Nixon, Kissinger and the New World Order: A Revisionist History

By Will Banyan

Copyright © **October 2007**

Author's note: *This is a draft chapter from my projected revisionist study of the New World Order, tentatively titled:* ***An Enforced Peace****. In my view more work could always be done, so comments and criticisms about this contentious chapter are most welcome*: banyan007@rediffmail.com

> "The only alternative to a balance of power is an imbalance of power…and history shows us that nothing so drastically escalates the danger of war as such an imbalance."
>
> President Richard M. Nixon, 25 June 1972[1]

> "I hate the idea of Dick Nixon being President."
>
> Nelson A. Rockefeller, undated[2]

Despite the enormous controversies that he generated while in office, from the secret bombing of Cambodia to his demise over the Watergate scandal, the role of President Richard M. Nixon (1913-1994) and his ill-fated Administration remains one the more neglected periods in the study of New World Order history. Gary Allen published a number of books in the early 1970s that purported to reveal Nixon's complicity in the world government conspiracy. Reflecting the John Birch Society's ongoing animosity towards Nixon – which stemmed from Nixon's attack on the Society in the1960s after they had attacked Eisenhower – Allen found much that was sinister about Nixon including his courting of the Communist world, his "socialist" domestic economic policy, brief CFR membership and appointment of "radical Leftist" and Nelson Rockefeller protégé, Dr Henry Kissinger, as his National Security Adviser.[3] Nixon, he concluded, was "in league with the Eastern Liberal Establishment *Insiders*" and had accepted their goal of "convergence with Communism in a world superstate."[4]

There have been few advances on this approach, however, with most contemporary NWO researchers producing shallow and uninformative accounts that uncritically recycle Allen's original allegations. Perloff, for instance, in his remarkably brief account (a chapter aptly titled "The Unknown Nixon"), regurgitates most of Allen's key claims, charging that Nixon stacked his administration with CFR members, was soft on Communism and was probably removed from office to fulfil Nelson Rockefeller's dream of becoming President.[5] Otherwise one struggles to find substantial mention or analysis of Nixon's role in the New World Order.

Ironically, while Nixon has largely been ignored, Kissinger has been widely vilified, becoming the bugbear to many anti-NWO activists and researchers. It is Kissinger who is identified in countless books and articles as belonging to that "bevy of one-worlders" by virtue of his long-time CFR membership and connections with Nelson Rockefeller (Jasper). Icke, for example, regularly denounces Kissinger as a "Satanist, mass murderer, mind control expert and child killer", portraying him as *the* master manipulator. "Nixon may have been officially president", writes Icke, "but Kissinger ran the government." While former MI6 agent Dr John Coleman, despite devoting more space to Nixon than many other NWO researchers in 1990s, does little more than promote the dubious tale that Kissinger set in motion Chatham House's "Watergate plan to oust Nixon for disobeying direct instructions" from the "Committee of 300." Curiously Coleman never explains which instructions Nixon failed to carry out, but he details at

considerable length Kissinger's alleged perfidy and unsavoury associations.[6]

A more intriguing alternative to this predictable litany is that Nixon *and* Kissinger actually broke with the Eastern Establishment's by then crumbling Cold War consensus. An analysis of their words and deeds while in power reveals that they took advantage of Establishment divisions to decisively reject the compromise with the liberal internationalist faction and pursue their own agenda. Instead of putting their faith in international institutions and free trade, Nixon and Kissinger sought to protect US national interests, as they perceived them, through a policy of secretive *Realpolitik*. Believing US power to be ebbing, Nixon's vision was to create a "structure of peace", based on a balancing act between the five main power centres: the US, USSR, China, Japan and Western Europe. Nixon planned to replace the bipolar system of the Cold War, not with US dominance or world government, but with a multipolar world order.

In short, Nixon and Kissinger did not advance the globalist cause: *they obstructed it*. Under Nixon's leadership the very framework of the emerging New World Order, which the liberal internationalists had been patiently constructing since 1945, was subject to its first serious internal challenge. In time, though, the Nixon Administration's decidedly uncompromising *Realpolitik* was to become a galvanising force for Eastern Establishment, leading to the emergence of a truly transnational elite and a radically revised agenda for building the New World Order.

Nixon: The Insider as Outsider

The typical process of deduction for most populist New World Order accounts involves identifying participants in the conspiracy through their membership of suspect organisations and their other elite connections. Underlying this is an assumption, generally untested yet at the same time taken as a self-evident truth, that certain links inevitably mean certain things. Membership of the Council on Foreign Relations, to cite the most common example, is typically regarded a proof of ones complicity in the world government plot. In Nixon's case we find the same logic operating with Nixon described in some accounts as an "obedient Rockefeller man" purely on the basis of speculative claims that Nelson Rockefeller supported Nixon financially following his failed president bid in 1960 and that Nixon subsequently ran, again unsuccessfully, for the governorship of California in 1962 on Rockefeller's orders.[7] From this "evidence" it is generally concluded that the Nixon's preference for world government was predetermined and inevitable; contrary facts are to be ignored.

The alternative course is to explore more critically the claims and evidence for Nixon's relationship with the Establishment and other elite figures. Doing so reveals that contrary to the somewhat jaundiced and fantastic accounts of Allen and Perloff, Nixon was not in thrall to Nelson Rockefeller, and actually had a complex and antagonistic relationship with the Eastern Establishment. Although Nixon was able to draw much of his support from the nouveau riche of the Southern Rim of the US, the so-called "Cowboy" elite, plus other more controversial benefactors, allegedly including foreign dictators and organised crime; the Eastern Establishment refused to give him the recognition he craved most, inspiring his hatred for them.

Born into a Quaker family that ran a grocery store in Southern California, Nixon's background, although not stricken by poverty, was nevertheless unexceptional and unprivileged. When he entered politics in 1946 as the Republican candidate for then California's 12th congressional district, successfully vanquishing the Democratic incumbent Jerry Voorhis, his resume was still modest. A graduate from Duke University Law School, he worked in the Office of Price Administration and before joining the US Navy as an officer during World War Two, serving in the Pacific, Nixon was hardly Establishment material. Yet Nixon's career is remarkable for his rapid yet seemingly effortless drive to the White House. At the end of his first term in the House of Representatives in 1950, he switched to the Senate. Just two years later,

riding in large part on his reputation as a leading anti-Communist following the Alger Hiss case, he was confirmed as Eisenhower's running mate, becoming Vice-President a mere six years after entering politics. Nixon would fail in his run against Kennedy in 1960, briefly retiring from politics to pursue a legal career, but in 1968 he resurrected his political vocation to finally win the presidency.

Given his meteoric political rise one would expect Nixon to have a respectful and mutually advantageous relationship with the Establishment; in truth he hated it and had numerous clashes with its leading figures and institutions. Historians often note Nixon's poor relationship with the Establishment. According to Robert Schulzinger, for example, Nixon believed "internationalist Republicans controlled the national media, influenced public opinion, and recruited the officials of the foreign policy apparatus." Evidence of Nixon's loathing of the Eastern Establishment is well documented. Kissinger makes a number of candid observations on this matter in his own self-serving memoirs. Nixon, he wrote, "did not consider himself a member of the Establishment…he felt ignored, even ostracised, by the elite before and throughout his period in office." Nixon's conversation was often "suffused with outrage" at the "'Georgetown cocktail set' and the Council on Foreign Relations." He detested Nelson Rockefeller, regarding him as a "selfish amateur who would wreck what he could not control, [and] a representative of the Establishment that had treated [Nixon] with condescension throughout his political life." Nixon also came to office suspicious of the State Department, believing it to be disloyal, and that the CIA was staffed by "Ivy League liberals" who had "always opposed him politically."[8]

Nixon condemned members of his administration who "start sucking around the Georgetown set…they're disgusting." His former aide, Alexander Butterfield recalled how once Nixon had asked, "'Did one of those dirty bastards ever invite me to his fucking men's club or goddamn country club? Not once.' He was shaking… The hatred was very deep-seated. He didn't just not like them. He hated them."[9] In his memoirs Nixon makes numerous accusations against those powers he believed were trying to sabotage his political career. Despite his efforts during his first term in the White House, Nixon later lamented in his memoirs, "Congress, the bureaucracy, and the media were still working in concert to maintain the ideas and ideology of the traditional Eastern liberal establishment."[10] Nixon also criticised the "liberal left media" whose record was "the most disgraceful in the whole history of communications." He repeatedly railed against the media's "blatant double standard", "biased coverage", and dominance by pro-Democrat elements, indifference to official secrecy, "their power and their bias" and "unaccountable power."[11]

The reasons for Nixon's hatred – no more than the usual dirty tricks from rivals and opposing factions that any aspiring politician faces – seem unexceptional, even trivial given his rapid rise to the White House, unless Nixon's state of mind is called into question. The crucial events appear to have been the attempts to dump Nixon from the Vice-Presidential nomination during the 1952 and 1956 campaigns, both seemingly orchestrated by the Eastern Establishment. The first attempt, over allegations that Nixon was benefiting from a "secret rich men's trust fund", spearheaded by the *New York Herald Tribune*, according to Parmet, amounted to an "official eastern establishment edict" for Nixon to be removed from the ticket. While the second, involved very public attempts to replace Nixon with Christian Herter, a "quintessential eastern establishment Republican", in an plot reputedly ordered by Eisenhower and supported by a number of Eastern Establishment luminaries, including Nelson Rockefeller.[12]

Although Nixon was ultimately successful in warding off both these challenges he was deeply wounded by the experience suspecting "intrigue" and a "set-up" to remove him.[13] This deepened his distrust of the Establishment, especially the media, which only worsened over time. This later emerged as paranoia following his close defeat in the 1960 presidential election against Kennedy with Nixon convinced that the CIA had contributed to his loss by deliberately leaking information to Kennedy's election team.[14] In 1962, after another election defeat, this time for the governorship of California, Nixon publicly expressed his suspicions the media was arrayed against him, telling a press conference they would no longer have Nixon to "kick around any more" as he was quitting politics.[15] It was therefore not surprising that when he

finally returned to the White House in 1969, Nixon would come with a number of scores to settle with the CIA, the media and the Eastern Establishment.

