8. GENERAL IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS ANDFOREIGN POLICY
1. Klaus Knorr, "on the International Implications of Outer Space," World Politics, Vol. 12 (July 1960), P. 579.
2. Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, The Johns Hopkins University, Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy (prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate as United States Foreign Policy Study No. 8; 1959), p. 83.
3. One area of the revolutionary implications of space activities in the international context seems likely to arise from military equipment and capabilities such as missiles and reconnaissance systems. In keeping with this report's commitment to examine the implications of peaceful space programs, specific research has not been suggested on these associated "hot war" implications.
Among research organizations, the RAND Corporation is perhaps in one of the best positions to identify the strategic implications in relation to planned defense systems. Evaluation of the implications in terms of international relations is a concern of university research organizations such as the Center of International Studies at Princeton University (Klaus Knorr, Associate Director) and the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research (The Johns Hopkins University) whose study mentioned in Note 2 includes some lucid remarks on the problems of assessing technological changes (Part C, Chapter 2) as well as discussions of various missiles, reconnaissance satellites, and other space products as contributing to or detracting from a stable strategic power situation. Other university centers experienced in studying relations of military technology to international affairs include those at the University of Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. [-67- / -68-]
4. Urgent suggestions that space should be used only for peaceful purposes have been offered by the President of the United States, the Congress, the General Assembly of the United Nations, and various private groups of interested scientists and engineers. The following paragraphs provide a brief selective outline of early preparations for international space activities.
The launching of Sputnik I on October 4, 1957, was part of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) program which achieved remarkable results in international cooperation among scientists acting to a great extent on their own initiative or that of their private professional societies, often generously supported by their national governments. Dr. Detlev Bronk, President of the National Academy of Sciences, has said of the IGY: "I think it is fair to say that the international significance of the program, as its name bears out, has been of greater significance than even the very important discoveries which have been made . . .
At times when we are torn asunder by ideological differences and by selfish national attacks upon the freedom we stand for, it is heartening to find that there are some things that people can do together with commonamity." See House Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 86th Congress, First Session, Report on the International Geophysical Year (February 1959), p. 3.
Although possible military aspects of space activities other than the development of ballistic missiles were recognized by Congress, the resolution of the House in which the Senate concurred, not only stated that the United States should strive to ban by agreement the use of outer space for military purposes, but also that it should seek joint exploration of outer space, joint cooperation in exploiting the results, and the peaceful settlement of related disputes should they arise. See House Concurrent Resolution 332 (June 2, p. 958), which was agreed to by the Senate on July 23, 1958. Congress indicated its awareness of the nondefense international aspects of space activities by the creation of NASA as a civilian agency, the explicit inclusion of provisions for international cooperation in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Sections 205 and 102(7), the active search for peaceful uses of space (Section 102:c, 4, 5), and designation of the Secretary of State as a statutory member of the National Aeronautics and Space Council. NASA has an Office of International Programs. In 1960, President Eisenhower recommended that the Council and the Civilian Military Liaison Committee established in this act be abolished; changing interpretations of the desirable military and peaceful uses of space appear to have been partly responsible for the recommendations. See House Hearings Before the Committee on Science and Astronautics, on H.R. 9675 (March, April 1960). [-69-]
The National Academy of Sciences, which was the U.S. participant in the IGY, established a Space Science Board with an International Relations Committee operating under it ' and Congress provided that NASA coordinate its activities with such private, as well as other public agencies and organizations (Section 203:8). The International Relations Committee of the Space Science Board includes "liaison members from all interested government agencies, so that the National Academy's delegation to COSPAR may be responsibly informed as to the national space program and the opportunities which it presents for cooperative effort in collaboration with COSPAR." See testimony of Lloyd V. Berkner, Chairman of the Space Science Board, House Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 86th Congress, First Session, Report on the International Geophysical Year (February 1959), p. 180.
