by Elaine M. Ramesh
Dr. Ramesh is an
attorney in the Patent and Licensing Department of
Chemical Co., Naperville, IL.
She holds a B.S. in
Chemistry, State University of NY-Buffalo; a Ph.D. in
Chemistry, Texas A&M University and a J.D.,
College of Law.
She thanks Professor
Lori Andrews for assistance.
Sophisticated microchip devices are available for identifying stray
animals. Implants about the size of a grain of rice have been a
great boon for owners with lost or stolen pets. One distributor of
chips has reported that it has already implanted over six million.
A pet owner can be assured that the chances of
recovering a lost animal are greatly increased. At the pound, a
stray can quickly be scanned, and, if it has a microchip, the
animal's owner can be identified.
Is it not then conceivable that this technology might be applied to
humans? Indeed, such predictions have already been made. For
example, Alan Westin discussed the possibility of "permanent implacements of 'tagging' devices on or in the body" as early as
If the technology were extended to
humans, a myriad of identification-related applications could be
envisaged such as the capability to find lost children or confused
Alzheimer's patients, or to determine if job applicants are illegal
immigrants or criminals. By encoding the microchip only with a
single number, it might also carry, e.g., medical or criminal
history. Also, devices can be used for tracking.
Although each such application has utility, privacy implications are
ominous. The level of intrusion
necessitated by implantation may be objectionable, for there are
many legal rights which would be impinged upon. It is plausible
that, since the technology has not yet been perfected, there is no
need to address the incipient legal problems until devices are used.
However, because of the very drastic
reductions in personal liberty and privacy that such implantation
represents, the legal ramifications need to be explored now. The
reasons that a mandatory program of implantation for all citizens
must be necessary for an identification program to be effective will
A system using the technology, once in
place, may be difficult to dislodge despite limitations of
individual freedoms because its advantages will be extremely
attractive. The positive applications may be said to outweigh the
detrimental legal consequences at that time. Therefore it is not too
soon to consider the repercussions that mandatory microchip
implantation would have, as a pre-emptive measure.
The first part will explore the technology and discuss possible
applications for microchip implantation into humans. The second will
discuss common law, constitutional, and property rights affected by
Last, we consider protections that can
be effectuated if the technology is used.
The Animal Model
Microchips are about the size of a grain of rice and coated with
biocompatible glass. Upon implantation by syringe, connective tissue
should form to prevent migration.
The procedure is very low-cost and simple.
All chips are implanted in the same place (between the shoulder
blades) so that they will be easy to find and read.
To identify a
pet, a scanner passed over the animal reads a twelve character
identifier from the implanted transponder microchip and displays it
on a screen.
The owner's name and address can be
obtained from a registry with a toll-free phone call. The current
market for these devices includes pet, livestock and laboratory
Though the technology is quite useful, some problems have already
surfaced. The first arises because of a multiplicity of
makes his own scanner to read his particular chips, not those of
The second is that because of their
novelty, their longevity is uncertain.
Emerging Human Technology
There are indications that science is moving inexorably closer to
the use of microchips in humans. In fact, some have described human
implantation as inevitable.
For example, a U.S. patent discloses microchips implanted in teeth.
Carrying information on a microchip for identification has already
been developed for use, e.g., on a tag outside the body.
Dallas Semiconductor is marketing a
Touch Memory Button microchip with information to be read by
a scanner. Potential
uses include employee identification.
Also, SmartDevice, a microchip manufactured by a subsidiary
of Hughes Aircraft Co.,
has been described as follows:
The chip is a passive transponder,
without any power source, which has meant it can be kept very
small. The information is non volatile and can be activated by
low frequency radio waves and so read in a manner not unlike the
reading of bar coded items. It... is an application-specific
integrated circuit. The code is burned in a [sic] the time of
manufacture. It has a non-magnetic, ferrite core and a copper
antenna and is encased in biocompatible glass and as it is so
small it can pass through the bore of a needle to be inserted.
The SmartDevice is being placed
within the Trilucent Adjustable Breast Implant, by
LipoMatrix, Inc. to
"include device manufacturing data, device performance data and to
facilitate periodic information updates regarding device status,
adverse event reporting and post-market surveillance."
Clinical trials have already begun in Europe
and are about to begin in the U.S.
An investigational device exemption has
been granted by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
If the device is approved, it would not be difficult to envisage a
facile transition to SmartDevice or a similar microchip being
implanted into humans alone.
In fact, steps in that direction have already been made. According
to one source, Hughes Aircraft has submitted a read-write device for
carrying a person's medical history for FDA approval.
Although the device can be read from
only about a foot away, with the addition of a battery, it could be
read at greater distances.
As mentioned, a patent discloses a microchip applied to the tooth of
a human or animal.
Identification is accomplished by scanning the teeth.
Thus, an internal, implanted microchip for identification of humans
is already a reality.
Also, IBM researchers are reportedly working on personal area
network technology (PAN) to transfer data stored in a human implant.
Apparently, they are exploiting the salinity of the body to create
an electric field, by which data could be read.
In this manner, data could be exchanged
between people, or verified by an external mechanical system as a
method of securing identification.
Embodiments of the Implantable Microchip
Microchip devices might have three embodiments: read only,
read-write and read-write with tracking capabilities.
The simplest form of the device would have a read-only character,
similar to that now used in animals. Even this most basic form would
have numerous applications, for example, to identify Alzheimer's
patients, children and the unconscious. A broader use would be as a
sort of national identification card, based upon the identifying
number carried on the microchip.
However, there are objections to the use of any numbering system for
nationwide identification. The debate over the legality of national
identification cards is not new.
A system of national identification would entail a
specific number for each person, a means for indicating or recording
the number, and a registry. The Social Security number (SSN)
is thought of as such an identifier. Technically it is not because
people may have more than one number or more than one person may
have the same number.
Also, cards issued prior to 1971 were
based on information provided by individuals and not independently
verified. Moreover, the
system now in place, which requires underlying documents for
verification before a SSN is issued, is also subject to fraud
because of "the ease of obtaining fraudulent underlying documents
(breeder documents) such as birth certificates and driver's
Thus, the SSN is not entirely suitable
for a national identification card.
Alternatives that encode certain physical characteristics
numerically may be employed instead. Biometric identifiers are
preferable because they contain an inherent validation mechanisms.
If the identifier is merely a random number, it only has meaning
when connected to an individual. By contrast, a biometric identifier
representing a particular human characteristic may be clearly
matched to an individual.
One possibility is the numerical
expression for the unique contours of an individual's iris.
Aside from the difficulties involved with the assignment of a
reference number for each individual, other concerns came to light
when a system for country-wide identification purposes was proposed
in Australia. Among the
problematic issues in the introduction and regulation of a national
identification card in Australia were: inaccurate, incomplete,
irrelevant or misleading data and unauthorized disclosure of
"[o]nce the system is established,
it will be virtually impossible to resist demands to make it
available to a wider and wider range of agencies" were voiced.
The most serious overtone, however, was
that "requiring each citizen to carry a government number is another
step along the path of treating people as a 'national resource',
which means government property, whereas the liberal democratic view
has always been that the government is the people's 'property'."
A system has also been advanced for U.S. worker verification, in
part to combat illegal immigration. To that end, President
Clinton has asked for a $1 billion budget for the Immigration
and Naturalization Service to control illegal immigration.
Approximately $28M of that money has
been allocated for a worker verification system,
in response to pressures from Congressional
representatives for action.
Barbara Jordan called for a "simpler more fraud-resistant
system for verifying authorization to work" in a speech to the
Senate Immigration Subcommittee in 1994.
California Proposition 187 to decrease services for
illegal immigrants has been approved. In conjunction, Governor
Wilson has suggested that "all legal California residents carry a
tamper-proof identity card."
However, opponents have intimated that
the use of the system would not solve the problem but would worsen
the situation by forcing the undocumented workers "into the
underground market and into more dangerous or less secure jobs."
Others have also expressed interest. A Republican proposal includes,
"a tamper-resistant Social Security
card that would have to be produced when someone applies for a
job but at no other time."
Still others recommend updating and
completing Social Security Administration and Immigration and
Naturalization Service databases .
These are steps towards creation of a worker verification database.
Problems with the introduction of a national identification card in
the U.S. would be similar to those related previously in conjunction
with the Australian system. Further problems revolve around the
privacy implications connected with the maintenance of a large
database or registry to connect the identifier to actual
When a computer is used to search for
all the data on many different databases concerning a person as
listed by his identifier (computer-matching), there is an increased
risk of intrusion into personal privacy, especially where the
information can be obtained by or disseminated to many others.
Obviously, the use of a microchip implant would serve the purpose of
identification card, but it would also be connected to a
computer-based registry to access desired information about an
Thus, the difficulties described above
related to computer-matching will also be relevant. It is evident
that the issue of what identifier the microchip will be coded with
must be addressed before the microchip implant can effectively serve
as a national identifier in the U.S.
Another form of the microchip implant could be a read-write device.
This type of microchip would be capable of carrying a set of
information which could be expanded as necessary. That is so because
this type of device allows the storage of variable data, and is
programmable at a distance.
