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			[Page 35]
 
			The Social and Political Impacts on 
			Emerging Markets  
			of Recent Economic Events 
			  
				
					
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						Moderator: 
						 
							
							Marie-Josée Kravis
							 
						Speakers : 
						 
							
							Stanley Fischer William J. McDonough
 James D. Wolfensohn
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			AS THE moderator argued in her introduction, the backlash against 
			globalization in many developing countries has been from some 
			perspectives surprisingly muted. All the same the panellists argued 
			that it was impossible to understand either the cause or the cures 
			of the Asian contagion without taking into account 
			non-financial factors, such as the quality of the government, the 
			integrity of the legal system and the prevalence of corruption. Some 
			participants thought that the West needed to put more 
			effort into tackling these things before lending money. Others 
			thought the International Financial Institutions 
			should stick to what they know about rather that engage in 
			broad-ranging social engineering.
 
 FIRST PANELLIST
 There are plenty of important non-financial things that have 
			contributed to the spread of the Asian crisis, and 
			also must be part of any cure. These begin with the quality of 
			government: a $57 billion aid package is unlikely to be successful 
			if the government is incompetent and corrupt. Another challenge is 
			the legal system. Countries with property rights and good bankruptcy 
			systems have a much better chance of surviving the storm than those 
			that do not. Many countries sell jobs as judges to the highest 
			bidder: in the Caucuses, for example, many of the wealthiest people 
			are all judges. Then there is the regulatory framework, and finally, 
			the social safety net.
 
 The people who suffer most from economic dislocation are almost 
			always the poor. In Russia as many as 50 million 
			people live on less than $4 a day. Two hundred thousand people have 
			been thrown out of work in the coal mines, threatening social
 
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 unrest. In South Korea, the poor are still suffering, 
			and the biggest need there is for more structural reform. South 
			Korea was enormously lucky that it elected a reforming president 
			just before the financial system collapsed. Kim used his 
			opportunities to push through structural reform and even set up a 
			social safety net in Korea. Kim now faces an even more 
			intractable problem: the fact that the economy has bounced back 
			without the reform program being completed.
 
 No reform program will be complete without the active participation 
			of business. Seven years ago $30 billion a year flowed into emerging 
			markets. Last year the figure was $300 billion. Engaging business is 
			not just a matter for theoretical debate. It is crucial.
 
 SECOND PANELLIST
 The International Monetary Fund is controlled by 24 
			executive directors, eight from single countries, the rest from 
			groups of countries. Countries vote in proportion to the number of 
			shares they control in the organization: the United States 
			has 18% of the votes, the G7 has half, meaning that a 
			united West cannot really lose a vote. Everything the IMF 
			does is voted on. But contested votes are rare: decisions are by 
			consensus, with the consensus usually put together outside the 
			boardroom. The IMF’s legitimacy results from the fact 
			that it was established by international treaty with more or less 
			universal membership. It sticks very close to its original articles 
			of agreement.
 
 Corruption is a huge problem in the Fund’s 
			work. In Kenya, for example, hundreds of millions of 
			dollars worth of reserves have been paid out to businessmen and 
			politicians. The IMF clearly cannot lend developing 
			countries money if is likely to be stolen; but without IMF 
			loans their economies are likely to decline still further. Before 
			giving a large loan to Indonesia the Fund 
			had to deal with corruption, particularly the forestation fund, 
			which represented 2% of GDP but had never been 
			properly accounted for in the budget and provided the president’s 
			family with monopolies. Was the Fund’s decision to 
			fight corruption
 
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 destabilizing? Perhaps. But the real cause of instability was the 
			system itself.
 
 The International Financial Institutions are facing increasing 
			pressure to use their might to democratize countries. They should 
			not just consult with the government, they are being told, but with 
			interest groups of all descriptions. They are increasingly 
			responding to this pressure. But is it really their job to get 
			countries to accept values and standards that are not rooted in 
			economics? Pushing for the implementation of the International 
			Declaration of Human Rights, for example, is very far from the 
			traditional role of financial institutions.
 
 THIRD PANELLIST
 The best way to solve the economic and social problems associated 
			with crises maybe to prevent boom-bust cycles from happening. In 
			America, where these cycles have successfully been resisted, high 
			school dropouts are extraordinary successful at getting new jobs. 
			Boom-bust cycles are particularly bad for emerging markets. The poor 
			are hardest hit. There is no safety net to catch them when they 
			fall. And the middle class is devastated. We were very lucky that a 
			highly capable, democratic leader came to power in South Korea 
			when he did.
 