In a resolution sponsored by the United States, the United Nations established an ad hoc committee on the peaceful uses of outer space to consider how the United Nations could further the peaceful uses by coordination and other organizational means and could help to identify legal problems. See General Assembly, Official Records: Thirteenth Session, Supplement No. 18 (A/4090), Resolution 1348 (adopted December 13, 1958, by a vote of 53 to 9 with 19 abstentions). Thirteen members of this committee of eighteen met and issued a report despite a boycott by the Soviet Union and some other members. [-70-]
On December 12, 1959, the General Assembly created a new Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and requested its twenty-four members to review or study and report on a somewhat more restricted set of topics than that assigned to the ad hoc committee. See General Assembly, Official Records: Fourteenth Session, Supplement No. 16 (A/4354),Resolution 1472. The resolution also took cognizance of the success of the scientific cooperation program of the International Geophysical Year in the exploration of outer space and the decision to continue and expand this type of cooperation."
The quasi-nongovernmental planning and coordination of rocket and satellite programs undertaken by national scientific groups were first carried out by a special committee of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), established in 1953 to plan the IGY. In October 1958 the General Assembly of ICSU first established the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) "to further on an international scale the progress of all kinds of scientific investigations which are carried out with the use of rockets and rocket-propelled vehicles." See ICSU Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, P. 109. Stress was placed on the principle that COSPAR was to be concerned with fundamental research and not normally with such technological problems as propulsion, construction of rockets, guidance, and control.
Engineers and scientists particularly concerned with problems affecting the design of rockets and astronautical equipment and techniques have for many years been associated through such organizations as the American Rocket Society. In 1950 some of these societies joined in the first Congress of the International Astronautical Federation (IAF). The American affiliates of IAF include the American Rocket Society and the American Astronautical Society, neither of which has the same degree of
national official status as does the National Academy of Sciences, which is the American member of COSPAR. Although the relative amount of official interest in IAF and COSPAR varies from nation to nation as does the expertise and freedom of expression of the individual participants, it is possible to characterize the free-world membership in the United Nations Committee, COSPAR, and the IAF as being respectively pages 71-80 official and politically interested, semiofficial and technically experienced, and private and technically interested. For the Soviet Union and the satellite nations it would appear that each of these organization is used directly, but with varying degrees of priority and importance, for official expression of national policy, National pride and military security have affected the organization of each of groups The Soviet Union has tended to use its prestige in space as a means to assert parity or impose a check on international space activities and deliberations.
The importance of missiles for strategic deterrence and the lack of immediate prospects for arms control in this area have thus far restricted full international discussion of space activities and hardware,
5. The abortive technical discussions on means to prevent surprise attack, in which the United States and the Soviet Union participated in 1958, were supposed to consider missiles as well as bomb-carrying aircraft. See United Nations General Assembly Report of the Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures Which Might be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack and the Preparation of a Report: Thereon to Governments, UN Document A/4078-S/4145 (Jan. 5, 1959.
6. This duality is reflected in COSPAR. American scientists made it clear that space activities of the Department of Defense were not part of the U.S. program for the IGY and that therefore, by implication, informationabout them would not be presented to COSPAR See Report of the Third COPAR Meeting, Appendix. D2, p. 4 The Johnson island and "Argus" experiments in the fall of 1958, involving nuclear explosions in outer space, were of interest to these advancement of basic scientific knowledge and were also of immediate importance to national security planners. For the latter reason the experiments were conducted in secret and some results remain secret, A scientific satellite participating in the IGY studies contributed to this experiment.
7. Much of the congressional comment and testimony of Hon. Livingston T. Merchant (Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs) and George V. Allen (Director of the U.S. Information Agency) before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics (January-February 1960, House Hearings, Part I) was devoted to the question of peaceful propaganda and its importance.
A radio message from President Eisenhower was received, recorded, and transmitted by the Project Score satellite launched by the United States on December 18, 1958. Apparently this satellite was the first one with no instruments specifically included for making scientific measurements. This project may, however, have contributed to the design of communication systems of military significance. Some major Soviet and United States space efforts appear to have been timed in part to coincide with planned political events, such as political meetings or anniversaries, or with international technical meetings connected with the IGY, COSPAR, or the IAF.
There are no absolute criteria for comparing the importance of contributions to science. As indicated elsewhere herein, the development of a broad space program may well expose and force the reconciliation of differences in interests and opinion among scientists with different training’s.