For example, if the microchip were to
carry a person's medical history, as that history evolved the
subsequent information could also be added to the microchip without
the necessity of removing the implanted chip.
While the use of such a chip in this capacity might require the
encoding of an enormous amount of data, scientists continue to
develop chips which are equal to the task.
The need for instantaneous access to the medical records of
individuals has been expressed by President Clinton as a part of his
universal health care coverage plan.
Therefore, the development of a microchip implant as a read-write
device to carry medical information has already begun,
and already has a potential application.
This however, is not the only purpose that a read-write microchip
implant could serve. It could also facilitate and record financial
transactions. Many credit card companies are already working to
Smart Card technology, using
chip-based payment products which are projected to reduce both fraud
and transaction processing costs.
Smart card used
for health insurance in France.
Another example of the interest in a
device with read-write capabilities is the Australian proposal for a
national identification card which mandated compulsory production of
the card in the following situations: investment, land transactions,
deposits at financial institutes, social security benefits, and
dealings in futures contracts.
It is evident that microchips do have
utility for recording financial transactions. Moreover, if the
credit card companies employed a microchip implant, instead of the
current external Smart Card under development, the
opportunity for loss or falsification would be even more drastically
The third important set of information that a read-write microchip
could carry would be criminal records. If one were to apply for a
job, employers could readily possible criminal convictions. This
might be particularly important for sensitive positions such as
security guards, bus drivers, or day care workers.
Additionally, if a police officer made a routine traffic stop, the
individual could be quickly "scanned" to see if he had a nefarious
Other potential applications could also be envisaged. The use of
read-write capabilities of the microchip would enable an airline
passenger to fly without purchasing a ticket. Upon sale, the
information that the purchase had been made could be imprinted on
Later at the airport, instead of asking
for a ticket, the stewardess would merely scan the individual to
insure that they had paid for travel, and were taking the correct
flight. This would serve a dual purpose in the case where the chip
carried information about criminal records. Subversives, known
terrorists or wanted criminals could quickly be identified before
their departure and be prevented from boarding.
Moreover, another commercial application would be to aid in toll
collections. The implantable microchip might replace the traditional
coin-operated highway toll system. Instead of paying as one drives
through the booth, one would be scanned, and a bill would be posted
to the driver's account. Prototypes of electronic toll systems are
currently undergoing testing.
Because of the multitude of
applications, this type of read-write microchip would generate both
commercial and governmental interest.
3. Read-write and Tracking
In addition to the read-write capabilities described above, a device
can also emit a radio signal which could be tracked. Applications
would again be numerous as evidenced by the less advanced
technologies already in existence.
An electronic tethering system is used
in some jurisdictions as a pre-trial detention monitor.
An ankle bracelet monitors a subject to ensure that he remains
within his home. If the device is removed, or the subject is more
than 50 feet from the receiver (telephone) it should transmit a
signal to police.
If a microchip implant had tracking
capabilities, it would be superior to the currently available
electronic tether because it would not require the telephone as an
adjunct. For the tether system to work properly, no one can use the
phone for extended periods, and line failure can interrupt
With a microchip implant, constant monitoring would be possible. If
each chip emitted a signal of a unique identifying frequency,
implanted individuals could be tracked by simply dialing up the
correct signal. The implantable microchip could be monitored from
the police station, a car or perhaps even a helicopter, in contrast
to the current tethering device, which only works if the tagged
individual remains close to the monitoring unit in his home.
the receiver is mobile, the tagged individual can be tracked
Such devices could also be used to keep a building secure, by
providing information as to who is in what portion of a building.
Some analogous devices are now used by biomedical researchers to
track animals. Microprocessor-based implantable telemetry systems
have been developed which require batteries for power to emit
batteries present problems due to their lifetimes and weight.
These problems need to be addressed for
implantable microchips to have such capabilities.
Post-Implantation Detection Avoidance
For several uses, such as encoding criminal records, persons
implanted would find it undesirable that that information be readily
available. As quickly as technology for implantation can spring up,
evasive techniques can be developed. For example, one might wear
certain clothing to block signals or even have the implant removed.
Equipment might be developed which could
be held up to the body to decommission the device.
If only criminals had implants, the result would be that criminals
would suddenly appear as law abiding citizens.
A requirement that everyone be implanted would circumvent such
be the most rudimentary method of deception. It would be much more
difficult to replace a correct chip with a counterfeit. Strict
controls and secrecy of manufacture would be imposed to prevent
this. Even if the
implant carried only work verification or medical information,
mandatory implantation is still needed.
We will therefore presume that, for microchips to have broad
utility, they must be mandatorily implanted. Commercial uses
involving consensual implantation,
or voluntary implantation for government record-keeping purposes
would be far less effective.
Below, the ramifications of mandatory
governmentally-imposed implantation will be viewed from the
perspectives of common law, constitutional and property rights.
Infringed by Microchip Implants
The right to privacy may be inferred from the language of the First,
Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments. It has also been established
through common law precedents.
As early as 1891, Justice Gray of the
U.S. Supreme Court indicated that,
"[n]o right is held more sacred, or
is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."
Similar sentiments have been echoed by
Justice Cardozo in his famous statement that,
"[e]very human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body."
The right to privacy defined by Justices
Gray and Cardozo is a right to bodily integrity.
One manifestation of that right is apparent in cases concerning the
terminally ill. These situations involve terminally ill adults who
wish, or whose relatives wish, to end their life. In Satz v.
Perlmutter, a competent terminally ill adult was allowed to decide
to terminate life support, based on his rights under the common law
doctrine of bodily integrity.
However, under the law of some states, a
person in a vegetative state must be demonstrated, with clear and
convincing evidence, to have earlier expressed a desire to terminate
life support under such circumstances before support can be removed.
A second manifestation in the common law of the right to bodily
integrity is the doctrine of informed consent. Though this doctrine
allows a pregnant woman to make informed choices for her life and
the life of her fetus, legal disputes have centered around the
question of whether or not the mother must submit to a Cesarean
section to save the life of her child, even if it is against her
An example of the use of the doctrine of informed consent is found
in In Re A.C., where a pregnant woman with terminal lung cancer was
forced by court order to have a Cesarean section.
Her difficulty in breathing was damaging
to the fetus, and doctors determined that a Cesarean section would
give the fetus a greater chance for survival, though she never
acquiesced to the surgery. Unfortunately, two hours after the
court-ordered C-section the child died; the mother died two days
later. The Court of Appeals, in recognizing a right to bodily
integrity as illustrated by the right to accept or refuse medical
treatment, said that the woman's competent informed decision to not
have a C-section should have been honored.
The ability to refuse invasive surgery
and the ability to hasten death both stem from the concept of bodily
To determine the legalities of policies affecting a person's bodily
integrity, courts often apply a balancing test whereby the weight of
the government's regulational objectives must be compared to the
weight of the individual's right to bodily integrity.
The court in In Re A.C. used this
"[i]n its analysis, the court
balanced A.C.'s interests of privacy and bodily integrity
against the state's interest in the potential life of the fetus,
by comparing the chances of survival for each."
Alternatively, it has been suggested
that strict scrutiny is the preferable test to determine whether or
not a regulation or requirement impinges upon an individual's right
to bodily integrity since the issues involved have such serious
some have suggested that the most rigorous of tests, requiring
compelling governmental interest and least restrictive means
possible, must be applied.
If the government mandated that all Americans be implanted with
microchips, it would be compelling an invasive procedure. Insertion
through a needle would not be complicated or delicate surgery, but
it would nonetheless interfere with bodily integrity. In addition to
the invasiveness of the initial surgery for implantation, the
continuing presence of the microchip within the individual must also
be taken into account. In combination with the surgery, the implant
represents a substantial permanent intrusion.
If a balancing analysis was used to determine whether one's rights
to bodily integrity were violated, the government would have
persuasive reasons for implantation due to the myriad of
applications previously described.
The numerous uses for microchip implants would indicate that a great
common good would indeed be served by their use. Moreover, with
regard to the degree of invasiveness, this implantation does not
require any in-depth surgical procedure, as in the case of a
Yet, intrusion upon individual's rights must also be considered. The
element of continuous intrusion elevates the consideration from one
of how drastic the surgical procedure is, to a consideration which
also includes the long-term, continuous effects. The continuous
intrusion could tip the balance against the government's police
If strict scrutiny analysis were employed, it would be even more
readily understood that implantation represented a clear violation
of individual rights. Ordinarily, this level of analysis is required
only where suspect classes are involved or where fundamental rights
are being regulated. Classification of the right to prevent foreign
objects from being placed in the body as a fundamental right is
plausible, and will trigger a strict scrutiny analysis.
compelling governmental interest might be evident, microchip
implantation is not the least restrictive means to achieve
objectives. Hence, mandatory implantation would not be legal.
Thus, by either mode of analysis,
implantation could be precluded because of violation of rights to
Devices described above can be said to impinge upon various
constitutional rights, depending on the embodiment. Here we focus on
the relation of human microchip implantation to the Fourth and the
The Fourteenth Amendment will be
discussed in conjunction with the impingement upon property rights.