But there was, as Nixon himself acknowledged in his memoirs, a paradox in that he assumed the presidency in 1969 "as a Washington insider, but with an outsider's prejudices"[16] Although Nixon hated the Eastern Establishment, it was hatred based on his belief that they had unfairly rejected him. Acceptance and respect from the Wise Men and their backers from America's superrich was what he craved the most. As one former member of the Nixon Administration recalled, "He'd love to get people like David Rockefeller in to call him 'Mr President.' He loved to have all those real old-core rich around, that had to defer to him."[17] Kissinger agrees: "Behaving more like a rejected lover than a sworn enemy, Nixon was eager to be admitted into the [Establishment], not to destroy it."[18]

During the 1960s, for example, while Nixon was trying to find his feet, he briefly dallied with gaining some acceptance from the Eastern Establishment, accepting an invitation to join the Council on Foreign Relations in 1961. This appears to have an unproductive association for Nixon terminated his membership in 1965 and making him "one of the few distinguished Americans who have ever resigned from the Council on Foreign Relations"(Hodgson). According to a letter from Nixon's office in 1968 claimed he had "never attended a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations." The reasons for his departure are unclear. One explanation is that he dropped out after CFR membership became an issue during his campaign to be the Republican nominee for Governor of California in 1962. Another reason, less well known, is that Nixon was actually removed from the CFR's rolls for failing to pay his dues, an act that would have exposed his indifference to the organisation.[19] Nevertheless, Gary Allen, disbelieving that anyone could truly resign from the CFR, later claimed that Nixon's resignation was most likely a sham and that he was probably a "secret member" of the CFR. Unfortunately this speculative smear has been repeated as fact by numerous other NWO researchers despite the absence of supporting evidence.[20]

The charge that Nixon was Rockefeller's lackey, deferring to his will in their political dealings, also collapses under closer scrutiny. In 1959 during the Republican primaries, Nixon, fearing that Rockefeller might gain the presidential nomination, not only attempted to dig up dirt on him but also considered moves to obstruct his campaign. In 1960 Nixon rejected the idea of having Rockefeller as Vice President when it became apparent that Nelson would not settle for anything less than Nixon stepping aside after one term for him. However, as part of a compromise to protect his candidacy from divisions within the GOP, Nixon appeared to accept a number of Rockefeller's suggested changes to the Republican platform in what became known as the "Compact of Fifth Avenue." This incident has been interpreted as a Nixon sell-out and thus proof that Nixon was in "the Rockefeller orbit" (Allen and Abraham). The reality, however, was that "Nixon and Rockefeller had capitulated to each other's unacceptable terms" with Nixon actually agreeing to Rockefeller positions that he already privately supported (Parmet).[21]

As for Nixon's relationship with Nelson Rockefeller, the evidence for Perloff's claim that he was Rocky's "neighbour, tenant and employee" during the 1960s is mixed.[22] While it is certainly true that Nixon and his family lived in the same apartment block as Governor Rockefeller in 1963, the block was in fact owned by Nelson's first wife, Mary Clark Rockefeller, who had obtained it as part of their divorce settlement. In his memoirs Nixon attributes to coincidence that he ended up living in the same block as his rival, but does mention any encounters with Rockefeller. Furthermore, Nixon's new job as a partner in the law firm of Mudge, Stern, Baldwin & Todd, came about because of a recommendation from one their clients, Elmer Bobst of the Warner-Lamberg Pharmaceutical Company. Bobst was one of Nixon's prime benefactors at the time. Although Nelson Rockefeller is alleged to have been client of that firm, making use of the services of John Mitchell (later to become Nixon's Attorney-General and Watergate co-conspirator), there is no evidence that Rockefeller was Nixon's client.[23]

To say that Nixon and Nelson Rockefeller did not like each other would be an understatement; their

mutual feelings went beyond mere political rivalry to that of loathing, bordering on hatred. According to Rockefeller's biographer and speechwriter, Joseph Persico, Nelson's attitude toward Nixon was "a bare notch above contempt." As for Nixon, he despised Nelson and remained convinced that Rockefeller had used dirty tricks against him during the 1968 campaign, as recently released White House tapes have revealed. He later snubbed Rockefeller when he visited to pay his respects to the President-elect – Rockefeller was told that Nixon was "resting". Nixon's ill-feeling towards Nelson was extended to his brother David. While considering awarding Cabinet positions to both brothers, Nixon reportedly grumbled that he did not know "why there even has to be *one* Rockefeller." Nixon subsequently told Nelson that he would be of better use to the Republican Party if he remained Governor of New York.[24]

Yet Nixon was not content to exclude the Rockefellers from his Administration. Despite his grumbling, Nixon clearly relished the prospect of having them, the pre-eminent family in the United States, doing his bidding. Thus, in an insincere gesture in 1969, Nixon dispatched Nelson on a fact-finding mission to Latin America, ostensibly to devise some recommendations for Nixon's policy toward the region. It became a costly venture for Rockefeller, whose self-funded travels produced a report that Nixon ignored. While David was offered on more than one occasion the position of Treasury Secretary, Secretary of Defense and US Ambassador to Moscow, albeit through intermediaries.[25] Unlike his vain and ambitious elder brother, the more reserved and inscrutable David, already occupying a number of leading positions in the Establishment, tactfully refused all of these positions, clearly more aware of Nixon's insincerity and desire to dominate, as well as the unacceptable risks to his own powerful position should he hold public office.[26]

A similar absence of evidence can be seen in claims that Nixon benefited from Eastern Establishment support during his political career. In his campaign against Voorhis, Nixon is alleged to have received financial backing from Standard Oil, "the company Voorhis most angered." Voorhis later claimed that "big Eastern financial interests," who regarded Voorhis as "the most dangerous man in Washington" because he advocated public ownership of the Federal Reserve System, had supported Nixon. It should be noted, though, that Voorhis' claims remain unsubstantiated, prompting one Nixon defender to dismiss them as a "wild charge" from a bitter and justly defeated opponent (Gellman).[27] Better evidence of Nixon's Eastern Establishment links include his membership of the exclusive Manhattan clubs, the Metropolitan, the Links and the Recess, and the country clubs of Blind Brook and Baltrusol, while he was a lawyer in New York in the sixties. Yet tellingly, as Sale observes, "there is no evidence that [Nixon] made friends with a single Establishmentarian patriarch during the whole five years in [New York]."[28]

The most consistent source of financial support for Nixon, certainly from the time of his vice-presidency, was the so-called "Cowboy" elite. This group has been described elsewhere (see Chapter Ten), but it is worth noting the extent of their financial support for Nixon. As Sale notes, in *Power Shift*, in the initial stages of Nixon's 1968 presidential campaign much of his financial support came from those:

> Southern Rim sources that had always backed Nixon: oilmen, real-estate operators, defence contractors, corporate farmers, and textile manufacturers, plus the usual Nixon cronies like C. Arnholt Smith, Bebe Rebozo, Howard Hughes, Henry Salvatori, John Wayne, and the lads of Newport Beach's extremely rich and conservative Lincoln club, who have claimed that their money single-handedly got Nixon into the Presidency in 1968.[29]

Nixon's close relationship with the Cowboy elite is perhaps inevitable given his political career began in California, the Western-most boundary of the Southern Rim. In 1952, for example, it was revealed that the main sources of Nixon's controversial slush fund were among the state's leading corporate interests. This fact prompted a local paper to describe Nixon as "the pet and protégé of a special interest group of rich Southern Californians." His key sources of income in this period included Union Oil, Standard Oil of California, Superior Oil, Richfield Oil, Signal Oil and Newhall Oil and Howard Hughes. This relationship continued and broadened as he advanced to higher office. In his 1968 and 1972 campaigns he received substantial donations from Southern Rim oil interests, including from Marathon Oil, Getty Oil, Shaheen

Natural Resources, Texas Oil and Coastal States Gas. And also from other leading Southern Rim firms of the time including Electronic Data Systems (Dallas), National General Conglomerate and Hughes Tools. Sale estimates that 45 percent of Nixon's finances came from Southern Rim sources.[30]

Nixon was never invited to the Bilderbergers and nor did he belong to the Skull and Bones or other Eastern Establishment secret societies. He was, however, a member of the San Francisco-based Bohemian Club, attending its annual retreats to the Bohemian Grove, long an important venue for elite male members of the Republican Party.[31]

Nixon's first visit to the Grove was in January 1950, while on a fund-raiser for his Senate campaign. Later, in July of that same year he attended as a guest of long-time member and former President Herbert Hoover, having his first meeting with Eisenhower. But it was only after he became Vice-President in 1953 that Nixon became a fully-fledged member of the Grove, joining the "Cave Man" camp. The Bohemian Grove, Nixon noted in his memoirs, was the venue for the "most important and influential men...from across the country." It was also, Nixon explained in 1984, the place where the power-elite of "East and West" mingled. The Grove, more than any other elite forum, helped clear Nixon's path to power. Nixon later acknowledged that attending the Grove was "one of those rare experiences of a lifetime, and clearly apart from any political considerations, I wouldn't have missed it for anything." It was at the Grove in July 1967 that Nixon made a foreign policy speech that he considered "the first milestone on my road to the presidency"; and it was to the Grove that he encouraged many of his aides to visit.[32]

Nixon's enthusiasm for the Grove reveals the paradox of his relationship with the US power-elite. On the one hand he was filled with loathing for the Eastern Establishment; yet he craved its support but failing to get it – because, he suspected, of his attack on Alger Hiss – Nixon professed to despise its members, institutions and opinions. On the other hand, in service of his massive political ambitions he sought and secured the support of the increasingly powerful "Cowboy" elite, using it to propel him into the vice-presidency a mere six years into his political career.

