by Michael E. Salla, PhD
from Exopolitics Website
I have recently had a number of discussions with members of the UFO Updates forum and it’s become clear that there is a quite a gap between those who advocate investigating whistleblower claims concerning highly classified projects involving ETVs/EBEs and those arguing that there isn’t the hard evidence or documentation to merit since an investigation. I think some of the key issues have been discussed in cases of whistleblowers such as Phillip Corso, Clifford Stone, Robert Dean, Bob Lazar, etc.
It seems that the underlying disagreement stems from what can and
can’t be done in terms of security procedures set up to maintain
secrecy in such projects. It is clear to me that there has been
little research done on how classified projects are set up and
security procedures set up for those by UFO researchers. This is
quite surprising given that the UFO phenomenon has been going on for
five decades and it’s well known that various national security
agencies and military departments classify this information since it
poses a threat to national security.
Current classification policies of the US Army are described in Army Regulation (AR) 380-5 which is available online at:
First it’s important to distinguish between the Confidential, Secret and Top Secret classifications currently used for information the release of which is deemed to damage national security in the U.S., and the various compartments created for more restricted information.
Next it’s important to understand the different types of compartments and projects that require ’special controls’ and/or a "need to know".
Information about the above classifications is available in the public realm. Classified programs and information are subject to oversight either through Congressional committees and/or Executive oversight through the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) which is attached to the National Security Council. There are severe penalties for those disclosing unauthorized classified information and these are determined by internal procedures that are spelt out in various manuals governing SAPs and SCI in the various branches of the military and government agencies.
The procedures governing penalties over unauthorized disclosure are subject to the congressional/executive oversight procedures in place. However, Congress has shown that in the case of waived SAP/SCI it exercises little effective oversight and this was identified as a major problem in the Moynihan Commission Report. A ’waived’ SAP/SCI is so sensitive that only eight members of Congress (the chairs and ranking members of the four intelligence [or defense] committees divided between the House of Representatives and Senate) are notified of a waived SAP/SCI without being given any information about it.
This means that for SAPs and SCI that falls into the waived category, there is no effective scrutiny by Congress of the security procedure in place for these and the penalties in place for unauthorized disclosure. So the idea that Congress has effective oversight over waived SAPs/SCI is a myth. The security procedures in place for SAPs/SCI are not under any effective Congressional oversight. While in theory, oversight coordination occurs in the ISOO set up in the NSC that issues an annual report to the President; the power to approve or terminate a CAP/SCI lies with the respective intelligence community and Department of Defense committees and executive officers. In general, Executive Office oversight of SAPs/SCI has been described as,
As far as whistleblowers of egregious policies that threaten public
interest are concerned, there is a procedure whereby whistleblowers
can typically chose to disclosure such practices either to Congress
or to the Inspector-General in the agency or department where these
occur. While whistleblower protection is not great for those
disclosing egregious practices in the way SAPs and SCI are run, it
exists in theory for those programs where Congress is informed of
these. In the case of waived SAPs/SCI, Congressional protection for
whistleblowers is non-existent since such programs are not
acknowledged to exist. This means that a whistleblower from a waived
SAP or dealing with waived SCI has no congressional protection since
it is a crime to acknowledge the existence of such an SAP or SCI.
Also, the penalty procedures in place for these have no
Congressional oversight and the executive oversight exercised by the ISOO is questionable at best.
In another leaked ’Majestic’
document, the "
Majestic Twelve Project: 1st Annual Report" it is
stated that the "national security status of the MAJESTIC operation
exceeds that of the H-bomb development" (Robert Woods, ed., The
Majestic Documents, p. 110).
Leaked documents indicate that the SAPs/SCI that fall into the Majestic classification compartment require the enforcement of extremely strict security procedures. The Eisenhower Briefing Document for example states:
These leaked documents lend support to whistleblower claims of draconian security procedures in place to deal with projects that fall into the compartment security classifications created for UFO/extraterrestrial affairs: Majestic; Cosmic; Umbra, etc.
Confirmation of these whistleblower testimonies is made especially
difficult since the existence of the SAPs/SCI they are disclosing
officially remain secrets the disclosure of which presumably leads
to "exceptionally grave damage" to U.S. national security. The US
Congress therefore is hamstrung in seriously considering or
providing protection to whistleblowers disclosing egregious
practices that genuinely threaten public interest in the way these
projects are run and the information contained in them. For Congress
to consider such whistleblower testimony would mean confirming the
existence of SAPs/SCI the disclosure of which arguably would lead to
"exceptionally grave damage" to U.S. national security.
In the midst of this tension created by conflicting
imperatives lie a number of exceptionally brave individuals who have
come forward to disclose information concerning waived SAPs/SCI
dealing with ETVs/EBEs. The rights of these individuals need to be
recognized despite the tension between the public interest they
claim to serve and the national security interests that proscribe
unauthorized disclosures of highly classified information.
draconian security procedures are in place to enforce secrecy
concerning programs and information the existences of which are
national secrets. There is an urgent need for public debate over the
most appropriate policies for dealing with the information and
technologies currently hidden in waived SAPs/SCIs concerning ETVs/EBEs.
Important steps in such a debate are to have such information enter
the public realm, and for whistleblowers disclosing such information
be given ’a fair hearing’ despite the inherent difficulties in
confirming their testimonies.
Without such support, the efforts of these
whistleblowers is unlikely to change what appears to be an
unresponsive national security system that assesses the potential
damage posed by the release of such information purely from its own
assessment of what constitutes "exceptionally grave damage" to
national security without sufficient input from the U.S. Congress or