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches
and seizures. A type of search which has been frequently tested for
potential violation of constitutional rights is the use of
electronic surveillance. In that instance, a bifurcated framework
has been used to analyze which acts of surveillance constitute
illegal searches. This approach considers first the implications of
the attachment of the surveillance device and second the
implications of continual monitoring once a device is in place.
These considerations must also take into
account the requirements of probable cause and particularity.
There must be a definite reason for
suspicion necessitating the search, and the search must also be
placed within finite limits. In this section, a search will first be
defined, then the method of determination of whether or not a search
is constitutional will be explained, and finally the applicability
to microchip implantation will be explored.
The courts often examine whether or not the activity under
surveillance normally has associated with it a legitimate
expectation of privacy in making their determinations as to whether
or not a "search" (requiring constitutional protection) took place.
This factor may be illustrated by a hypothetical surveillance of an
individual walking on the sidewalk.
Privacy often has two aspects:
Applying these to the hypothetical, just
because a pedestrian thinks sidewalk activities are private and
precluded from surveillance does not mean that they are. Legally,
because of no reasonable expectation of privacy on a sidewalk,
observing the pedestrian does not amount to a search for Fourth
The same type of question has been asked in litigation over whether
or not surveillance of a moving automobile is a search. If a beeper
is placed on an automobile for tracking, is it within the realm of
public activities and therefore a type of surveillance which is not
Courts have answered that question in
the affirmative, terming driving an activity associated with a,
"diminished expectation of privacy,"
not a search because "[a] car has little capacity for escaping
The same reasoning has also been applied
to beepers placed on airplanes,
and the use of infrared devices to examine the heat content
emanating from buildings.
The generalized concepts relating to the definition of a search have
been related to external examples of beepers or wiretapping.
However, the Fourth Amendment has also been invoked with reference
to internal intrusions upon individuals to obtain evidence which
could be used against them. Examples include the withdrawal of blood
and bodily searches which require surgical procedures or other means
to extract substances from the body.
In Winston v. Lee,
a robber was shot during an escape of the scene of an attempted
robbery. Shortly thereafter, a man with a gunshot wound was
discovered in the vicinity. To confirm that the suspect was
connected with that particular robbery, the police wanted to compel
surgery to remove the bullet. Because of the complicated and
life-threatening surgery required to remove the bullet, the Supreme
Court ruled that the surgery would be an unreasonable search.
Alternatively, other decisions have
classified these highly intrusive searches as warrantless searches
rather than unreasonable ones.
Thus, it seems that the courts are unwilling to totally relinquish
the power to conduct a highly intrusive search, regardless of the
Arguments have also been made that taking blood samples is another
example of an internal search which may be said to implicate the
Fourth Amendment, where those samples indicate intoxication.
The same reasoning has been suggested as
a reason to prevent the collection of blood samples from convicted
criminals to obtain DNA for a genetic data bank.
However, these arguments have not been successful against the claim
that greater restraints on liberties are required for the convicted.
Once it has been established that a search has indeed taken place,
it is thereafter unconstitutional only if a valid warrant was not
obtained prior to the search. The warrant is evidence that the
proposed search has been examined, and considered not to infringe
upon the suspect's rights. The leading case detailing the
constitutionality of the search when a warrant is provided is Katz
v. United States, which
examined the constitutionality of wiretap surveillance by the
The petitioner had been convicted based
on improperly-obtained evidence because the safeguard of first
obtaining a search warrant before bugging the phone booth had been
On appeal the court stated that,
"[i]n the absence of such
safeguards, this Court has never sustained a search upon the
sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence
of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities
to the least intrusive means consistent with that end."
The principles evolved for Fourth
Amendment claims can be applied to microchip implants. The clearest
application will be to the embodiment of the device that can
read-write and track. Still, read only and read-write devices also
implicate Fourth Amendment principles because, once installed,
either could be scanned by police to obtain information about the
individual. Scanning of the microchip would be considered as a
The first question to consider is whether or not a search (worthy of
Fourth Amendment protection) took place. Thus, scanning or
interrogation of the implanted microchip to obtain information from
it is the action to be evaluated. The act of implantation itself
does not constitute a search.
Rather, it is subsequent actions relating to the garnering of
information from the microchip which are of consequence to the
Fourth Amendment analysis.
In the case of any of the embodiments, an individual may have an
expectation of privacy as to the information on the microchip.
However, it would be more difficult to defend that expectation as a
justifiable one, if the microchip carried information of medical
records on a read-write device.
Because the information is vital for the
good of society, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.
Proponents of this theory would argue that such information was
available and on record already, and that this technology merely
increased the speed with which it could be recovered. If these
arguments prevail, there would be no search and no Fourth Amendment
However, one court has found that personal information should be
kept private and not readily accessible.
In a Doe case, this philosophy was
validated for medical information by judges who declared that,
"Doe has a right to privacy (or
confidentiality) in his HIV status, because his personal medical
condition is a matter that he is normally entitled to keep
Therefore, under Doe, retrieval of
information from a microchip read-write device is a search when the
information retrievable is of a type that is normally protected.
Monitoring a read-write device with tracking capabilities could be
defined as a search if the implanted citizen were law-abiding.
Because criminals have lesser privacy rights, tracking in their case
wouldn't be termed a search.
Once it has been established that a search has occurred, the Fourth
Amendment protections insure that the search is only permissible
under certain conditions: that a warrant has been issued and that
the search is described with particularity. Even if it is a
possibility that blanket warrants could be issued, or that a warrant
could be easily obtained, it will be difficult to evade the
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment with reference to
microchip implantation. That requirement is to prevent an overbroad
search which impinges on an individual's privacy rights.
If the embodiment of the device is read only or read-write, the
particularity requirement could be satisfied with a warrant.
Conversely, if the device was read-write with tracking capabilities,
the search would not be defined with particularity, as a person
could be monitored at any time, in any place.
In summation, in any form, interrogation
of the microchip implant can be considered a search under the
bifurcated analytical framework. The Fourth Amendment protections to
make a search constitutional could conceivably be met by the
government when the search involves certain information from read
only or read-write devices.
However, if the device is used for
tracking purposes, it will fail the particularity test and thus
violate the Fourth Amendment on the grounds that a valid warrant has
not been issued.
The Fifth Amendment provides, in part, that no citizen,
"shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."
Verbal self-incrimination is commonly
understood to be covered by the amendment, but it has also been
applied to removal of objects from someone's body.
"[A] person is compelled to be a
witness against himself not only when he is compelled to
testify, but also when... incriminating evidence is forcibly
taken from him by a contrivance of modern science" according to
a concurrence by Justice Black.
Non-verbal communications are not as
easily categorized. For example, in a case concerning whether or not
blood withdrawn from a suspect could be used to prove intoxication,
the court commented that,
"[s]ince the blood test evidence,
although an incriminating product of compulsion, was neither
petitioner's testimony nor evidence relating to some
communicative act or writing by the petitioner, it was not
inadmissible on privilege grounds."
Yet later in the same opinion, Justice
Brennan tempered the decision in the following manner:
"That we today hold that the
Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an
individual's body under stringently limited conditions in no way
indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or
intrusions under other conditions."
Thus, there appears to be some
disagreement as to the extent of the reach of the Fifth Amendment's
protection as applied to bodily intrusions. However, a common theme
in such cases is that the courts examine the difficulty involved in
terms of the level of intrusiveness required to obtain the
"non-verbal communication," to determine whether it is
The Fifth Amendment could be applied to the use of microchip
implants in humans because it could be a form of self-incrimination
where the device has tracking capabilities.
Note that the implantation itself would
not be incriminating, but the scanning or tracking of the implant
could be. The question which arises is whether or not the act of
carrying the implant is self-incrimination. According to decisions
which require a communicative act such as speech or writing, the
implant would not be an example of self-incrimination worthy of
Fifth Amendment protection.
Yet the carrying of the implant might
properly be categorized as a communicative act because the chip
would provide for constant communication of location.
If the government has the ability to
determine where someone is at all times, that information could be
used as evidence in the commission of certain crimes. It would be
analogous to the situation in which a suspect wore a beeper for
surveillance 24 hours a day for the rest of his life.
In that instance, it might be most
properly characterized as self-incrimination and therefore
prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. Conversely, if the implantation
were consensual, it could hardly be said to represent
self-incrimination because of acquiescence.
Moreover, if tracking or scanning of the microchip is considered
merely as a non-verbal communication, it may not qualify for Fifth
Amendment immunity if constitutionally obtained.
Since the act of scanning or tracking
does not involve any life-threatening operation, or serious physical
disruption, but rather only the monitoring of an electronic device,
it would not be intrusive enough a method to qualify for immunity.
Property rights are protected from governmental deprivation without
due process by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Here, we focus on the latter. To determine what is protected by the
due process clauses, it is necessary to understand what is meant by
the term "property." This is constantly refined and expanded by the
courts, but basically it refers to a collection of rights held in a
They may be tangible, as in the case of
land or possessions, or intangible, as in the case of intellectual
property. Property has been defined as "every species of valuable
right and interest" which may be protected by the State.