Kissinger: The Opportunist

Like Nixon, Kissinger's alleged complicity in the New World Order conspiracy has been largely deduced from his Establishment ties. In particular his well-documented relationship with Nelson Rockefeller, causing Gary Allen to condemn Kissinger as "an agent of the...House of Rockefeller"[33]; and his long association with the Council on Foreign Relations, making him perhaps its most widely known, but possibly its most misunderstood member.[34] Citing these links numerous researchers, such as Phyllis Schafly and retired US Admiral Chester Ward, authors of *Kissinger on the Couch* (1975), have denounced Kissinger as a megalomaniac and accused him of taking a leading role in the world government conspiracy.[35]

Yet, as with Nixon, the picture of Kissinger the arch-conspirator is complicated by certain facts. It is true that, in contrast to Nixon, Kissinger was far more successful in securing acceptance from the Eastern Establishment, but he did so by fulfilling the role of a modern "bastard feudalist", shamelessly compromising principles in the pursuit of benefactors most likely to advance his career. To the extent that he had any allegiances, Kissinger's transitionary loyalties were almost entirely determined by what his patrons could do to advance his own pursuit of power.[36]

Although distasteful to many researchers, this rampant opportunism was perhaps inevitable given Kissinger's somewhat less than privileged background. Contrary to the fantastic claims from some writers that he came from an "elite bloodline", Kissinger's family were middle-class German-Jews who fled to the US in 1938 to escape Nazi persecution. Kissinger's father, Louis, was teacher, as were his father and

grand-father before him, while Kissinger's mother, Paula Stern, came from a family of prosperous cattle-dealers. Adapting to life in the new land, the young Heinz Kissinger soon distinguished himself from his family and German-Jewish peers, by downplaying his Jewish identity and also being "more directed, more ambitious, [and] more serious about assimilating and succeeding in America."[37]

Kissinger's preferred path to glory was through shamelessly courting the powerful, a practice he began in earnest as a graduate-student at Harvard, becoming a co-founder of the Harvard International Seminar in 1951, a summer program ostensibly designed to introduce professionals from Europe and Asia to the United States. In reality, though, the program served to bring future foreign leaders and senior figures of the US Establishment into contact with Kissinger who craved their indulgence. Kissinger also edited and published, with financial assistance from the Rockefeller Foundation, a quarterly periodical on international affairs called *Confluence*. Although this journal contained weighty articles on international relations by many distinguished personages, it was in fact little more than an "enterprise designed to make Henry known to great people around the world" (Isaacson).[38]

His efforts eventually bore fruit in 1955 when *Foreign Affairs* editor Hamilton Fish Armstrong, responding to recommendations from Kissinger's Harvard patrons McGeorge Bundy and Arthur Schelsinger Jr, offered Kissinger a position as study director of a CFR study panel examining "foreign policy in the nuclear age." Working on the study brought Kissinger into contact with many powerful and influential individuals in the Establishment. The panel was chaired by Gordon Dean, former head of the Atomic Energy Commission and included, among other notables, former State Department policy planning director Paul Nitze, the current director Robert Bowie; and David Rockefeller. The book Kissinger wrote based on the deliberations of the study, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, became a best seller when finally published in 1957, raising his public profile and giving him entry into many elite circles. This included the Bilderbergers, with Kissinger receiving an invitation to attend their May 1956 meeting in Fredensborg, Denmark.[39]

His status growing, in 1961 Kissinger published another book on US foreign policy for the CFR, this time his own work rather than that of a study group, titled *The Necessity for Choice*. That year Kissinger also secured his first official appointment; the Kennedy Administration employing him as a consultant to the National Security Council. This was to be a short-lived venture, however, partly because his relationship with McGeorge Bundy, his old mentor at Harvard, but now Kennedy's national security advisor, quickly soured. Bundy took umbrage with Kissinger's incessant demands for personal contact with JFK and the right to talk to the press. Kissinger's persistent objections to Kennedy's foreign policy also raised the ire of the President's foreign policy and defence team. His contract was not renewed, so in 1962 Kissinger returned to Harvard and the CFR, where he continued to purse an academic career as a foreign policy specialist. He contributed to the CFR project on the trans-Atlantic relations with the book *The Troubled Partnership* (1966), and wrote numerous articles in *Foreign Affairs* and other journals. He also did occasional consultancy work for the Johnson Administration; in 1967, for example, he acted as an intermediary in initial peace talks aimed at the ending the Vietnam War.[40]

It would be a mistake, however, to think that Kissinger was a well-liked member of the Establishment. The combination of his vast ambition with his deep insecurity, stemming from his Jewish refugee background, made him appear, at best, as little more than an irritating opportunist in the eyes of the WASPish ranks of the Eastern Establishment. At Harvard, for example, McGeorge Bundy, finally tiring of Kissinger's endless scheming had taken to teasing his academic understudy, baiting his numerous insecurities. Such behaviour later earned a rebuke from Kissinger who, in his memoirs, implied that Bundy was anti-Semitic; Bundy, Kissinger complained, had displayed a "subconscious condescension" for people of "exotic backgrounds." Bundy, though, would later regret his role in assisting Kissinger's career advancement, coming to regard Kissinger as little more than an opportunist. "Kissinger doesn't need to lie because it's in his interest", Bundy would tell friends in a scathing reassessment some decades later, "he lies because it's

in his nature." That other giant of the Establishment, John J. McCloy, also had reservations about "Henry's opportunism", finding him too calculating.[41]Being tolerated, rather than accepted, by the old guard of the Eastern Establishment, Kissinger, for all his talents for self-promotion, might have sunk back into academic obscurity were it not for the sincere and enduring patronage of Nelson Rockefeller. Kissinger first met his most important benefactor in 1955, when Rockefeller assembled a group of academics at Quantico Marine Base near Washington to discuss national security policy. Rockefeller was impressed with Kissinger and later appointed him as director of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project in 1956. That experience, which involved Kissinger giving Rockefeller regular personal briefings on the progress of the study panels, brought the aspiring academic into Rockefeller's close orbit. It was also from that moment; right through until 1968, that Rockefeller employed Kissinger as a foreign policy consultant for his political campaigns.

Publicly, Kissinger was lavish in his praise for his benefactor, describing Nelson Rockefeller in his memoirs as "the single most influential person in my life." Rockefeller, he maintained, possessed a "pragmatic genius", as well as "unquenchable optimism", and "would have made a great president." In his eulogy for his departed sponsor in 1979, Kissinger claimed that Nelson's passing as "both shattering and nearly inconceivable"; few could appreciate "how desolate our life has become." Nelson was "born to leadership", his enemies "were the slipshod and the second-rate" and it was "a tragedy for the country" that he had not become President. Rockefeller, in turn, had apparently "liked Kissinger, admired him for his intelligence and wit, and enjoyed his company" (Graubard). This admiration had manifested itself in a series of annual financial gifts to Kissinger, including a severance gift of $50,000 when he joined the Nixon Administration in 1969.[42]

Privately, though, Kissinger had been less gracious in his assessments of his benefactor, observing that Rockefeller had "a second-rate mind but a first rate intuition about people. I have a first-rate mind but a third-rate intuition about people."[43] Moreover, obsessed with his own self-advancement Kissinger continued to cultivate other potential sponsors. Thus it was during the 1968 presidential campaign that Kissinger, despite having publicly denounced Nixon as "a disaster" and "unfit to be president", secretly made himself useful to Nixon's campaign team once he realised that Rockefeller's presidential aspirations were in freefall. Kissinger helped Nixon by illegally passing on secret information about the Johnson Administration's negotiations with the North Vietnamese. As Nixon noted in his memoirs, it was Kissinger who provided them with advance notice of Johnson's planned bombing halt close to the election date. This had helped the Nixon campaign's own illegal attempts to pressure South Vietnam to reject any deal made by the Johnson.[44]

A persistent question, however, is why did Nixon chose Kissinger as his National Security Adviser – Nixon's *first* appointment – when they had met only once before Nixon's electoral victory and when Kissinger had been employed by Nixon's arch-rival? The belief among many NWO researchers is that Rockefeller forced Nixon to accept Kissinger as the price for attaining the presidency. Academic historians, in contrast, hold a number of competing theories. Schulzinger, for example, argues that Nixon's decision probably stemmed from his belief that Kissinger's close Establishment connections would "add lustre to an administration of outsiders." While Hoff suggests that it may have been a combination of factors, including Nixon's desire to "steal" someone from the Rockefeller camp. Kai Bird speculates that, "Nixon sensed in Kissinger a kindred spirit, a desperately ambitious man who as an immigrant would always remain an outsider, insecure about his standing in the Establishment."[45]

All these theories go some way toward providing an explanation for Nixon's otherwise inexplicable decision, but there are two other reasons that stand out. The first is that Kissinger's secrecy and duplicity, demonstrated in his willingness to abandon Rockefeller and provide covert assistance to Nixon's campaign had convinced Nixon of "Kissinger's credibility."[46] The second, and perhaps the most important reason, was their mutual devotion to *Realpolitik*.

Although their respective relationships with the Eastern Establishment were quite different, Nixon and Kissinger shared a similar foreign policy outlook in that they believed a *balance of power* was the only way to ensure international peace. As Nixon later recalled, "I knew that we were very much alike in our general outlook in that we shared a belief in the importance of isolating and influencing the factors affecting worldwide balances of power."[47] Their respective paths to that understanding had been different, though, with Nixon reaching that point as his outlook matured, while Kissinger had launched his academic career on such views.

From Idealist to Pragmatist

On those few occasions Nixon's foreign policy thinking has actually been discussed by NWO researchers, much is made of his pro-UN sentiments while a Congressman in the late 1940s, as though he had entered the White House with those sentiments intact. In a typical example, Allen and Abraham, citing his voting record as evidence that Nixon had supported world government "since his early days in Congress," casually dismissed the 1968 elections as a non-contest between "CFR world government advocate Nixon and CFR world government advocate [Hubert] Humphrey."[48] These claims conjure up the fantastic scenario of a young Richard Nixon, having proved his globalist zeal, being "tapped" by the NWO cabal for future greatness, and then deliberately hiding his true ideology under a mask of anti-Communism, only to unleash the NWO program onto a duped public once he entered the White House. In truth, Nixon's international vision can best be understood as a progression from globalist idealism through hawkish anti-Communism, finally culminating in a pragmatic policy of *Realpolitik*.

There can be no doubt that Nixon's earliest foreign policy philosophy was defined by a devotion to Woodrow Wilson's liberal internationalist ideals. In his memoirs Nixon recalls having been "elated" when the US and Soviet Union both supported the formation of the United Nations at the end of World War II.