8. See Hugh Odishaw, "International Geophysical Year," Appendix II in House Report of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (Feb. 17, 1958), p. 59.
9. The letter of March 14, 1959, from the U.S. Delegate to COSPAR stated ,that NASA would "undertake to launch an entire payload to be recommended by COSPAR." The January 1960 report to COSPAR on United States activities referred only to the offer to launch mutually agreeable scientific experiments or complete instrument packages prepared by scientists of other nations, with COSPAR kept fully informed and consulted for advice and comment.
10. New York Times, Aug. 16, 1960.
11. The design of the Tiros I meteorological satellite launched by NASA as a peaceful experiment on April 1, 1960, illustrates the opportunities, problems, and surprises confronting the designer who wishes to maximize the return of relevant scientific data and minimize possible military, political, economic, or other consequences of the enterprise. The need for world-wide coverage involved the automatic storing of pictures taken when the satellite was beyond the range of our receiving stations
and their subsequent transmission to U.S. stations on command. The two cameras aboard differed in the width of the area covered but were designed to disclose cloud clover rather than ground details. See Science, Vol. 131 (April 8, 1960), P. 1031. Yet, the camera with the narrower angle might have provided an unexpected and embarrassing amount of ground detail which could have become a political issue, The Wall Street Journal of September 26, 1960 refers to Tiros I as having "snapped clear photos of Russian terrain," Within a day, however, the timing device of the narrower angle camera malfunctioned so that the only pictures available were those taken near the receiving stations. (See Science, April 15, 1960, p. 106.) The timing device corrected itself on May 10, 1960, and thereaftermay have set a precedent by taking pictures over the Soviet Union and
Communist China without official protest. See New York Times, May 26, 19'00, p. 1. Although some pictures have been released and all will be deposited for scientific study, they will first have been scrutinized by officials, The Strategic Air Command has pointed out that even these first pictures could have been of use to it in the planning of some airborne refueling operations,
12. George B. Kistiakowsky, "Science and Foreign Affairs," Science, Vol. 131 (April 8, 1960), P. 1023. Research work on "science and public policy" bears most directly on this line of inquiry, This is the focus of a group led by Don K. Price, Dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University. This group does net, however, have any specific focus on international policy formation.
There is as yet no curriculum which pretends to train individuals adequately to understand the potential social aspects of space science and engineering aspects of contemporary international relations and to formulate policy concerning these aspects. It is unlikely that adequate patterns of coordination among the many interested and responsible groups can be designed until the presently recognized scarcity of personnel with sufficient interdisciplinary knowledge and interest has been eliminated. For a general statement of this scarcity, see E. R. Piore and R. N. Kreidler, "Recent Developments in the Relationship of Government to Science," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 327 (January 1960), page 18. [-74-]
13. The possible development of significant programs abroad must not be underestimated because of high costs. Although the expense of launching scientifically instrumented earth satellites is great compared with many scientific enterprises, it is not great compared with the purchase of a military missile capability. It has been suggested that Great Britain should
use the rockets remaining from its abandoned military missile program as boosters for scientific satellites. See "Europe Planning Joint Space Unit, New York Times, June 26, 1960. Summaries of proposed space activities have been sent to COSPAR by a number of nations. Such descriptions do not, however, list resources which could be used if arrangements for sharing or collaboration were developed.
14 .For example, Hugh L. Dryden, Deputy Administrator, of NASA, has said: "The task of space exploration is global in nature; it requires large resources; and its needs are better matched by the resources of the whole world than by those of one nation." ("Prospects for Space Travel", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 104 (Oct. 17, 1960), P. 484.
15. The economic aspects of scientific enterprises have not been adequately studied. However, at least one group studying science and public policy, that at Harvard University under the leadership of Don K. Price, includes an economist, Dr. Carl Kaysen. For a general but nevertheless relevant and suggestive discussion, see Thomas C. Schelling, "International CostSharing Arrangements," Essays in International Finance, No. 24 (September 1955), Princeton University, Department of Economics and Sociology, International Finance Section.