Although the concept of one's own body
as one's property has not been embraced by the courts, there is some
precedent for that expansion. The law does not provide an overtly
obvious method of insulation from bodily intrusions such as
mandatory microchip implantation, but it is argued that novel
situations require novel applications and expansions of existing
Here, the current rationale for and against the definition of the
body as property will be examined, followed by current indications
that the theory should be generally adopted.
Last, the application of the concept of
the body as property to the use of microchip implantation into
humans will be explained.
As explained, the concept of the human body as property is not
generally accepted. One reason is fear that if the body were
property, one could sell oneself or a portion thereof to another for
profit. The basic rights in property include the right to transfer
it as one wishes.
However, those fears could be allayed by
specific statutes covering and limiting transfers. Even the transfer
of land is subject to, e.g., zoning restrictions.
Another reason for hesitation to consider the body as property is
that it harkens back to slavery.
If the body were recognized as property, it would provide certain
advantages. Namely, the Fourteenth Amendment which insures that the
individual will not be deprived of property without due process of
law could then be invoked against intrusions into an individual's
body. It may be argued however, that the individual is already
afforded Fourteenth Amendment protection through the liberty aspect
of the amendment.
Liberty is generally thought to refer to
personal rights in conjunction with torts such as battery, assault
and false imprisonment.
These may be categorized as external
events, ones which are not the doing of the individual himself, but
rather the acts of another against the self. Conversely, property
rights in one's own body would cover the acts of the self concerning
the self. Therefore the liberty interest does not strictly apply,
and the property interest in the self could result in a right
distinct from the liberty interest.
The importance of this feature will be
Evidence for some situations in which the body has been considered
as property, or at least as quasi-property, can be found in statutes
and court decisions. For example, individuals can have limited
rights with respect to the corpse of another, referred to as
Surviving spouses often have the ability to determine how to dispose
of the dead.
Other rights in an individual's body are
defined by the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) which determines
how and to whom gifts of transplantable organs can be made
subsequent to the death of a donor.
Since one of the rights attached to
property is the ability to alienate it, the introduction of the UAGA
serves as evidence that it is permissible to have property rights in
one's body, though they
are statutorily limited.
In York v. Jones, a couple had an embryo cryogenically frozen for
future use. Later, they
wished to transfer it from an in-vitro fertilization institute in
Virginia to another in California. The Virginia institute refused,
citing the Cryopreservation agreement signed by the couple which
specified only one of three fates for cryo-preserved embryos.
Inter-institutional transfer was not one agreed upon. The Yorks'
argument, adopted by the court, was that the Cryopreservation
Agreement was an admission by the Institute that the Yorks had
property rights in addition to contract rights in the embryos.
Thus, within the confines of a contract,
the court was willing to recognize property rights in an embryo.
In a later dispute over the ownership of frozen embryos, another
court was not as willing to go as far.
The Davises had seven in-vitro fertilized embryos stored at a clinic
for later implantation. Afterwards, in divorce proceedings they
disagreed over who should get the embryos. Finding it impossible to
call the embryos "persons", and unwilling to call them "property",
the court compromised by putting them in an "interim category that
entitles them to special respect because of their potential for
The rights or duties entailed by the
interim category were not further elaborated upon other than to
indicate that the interest of the parents was one of ownership
(where they had equal weight in determining the fate of the
embryos). In both York
and Davis, the emphasis was on an embryo outside of the human body.
Property rights exerted, where granted, are still external to the
In a third example, external rights were also the issue where a man
sued to obtain the monetary gain of the use of his cells to create a
profitable cell line.
In part of his argument, he claimed that
he had property rights in the cells removed from him during the
course of his treatment. Because he never agreed that his cells
could be used by the researchers to develop a new cell line, he
claimed that they had converted his property based on the belief
that the cells were still his property (because he had not released
them) even after they were removed from his body.
The argument had been accepted by the
lower court, but was not confirmed by the California Supreme Court.
Instead, that court sustained the demurrers of the defendants to the
cause of action of conversion, citing that the burden that would be
placed on researchers to confirm consent before utilization of human
body fluids in research would be too great.
Here again, the case focused on the
ability of one to define products of his body external to himself as
Applications of Property Law Concepts
Implantation of microchips concerns an
internal property interest in the self because placement of the
device involves breaking the skin to place a foreign object within
the body permanently. It may be likened to the use of an artificial
eye or a pace-maker. However, in those cases, the implant is
desired. In the case of the microchip, there is only a convenient
accounting system and repository for government information.
Thus, new questions such as whether or
not property rights can be extended to oneself now arise.
If York could be used as a precedent, it would then be possible to
extend the right from a frozen embryo removed from the body, to
internal bodily organs. If embryos outside an individual's body are
his or her property, why then couldn't the embryos inside the body
also be that individual's property? From there the conclusion that
anything within an individual's body was the property of that
individual, or that the body as a whole is property if its
components are, could be reached. York is somewhat different
however, because concerns and interests in reproductive freedom
enter into disputes over fetuses, embryos and contraception in
York or Davis or other cases concerning
reproductive rights and technologies are therefore not the best
models for the microchip, but they are closest in substance.
Additionally, the very closest legally applicable statutory
precedent is the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. Unfortunately,
as previously stated, because this Act covers intrusions into self
only after death, it is not directly applicable either.
As stated previously, in the absence of close precedent, and in the
face of emerging technology, it is sometimes necessary to forge new
legal concepts to cover the previously unanticipated developments of
science. The use of microchip implants in humans is such an
instance, wherein the application of novel legal theories is
required, because of the novelty and the direness of the
implications for humans. The concept of property should be extended
to oneself as concerns internal matters to prevent technology from
swallowing up the individual.
One important aspect of property is the owner's right to exclude
others from it. It follows that if an individual can be said to have
property rights in himself, he can exclude others from invading his
body which he controls as his property. Thereafter, if it is
recognized that the individual has that right to prevent intrusions
into his own body under property law, he can invoke Fourteenth
Amendment protection to dissuade others or the government from
requiring the placement of foreign objects in his body or at minimum
provide adequate compensation.
Those principles can be analogized to the scenario of governmental
mandate of microchip implantation. If the government desires to
mandate microchip implantation, it must provide just compensation
for those implanted. The question would then become how to value
this level of intrusion. Compensation required would include money
damages for the initial implantation,
as well as carrying a foreign substance,
difficult calculations indeed.
Even if an amount could be calculated,
it is unlikely that the government could give its value in cash
because the total amount required for compensation of all
individuals would be prohibitively high.
Thus, if property interests were recognized in self, the
compensation required by each individual from the government to
implant the chip in each individual would be very great. The
remunerative aspects of the program would effectively make it
difficult to uniformly mandate the implantation of the microchip.
To overcome this obstacle, the government might insist on some form
of nonmonetary compensation. For example, a tax break, an additional
legal holiday or some other compensatory program might be invoked
which did not involve an actual exchange of money on the part of the
In summation, property rights in self should be recognized in the
case of mandated microchip implantation.
This would ensure that individuals
receive compensation for their inconvenience, though the government
may provide nonmonetary compensation which would be less
The Need for
Although microchip implantation might be introduced as a voluntary
procedure, in time, there will be pressure to make it mandatory. A
national identification system via microchip implants could be
achieved in two stages. Upon introduction as a voluntary system, the
microchip implantation will appear to be palatable.
After there is a familiarity with the
procedure and a knowledge of its benefits, implantation would be
mandatory. To forestall this, legislative protection for individual
rights must be enacted. For example, a recent poll indicates that
safeguards would increase by 11% the number of people willing to
accept health care identification numbers.
Legislation which concerns and protects the consensual implants
might address two possible problems.
First, laws should
protect minors. Though a child may be too young to give his
own consent, the parents may be allowed to make the
decision. At some age, the child should be allowed to decide
whether or not he or she wants to keep the implant.
Second, laws should allow
an implantee to remove a chip at will. These safeguards
should insure that once implanted, the microchip can be
removed without further legal action.
For example, if the individual enters a
contract with a service to store medical records on a microchip, she
should be able to end it.
That is, a commercial institution should
not have the power to insist that the microchip remain, even if only
for a short time. Also commercial parties should not "own" the
implant. Once it is in the individual, it belongs to that individual
and not the corporation providing the service. In this way, the
individual will be free, for example, to remove a chip or reinstall
That decision should rest solely with
To avoid a governmental mandate, citizens may advocate for an
outright ban. This drastic measure may also be necessary in a system
that is initially voluntary, for it may well be the precursor to a
mandate. A voluntary program will lead to the desensitization to the
loss of legal rights. When the government subsequently announces a
mandate, it is conceivable that the public would acquiesce by reason
of familiarity with the benefits obtained, without adequate
consideration of the implications. If at that point, many people
have already chosen implantation and reaped its benefits, then it is
less likely that they will protest.
Thus, an outright ban may be the surest
form of protection. Short of that, the best way of preventing
incipient problems is to protect rights before desensitization.
That all of these protections against microchip implantation should
fail must also be considered. If none of the current protections is
strong enough to prevent mandatory implantation, legislation must be
enacted to ease the very great intrusion into individual privacy.