> As an admirer of Woodrow Wilson I felt that we had made a serious mistake in not joining the League of Nations, and I believed that the UN offered the world's best chance to build a lasting peace.[49]

Nixon carried this enthusiasm into his first political campaign, urging Americans to transform the UN into a more effective organisation. Once in Congress Nixon had supported a number of resolutions from 1948 to 1950 which advocated: strengthening the UN by eliminating the Soviet Union's veto; revising the UN Charter to strengthen the UN as an effective instrument against war; and securing US support for creation of a "UN Police Authority." He also supported arms control, backing international quotas on the production of warships, heavy guns and warplanes. Nixon seemed sincere in his argument, "We must either make the UN work through revision of its charter or stop relying upon it as an effective means for peace and scrap it."[50]

Yet, during that period it is evident that Nixon's increasingly strident opposition to Communism – and his political opportunism – was diluting his enthusiasm for the United Nations. During his Senate campaign in 1950, for example, Nixon had endorsed converting the UN into a global anti-Communist organisation. He also supported former President Hoover's proposal to remove the USSR from the UN, arguing that the Soviet veto made the organisation "powerless to avoid the third world war." And he again called for the creation of a UN police force to repel worldwide Communist aggression.[51] He was also increasingly wary of proposals for world government. In May 1948, Nixon had rejected pressure from some visiting world peace activists to change some of his resolutions from strengthening the UN, to transforming it into a world government. Sensing the changing national mood, Nixon also rejected the agenda of United World Federalists, arguing in 1949 that in his view the UWF went "too far" in the direction of world government.[52]

Carrying on his public role as one of America's most hawkish anti-Communists, Nixon became more belligerent in his calls for a crusade against the Soviet Union. He attacked Truman for being an Anglophile, while demanding a "realistic foreign policy", favouring US guarantees for smaller nations and no appeasement of any aggressors. During the 1952 presidential elections, Nixon had condemned containment as a soft option, endorsing the more aggressive policy of "rollback" and making the rash promise that the Republicans would liberate Eastern Europe. He also supported an expansion of the war in Korea to the Chinese mainland, claiming that a settlement would only lay the foundation for the "eventual Communist domination of all of Asia" which would in turn lead to "world war."[53]

As Vice-President, Nixon was somewhat more restrained in his hawkish sentiments, although in his numerous trips around the world he frequently courted controversy with his anti-Communist pronouncements, resulting in some memorable incidents including the famous "kitchen debate" with Khruschev and having his car attacked by pro-Communist mobs in Venezuela. Nixon carried these sentiments into the 1960 election campaign, endorsing a tough stance toward Cuba, although out of expediency distancing himself from Kennedy's suggestion that the US support a counter-revolution against the Castro regime on the grounds that not only would it fail, but it would breach the UN Charter and give the Soviets a propaganda victory. Although Nixon was soon proved to be right after the Bay of Pigs debacle, "he did not believe a word of what he said", and had been intimately involved in plans to use the CIA to overthrow and assassinate Castro.[54] This incident was telling, however, as it not only demonstrated that Nixon's political expediency was limitless, but that his previous commitment to upholding international law was no more.

The first real signs of this new pragmatism became apparent with Nixon's returned to national politics in 1967. Gone was the belligerent anti-Communism and support for a stronger UN, and in its place was a less sentimental, less ideological foreign policy based on a broader scheme of *Realpolitik* that involved reducing America's overseas commitments and altering its strategy against Communism. In most conventional accounts Nixon's new foreign policy strategy is said to have emerged from his visits to Europe, Latin America Africa, the Middle East and Asia earlier that year. Nixon had met with former and serving world leaders including Konrad Adenauer (West Germany), Nicolai Ceaucescu (Romania), Indira Gandhi (India), Eisaku Satu (Japan) and Chiang Kai-Shek (Taiwan).[55] [explain origins in terms of influence of cronies; see Sale & Summers]. There were three key elements to his foreign policy vision, which were, in yet another example of his ambiguous relationship with the Establishment, first voiced in an off-the-record speech at the Bohemian Grove and later in an article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1967.

- First, Nixon argued that the US could no longer afford to take a frontline role in fighting Communism and should shift the responsibility to its allies. America needed to reduce its "immense burden" of intervening directly to help nations threatened by Communism, and to also avoid the risk of a confrontation with the USSR or China. As a solution Nixon advocated the creation of "collective security arrangements" in which countries in the affected area "would assume primary responsibility of coming to the aid of a neighbouring nation rather than calling upon the US…for direct assistance." [56]

- Second, he called for a rethink of US relations with Communist China. It was impossible for the America to contain China alone and to "leave China forever outside the family of nations" where it would only "nurture its fantasies, cherish its hate and threaten its neighbours." The best solution was "pulling China back into the world community" so it would no longer be "the epicentre of world revolution."[57]

- Finally, he believed the United States needed to improve its relationship with the Soviet Union. This would involve increased trade with the USSR and Eastern Europe and on a diplomatic level "discussions with Soviet leaders at all levels to reduce the possibility of miscalculation and to explore the areas where bilateral agreements would reduce tensions."[58]

Although nebulous, all three components would soon become central planks in the Nixon Administration's foreign policy. The first in the so-called "Nixon" or "Guam Doctrine" which heralded a decline in US defence commitments and the second in Nixon's opening up of relations with China, and the third as détente with the USSR, both parts of his plan for triangular diplomacy with the Communist bloc. Of greater import, though, was that these policies reflected the interests of his "Cowboy" backers. As Sale explains, a president implementing the "Cowboy Strategy" would:

> …direct a foreign policy to mesh with both the political and economic spirit of the Southern Rim, providing enough force to sustain the balance of power and enough leniency to open new markets for the new money, and particularly to protect and enlarge the development of military technical, agricultural and petroleum markets abroad.[59]

And it was this strategy that was applied by Richard Nixon.

Metternich's Heir

Unlike Nixon, Kissinger came to office as a well established and highly regarded proponent of the concept. His PhD dissertation, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Concert of Europe*, had examined the so-called "Concert of Europe" which had been established at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 by Austrian diplomat Prince Metternich following the Napoleonic Wars.[60] Kissinger had not only praised Metternich's style of leadership, lauding him as a "scientist of politics", but had endorsed the system of alliances that Metternich had created to keep the peace. In Metternich's "conference system", where a group of foreign ministers maintained peace through their monopoly of the diplomatic process, rather than through the constant use of force, Kissinger found a "conceptual blueprint for the policy he would have wanted the United States to enact" (Landau).[61]

The essential lesson Kissinger drew from the "Concert of Europe" was that a balance of power required the common agreement that the survival of other members was never to be threatened and all disputes were to be resolved through negotiation. The greatest threat to this system was if one of the powers abandoned the agreed rules of international conduct and instead sought to conduct its foreign policy in accord with ideological premises, thus making it a "revolutionary power." It was only when threatened by revolutionary powers, Kissinger argued, that the international order must be protected though the use of military power. "The balance of power", Kissinger wrote, "is the classic expression of the lesson of history that no order is safe without physical safeguards against aggression."[62]

Kissinger's devotion to this model of international relations was subsequently reflected in his foreign policy writings prior to reaching the White House, which included ten articles in *Foreign Affairs*, a paper for the Brookings Institution and three books. The guidelines for the application of *Realpolitik* to US foreign policy that Kissinger developed consisted of the following themes and policy prescriptions.

First, and perhaps foremost, Kissinger articulated the necessity of a global equilibrium or a balance of power, to ensure a stable world order. In 1956, for instance, Kissinger wrote in *Foreign Affairs* that, "unless we maintain at least an *equilibrium of power* between us and the Soviet bloc we will have no chance to undertake any positive measures." "No statesman", he warned, could "entrust the fate of his country entirely to the continued goodwill of another sovereign state." Instead, peace was the product of "certain conditions and power relationships" to which diplomacy must be addressed.[63]

Consequently Kissinger did not envisage any role for supranational institutions, let alone world government, in maintaining international order. This was evident in his book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, which explicitly rejected the option of world government as "hardly realistic." It was "a

symptom of our legalistic bias", Kissinger observed, "that so many consider a legal entity, the United Nations, as somehow transcending the collective will of its members." There was, Kissinger concluded, "*no escaping* from the responsibilities of the thermonuclear age into a supranational authority." In a later article in *Foreign Affairs*, Kissinger dismissed the "obvious solution" to arms proliferation of eliminating such weapons as "deceptive." It was, he maintained, "more worthwhile...seek to reduce the incentive to attack than the capability for it." Thus the goal of "responsible" arms-control measures was not to eliminate retaliatory forces but "to *maintain an equilibrium between them*." Kissinger, like all practitioners of *Realpolitik*, was convinced that nuclear war could be avoided through careful diplomacy between the nuclear powers rather than ceding control to world government.[64]

Another long-running theme was his impatience with America's "reluctance to think in terms of power."[65] Demonstrating the depth of his adherence to *Realpolitik*, Kissinger rejected the tendency, as he perceived it, of many American foreign policy-makers to justify US actions in Wilsonian terms of fulfilling moral imperatives. The "American mood", he wrote in 1968, "oscillates dangerously between being ashamed of power and expecting too much of it."[66] In an earlier article for *Foreign Affairs*, he had observed that:

> As a nation we have used power almost shamefacedly as if it were inherently wicked. We have wanted to be liked our own sakes and we have wished to succeed because of the persuasiveness of our principles. Our feeling of guilt with respect to power has caused us to transform all wars into crusades, and then to apply our power in the most absolute terms...But international relations cannot be conducted without an awareness of power relationships.[67]

Kissinger believed that the US should not shy away from acknowledging that it acted and, indeed, *should* act to preserve its national interests, and that it should recognise that its national interest was to maintain a global balance of power. As journalist David Landau, writing in 1972, observed:

> [Kissinger] does not see Washington's legitimate goal as the export of Western-style democracy or a capitalist economy to all corners of the globe. It is precisely this intellectual restraint which sets Kissinger apart from all other American policy-makers of our time, men who persistently believe that the United States is a paragon of international virtue and that it has a perpetual civilising mission in the rest of the world. ...His view of the U.S. role might be best described as a kind of muscular liberalism, designed to defend a pluralistic world order and prevent the emergence of forces which might threaten it.[68]

In 1969 Kissinger set out exactly such an agenda in a paper for the Brookings Institution. Kissinger argued that "the age of the superpowers is now drawing to an end...[m]ilitary bipolarity has...encouraged political multipolarity." A "new international order", he wrote, "is inconceivable without a significant American contribution," however the new multipolarity made it "impossible to impose an American design" without a more "creative" foreign policy.[69] Using Nelson Rockefeller as his mouthpiece, Kissinger presented the appropriate foreign policy, during the 1968 presidential campaign. Kissinger's plans included: a reduction in US defence commitments, with regional allies looking after their own defence; improving relations with China and the Soviet Union; and finally, encouraging a unified Europe to play a larger role in world affairs.[70]

Kissinger's European style of *Realpolitik* distinguished him from most of the other leading lights of the Eastern Establishment.[71] He was scornful of the moral pretensions of the "Wise Men" who had dominated the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, and unashamed in arguing that the US should focus on protecting its national interests rather than pursuing a crusade to change the world. Furthermore, Kissinger's desire to emulate the secretive diplomacy of 19th century Europe that he so admired made him uniquely suited to a President who distrusted the both the State Department and the Eastern Establishment. Moreover Kissinger's foreign policy blueprints, especially his vision of a multipolar global system, comfortably merged with Nixon's own plans for world order. Although, in Nixon's own words, but a "politician and an academic", this duo went on to fill in the post-Vietnam policy vacuum in the United

States with a unique experiment in *Realpolitik*.