16. For a discussion of possible European rocket programs and the equipment they might use, see S. Fred Singer, "Europe’s Ambitious Plans to Explore," Missiles and Rockets, Vol. 7 (Oct. 3, 1960),pp. 23-24.
17. See Note 16.
18. The economic aspects of the Air Force program of supporting unclassified research abroad provides an instance where science has been supported across national boundaries. Characteristically the IGY did not depend on international financing, although there were notable exceptions to this pattern. The proposed International Indian Ocean Expedition and other outgrowths of IGY do include more international economic sharing, As yet there are no definite plans for a comprehensive study of the planning, organization, financing, and execution of the IGY or its rocket and satellite program by means of economic, administrative, or other lines of social science inquiry. The Council for Atomic Age Studies at Columbia University has started a study of the IGY, although not specifically from an economic point of view,
19. See Rule 24 of the International Geophysical Committee (CIG) of the ICSU, ICSU Review, Vol. 2 (April 1960), page 67.
20. Research groups in a number of law schools including those of Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, and Michigan universities have made studies of one or more of the problems arising from the new sale and international character of expenditures, financial risks, or cooperation on technical matters which have beer stimulated by scientific and technical advances. As yet, space programs have not received the same attention in this regard as have atomic energy or natural resources programs.
21. See Charles V. Kidd, American Universities and Federal Research, Belknap Press (1959).
22. For a description. of the present difficulty of using American-controlled foreign currencies for science projects under Public Law 480, see "Use of Funds from Sales of Surplus Foods for Science and Education Is Not Up to Expectations," Science, Vol. 132 (Aug. 26, 1960), page 534. [-76-]
23. For discussion of the possible impact of financing on the consultative activities of scientists, see, for example, the Report of the Third COSPAR Meeting, p. 11.
24. For a suggestive study of the IAEA which does not, however, consider possible implications for prospective international space programs, see John G. Stoessinger, "Atoms for Peace: the IAEA," in Organizing Peace in the Nuclear Age (a report of the Commission to study the organization of Peace), New York University Press (1959).
25. See the New York Times, June 26, 1960.
26. The increasingly large budgets of many international science organizations and other considerations are prompting a considerable number of changes in the charters and bylaws of these organizations. Certain studies of these formal arrangements have been made at Columbia University by the Council for Atomic Age Studies, with the assistance of the Legislative Drafting Research Fund.
27. There are nine non-U.S.-based Smithsonian Optical Satellite Tracking Stations employing a total of about fifty operating personnel, of whom about half are foreign nationals. There are eight minitrack stations in operation or being negotiated, requiring over twenty technically trained persons. To the maximum extent feasible NASA attempts to employ local personnel for any and all of these positions.
28. Work at the optical tracking stations appears to involve considerable onsite calculation in connection with the taking of photographs and their immediate interpretation. Maintenance work on precision electronic and optical equipment must also be done. With four or more observers at each station there appears to be an opportunity for considerable on-the-job training. See Smithsonian Institution Astronautical observatory, Tracking Satellites (mimeographed April 1960).
The skills required at the minitrack stations have primarily to do with electrical and electronics engineering and communications services including teletype operations. The size of each station suggests there is the possibility of some on-the-job training.
29. The belief has been expressed by informed scientists that arrangements could and should be made to have foreign laboratories perform more or less routine data analysis, The report of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space mentions the possible use of the new International Computation Center in Rome, established with the assistance of UNESCO, for the interpretation and utilization of data from meteorological satellites. See United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, A/4141 (July 14, 1959), Part II, paragraph 29, page 35.
30. See, for example, UNESCO inventories of science organizations and scientists in many different parts of world, UNESCO has also sponsored studies of technical terminaologies and their standardizations.
31. The Jodrell Bank radio telescope plays a unique role in the tracking of small probes as well as well as in radion astronomy. It might be of particular interest to Consider the history of this unique instrument in order to better understand the circumstances under which it was built, and why similar developments did not take place in the countries which now have the largest space programs.
One rather bizarre but nevertheless provocative illustration of the kind of problem which might well be anticipated is the case of the Greek, electrical engineer Nicholas C. Christofilos. The principle of "strong was fault expounded by Christofilos and communicated by him, to an appropriate research center the United States. His suggestion was ignored until the principal was, subsequently discovered independently in the United States. This principle has made possible the high energy particle accelerators now operated by CERN and Brookhaven National Laboratories. See New York Times, March 19, 1959, p. 16.