Minimally, if the government is to initiate broad usage, it must
provide assurances. Of utmost importance would be a guarantee of the
limited access of the information contained on the microchip or
within associated databases. It would be essential that information
access be severely limited. Such protections could be modeled after
the Consumer Credit Protection Act and the Privacy Acts.
For example, individuals should have the
opportunity to review all records kept on or in connection with
microchips and be given
the opportunity to correct them.
Three categories of rights are relevant to implanting microchips in
humans: common law, constitutional and property. The common law
concept of bodily integrity precludes nonconsensual implantation.
When microchips constitute a legal
search, the Fourth Amendment applies to preclude the government from
using devices with read-write and tracking capabilities, but a
warrant could legitimize scanning a read only or read-write device.
Property rights might be applied to prevent intrusion without just
compensation. This would seem to require expanding current law, but
novel and unique situations may spawn novel applications of laws.
Of the approaches described, it appears that the closest parallels
and thus the strongest protection are afforded by common law right
of bodily integrity. Though cases have generally concerned death or
birth issues, in contrast with permanent insertion of a foreign
substance into the body, the analogies are much stronger than in two
other branches of the law discussed. Concerning constitutional
rights, the strongest protection is afforded with certainty only
against the most complicated device, the one with read-write and
tracking capabilities, for which there is not yet evidence of a
marketable device. It is much more likely that the read only or
read-write implant would be initially used.
The common law right of bodily integrity seems most weighty and
convincing, especially where law-abiding citizens are forced to
undergo implantation. If only criminals must be implanted, as
opposed to the population at large, it will be more difficult to
argue against implantation in the face of the increased latitude of
governmental control over law-breakers.
Although use of such a device at first appears farfetched,
examination of the existing technology and the potential utility
proves that microchip implantation is both possible and, for some
purposes, desirable. Beginning with voluntary introduction,
Americans may be lulled into accepting them. This article thus
sounds a warning bell.
The time to prevent grievous intrusion
into personal privacy by enacting appropriate legislative safeguards
is now, rather than when it is too late.
 The device is easily implanted
by means of injection through a needle, into the shoulder of the
animal. A hand-held or pass-by scanner is used to check the
animal for the presence of the microchip. Richard Louv, Walking
Around With A Chip in its Shoulder, The San Diego Union-Trib.,
June 15, 1994, at A-2.
 The author also stated that "[e]xisting microminiaturized
transmitters the size of a pinhead might be coded with an
identification number, enclosed in a permanent capsule, and
implanted under the skin by a simple and painless surgical
operation. Once in place, this tag would do no damage to the
body, but when 'interrogated' electronically by an outside beam,
it would emit an identifying number." Alan F. Westin, Privacy
and Freedom 86 (1967). However, proving that old adage that
there is nothing new under the sun, the concept may be
attributed to far earlier authors. The Book of Revelation of the
Bible contains the following statement: "He also forced
everyone, small and great, to receive a mark on his right hand
or on his forehead, so that no one could buy or sell unless he
had the mark, which is the name of the beast or the number of
his name." Revelation 13:16-17. That mark could well be the
 Intrusion does not refer to the physical act of implantation
but rather the effect that the implantation will have on the
individual's control over his body and on his privacy rights.
 This view was adopted by Justice Rehnquist in a Supreme
Court decision concerning beeper surveillance where the
respondent had indicated that if beeper surveillance were
constitutional, "twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of
this country will be possible, without judicial knowledge or
supervision." The opinion stated "if such dragnet-type law
enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually
occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether
different constitutional principles may be applicable." U.S. v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983).
 It has been recognized that "[a] true national identity
document would be mandatory". Robert Ellis Smith, The True
Terror is in the Card, The New York Times, Sept. 8, 1996 at 58.
 The statement by Justice Rehnquist that there will be time
enough to consider legal ramifications of incipient technologies
as they arise is inapplicable in this case because of the dire
consequences to humans involved.
 Betsy Siino, Where Will the Chips Fall? Innovations in Pet
Identification Systems, 47 Pet Product News 24 (1993).
 The procedure costs $30 and there is a $15 fee for listing
in the registry. The scanner costs more than $400. Mary
Stephens, Chip Implant Eases Lost Pet's Identification, The
Columbus Dispatch, Aug. 13, 1994, at 1C.
 Large corporations such as Schering-Plough have become
involved with the sales and marketing of these devices. Destron/IDI
Has Distribution Agreement with Schering-Plough, PR Newswire,
June 16, 1994, available in Lexis-Nexis Library, News File.
Interestingly, it has been predicted that "companies making
electronic detection devices will move quickly 'into the human
market, because there's not enough money in pets and
livestock.'" Louv, supra note 1, at A2.
 Avid, Trovan, and Destron are the three competing
manufacturers. The questions of which scanners are able to
accurately read which chips is disputed. Siino, supra note 6, at
 Jon Van, In Future, Tiny Chip May Get Under Skin, Chicago
Tribune, May 7, 1996, at 1.
 Medical researchers are also currently "developing a system
in which a microchip implanted on the retina feeds visual
information through to the brain." For those blinded due to
retinal deficiencies, the chips will aid vision by passing
signals received in response to light to human nerve cells. Carl
Franklin, Chip Gives Sight To The Blind, Sunday Times, Feb. 26,
 Information has been released on an externally applied
suitable device for employee identification. Scott Liebs, Data?
Look for The Button -- Dallas Semiconductor's miniature device
finds a range of applications, Information Week, Aug. 1, 1994,
available in Lexis-Nexis Library, News File.
 The new device has already been sold to the U.S Postal
Service for attachment on mailboxes to improve collection
schedules and to Ryder Systems Inc. to gauge mileage on trucks.
 Kathleen Wiegner, In Development: The Cutting Edge:
Computing/Techno-logy/Innovation; Giving Surgical Implants IDs,
Los Angeles Times, Aug. 17, 1994, at 5.
 The microchip is encased in a very strong glass. A force
strong enough to shatter the casing, the blow would kill the
person. Chips With Everything! LipoMatrix's Processor in Breast
Implants to LipoMatrix's Patient-Tracking, Computergram
International, Sept. 9, 1994, available in Lexis-Nexis Library,
News File [hereinafter Chips With Everything!].
 The breast implant is made out of a soybean oil derivative.
Because saline and silicon gel filled implants interfere with
mammography, this new filler was LipoMatrix's solution to
interference. Clinical Trials of Triglyceride-Filled Breast
Implant To Be Conducted; Device May Improve Mammography, Pr
Newswire, Aug. 1, 1994, available in Lexis-Nexis Library, News
File [hereinafter Clinical Trials].
 The following countries are conducting trials which begun
in October 1993: Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Id.
Additionally, Spain and France will soon also be testing the
device. Chips With Everything!, supra note 17.
 Approximately 50 American women will participate in the
study to be held at such prestigious institutes as Johns Hopkins
University Hospital in Baltimore, Md. Clinical Trials, supra
 Robert Ellis Smith, Implanting ID Microchips in Humans No
Longer Far Fetched, 20 Privacy J. 1 (1994). Currently, according
to a former Hughes employee, "two doctors at Hughes Aircraft are
now wearing the internal tags as a trial." Id. at 1.
 U.S. Patent No. 5,037,301.
 Id. Identification of missing children and criminals are
envisaged uses of this invention. Health information and other
identifying information may also be inscribed on the microchip
according to the inventors.
 Personal touch at your fingertips, The Sunday Star-Times,
Dec. 8, 1996, at 5. Such a device would allow a transfer of
information between humans during a handshake.
 A fourth embodiment is conceivable, though technologically
somewhat far from implementation. The possibility of using a
microchip implant inserted into the brain to control a human's
thoughts and/or actions has been discussed by scientists. One
scientist "believes it is realistic to envisage a time when
microchips can be attached to the living circuits of the brain
to augment memory and intellectual prowess."
Simon Davies, Bionic Man Comes of
Age, The Times, Oct. 17, 1994. Another scientist speaking on the
ethical implications of such a device said "[t]here is a risk
that the mind could be controlled externally." Id. The British
Medical Association has recently begun to examine the ethical
implications of intelligent implants. Id. Active implants which
have their own internal electronics which can respond directly
to neural interconnectivity have also been envisaged by others.
Geoff Metcalf, Midnight Radio: Geoff Metcalf interviews Charles
Ostman, Mondo 2000, Indian Summer 1996, at 14, 17. This
technology is currently undeveloped and will not be treated.
 Eric Grossman, Comment, Conceptualizing National
Identification: Information Privacy Rights Protected, 19 J.
Marshall L. Rev. 1007 (1986). The impact of a national
identification card on an individual's right of informational
privacy has been described in terms of a balancing act between
public interest and probability of harm to the individual.
However, in this Comment the author concluded that "[a] national
identifier does not infringe informational privacy per se
because there is not personal information in the number itself.
 Trudy Hayden & Jack Novik, Your Rights To Privacy 100
(1980). Additionally, the safeguards required for the SSN to be
a universal identifier are not in place i.e., internal check
features to prevent falsification and to prevent reuse of the
number after a person's death.