 The countries that went under in the financial crisis all have one 
			thing in common: very weak banking systems. As Schumpeter 
			pointed out, the only institution that is really essential to a 
			capitalist economy is a bank: banks act as shock absorbers and 
			workout specialists during recessions. But in Asia’s command economy 
			the government simply told bankers what to do. In a meeting of 
			bankers in South Korea in April, 1998, it rapidly 
			became clear that none of the bankers in the room had any idea what 
			a ``workout loan’’ was: they had never made a credit judgment and 
			had no idea how to work with a troubled customer.
 
 Banking is a very difficult business to learn. The best way 
			to learn it is to let foreign banks come into your country.
			Argentina was perhaps the first country to do this. 
			Argentine banking fami-
 
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 lies now send their children to foreign banks so that they can learn 
			the latest banking methodologies before they return to the local 
			bank. The other thing that is crucial is the rule of law:
			you need to be able to collect on your loans. In the United 
			States you can take ownership of collateral property in three 
			months; in Mexico it can take a minimum of 
			three-and-half years - and in that time your investment has probably 
			deteriorated hopelessly.
 
 DISCUSSION
 An early theme to the discussion was the fate of globalization as an 
			ideology. A Swiss participant pointed out that the Uruguay 
			Round had ended up in a very different - and very much more 
			pro-market - climate than it had begun; now, he warned, the climate 
			seemed to be changing again, with right-wing governments losing 
			power around the world. He wondered what could be done to co-opt 
			emerging countries into the system. A panellist replied that the 
			reason why countries find the transition to the market economy 
			difficult is not usually ideological - anti-market ideology is dying 
			out in much of the world, and has almost completely disappeared in 
			Latin America - but lack of competence, particularly in putting 
			together a financial and legal system that works.
 
 For one Swedish participant, confidence was the key. In most 
			countries, there is plenty of private capital available. But no one 
			will invest their capital unless they have confidence in the 
			institutional framework of the countries in which they are 
			investing. Indeed, lack of confidence promotes capital flight: there 
			is thirty times more Russian capital outside the country than inside 
			the country.
 
 Several other participants emphasized the importance of fighting 
			corruption. An Italian pointed out that Europeans are often too 
			shy about fighting corruption in their own backyards: in 
			some European countries bribes are tax deductible. A Canadian 
			thought it a little odd to make the International Financial 
			Institutions the main vehicle for fighting corruption and 
			imposing the rights of labour, when non-governmental organizations 
			already have an
 
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 impressive track record in fighting for these causes.
 
 The problem of Russia aroused a good deal of comment. A French 
			participant argued that the West bore a good deal of 
			responsibility for Russia’s situation. It had encouraged Russia to 
			jump into a free-market system that it had taken forty years for 
			Western Europe to embrace. Perhaps we should recognize that we do 
			not need a perfect world in order to do business, he argued. But 
			most participants were less sympathetic. A Swede pointed out that 
			much of the money sent to Russia has been squandered. 
			The state of the coal industry, for instance, is not primarily a 
			social problem, he argued, but a problem of organized crime. 
			An American asked whether there would ever come a point at which the 
			West would decide to stop lending money to Russia. Yes, 
			replied one of the panellists, the West has said enough is enough in 
			August 1998; but the West has a continuing 
			interest in tying Russia into the international financial system.
 
 However, the main focus of the discussion was the degree to which 
			outsiders - particularly the international financial institutions - 
			could intervene in the non-financial affairs of borrowers. A Finnish 
			banker pointed out that it has been standard practice in the 
			academic community for years to take into account social and 
			political factors. A Portuguese participant emphasized the 
			importance of having a "social argument’’ with all the major 
			partners in economic life.
 
 But others were more skeptical. A Swedish banker pointed out that 
			for his profession, the state of the legal system was simply part of 
			credit risk. An American argued that it could be a huge mistake to 
			interfere in political issues: the IMF should meddle 
			only in areas where it has the expertise, such as banking. In
			South Korea, for instance, the struggle between the 
			chaebol and the politicians has been a long-standing 
			political issue, and the IMF interfered at its peril. 
			A Canadian saw even more limitations in taking a "holistic’’ 
			approach. Should the private sector really be involved with labour 
			organizations and religious organizations? And should businesspeople 
			try to double up as social missionar-
 
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 ies? He worried that this policy would make the West enormously 
			vulnerable to demagogues. It might even create a "matrix of 
			colonialism’’.
 
 In their conclusions, some of the panellists defended the idea that
			the West had the right to demand higher standards. The 
			first panellist pointed out that in places like Azerbaijan,
			Armenia and Georgia the discussion has 
			not been about the West imposing something: it had been asked to 
			provide help and give the benefit of its experience. Fighting 
			corruption had got huge domestic support in these countries: in 
			Georgia, for example, the government had put the exams 
			for judgeships on television to prove that the system was being 
			cleaned up. The battle against corruption is not an overnight thing. 
			And it needs to be built around the traditions of the countries 
			concerned. But, in his view, it was certainly not a matter of 
			imposing foreign values.
 
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