32. The skills required in connection with the minitrack stations would, for instance, appear to be Useful and transferable in many parts of the world. [-78-]
33. The Stanford Research Institute has studied some of the uses of new technology to help underdeveloped areas meet their special needs.
34. Writing in the New York Times, Aug. 22, 1960, P. 2, Walter Sullivan described the disadvantage for the Soviet Union of having to put its man-in-space capsules in a polar orbit, whereas political geography makes it unnecessary for the United States to do so.
35. This need for global networks of tracking and receiving stations has been stressed by Livingston Merchant and others. See "Review of the Space Program," House Hearings Before Committee on Science and Astronautics, 86th Congress, Second Session (1960), Part I, P. 6. Data storage and arrangements for readout on command are helping the United States effort to become more self-sufficient in its space program. This technique may, however, introduce some new political problems while it eliminates others. The launching of many sounding rockets for synoptic surveys and the use of satellites for certain geophysical, navigational, or communications purposes necessarily involves the use of equipment which is geographically dispersed. Even outside the iron curtain, desirable locations for space project stations are sometimes unavailable, being placed in jeopardy by political conditions, or being the subject of objectives and restrictions. With increasing political change in Asia, Africa, and perhaps South America, the effects of such changes on our space program will have to be anticipated.
If maximum social benefit is to be derived from future space activities, studies on the relative political desirability of having ground stations, launching ranges, or re-entry ranges in different locations must proceed concurrently with technical studies on the need for and specification of such stations and ranges.
36. Plans for a satellite-mounted telescope as outlined in the New York Times, Oct. 9, 1960, P. 24, appear to call for a single receiving station with all data being relayed immediately to Princeton University, The need for elaborate ground installations and data analysis centers may make it economically desirable to have only one information receiving station, even for non strategic satellite equipment such as an astronomical telescope. It should nevertheless be recognized that in many instances more scientific information might be obtainable with more receiving stations and that in their absence profound changes may take place in the professional organization and opportunities available to the international astronomical fraternity. other scientific professions may be similarly affected as satellites are incorporated into the foremost tools of the experimental scientists.
37. The general problem of limited agreements designed to facilitate technical operations has been discussed by Philip C. Jessup and Howard J. Taubenfeld in Controls for Outer Space and the Antarctic Analogy, Columbia University Press (1959).
38. There appears to be increasing general as well as professional awareness of the legal and political precedent-setting nature of various space activities. See, for example, "Spy Satellite to Test Sovereignty in Space," New York Times, Oct. 11, 1960, P. 1. The extent to which any one physical act does set a precedent affecting subsequent social behavior is, of course, a complex social problem which is made even more complex by "selffulfilling prophecy" associated with the subtleties of the technologies involved, the auspices of those acting, and the affects of some published studies and reports.
39. Shortly after the launching of Sputnik I, some space scientists formed an international Committee on Contamination by Extraterrestrial Exploration, known as CETEX, whose work has now been taken over by COSPAR. CETEX prepared a report on the steps which should be taken to avoid biological contamination of the moon and planets. it was hoped that the governments with space probe capabilities would favor these procedures,
40. See "Billions of Tiny Wires in Orbit Planned for Radio Relay System," New York Times, Aug. 15, 1960, P. 1.
41. In the United States, at least, space scientists were instrumental in forestalling at least one threat to the advance of radio astronomy, but according to some well-informed observers there was and always will be a serious risk of lack of knowledge and coordination on the part of those who should be concerned, those who are concerned, and those who can do something about the situation. "Radio astronomy recently almost came to an untimely end, simply through the negotiation of an international treaty on frequency allocations without adequate recognition of the needs of this young science for listening windows. Through the good offices of the National Academy of Sciences it was possible to bring scientists and the appropriate government officials together in time to establish a U.S. position for the Geneva International Telecommunications Union conference compatible with the needs of the radioastronomers." See George B. Kistiakowsky, "Science and Foreign Affairs," Science, Vol. 131 (April 8, 1960), P. 1022. [-80-]
42. It is recognized, of course, that there are some basic engineering differences and mission differences between those space activities directed to scientific research and those directed to military ends. These differences are very well summarized in H. Guyford Stever, "Growing Problems in the Space Program," Aero/Space Engineering, Vol. 18 (April 1959) pp. 40ff.