 In a statement made by Dr. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner
of Social Security before the House Committee on Governmental
Reform and Oversight, Mar. 7, 1995, she indicated that the
General Accounting Office "concluded that the card would not be
a good identifier because it does not satisfy three criteria for
a reliable identity document." A reliable document would be
"difficult to counterfeit; allow verification that the person
presenting the document is, in fact, the individual to whom it
was issued; and be difficult to obtain fraudulently." She also
estimated that the cost of making the Social Security card more
secure would be $3-6 billion.
 Because the breeder documents are themselves subject to
fraud by counterfeiting, the use of the Social Security numbers
(SSNs) as accurate identifiers is undesirable, according to
testimony given by Gregory T. Nojeim, Legislative Counsel for
the A.C.L.U. on Capitol Hill on Mar. 14, 1995. Testimony the
same day by the Commissioner of Social Security Dr. Shirley S.
Chater also cast doubt on the utility of the SSNr as an
identifier. She indicated concerning the Death Master File, "we
do not verify most of the death reports which we receive from
family members, funeral directors, or postal authorities, nor do
we verify death reports for people who are not beneficiaries."
So it is conceivable that an
individual's death would not be reported to the Social Security
office, and that number could subsequently be conveyed to
another for identification purposes. Thus, the SSN has very
large loopholes both in the use of counterfeit breeder documents
and in the continued fraudulent use of numbers which should be
decommissioned due to death, which allow for deception in
identification and make it a poor universal identifier.
 An example of a biometric identifier is the fingerprint.
The Comparator Systems Corp. has developed a Fingerprint
Identification System (utilizing software and scanners) to be
used on a national identification card for an unspecified
foreign country. Business Wire, Mar. 6, 1995, available in
Lexis-Nexis Library, News File.
 U.S. Patent No. 5,291,560. By this technique, a reference
code for an individual is first established. Subsequently, the
reference code for a particular individual is compared to the
code obtained for the iris imaged. Using statistical
calculations which compensate for variations in pupil dilation,
the degree of similarity is established. A very close
correlation will confirm that the reference code and the present
image were taken from the same individual. Id.
 See, Law Society opposes Australia Card, Law Soc'y J., June
1986, at 32.
 The government had proposed that a registry linking the ID
number to specific information be kept for each citizen. Adam
Marshall, The "Australia Card" A Survey of the Privacy Problems
Arising from the Proposed Introduction of an Australian Identity
Card, 2 J.L. & Info. Sci., 111, 113-115 (1986).
 Geoffrey de Q. Walker, Information as Power: Constitutional
Implications of the Identity Numbering and ID Card Proposal,
Queensland L. Soc'y J., June 1986, at 153, 158. A governmental
committee was formed to determine the structure for a "national
identification numbering system." The card was to be required
for financial transactions, obtaining employment, and transfer
of real estate among others. In a chilling commentary which
indicates that the government was aware of the extensive
intrusion of individual's privacy, it was stated that "[i]t will
be important to minimize [sic] any adverse public reaction to
implementation of the system. One possibility would be to use a
staged approach for implementation, whereby only less sensitive
data are held in the system initially with the facility to input
additional data at a later stage...." Id. at 159.
 Id. at 163.
 Alan K. Simpson, That's not the Idea, The Plain Dealer,
Aug. 15, 1994, at 9B.
 "The INS's budget went up 25 percent from 1994 to 1995, and
under the president's proposal it would go up another 24
percent." Susan R. Kneller, Daily Labor Rep., Feb. 7, 1995,
available in Lexis-Nexis Library, News File.
 Id. As chair of the congressional Commission on Immigration
Reform, Jordan's speech was to recommend methods to deter
illegal immigration. Senator Simpson argues that the system
called for is not a national ID card because it would not have
to be routinely carried and produced to officials. Instead it
"would be presented only at the time of new-hire employment, or
at the time of application for federally funded benefits,
including health care." Id. See also Immigration Reform: Can a
Central Data Bank Detect Illegal Aliens Without Trampling Civil
Liberties? A.B.A.J., Nov. 1994, at 44, 45.
 George de Lama, Candidates Backing Proposition 187 Could
Get Burned, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 28, 1994, at 1.
 Scott Hodge, Big Brother's I.D. Card Better Yet, Why Not
Just Brand Babies? Los Angeles Daily Journal, July 2, 1990, at
 Gil Klein, National ID Seen As Way To Screen Illegal
Workers, Tampa Tribune, Dec. 31, 1994, at 1. It was also
proposed that the card have a magnetic code, which would be read
to verify whether or not the individual carrying that card had
the legal right to work. Id.
 Robert Suro, Workplace May Be Focus of Immigration Control;
White House Officials Consider Programs That Could Spawn
Computerized National Registry, Washington Post, Jan. 11, 1995,
at A11. On Jan. 24, 1995 at his State of the Union address, the
President announced his approval for this immigration policy. It
is apparent that the registry will only be useful if individuals
are required to carry some identification to link them to the
updated database. Id.
 See, e.g., John Shattuck, In the Shadow of 1984: National
Identification Systems, Computer-Matching, and Privacy in the
United States, 35 Hastings L. J. 991 (1984), Jonathan P. Graham,
Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of Personal
Information, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 1395 (1987), Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589 (1977) (State of New York's desire to have the names
and addresses of all people who filled certain classes of
prescription drugs which could have legal or illegal uses ruled
to be a reasonable exercise of the State's broad police powers).
But see, John Doe v. City of New York, 15 F. 3d 264 (2nd Cir.
1994) (regarding a press release concerning conciliatory
agreement revealed that individual had AIDS, the court stated
that he had a constitutional right to privacy regarding his
 The implant is not completely tamper-free because there is
a possibility that the microchip could be excised, and replaced
with a microchip with manipulated data.
 An RF transmitter forming part of a read/write device is
generally used to radiate an electromagnetic field via an
antenna. When the chip enters this field, the detection
microchip receives energy from the RF field and begins
transmitting its stored data.... In return, it is possible with
read/write systems, to modulate the RF transmitter, and to
transmit data to the detection microchip over a distance. U.S.
Patent No. 5,218,343.
 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 23, where a read/write device
is under current evaluation and also Bill Hart, Big Brother's
Watching... the Family Pet, Phoenix Gazette, July 24, 1994, at
G1. Charles Jenkins, a Phoenix psychologist is reportedly close
to marketing a microchip implant containing a medical profile to
aid paramedics at the sites of disasters.
 Scientists have already described microchips capable of
holding a billion bits of information, and predict that within
the next twenty years chips which hold a trillion bits of
information will be available. Gary Stix, Toward "Point One",
Sci. Am., Feb. 1995, at 90.
 The connection between a universal health card and a
national ID card is close because one could easily be adapted
for the purposes of the other. Charles Oliver, Do We Need a
National ID Card? Investor's Business Daily, Aug. 12, 1994, at
 See, e.g., supra note 23.
 Mastercard Will Support Smart Card Technology, EFT Report,
Aug. 3, 1994, available in Lexis-Nexis Library, News File. The
program should be phased in by the end of the year 2000 and is
expected to save more than $3 billion worldwide. The changeover
involves cards containing the chips and terminals to read the
 Graham Greenleaf, The Australia Card: Towards a National
Surveillance System, Law Soc'y J., Oct. 1987 at 24, 25. The same
article also reveals that "[e]very person in Australia will be
required to obtain a Card, including children. The Bill does not
make it legally compulsory: it simply makes it impossible for
anyone to exist in Australian society without it because they
will be unable to carry out normal activities... such as
operation of bank accounts."
 The utility of the device would be obvious, but the
question would then become how much information to include. For
instance, if the microchip only contains information on
convictions, it would not be as helpful as a record of all
arrests. As more and more information is stored, the intrusion
on personal privacy is correspondingly increased.
 Jonathan Lewis Miller, Search and Seizure of Air Passengers
and Pilots: The Fourth Amendment Takes Flight, 22 Transp. L. J.
199, 200 (1994). The usual searches conducted at airports reveal
only drugs or firearms. However, "[i]t would technically be
possible to implant felons with microchips via hypodermic
injections, which would announce their status as felons as they
passed through airport arrival and departure gates." Id. at 200.
 A system currently undergoing testing in six states is a
pre-paid tag placed on a vehicle which can be read by overhead
antennas on the toll booth. For Whom the Tolls Swell: Electronic
Toll Systems Promise Big Growth, The Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1994,
 United States v. Cashin, 739 F. Supp. 1107 (E.D. Mich.
 The device can be programmed to monitor the subject as
frequently as every 30 seconds. Once the subject is out of the
range of the receiver, a warning may be sounded, but the
bracelet cannot then be used further to track the subject's
movements. Id. at 1108.
 If some interference with the telephone line occurs, the
warning signal of that event may not be received until between
30 minutes to four hours later. For that reason, the system is
somewhat limited in scope. Id.
 A flexible system which can be programmed for a variety of
short-term experiments has been described. Kenneth W. Fernald et
al., A Microprocessor-Based Implantable Telemetry System,
Computer, Mar. 1991, at 23.
 Interestingly, A. F. Westin has suggested a solution to
this problem. "However, it is possible that low-level electrical
charges generated within the body or other bodily power sources,
such as body heat or pressure changes, might be harnessed to
provide the operating energy." Westin, supra note 2 at 86.
