b. The Executive Branch should give special attention to briefing the
Congress on population matters to stimulate support and leadership
which the Congress has exercised in the past. A program for this
purpose should be developed by S/PM with H and AID. 2. World Population Conference a. In addition to the specific recommendations for action listed in the
preceding sections, U.S. agencies should use the prestige of the World
Population Plan of Action to advance all of the relevant action
recommendations made by it in order to generate more effective
programs for population growth limitation. AID should coordinate
closely with the UNFPA in trying to expand resources for population
assistance programs, especially from non-OECD, non-traditional donors.
The U.S. should continue to play a leading role in ECOSOC and General
Assembly discussions and review of the WPPA. 3. Department of State a. The State Department should urge the establishment at U.N.
headquarters of a high level seminar for LDC cabinet and high level
officials and non-governmental leaders of comparable responsibility
for indoctrination in population matters. They should have the
opportunity in this seminar to meet the senior officials of U.N.
agencies and leading population experts from a variety of countries. b. The State Department should also encourage organization of a UNFPA
policy staff to consult with leaders in population programs of
developing countries and other experts in population matters to
evaluate programs and consider actions needed to improve them. c. A senior officer, preferably with ambassadorial experience, should be
assigned in each regional bureau dealing with LDCs or in State's
Population Office to give full-time attention to the development of
commitment by LDC leaders to population growth reduction. d. A senior officer should be assigned to the Bureau of International
Organization Affairs to follow and press action by the Specialized
Agencies of the U.N. in population matters in developing countries. e. Part of the present temporary staffing of S/PM for the purposes of the
World Population Year and the World Population Conference should be
continued on a permanent basis to take advantage of momentum gained by
the Year and Conference. Alternate
View on 3.c. c. The Department should expand its efforts to help Ambassadorial and
other high-ranking U.S.G. personnel understand the consequences of
rapid population growth and the remedial measures possible. d. The Department would also give increased attention to developing a
commitment to population growth reduction on the part of LDC leaders. e. Adequate manpower should be provided in S/PM and other parts of the
Department as appropriate to implement these expanded efforts. 4.
A.I.D. should expand its programs to increase the understanding of LDC
leaders regarding the consequences of rapid population growth and
their commitment to undertaking remedial actions. This should include
necessary actions for collecting and analyzing adequate and reliable
demographic data to be used in promoting awareness of the problem and
in formulating appropriate policies and programs. 5. USIA. As a major part of U.S. information policy, the improving but still
limited programs of USIA to convey information on population matters
should be strengthened to a level commensurate with the importance of
the subject.
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