43. Wallace R. Brode, "The Role of Science in Foreign Policy Planning," Department of State Bulletin, 62, No. 107-f (Feb. 22, 1960), P. 274.
44. A scholar visiting Japan in 1960 reported that the Japanese he met regarded the Soviet rocket shots into the Pacific at that time as intended demonstrations of Japan's particular military vulnerability.
45. It has been suggested, for instance, that the U.S. offer to exchange some of its Tiros II cloud pictures for foreign cloud data collected from below is partly intended to "allay fears that the weather-eye satellite is deliberately peeping at more then the weather over Red lands," See "U.S. Seeks More Help in Other Lands, Will Offer Data to Reds," Wall Street Journal, Sept. 26, 1960.
46. It is worth questioning whether events in our space history have confounded foreign attitudes toward our peaceful program. The U-2 example is the most obvious recent event. Further, our astronauts are all military personnel, and there is a military man-in-space program as well. The use of an Atlas missile as a vehicle for President Eisenhower's Christmas message transmission is believed, by some informants, have confused further our distinction between the civilian and the military space programs. See also Hal Gettings, "Usefulness of Transit Questioned," Missiles and Rockets, Vol. 7 (Sept. 26, 1960), p. 15, from which this excerpt is taken: "Speaking at last week's IRE (Institute of Radio Engineers) Symposium on Space Electronics and Telemetry, in Washington, D.C., Dr. Conrad C. Wan, of Hughes Aircraft, said that development of a system such as Transit for commercial applications 'appears needlessly redundant and unnecessary.'...Dr. Wan did not touch on the possible use of Transit in-nuclear submarines to periodically check their inertial guidance systems. The navigational satellite is most often touted as a global aid for ships and aircraft -seldom mentioned is this more vital Navy requirement."
Stephen B. Withey, Director of Public Affairs Studies, Survey Research Center, the University of Michigan, has noted that "it is clear from the SRC studies from 1946 to 1956 that it took the public a long time to separate military and peacetime uses for atomic energy. The development of medical uses was the major factor, with power production an ambiguous second because of military needs for power of a different kind, and also fear of radiation, etc., that has made problems sometimes in public acceptance of power plants near private housing." (From personal correspondence.)
47. One nuclear test detection system, Project Vale of the U.S. Department of Defense, includes one space component. A system of detection of nuclear weapons in space might use satellites extensively. See testimony by Dr. Herbert York, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1961, Senate Report No. 1300: Report of the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences on H.R. 10809 (April 29, 1960), p. 80.
48. See Lincoln P. Bloomfield, The United Nations and the Strategy of Peace (mimeographed version), Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1960), p. 184.\[-82-]
49. See Report of the Section of International and Comparative Law of the American Bar Association (mimeographed; August 1959), p. 9.
50. The literature and bibliographies on "space law" are growing rapidly. The American Bar Foundation has prepared, under contract with NASA, a selective, qualitative compilation and analysis of proposals for a law of outer space. See also External Research Division, Department of State, Social Science Research on Outer Space, ER-27 (December 1959), entries 129-146; and Bibliography of the Space Law Collection (mimeographed), University of Oklahoma Law Library.
Much of the thought thus far developed is necessarily a priori. There remains a need to consider the legal context of specific space activities and, perhaps more important, the appropriate machinery for drafting, negotiating, and enforcing rules or otherwise settling and avoiding disputes related to space activities. Machinery for this purpose must take account of the technical nature of the likely disputes. Studies of developments for other purposes, such as the regulation of communications, the sharing of expensive equipment, or the use of unique resources, might provide helpful comparisons. See Philip C. Jessup and Howard J. Taubenfeld, Controls for outer Space and the Antarctic Analogy, Columbia University Press (1959).