 The same would apply for the situation in which the
microchip contained information on medical history. Some might
be motivated to remove evidences of psychological instability
which might be encoded. Also, if one were suing for injuries
obtained, they may not want an easily accessible record which
might indicate that that injury was actually a pre-existing
 This conclusion has been drawn as a result of interviews
with experts in the industry who attest to the veracity of the
concept of necessitated universal implantation.
 In addition to controls of manufacturing, there would
probably be secrecy surrounding the encoding of the information
and the receivers or scanners to read the microchips.
Additionally, as with certain key components of the manufacture
of drugs, the necessary materials to make the microchip would be
closely monitored. Also, the government would probably employ
some sort of electronic signature, similar to the watermark on
currency, to make duplication extremely difficult. Thus, the
multiplicity of obstacles to overcome would effectively prevent
counterfeiting by implantation of microchips bearing false
 This is so because otherwise undesirable information could
relatively easily be blocked. For example, if only those with
serious diseases that are also contagious such as AIDS are
required to have a microchip implant, someone who does not want
that information to be known could simply block it as described
in the text. With the chip's information effectively silenced,
the individual could appear to be disease free, because he would
have no scannable record.
However, in the case of worker
verification, counterfeit chips would play a part, if only those
eligible to work had implants. To become "eligible" one need
only have a counterfeit implant inserted. The government would
have to take steps to insure that the microchip was not readily
counterfeited. Thus, even if the microchip was only used to
carry medical information or worker verification information,
the government would find administration of a microchip
implantation program simplest if all citizens were to be
 If a parent wanted their child to be implanted for
identification purposes in case of kidnapping, one of the
techniques described above could be easily used to nullify their
identity as indicated on the chip. If it were not mandatory for
all children to have the chip, it would be impossible to tell if
the microchip had been removed or altered.
 Because these matters concern an individual's
self-determination, they form part of the right to privacy.
Privacy involves "an interest in making certain kinds of
important decisions." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600
(1977). In Whalen, the objectionable government regulation was a
requirement to keep centralized computer files with names and
addresses of those who ordered certain prescriptions.
 Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251
(1891). A woman had been injured in a train accident and was
suing for negligence. A lower court had ordered that she submit
to a physical examination prior to the trial to determine the
extent of her injuries. The Supreme Court decided that the lower
court had no power to subject a party to a physical examination
against her will. This was well before development of rules for
Civil Procedure. Id.
 According to this decision, if a surgeon operated on a
patient without his consent, it would be an assault.
Schloendorff v. Society of the N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129
 Dawn Johnsen, Symposium: Substance Use During Pregnancy:
Legal and Social Responses: Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy
Births Without Sacrificing Women's Liberty, 43 Hastings L. J.
569, 582 (1992).
 Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978). It was estimated by his doctors that once the life
supporting artificial respirator was removed, he would live less
than one hour.
 Nancy Cruzan was critically injured in an automobile
accident. She entered a persistent vegetative state, kept alive
by artificial feeding and hydration equipment paid for by the
State. Her parents petitioned to cease life-sustaining care, but
the care was not terminated because the Supreme Court of
Missouri felt that clear and convincing evidence of her wish not
to be kept artificially alive (expressed in a competent state)
was missing. Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of
Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
 Despite apparent mootness due to the fact that the
operation had been performed, the Court of Appeals ruled on the
case because of the basic dispute over the right to make such
decisions. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
 In 1994 another dispute about a court-ordered C-section
over the mother's objections arose in Chicago. The doctors felt
that the fetus would not survive unless delivered immediately
surgically, but the mother refused to submit to the surgery,
protesting on religious grounds. The State wanted to appoint a
guardian over the fetus so that consent for performance of a
C-section could be obtained. The court decided that based on the
concept of bodily integrity and applying the principle of
informed consent, a woman had a right to refuse invasive medical
treatment. Despite the doctor's predictions otherwise, the child
was born healthy in a natural delivery. In re Baby Boy Doe, 260
Ill. App. 3d 392 (1994).
 Annette Williams, Comment, In re A.C.: Foreshadowing the
Unfortunate Expansion of Court-Ordered Cesarean Sections, 74
Iowa L Rev. 287, 293 (1988).
 Johnsen, supra note 63. "If the courts fail to apply strict
scrutiny to adversarial policies, the government will be free to
override or penalize any decision by a woman upon a simple
showing that the regulation is rationally related to a
legitimate interest in reducing a risk to fetal development."
Id. at 584.
 For criminals, the government generally exercises a more
far-reaching control. Thus the implantation of microchips does
not result in as great a loss in the bodily integrity rights of
a criminal as it does for a law-abiding citizen. Johnsen, supra
note 72, at 582.
 The C-section may be considered to be a much more serious
operation because the body cavity must be opened, and general
anesthetics are required. However, a microchip implantation
would be a much simpler procedure.
 If Norplant, a contraceptive device which must be
surgically implanted, is mandated by the government, an
analogous argument might apply. The use of Norplant represents a
continuous intrusion because as the device slowly releases
contraceptives for a period of up to five years unless
surgically removed by a sometimes complicated procedure. Julie
Mertus & Simon Heller, Norplant Meets The New Eugenicists: The
Impermissibility of Coerced Contraception, 11 St. Louis U. Pub.
L. Rev. 359, 360 (1992). Thus far, only a few cases have touched
on this subject.
See, e.g., In re: Lacey, 189 W. Va.
580 (Ct. App. W.Va. 1993), and In re S.S.J., 634 So. 2d 198
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). Government has already expressed an
interest in at least encouraging the implantation by increasing
welfare payments to women who have the implant in proposed
legislation. This could foreshadow a mandate. Karin E. Wilinski,
Involuntary Contraceptive Measures: Controlling Women at the
Expense of Human Rights, 10 B. U. Int'l L. J. 351, 362 (1992).
 Requiring the carrying of I.D. cards, electronic tethers
and even tattooing would all be less intrusive options.
 There is some indication that Article I Sec. 10 of the
Constitution may be applicable. In 1980, the Supreme Court
affirmed a lower court ruling that struck down a Louisiana law
which required itinerant workers to obtain identification cards.
Because the scheme in question would interfere with free
movement of labor across state lines, the law was invalidated.
David Ranii, ID Cards For Laborers Ruled Illegal, Nat'l L. J.,
Nov. 10, 1980, at 4.
 The Ninth Circuit has used this analytical approach, but
holds that the use of a beeper to follow an automobile or an
airplane is not a search within the Fourth Amendment. United
States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir. 1979).
 The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads:
The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
 A beeper had been placed on a
container of chloroform that was sold to an individual suspected
of using the chemical to manufacture illegal drugs. Because the
moving of the drum by the suspect outdoors was an activity with
no reasonable expectation of privacy, the use of a beeper was
not ruled to be a search. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276,
 Id. at 281 (citing Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)).
 Placement of a beeper on an airplane was not a search
because in that instance, there was no reasonable expectation of
privacy. Planes are constantly monitored as to their positions,
heights and altitudes already, so a flying plane is a
scrutinizable activity that is not a search. United States v.
Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1979).
 The devices are forward looking infrared devices used to
detect differences in surface temperature. These instruments can
be used by police to determine whether or not marijuana is grown
inside a structure, because the extra lighting necessary to grow
marijuana plants generates a high amount of heat. See, e.g.,
United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994) and United
States v. Ford, No. 92-5181, 1994 WL 514580 (11th Cir. Sept. 21,
 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
 The surgical procedure to remove the bullet lodged in his
chest was estimated to carry a 1% chance of nerve damage and a
1/10% chance of death. Id. at 755.
 A man was carrying illegal drugs. Upon obtaining a search
warrant, the police attempted to find the drugs by attempting a
body cavity search, but the suspect was uncooperative. Assuming
that he had swallowed the drugs, they gave him laxatives to
recover the evidence. These were unsuccessful, so x-rays were
taken which revealed that an object was lodged in his stomach.
Upon endoscopy, a surgical
procedure, a plastic bag filled with heroin was retrieved from
his stomach. The court ruled that the actions of the police to
perform an endoscopy violated the suspect's Fourth Amendment
rights "because the endoscopy exceeded the scope of what any
reasonable police officer would believe to be authorized by the
search warrant. United States v. Nelson, No. 93-3628, 93-3848,
1994 WL 526111 (8th Cir. Sept. 29, 1994).
 The reason for the blood test was that the petitioner was
in an automobile accident where it was suspected that he caused
the accident due to his intoxication. Schmerber v. State of
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
 See, e.g., Doe v. Gainer, No. 75806, 1994 WL 515549 (Ill.
Sept. 22, 1994), Gilbert v. Peters, No. 93 c 20012, 92 c 20354,
1994 WL 369643 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 1994), State v. Olivas, 122
Wash. 2d 73 (1993), Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 472 (1992).
 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (FBI agents attached an electronic
listening device in a phone booth where phone calls related to
illegal gambling were made).
 Id. at 356.
 At the time of the installation, there is no motivation to
recover or obtain evidence. That is only possible later when the
individual is tracked or scanned.