The Imperial Presidency

It is a truism that any analysis of the foreign policy of the Nixon Administration must concentrate on the beliefs, concepts and actions of Nixon and Kissinger. The principal reason for this is that unlike previous administrations, where most Cabinet members had some input, Nixon and Kissinger exercised very tight control over the foreign policy-making process. This arrangement was quite deliberate with Nixon and Kissinger, who both shared a strong distrust of the US State Department, agreeing to concentrate the policy-making process in the White House. Under their reign of suspicion, the State Department was to be "excluded as never before from the President's most important ventures in foreign policy" (Hodgson).[72]

To ensure the State Department was kept at arms length, Nixon appointed William Rogers as Secretary of State. A lawyer and former colleague of Nixon in the Eisenhower Administration, Rogers was a typical Establishment patrician whose somewhat condescending manner Nixon reportedly resented. However, in his favour Rogers displayed little knowledge or interest in US foreign policy. As Kissinger later observed in his memoirs, "Nixon considered Rogers' unfamiliarity with the subject an asset because it guaranteed that policy direction would remain in the White House...Few Secretaries of State can have been selected because of the President's confidence in their ignorance of foreign policy."[73]

For a time Rogers performed his role admirably and unwittingly; he became the benevolent public face of US foreign policy, while Nixon and Kissinger made the key decisions in the White House. He was rarely informed of Nixon's real plans and was usually given the undesirable task of announcing the failures and other unpopular decisions. The triumphs were always for Nixon. In addition, Nixon and Kissinger conducted secret or "back channel" high-level negotiations with the Soviets and the Chinese, the details of which were kept from the State Department. For Rogers this was become a source of frustration once he became aware that Kissinger, whom he regarded as his social and official inferior, was sidelining him. But the contempt was mutual with Kissinger overcome with anger whenever Rogers managed to wrangle a few moments of Nixon's time.[74]

That the President and his National Security Adviser would find it necessary to take such a course would seem illogical if one accepts the premise that Kissinger, as a long-time CFR member, and Nixon, as a supposed stooge of Nelson Rockefeller, were both irrevocably committed to surrendering US sovereignty to world government. After all Nixon had "broke all records by giving more than 110 CFR members government appointments" (Perloff),[75] an act that would have surely removed the need to exclude them from the decision-making process. And yet, in a clear repudiation of these assumptions, Nixon and Kissinger pursued that course. It is for that reason that the details of their foreign policy is far more important than the analysis of their connections with the CFR or Nelson Rockefeller, for it lends weight to the thesis that they were actually out of step with the Establishment.

Nixon's "Structure of Peace"

The central feature of Nixon's "new world order" vision was the balance-of-power. As Kissinger himself recently wrote, in contrast to his predecessors, Nixon "counted on a balance of power to produce stability, and considered a strong America essential to the global equilibrium."[76] Nixon's first task was to withdraw US forces from Vietnam, however, as part of that very process, he sought to realign the global balance of power and America's role in the world. His first policy pronouncement on this was on Guam on 25 July 1969, where in a rambling address to the press he effectively renounced Kennedy's "bear any burden"

promise. Nixon announced a new doctrine for US intervention in the Asian area with the aim of reducing America's defence burden. The US would keep its treaty commitments with its Asian allies, but unless there was a threat from "a major power involving nuclear weapons" America would expect such problems to be "handled by…the Asian nations themselves."[77]

Nixon's "State of the World" address to Congress in 1970 developed the "Nixon Doctrine" further explaining that its "central thesis" was that the US "will participate in the defence and development of its allies and friends, but that America cannot--and will not--conceive *all* the plans, design *all* the programs, execute *all* the decisions, and undertake *all* the defence of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is in our interest."[78] The implications of the "Nixon Doctrine" were clear: the US would continue to maintain its nuclear umbrella over all friendly Asian nations, in the event of a Soviet or Chinese nuclear attack, however, in the case of conventional assaults by Communist states or insurgents, each nation would have to defend itself, although they could count on receiving materiel support from the US. This new doctrine would come into effect once the Vietnam War was concluded.[79]

The Nixon Doctrine was more than a statement on US policy in Asia; it was also an admission of weakness. It tacitly acknowledged Nixon's belief that the US was a superpower in decline; that he was "presiding over the transition of America's role in the world from domination to leadership" (Kissinger). By reducing America's peripheral defence commitments and asserting that its foreign policy would be driven by the "national interest", Nixon sought to free up the US for the more urgent task of constructing a stable international order based on a balance of power. Details of Nixon's scheme were unclear at first, revealed suddenly and unexpectedly in a number of public utterances by the President, but in time his vision became apparent to all.[80]

The first announcement was Nixon's speech to a group of news media editors in Kansas City on 6 July 1971, where observed that there were five great economic powers in the world: the US, the USSR, Western Europe, Japan and China. "[T]hese are the five that will determine the economic future and, because economic power will be the key to other kinds of power, the future of the world in other ways in the last third of this century."[81] Nixon indicated that he wanted to bring these five great powers into constructive negotiation and mutually profitable economic competition, arguing that the US could no longer dominate the world system; therefore it was necessary to link the interests of these powers to maintain international stability. This apparently did not go down well with Kissinger who was, according to one observer, "not happy with what [Nixon] said", and argued with Nixon who replied: "you'll learn, relax."[82]

Nixon's balance-of-power vision received its most explicit explanation in an interview published in *Time* magazine on 3 January 1972:

> We must remember the only time in the history of the world that we have had any extended periods of peace is when there has been a *balance of power*. It is when one nation becomes infinitely more powerful in relation to its potential competitor that the danger of war arises. So I believe in a world in which the United States is powerful. I think it will be a safer world if we have a strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, *an even balance*.[83]

On 27 December 1973, Kissinger, by then Secretary of State and more supportive of the idea, explained this strategy further:

> ...[T]he great task before this administration…has been to construct an international system…with a *sufficient balance of power so that no nation or group of nations would be dependent entirely on the good will of its neighbours*...[84]

That Nixon's foreign policy represented a strand of thinking that was very much at odds with the tenets of

liberal internationalism was observed by a number of commentators at the time. James Chace, for example, writing in the *New York Times Magazine*, described two camps that were seeking to establish world order in the postwar era. Employing European terms, Chace identified one group as the "Gaullists" (after France's post-war President Charles de Gaulle) and the other as the "Monnetists" (after EC-founder Jean Monnet). The Gaullist camp, he wrote, "believes in the viability of the nation as a major actor on the world's stage"; while the Monnetists believe "that the day of the nation-state is drawing to a close, transnational forces will combine to create a more centralised international system." In Chace's opinion: "The world which President Nixon perceives conforms much more closely to the Gaullist model than to the Monnetist." Nixon and Kissinger, he wrote, "pursue a quest for equilibrium in a world in which *the nation state persists as the most important force to be reckoned with*."[85]

Triangular Diplomacy: China and the USSR

The Nixon Administration's commitment to establishing a global balance of power between nations irrespective of their ideological differences took its most obvious form in the policies of rapprochement with China and détente with the Soviet Union. Unlike the liberal internationalists who sought to contain, undermine and eventually absorb the Communist states into the global system, Nixon and Kissinger sought merely to ensure that the Communist countries conducted their foreign policies in a manner that respected the sovereign rights of other states and contributed to the maintenance of the global balance of power. "[W]e can and must communicate and...negotiate with the Communist nations. They are too powerful to ignore", Nixon later wrote in his memoirs. And as Kissinger stated in December 1969: "[W]e have no permanent enemies, we will judge other countries, including Communist countries,...on the basis of their actions and not on the basis of their domestic ideology."[86] Their overall strategy was to incorporate the Soviet Union and China into the international system as "normal" powers that were committed, alongside the US, to maintaining global stability despite their oppositional ideological systems.[87]

At a tactical level of international diplomacy, however, this required a somewhat more devious approach. In their envisaged "triangular diplomacy" Nixon and Kissinger hoped to exploit the Sino-Soviet split and play the Communist powers off against each other. It would be less costly to the US, they reasoned, if the two Communist powers balanced each other off. Events in 1969, notably a series of border clashes along the Sino-Soviet border in Siberia, lead the Nixon Administration to believe that if trends continued more widespread conflict between the Soviet Union and China could break out. Nixon and Kissinger saw this as an "unprecedented opportunity" and proceeded to exploit the dispute by working to improve US relations with both countries with a view to achieving their triangle.[88]

The new policy toward China had been signposted some years earlier with Nixon's 1967 article in *Foreign Affairs*, however few in the Establishment were anticipating that Nixon would act in the way in he did or with such different goals in mind. While liberal internationalists had long sought to integrate China into their world order that would eventually undermine national sovereignty, Nixon merely wanted to ensure that China participated in his envisaged balance of power system; if excluded China only threaten it. This was stated in his 1971 Report to Congress:

> *[A]n international order cannot be secure if one of the major powers remains largely outside it* and hostile toward it. In this decade, therefore, there will be no more important challenge than that of drawing the Peoples Republic of China into *a constructive relationship with the world community*, and particularly with the rest of Asia.[89]