51. The question of the eventual relevance of routine satellite and rocket launchings and landings to an agency like the International Civil Aviation Organization does not seem to have been fully explored. In the event that rockets were used for the peaceful transport of man or materials from point to point or that satellites became the basis of worldwide air and sea navigation systems, it might be necessary to have the active participation of such an agency as well as such others as the Universal Postal Union and the World Health organization.
52. The appropriateness of the emphasis given to atomic energy in many lesser developed parts of the world has been questioned. (See, for example, Farrington Daniel--, "Report on Asian Trip for the National Academy of Sciences and the Asia Foundation, February 6-April 23, 1960,11 office of the Pacific Science Board, National Academy of Sciences.) [-83-]
Some dissatisfaction concerning the emphasis given to some sciences was expressed to the International Conference on Science in the Advancement of New States held at the Weizmann Institute of Science in Israel. See New York Times, Aug. 27, 1960, page 12. In respect to the space sciences, it should be noted that the USIA has apparently concluded that Voice of America should broadcast a program on "Science and Space" to Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. The program will include a description of the satellite telescope which the United States proposes to launch. See New York Times, Oct. 9. 1960, p. 24.
53. The need for private scholarly assessment of changes in world political "atmosphere" has been recognized, and plans for an independently operated "World Intelligence Center" have been outlined. See, for example, Quincy Wright, "Project for a World Intelligence Center," Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1 (March 1957), pp. 93-97. One part of this mapping of the "atmosphere" which is particularly pertinent to a space program is the quantitative measure of international cooperation in the natural sciences, including the space sciences, and the continuing assessment of the contribution which international science programs are making to international relations. Efforts can and should be made to discover ways to measure trends in the international organization and financing of space science, in the interest in, and quality of, space science as compared with other scientific and non-scientific activities around the world, and in the significant flow of scientific information and expertise across national boundaries through travel, publications, demonstrations and conferences.
54. Some of the incompatibilities between scientists trained in different environments have been referred to elsewhere in this chapter. It has been pointed out by experienced scientists that the short-run result of efforts at international or even interdisciplinary scientific or technical cooperation can dilute the impact and quality of technical accomplishments. It has sometimes been suggested that the work of UNESCO, for instance, is particularly vulnerable to this dilution. It remains, therefore, to delineate and weigh possible long-run benefits against the short-run liabilities of cooperation within the international community on scientific and technical subjects, [-84-]
55. "Finance Minister Dr. S. E. Imoke of Eastern Nigeria, which will become an independent nation on October 1, expressed the hope that the countries from the Eastern bloc, especially the Soviet Union, would join in the attempt to harness scientific and technological knowledge for the less privileged on earth before proceeding with ambitious programs in outer space and trips to the moon....'We do not ask for the moon,' he said. 'All we seek is guidance, assistance, and cooperation in our efforts to extract from the resources of our countries a more abundant life."' See "Better Life Here, Not on Moon, Urged," New York Times, Aug. 28, 1960, P. 58.
56. Along with announcements of plans for space activities or of accomplishments in space, it might be possible to include statements intended to inform and prepare appropriate publics for the social and psychological implications of the plan or event. In the words of Professor Alfred de Grazia, "space can be strong medicine and the least we should do is to make sure the label instructs the user on the proper application of the contents and of the possibility of side effects." More specifically, as suggested by Bert Hoslitz, Director, Research Center in Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, the possibility of weather and communications satellites might be used as a stimulant in the developing nations for programs in data keeping, irrigation and dam construction, and literacy.
57. A most-informative presentation of various sides of this argument is provided in House Hearings Before the Committee on Science and Astronautics, No. 3, Part 1, Review of the Space Program, 86th Congress, Second Session (1960), pp. 1-34.