 It may be in the vital interest of society to have access
to the medical records if they contained, e.g., information that
someone had a contagious disease.
 This argument is particularly suited to the case that the
implant carries medical records, but less so if the implant is
to carry criminal records which are afforded less protection.
 In this case, his condition was revealed in a press
release. Proponents of the microchip implantation may argue that
the information will only get into the hands of a select few,
such that this case is not governing. John Doe v. City of New
York, 15 F.3d 264, 269 (2nd Cir. 1994).
 Similar arguments have been used to justify the intrusive
DNA sampling of criminals to create genetic data banks.
 The Particularity Clause has recently been examined in
relationship to the proposed use of the Clipper scheme. For the
protection of data there are currently a number of methods for
scrambling the data (encryption). Only authorized users are then
able to read the data. The government has proposed that only one
encryption method be utilized, the Clipper scheme, so that they
will effectively be able to read any information from any
source. It has been proposed that the Clipper scheme violates
the Fourth Amendment because it would allow an essentially
continuous review of data in an unlimited fashion. Mark I.
Koffsky, Comment, Choppy Waters in the Surveillance Data Stream:
The Clipper Scheme and the Particularity Clause, 9 High Tech. L.
J. 131 (1994).
 Each microchip might be on its own particular frequency,
which would enable police to "tune in" to anyone they might wish
 U. S. Const. amend. V.
 In addition, the use of beepers for surveillance has been
said to have Fifth Amendment implications. "The government, by a
trespass minimal in the physical sense, causes the unwitting
suspect to become a reporter to the government of information
incriminating to himself." United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d
252, 271 (5th Cir. 1981).
 In one instance, a man swallowed pills suspected to be
illegal drugs. The police forced him to take an emetic to
recover the evidence. The court ruled that the evidence obtained
by the forced vomiting violated the suspect's constitutional
rights. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
 Id. at 173 (Black, J., concurring).
 The court held that only communicative testimonials were
protected by the Fifth Amendment, and withdrawal of blood did
not qualify as such. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765
 Id. at 771.
 If the device is read only or read/write, it would be much
more difficult to relate the device to the concept of
self-incrimination. If the device were read/write and contained
a criminal history or history of mental illness, there might be
some intersection with Fifth Amendment principles. See also
supra note 64.
 This possibility was foreshadowed by Justice Rehinquist,
but disregarded as technologically unlikely. See supra note 4.
 The Fourteenth Amendment reads: "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law." The Fifth, applicable to the federal government
 Roy Hardiman, Comment, Toward the Right of Commerciality:
Recognizing Property Rights in the Commercial Value of Human
Tissue, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 207, 213 (1986).
 In the same paragraph, the author also explains that the
term "property" is purposefully vague so that the courts can
interpret it as modern life evolves. Id. (quoting Susan Rose-Acherman,
Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 Colum. L.
Rev. 931 (1985)).
 The ability to transfer the property is alienability. It
has been pointed out that merely because an item is property
does not mean it must be fully alienable without restriction.
Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, Hastings Center Report,
Oct.1986, at 28, 29.
 For instance, a law might be passed which would allow
transfer of organs or body parts, as long as it is not for
valuable consideration. This would decrease the possibility that
a person would be tempted to damage himself for monetary gain.
Id. at 33.
 U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
 In this note, it is argued that one can have property
rights in one's own body. Erik S. Jaffe, Note, "She's Got Bette
Davis['s] Eyes": Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver
Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 Colum. L.
Rev. 528, 554 (1990).
 These property rights are very limited, and are generally
only concerned with burial. Thomas P. Dillon, Note, Source
Compensation For Tissues And Cells Used In Biotechnical
Research: Why a Source Shouldn't Share in the Profits, 64 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 628, 631 (1989).
 The Note cites cases where this right has been given to
the widow. Id.
 All 50 states have adopted the Act in whole or in part.
Among the stipulations of the Act are: definition of the scope
of legal donations, rules on how determination of donation may
be made by next of kin, and to whom donations may be given as
well as for what purposes. Jaffe, supra note 121, at 532.
 Note that though these concepts pertain only to dead
bodies and not to the living, whatever rights are afforded to
the dead should be available in even greater portion to the
living, since they are in much greater need of protection.
 This argument has been propounded by the dissent in the
case Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 51 Cal.
3d 120, 154 (1990).
 The couple had been receiving fertility treatments for a
number of years. Six eggs were removed from Mrs. York and
fertilized. The dispute centered around a cryogenically frozen
embryo that was left over after an unsuccessful implantation of
five embryos in her uterus. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D.
 The court indicated that language such as "our pre-zygote"
and the provision that in the event of a divorce, the ownership
"must be determined in a property settlement" indicated a
recognition by the defendants that the plaintiffs did have
property rights in the embryo. Id. at 426.
 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993).
 The implication is that the embryos are in a temporary
category somewhere in the middle of the continuum from property
to person. It may also be that the more permanent solution would
ultimately be to define them as one or the other. Id. at 597.
 It was ruled that the lower court's decision to allow
normal procedure in disposing of unused embryos was correct. For
the Davises, this meant that relative interests of each spouse
to either the use or the deliberate refraining from the use of
the embryos must be weighed. Id.
 The plaintiff patient had a rare form of leukemia. His
doctors took many samples of his blood and bodily fluids from
which they harvested cells to create the Mo cell line. The
importance of the created line was that it could be sold to
researchers who wished to use the cells to determine how best to
combat the disease. Moore v. Regents of the University of
California, 51 Cal. 3d 120 (1990).
 The researchers never informed him of their ultimate goals
but rather insisted that the harvesting of the bodily fluids was
a necessary part of the treatment of his condition. Id. at 126.
 The following rationale was provided by the court: "The
extension of conversion law into this area will hinder research
by restricting access to the necessary raw materials.... At
present, human cell lines are routinely copied and distributed
to other researchers for experimental purposes, usually free of
charge. This exchange of scientific materials, which is still
relatively free and efficient, will surely be compromised if
each cell sample becomes the potential subject matter of a
lawsuit." Id. at 144.
 There are very famous cases concerning abortion which
touch upon the concept of the self as property, but these
concerns are too closely intermingled with emotional questions
of reproductive freedom to provide a clear basis for comparison.
 In the situation that courts begin to mandate Norplant for
child abusers, the same arguments might be made for self as
property. However, here again, the reproductive freedom issue
would overshadow other concerns.
 The compensation might be for pain and suffering, if any
in the initial insertion, as well as emotional distress.
 Other compensation might be for side-effects of carrying
the implant such as discomfort, irritation, or emotional
distress. Certain individuals may also make claims for other
physical ailments if they feel that they have been worsened or
brought on by the implantation.
 Even if the compensation were a nominal amount, such as a
dollar, this cost would be high when multiplied by the number of
U.S. citizens. The cost becomes prohibitive when added to the
costs of implantation, and maintenance of records to run the
 If these arguments that self is property fail, instead,
the fact that the act of microchip implantation forces
deprivation of life might be proffered to invoke Fourteenth
Amendment protection from a deprivation of life theory. Life
would be deprived because part of the individual's body would
now be occupied by the government. This would not be a total
deprivation of life (such as death) as is commonly associated
with this principle. It is not inconceivable that partial
deprivation of life by microchip implantation could be covered.
 If the microchip implantation is voluntary, compensation
will not be applicable. This itself brings up another
interesting point, as the government may follow the logic that
the mandated implantation is completely voluntary, to avoid
 The survey, conducted by Louis Harris and Associates in
conjunction with Alan Westin, showed that 60% would agree to a
health care identification number. The proposal would be even
more acceptable to a greater number of Americans according to
the pollsters, when additional safeguards were proposed such as
"criminal penalties for improper use of the information" and
"the personal right to sue someone who misused their health care
ID number." Safeguards Allay Distrust of ID Efforts, The Wall
St. J., Feb. 10, 1995, at B1.
 Commercial entities will likely insist on certain types of
insulation from liability concerning the implantation, but we do
not explore that side of the issue.
 Robert S. Peck, Extending the Constitutional Right to
Privacy in the New Technological Age, 12 Hofstra L. Rev. 893,
898 (1984). The Census Act as well as the I.R.S. Code "restrict
disclosure of information collected except for certain limited
statutory exceptions." Id. at 898.
 In his testimony on Capitol Hill on Mar. 14, 1995, Gregory
T. Nojeim enumerated several safeguards for guarding the privacy
of citizens where a national identification system is required.
One requirement is "immediate, automatic notification to any
person about whom the data base is queried... with the
opportunity to contest unauthorized transmission of the
information before it occurs."
 Lack of current legal protection notwithstanding, the
individual citizen may still have options open to him to oppose
implantation after it has occurred. Though governmental entities
are generally thought of as having immunity from liability in
tort, it is conceivable that the government, the manufacturer of
the implant or the person that implants the microchip could have
product liability charges leveled against them. Individuals
might claim that the implants have given them headaches, cancer,
brain tumors, impotence or a great host of other ailments.
Thus, the individual could demand
removal of the device on the basis that it contributed to or
worsened some illness in his body, should the legislative
protections and banning attempts fail.