Kissinger explained in his memoirs more fully that their intention in improving relations with China was to "shape a global equilibrium. It was not to collude against the Soviet Union but to give us a balancing position for constructive ends – to give each Communist power a stake in better relations with us." To

restart relations with China Kissinger pursued an existing channel through the US Embassy in Poland. This was later supplemented with a "back channel", to keep the State Department out of the loop, established by Nixon through Pakistani President Yahya Khan. This process bore fruit with Kissinger making a secret visit to China in July 1971 to parlay with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, resulting in an invitation to Nixon to visit China for a summit meeting. In February 1972, Nixon's visit took place with great fanfare. An event lauded by Nixon in his final toast on his final night in China as "the week that changed the world."[90]

Nixon's rhetoric has attracted much attention, particularly from researchers suspicious of an apparent sell-out to the Chinese Communists; however, in reality Nixon was merely restating his central theme that both nations could participate in a balance of power system despite their ideological differences. For example, in one of his first speeches in Beijing Nixon stated:

> *There is no reason for us to be enemies. Neither of us seeks the territory of the other; neither of us seeks domination over the other; neither of us seeks to stretch out our hands and rule the world*…This the hour, this is the day for our two peoples to rise to the heights of greatness which can build a new and a better world.[91]

Hand in hand with such diplomatic niceties, however, were enticements for China which appealed to their concerns about the USSR, and which contradict the Nixon-Kissinger claim that they were not colluding against the Soviets. In a number of meetings both in China and the US, Kissinger offered the Chinese intelligence on Soviet military movements, high-speed computers and a hotline to advise China of Soviet troop movements. In late 1971 Kissinger personally delivered to China's UN Ambassador, Huang Hua, a file of intelligence, telling Huang, "You don't need a master spy. We give you everything." In his secret trip Kissinger had also compromised on US support for Taiwan accepting Beijing's insistence that it, and not Taipei, was the true government of all China. Kissinger told Zhou that the US would not advocate "a 'two China solution' or a 'one China, one Taiwan' solution."[92]

Parallel with Nixon's moves toward China, the Administration sought to change its relations with the Soviet Union. Nixon believed that it was "more sensible and also safer to communicate with the Communists that it is to live in icy-cold war isolation or confrontation." In January 1969 Nixon regarded the US-Soviet relationship as the "single most important factor determining whether the world would live at peace during and after my administration."[93] Almost from the time of taking office the Kissinger had developed a back channel with the Soviet leadership via the Soviet Ambassador Dobryin with the intent of going beyond containment to a less adversarial relationship. According to the *Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought*, détente took a number of forms including:

> [A]ttempts at arms control; an increased tolerance of the other state's social and political systems; a less aggressively competitive approach to Third World states and to Western Europe; the rebuilding or creation of stronger diplomatic, economic and cultural ties.[94]

It might be assumed, if one accepts the now historically disproved theory that Communism was a vehicle for the New World Order, that the Establishment would have viewed Nixon's diplomatic triumphs with China and the Soviet Union favourably. However, as Nixon's actions actually forestalled convergence, but also undermined containment, we find grudging praise for his initiatives. There were harsh words, for example, from the editor of *Foreign Affairs*, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, who described Nixon's announcements of his China and USSR visits as evidence that US foreign policy had become "erratic and egocentric." The "objectives were admirable", Fish wrote, but the result was a "chaotic situation", international monetary stability was "undermined", adversely affecting the NATO alliance, while Canada, Japan and India had all been "alienated."[95]

The Liberal Internationalist Backlash

As noted above, both Nixon and Kissinger are believed by most NWO researchers to have been yet another set of puppets for the New World Order conspirators, their respective links with both the CFR and Nelson Rockefeller cited as evidence of this inclination. Thus, in 1976, Gary Allen confidently claimed that under Nixon the "CFR-Insiders made gigantic leaps toward their New World Order." The "dismantling of American sovereignty", wrote Allen, had continued at a "dizzying pace."[96] The foreign policy record, though, makes it clear that the Nixon Administration was pursuing quite a different agenda, one that actually raised the ire of much of the Establishment. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, for example, accused Nixon of damaging America's claims to world leadership, claiming that, "[n]ot...since the Harding era...has the world had such a poor opinion of us." America, he lamented, instead of being seen as "naive, but...respected as sincere and humane", was now openly being called "hypocritical and self-serving." Nixon was damaging relations with allies by failing to consult and was fostering the feeling that "American policies are conceived for American purposes only."[97] Some Establishment critics were less gracious. Dean Acheson privately condemned Nixon somewhat harshly; "The present Administration is the most incompetent and undirected group I have seen in charge since the closing years of the Wilson Administration."[98]

Although it is questionable whether America's global reputation had always been as unsullied as Armstrong believed, his critique nevertheless identified Nixon's greatest sin in the eyes of the Establishment: its frank admission that the US was guided by its material interests rather than the humanitarian values it so often proclaimed. Such brutal truths emanating from the White House were not considered welcome. For the Establishment liberal internationalists, though, there was much more to take umbrage with in Nixon and Kissinger's machinations. Barely a year after coming to office, Nixon came under a sustained attack from members of that faction. The basis for this globalist attack on Nixon's foreign policy was threefold.

Realpolitik: First, many Establishment liberal internationalists lambasted Nixon and Kissinger's preference for *Realpolitik*, seeing it as evidence of their limited vision. Although there was general support for Nixon's initiatives towards China and the USSR, the broader framework of his foreign policy was regarded as flawed as he was using America's superpower status to create the wrong type of new world order. Nixon, they argued, had failed to realise that "transnational forces" were steadily eroding national sovereignty and that America's proper role in this transforming global system was to lead the way in setting up the required international bureaucratic mechanisms to keep order. This argument had many authors.

In a 1972 essay in *Foreign Affairs*, for example, Professor Kingman Brewster Jr from Harvard University lamented the Nixon Administration's apparent unwillingness to adopt liberal internationalist policies:

> Neither the political atmosphere nor the administrative priorities will change until a President of the United States is willing to affirm that the national destiny requires *first priority for international solutions to international problems*. President Nixon has shown such an insistence on the issue of maintaining the military presence of the United States in Europe. Comparable boldness has not been shown by the *leadership of either party* with respect to the support and development of international institutions and organisations on a global scale.[99]

Brewster raised the spectre of a global Communist victory if liberal internationalist polices were not adopted, asserting that if the United States did not "become the affirmative champion of arrangements adequate to deal with those problems which transcend nations..." the initiative would "fall by default to the champions of centralized world socialism."[100]

At the *Pacem In Terris III* convocation, held in Washington DC in October 1973, Senator J. William Fulbright, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and an advocate of "world rule of

law," condemned the Nixon Administration's approach as "inadequate", "reactionary", and "devoid of hope for progress or betterment in human affairs." Describing himself as a "seeker...of a world system of laws," Fulbright expressed his hope that the "dangerous romanticisms" of *Realpolitik* would be exposed and that the US would work towards fulfilling the dream of "supplanting the anarchy of nations with an effective international organisation."[101]

Stanley Hoffmann, a former Harvard colleague of Kissinger and CFR member, also questioned the relevance of the balance of power approach, arguing that the real issue remained the contest between the America and the USSR over who would shape the world. According to Hoffmann:

> ...in the traditional arena, the model of the balance of power provides no real prescription, however wise the idea of balance remains. Five powers are not the answer.. What matters is, first and still, the Big Two, in pursuit of universal influence and in possession of global military means...[102]

Hoffmann also observed that even the bipolar world was becoming redundant, given that "[t]oday state policies are often impaired or inspired by *transnational forces* that range from corporations to scientists" which were raising "increasingly important issues for states." In his estimation, the balance of power was "doubly irrelevant" to this new reality as it "addresses itself to the wrong problem." Instead a "*single world system* must be the goal" as there was "a growing need for pooled sovereignty, shared powers and effective international institutions in all realms."[103]

Kissinger's rival at Harvard, Zbigniew Brzezinski, then emerging as the leading exponent of trilateralism, also joined the fray. Brzezinski criticised Nixon for being "insufficiently concerned" with the "central threat to international stability…the contagious threat of international anarchy." The Nixon Doctrine, he wrote in *Foreign Policy* in 1971, "fails to seize the opportunity to postulate a larger community of the developed nations, spanning Japan, Western Europe and the United States, as the historically relevant response to that challenge." In 1974 Brzezinski argued that with the world undergoing a "shift from traditional *international politics* to a new *global* political process in which the old nation-states are losing their centrality", Nixon's balance of power approach "will simply not suffice for shaping the future." He also suggested that their *Realpolitik* was out of step with the "planetary humanist outlook, so much more widespread in the younger generation."[104]

Law Professor and former official of the UN and the Kennedy Administration, Richard Gardner, writing in *Foreign Affairs* in April 1974 on the virtues of outflanking the nation-state through a variety of international arrangements, pointedly admonished Nixon's *Realpolitik* vision of a new world order, arguing that:

> ...a "structure of peace" cannot be achieved merely by maintaining a precarious balance between five power centres...it requires strengthened international institutions at the global and regional levels in which all interested nations have a chance to participate.[105]

Another liberal internationalist, Richard Falk, in a paper attacking Kissinger, argued that the Nixon Administration had failed to address "the central task of our time – namely, the need to evolve a new system of world order based on principles of peace and justice." Falk argued that Kissinger's main achievement had been to provide "a specious stability to a disintegrating state system, on behalf of a few states that are both powerful and rich." Like Hoffmann, Falk believed that the Nixon Administration's foreign policy was out of step with the realities of a changing world:

> It is a foreign policy based on the presumption that the governments of sovereign states can achieve security and prosperity for their populations, despite the growing interdependence of life on the planet. ...Kissinger's foreign policy is oblivious to the deeper self-destruct tendencies and inequities of the state system, and hence to the need and desirability of adapting geopolitics to an emergent global situation of *de facto*

> cohesion.[106]

Later in his 1975 book, *A Study of Future Worlds*, which detailed the work of the World Order Models Project (WOMP), Falk observed that the Nixon-Kissinger model of world order was premised on "maximising certain oligopolistic tendencies in the existing system." He further noted that in Nixon's five-power model "the status and role of supranationalism is *diminished* beneath current levels," and that it tolerated "high levels of poverty and repression within the system."[107] Although an "improvement" over the alignments of the Cold War:

> ...the five-power design fails to affirm ideals of *human solidarity* or to seek ways of overcoming the immense inequalities and miseries endured at present by such a high proportion of the human race. This five-power conception also tends to underestimate the ecological constraints and risks arising from continuing patterns of uncurtailed economic growth in a decentralized world order system. Finally, a concert of principal actors denies participation to many other important actors in the global arena and is eventually likely to produce a mode of bitterness and opposition from excluded sectors.[108]

The "Nixon Shocks": The second main criticism was directed at Nixon's controversial decisions in 1971 to introduce protectionist measures and his interventionist domestic economic policies. Known as the "Nixon Shocks", Nixon's New Economic Policy (NEP), unveiled in August 1971, effectively marked the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. The international components of the NEP were twofold, first he suspending the convertibility of US dollars into gold, thus ending the Gold Standard and violating the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, but in doing so increasing the competitiveness of the US exports; and second, Nixon disregarded US obligations under GATT by imposing a ten percent tariff on imports into the US and pursuing more favourable terms of trade with Japan, Western Europe and parts of the East Asia. Domestically, with an eye to upcoming elections, Nixon imposed wage and price controls in an attempt to improve economic circumstances for the voting public, becoming the first US president to do so in peacetime.[109]

Although popular with voters, Nixon's measures did not meet with the approval of the business community or many liberal internationalists who were surprised at Nixon's seemingly inexplicable break with his previous support for free trade and the Bretton Woods system. Particularly irksome was that Nixon's ending of financial regulation coincided with a strengthening of protectionism, evidence that he was following his own political interests rather than the broader world order goals favoured by elite liberal internationalists. The first signs of Establishment discontent over the NEP came with the resignations of three senior officials: the Ambassador to the European Community, Robert Schaetzel, the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Philip Trezise, and from Kissinger's own staff C. Fred Bergsten, his Assistant for International Economic Affairs.[110] The business community, meanwhile, expressed its displeasure through other means. Nelson and David Rockefeller attempted to see Nixon to present their arguments against the NEP, however, because Kissinger apparently did not insist on it, Nixon's aides blocked the proposed meetings. Later, though, Nixon aide John Ehrlichman met with David Rockefeller to hear his concerns but was moved only enough to describe Rockefeller's argument as "not especially innovative."[111]

Meanwhile, Bergsten, by then a beneficiary of the patronage of David Rockefeller, attacked the Nixon Administration's trade policies in a 1972 article in *Foreign Affairs*, charging that Nixon's promotion of protectionism had "encouraged a disastrous isolationist trend which raises questions about the future of U.S. foreign policy..." Nixon had also "violated the letter and spirit of reigning international law in both the monetary and trade fields, reversing *the traditional American role of leading the effort to strengthen the rules governing global conduct*." Continuing, Bergsten argued that the international component of the NEP had gone "much too far", "was wholly unnecessary" and had been pursued with "violent hyperbole and supreme indifference." Condemning Nixon for having "made protectionism respectable" and raising

the possibility of an international trade war, Bergsten argued that in view of the "uncertainties" of US leadership Europe and Japan should cooperate to bring US economic policy into line.[112]

Bergsten and a number of other opponents of the NEP, including Richard Gardner and Richard Cooper, also appeared before a Congressional subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy in September 1971 to express their views. According to the subcommittee's report:

> There was a consensus among the nongovernmental witnesses...that the tactics pursued in behalf of the "New Economic Policy" embodied a high risk strategy that could lead to the first international trade war since the 1930s...
>
> There was a considerable body of opinion that the method of approach of the "New Economic Policy" unnecessarily harmed U.S. international relations. Most significant was the apparent absence of any prior consultation with foreign nations, including our closest allies, on the measures announced. Such a procedure undermines the basis for durable bilateral and multilateral relations of trust and cooperation between countries and in international organisations.[113]

Neglecting the United Nations: Finally, the Nixon Administration's policy toward the United Nations came under fire. This was perhaps inevitable given that the focus of the Nixon-Kissinger strategy was the management of world order by the five power centres working together, thus effectively bypassing the UN and other international organisations. This was further exacerbated by the Administration's open disdain of the organisation, best expressed by Nixon in his 1972 *Report to the Congress*:

> The United Nations is an experiment in cooperation among nations. It is a mistake to assume its success is foreordained... We have reached a point at which it is no service to the idea of the United Nations and no contribution to its future to blink at its limitations. We believe that the United Nations is now entering a crucial period. A pervasive scepticism concerning the UN is widespread... We believe that the time has come for a large dose of realism and candour in United States policy toward the United Nations.[114]

This "realism and candour" in dealing the UN "experiment" had already been manifest in a number of actions reflected the Nixon Administration's indifference to the UN. One major point of contention was US financial contributions to the UN, which the Nixon Administration sought to reduce from 31.5% of the UN's budget down to 25%.[115] Noting that the Soviet Union and France had been delinquent in paying their UN dues, Nixon had insisted that the US "will not take the initial or major responsibility for making up a deficit created by the policies of other countries."[116] The United States also clashed repeatedly with the UN General Assembly over a number of issues, including the retention of Taiwan as a member, sanctions against Rhodesia, the International Labour Organisation, decolonisation and US support for Israel.[117] The Nixon Administration argued that the effectiveness of the UN had been "impaired...by an excessive resort to the politics of confrontation by members who placed group solidarity above the need for a realistic consensus."[118]

The decreasing priority accorded to the United Nations by the Nixon Administration was also manifest in the successive appointments to the position of US Ambassador to the UN. The first to hold the post, Charles Yost, was a career diplomat and CFR member with a strong liberal internationalist orientation,[119] who was reportedly selected after a number of leading Democrats, including Hubert Humphrey and Eugene McCarthy, turned down offers from Nixon.[120] It seems likely that Yost was selected because of his support for admitting Communist China into the UN.[121] Yost did not last long enough to see this happen, however, and was replaced by George Bush in December 1970. Unlike Yost, Bush did not come to the position with much credibility; he was commonly regarded in diplomatic circles as a "neophyte", whose only criteria for the job seemed to be that he was a "staunch Nixon loyalist."[122] Following his 1972 election victory, Nixon replaced Bush with John Scali, a White House consultant and former journalist. Although Scali's abilities were not called into question, *Time* nevertheless observed that "his appointment

to a post once held by such major figures as Adlai Stevenson and Arthur Goldberg seemed to be Nixon's not so subtle way of showing his dissatisfaction with the U.N."[123]

It did not take long for the Nixon Administration's obvious disinterest in the UN to came under fire. In a 1970 article in *Foreign Affairs*, Richard Gardner not only called for the reform and revival of the United Nations, but took aim at the Nixon Administration's lax attitude towards the UN:

> The present American attitude toward the [UN] is less irritation than indifference. The Nixon Administration pays little attention to it in the conduct of foreign policy, and American leadership in the world body has declined to an all-time low.[124]

The "low profile" of the Nixon Administration, Gardner lamented, was "even more evident in the United Nations than in some regions of the world." Statements by the President and senior officials were "notable for their blandness and lack of any forward motion on matters of substance." The "commendable objective" of the Nixon Doctrine of doing less by itself and more with others had "yet to be given substantive expression so far as the United Nations is concerned."[125] The Council on Foreign Relations annual survey of American foreign policy for 1970 came to a similar conclusion; observing that it remained, "...questionable exactly how seriously the [Nixon] administration took this organisation celebrating its 25th birthday, or even the proposals for reform being set forth to improve it."[126]

Gardner went on to voice more criticism in 1972 at a high-level Columbia University seminar held at Harriman in New York, where he accused the Nixon Administration of sabotaging the UN by breaking UN sanctions against Rhodesia, failing to build new office space for overcrowded UN staff, refusing to pay its dues to the International Labour Organisation as well as one of the international loan funds. Also at the seminar was former UN Ambassador Yost, who attacked the Administration's focus on a "structure of peace", based on the balance of rival powers, as being at the expense of "the world society of which the United Nations is the emerging prototype." According to Yost, "There is a far better chance that great-power ambitions can be contained and controlled inside legally constituted international institutions, than by precarious balances, combinations and accommodations among themselves."[127]

Yet more criticism of Nixon's UN policies was made by participants at the *Pacem In Terris III* convocation. Senator Fulbright noted that the UN seemed to be at the "far periphery" of US foreign policy, and expressed his "disappointment" with Kissinger's recent proposals for reforming the organisation, endorsing the *New York Times'* criticism that they were "unnecessarily modest."[128] While Ambassador Yost made the cynical observation that it was because the UN was no longer as "amenable to US manipulation" as it was when it was first formed, that it was now being "denigrated and neglected in favour of an old-fashioned balance-of-power policy..."[129]

By any reasonable measure it is self-evident that the foreign policy of the Nixon Administration was disliked to varying degrees by the liberal internationalists within the US Establishment. This was manifest in public criticism by many of the leading lights of the liberal internationalist camp and by behind-the-scenes lobbying through normal political channels to try to stymie some of Nixon and Kissinger's more controversial initiatives. In view of this evidence, the notion that they seriously attempted to fulfil any of the alleged world government plans of the Eastern Establishment is at least questionable.

At War with the Eastern Establishment

That Nixon had put the liberal internationalist faction of the Eastern Establishment offside with his embrace of *Realpolitik* was perhaps inevitable. It was probably also a *fait accompli* that he would wage war with the Establishment for rejecting him. In his memoirs Nixon claims that he started his second term "determined…to break the Eastern stranglehold on the executive branch and the federal government." His

plan was to give the "Midwest, the West and the South" the chance to challenge the "Eastern liberal elite" for "control of the nation's key institutions."[130] However, his struggle with the Eastern Establishment had started not long after he had entered office in 1969 with Nixon contemplating and ordering a number of aggressive moves against Establishment individuals and institutions.