58. "For most people in the world the United States is not a very important object to be either for or against. People are concerned with their own problems and their own policies. If at a particular moment American action is favorable toward those, well and good; if not, our actions will be disapproved. For most people there are no independent identifications with foreign countries. We take this for granted for Americans. A few Americans may have favorite foreign countries, but these are usually favorites from a touristic point of view.... The attitude of most Americans toward the policies of most foreign countries is simply a reflection of the current impact of those policies on the United States rather than the other way around. American effective attitudes toward Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela are hardly very different in the long run. Differences in policy are simply differences in current situations and we are friendly or hostile for the moment accordingly. We can see this in ourselves. It is much harder for us to recognize that attitudes toward the United States by others are similarly detached and of equally low saliency for policy." See Ithiel de Sola Pool, Research on Communication and Values in Relation to War and Peace (to be published by the Institute for International Order, New York City, early in 1961),pp. III-15,16, of prepublication draft. For the experiences of business executives in this matter, see Question 11 of the Harvard Business Review Questionnaire (in Appendix A at the end of this Footnote Volume).
In April-June 1960, Professor Jiri Nehnevajsa and Albert S. Francis of Columbia University surveyed samples of legislators and university students in Brazil and Finland. The respondents were asked to indicate which of a series of eighteen international political-economic-military circumstances they foresaw as changed by a series of events including some in space. (In what follows the figures are given in the following order: (1) Brazilian legislators and (2) students; (3) Finnish legislators and (4) students.)
As to the effects of the USSR being first with manned space flight, an increase in the status quo was foreseen by 13, 15, 35, and 49 per cent. other foreseen changes of increased chances for reconciliation and increased acceptance of Communism accounted for 10 per cent or less of the total responses in each of the four respondent categories. Most of the eighteen types of circumstances listed were seen as unaffected. [-86-]
If the United States were first to succeed with manned space flight the status quo was foreseen as emphasized by 17, 19, 35, and 52 per cent. Evolution of democracy in Communist countries, reconciliation, and disarmament were foreseen as being more likely in this event by substantially less than 10 per cent of each category of respondent to each type of event. The remainder of the eighteen events were seen as essentially unaffected by this space activity. The study was done under Air Research and Development Command, Air Force Office of Scientific Research, Contract AF 49 (638)-473 with Columbia University. The methods used are described in Technical Note TN-60-2 'Research on Comparative Impact of Actual Versus Anticipated Events," July 15, 1960. For an interpretation of some responses of foreigners to early space activities, see Gabriel A. Almond, "Public Opinion and the Development of Space Technology," International Political Implications of Activities in Outer Space (Joseph M. Goldsen, Chairman), RAND Corporation Report R-362-RC (May 5, 1960).
59. "It is sometimes said that the prestige of the advocate of a new idea is a decisive factor in its acceptance or rejection by others. This is true, but only with important reservations. The proposition does not provide us with a sufficiently refined conceptual tool to probe the effective elements in the situation. on the one hand this statement is likely to be misleading and, on the other, it does not bring to the surface the advocate characteristics that are pertinent. Prestige is a blank term that covers a heterogeneous assortment of discrete attributes. Eminence is, in the last analysis, an accreditation of competence. It, therefore, attaches to many qualifications, the differential effects of which are masked by their all being referred to simply as prestige factors. All advocate characteristics which bear upon acceptance can be subsumed under the rubric of prestige, or the lack of it, if one wishes, but this gives no insight into the issues in the acceptance situation." Homer G. Barnett, Innovation: The Basis of Cultural Change, McGraw-Hill (1953), P. 313. For a detailed discussion of some aspects of this complex problem, see Ibid., Chap. 14, "Acceptors and Rejectors."
60. For example, according to American scientists who have recently visited Europe, the attitudes of European scientists, including some from the Communist bloc, regarding the quality of our space efforts indicate that they fully appreciate the quality of our scientific accomplishments. But in no sense is it clear what part these scientists play in decisions made by their governments regarding relationships with the United States, as compared to relationships with other nations of the world. We do not know whether the governing elites attend closely to what the scientists say about our science, and we do not know whether, even if they do attend, this knowledge is used as a basis for making decisions about, for example, their commercial purchases, their military posture, their educational system, and their economic methods. Nor is it known, in general, what expertise is attended to under what circumstances.
61. A recent example of the untoward consequences of one suchimbalance is discussed in R. Hart Phillips, "Rocket Fragments Fell on Cuba; 'Yankee Aggression' is Charged.” New York Times, Dec. 2, 1960, p. 1.