The Watergate investigation revealed that Nixon's paranoid fear and hatred of the Establishment was taken to new levels while he was in the White House, with Nixon privately contemplating having the Brookings Institution, among other Establishment targets, burgled and firebombed.[131] On 17 June 1971, Nixon told Haldeman and Kissinger that he wanted the Brookings Institution burgled in order to retrieve some classified documents: "...get in and get those files. Blow the safe and get it."[132] Later on 2 July 1971, in a conversation with Haldeman and adviser Charles Colson, Nixon repeated his order to burgle the Brookings Institution and ordered the removal of security clearances for a number of think-tanks including the RAND Corporation and the Council on Foreign Relations:

> Also, I really meant it when--I want to go in and crack that [Brookings] safe. Walk in and get it. I want Brookings cut. They've got to do it. Brookings is the real enemy here... Cut of Rand, Brookings, all outside. *Oh, Council [on] Foreign Relations. Put that one down too.* If they've got anything in the way of a secret safe and so forth, out--no more.[133]

A few days later Nixon told Haldeman that he had ordered Alexander Haig (then working for Kissinger in the NSC) to prepare a list of all security clearances given to non-government people and organisations with a view to restricting them prompting Nixon to repeat his threat to cut off the CFR's security clearances:

> *I'm going to get that Council on Foreign Relations. I'm going to chop those bastards off at the neck.* That's all there is to it...We've got to get our enemies out of the clearance business. I mean Rand [Corporation]. That was good move. That was welcomed, don't you agree, taking them on? Let them squeal.[134]

Another of Nixon's sins against the Establishment was his "enemies list", compiled by members of his staff, which recorded the names of those individuals and organisations whom were regarded as Nixon's foes. The lists contained hundreds of names and included, besides the usual selection of Nixon's critics from the left, quite a number of senior Establishment figures such as McGeorge Bundy, journalists Joseph Kraft and James Reston, and businessman Thomas Watson. The intention, according to White House Counsel John Dean, was to use "the available federal machinery to screw our political enemies." To this end, up to 2000 groups and 4000 individuals were identified for auditing by the Internal Revenue Service.[135] As Chomsky noted in 1973, following the public revelation of the list, by targeting senior figures in the Establishment the Nixon Administration had "violated the rules of the game":

> They were attacking the political centre. Their targets included the rich and respectable, spokespeople for the official ideology, men who are expected to share power, to design social policy and mould popular opinion. Such people are not fair game for persecution at the hands of the state.[136]

Being in the White House did not improve Nixon's relationship with or attitude toward the Rockefellers either. In June 1972, Nixon interfered in New York politics for example, Nixon upset Nelson Rockefeller by intervening in a dispute over abortion in New York, with a letter to the Catholic Cardinal of New York supporting moves to repeal a statute that allowed abortions to be practiced. Although apparently part of a Nixon strategy to try to lure Democrat Catholics in New York into voting Republican, it conflicted with Nelson's own attempts to seek a compromise. According to a report in *The Nation* at the time "Rockefeller was so incensed by the President's letter he is reported having second thoughts about his ability to work with or under Nixon." Sure enough, in a meeting between Nixon and Rockefeller on 14 September 1972, as the Watergate crisis began to unfold, Nelson refused to support Nixon. But Nelson Rockefeller's resentment went deeper, as *Newsweek* reported in 1974, "The Nixon Presidency was a

painful period for the proud governor. Privately, friends say, Rockefeller despised the self-made man from Yorba Linda..."[137]

Kissinger also fell afoul of the Establishment, mainly over his refusal to toe the line on the new consensus favouring immediate withdrawal. In May 1969 a group of Establishment luminaries, led by Cyrus Vance, had presented their Vietnam peace plan to Kissinger. The group, which had been meeting at Pratt House and the Cosmo Club since March, had anticipated that the Establishment stamp of approval would easily sway their former colleague; but it proved a futile hope. Kissinger's aide appeared interested, recalled one member of the group, however, "Henry obviously wasn't, and its Henry that counts." A year later, following the invasion of Cambodia, a group of thirteen Harvard professors visited him with another plan and another demarche, imploring Kissinger to listen to their plan "to save the country." "You are tearing the country apart domestically", warned one of the academics, "This will have long-term consequences because tomorrow's foreign policy is based on today's domestic situation." Kissinger was unmoved, later writing that the demarches from Pratt House and Harvard were evidence of a "cowering Establishment" that the "radical protest movement" had been "intimidating into acquiescence."[138]

The visits from the Establishment were but the tip of the iceberg of elite dissent over their policies in Indochina. "Your views represent the cowardice of the Eastern Establishment", Kissinger had told William Watts when he resigned from the NSC on 24 April 1970 in protest at the invasion of Cambodia. Three other NSC staffers, Tony Lake, Roger Morris and Larry Lynn also resigned, joining their former colleagues Morton Halperin and Daniel Davidson who had resigned earlier.[139] Nixon and Kissinger were both indifferent to what they regarded as Establishment attempts to undermine their strategy. Kissinger would later write that the Establishment, "paralysed by what they wrought…simply wished to extirpate the Vietnam War from their consciousness and to submerge their mistakes in collective amnesia." To the extent that they "would not support any American negotiating position rejected by Hanoi, thereby depriving the American negotiators of a floor on which to stand."[140]

Endgame

On 17 June 1972, six men were caught breaking into the offices of the Democrat National Committee at the Watergate Hotel in Washington D.C. The incident would perhaps have had few consequences until the ensuing investigation revealed that the team had been operating under the orders from Nixon's principal advisers. In addition it became evident that Nixon had been conspiring to cover-up the incident, not only because of the White House's central role in the affair, but because it represented "the tip of an iceberg of lawless abuses of office on which the Nixon presidency was to founder."[141]

Investigations by the Watergate Special Prosecution Force would result in the prosecutions of no less than twenty men either working in the White House, including Nixon's top aides John Ehrlichman and H.R. Haldeman and one Cabinet member, Attorney General John Mitchell Jr. This all finally culminated in the resignation of Nixon on 9 August 1974 in order to avoid impeachment by the Congress once evidence of his own direct involvement in the cover-up had become too overwhelming to ignore. Being unable to complete his second term was a bitter irony for Nixon as he had been toying with the idea of amending the Constitution so he could run for a third term. Failing that Nixon hoped to control the Executive Branch, selecting his heir and thus giving him, according to convicted Watergate conspirator Jeb Magruder, a "perpetual presidency."[142]

The reaction of many NWO researchers to Watergate has been to argue that the NWO elite ousted Nixon. Gary Allen, for example argued that the Watergate scandal had been set up as part of a plot to get Nelson Rockefeller into the White House without the inconvenience of enduring primaries and the election.

Looking closely at the scandal, Allen claimed "we find that each tug that ultimately toppled Nixon from the throne can be traced to Rockefeller." Nixon, he claimed, was in fact driven to resignation by a conspiracy by the CIA and Rockefeller's agents in the White House, which included Kissinger, Chief of Staff Alexander Haig, and the Secret Service chief, Robert H. Taylor. While according to Icke, Nixon was removed by a conspiracy orchestrated by Kissinger, who was the "frontman" of the Rockefellers and the Rothschilds. The purpose of the plot was to "remove what shreds were left of government for the people, by the people. Watergate and the removal of Nixon was another coup d'etat on America."[143]

These claims of a conspiracy behind Nixon's downfall are curious given that most NWO researchers seem to be in broad agreement that Nixon was but a puppet being manipulated by Kissinger and thus surely there would have been no need to remove him. Moreover few specific motives, other than Nelson Rockefeller's presidential ambition, are given for Nixon's removal. Although, in the aforementioned rejection of liberal internationalism and his use of state power to attack the Eastern Establishment we have two well-documented and compelling motives for such a conspiracy to be launched. However the evidence for such a conspiracy is slim, despite some heroic efforts to locate such a secret plot. The only plotting, revealed by the ongoing release of the White House tapes, is that of Nixon. Indeed, as one reviewer noted, following the recent release of transcripts of the remaining 210 hours of tapes covering the scandal:

> ...these edited transcripts...*are* shocking...[W]hat shocks is the wilful abuse of presidential power the tapes of reveal, a catalogue of crimes directed against the administration's opponents before the Watergate break-in... Among these were spying on Democrat leaders Teddy Kennedy, Edmund Muskie and Hubert Humphrey, then sooling the Internal Revenue Service on them; breaking into doctor's offices, planning break-ins at the Brookings Institution and the National Archives, planting false evidence as well as numerous instances of more borderline dirty tricks.[144]

In the end it was Nixon's paranoia and hatred that provided the Establishment with the rope they used to hang him. In what Sale describes as a "process" or "yankee counterattack", the various organs of the Eastern Establishment, in the media, bureaucracy, military and Congress, moved against the villainous upstart from the West. However, as Sale explains, it was hardly a secret plot or conspiracy:

> The yankee counterattack was not a *thing* but a *process*, not a plan but an eventuality. To talk of a "counterattack" is not to pretend there was something calculated and controlled, decided on in the board rooms of General Motors or Chase Manhattan, the fulfilment of a plan craftily hatched by Nelson Rockefeller, Henry Ford, and the staff of the Council on Foreign Relations; it describes, rather, a *response*, very real to be sure, but amorphous, unregulated, unplanned, moving like an amoeba without sure purpose or direction although quite capable of absorbing without sure purpose any new thing that comes along and making it serve its needs...The drift...was clear enough, and the goal, but no single person or group of persons programmed its course. Power struggles on such a broad battlefield as a nation are never crude.[145]

War Crimes and Other Legacies

In his memoirs Nixon records an incident when anti-war protesters described him as a "war criminal" in a "melee", in San Jose in 1970, where the presidential limousine was attacked. The charge was not new, having been levelled at the US government in countless other anti-war demonstrations, but Nixon's response was instructive in that he felt the charge was beneath refutation. His responsibility for the "supposedly immoral war in Vietnam" was a non-issue, instead the onus was on the behaviour of the protestors: "super-hypocrites", "thugs and hoodlums who have always plagued good people."[146] Kissinger had his own encounter with that charge at John Hopkins University in 1970 and reacted in a similar fashion. Invited speak on the Vietnam War, he was asked by a student if he considered himself a war criminal, Kissinger was at first silent, then he told the master of ceremonies to "Get your people under control" and promptly left the auditorium.[147] These incidents are noteworthy if only because the

immorality of the Nixon Administration has been

History was to be kind to Nixon who died in April 1994 no longer a disgraced figure, but rehabilitated into an elder statesman dispensing advice to the foreign policy novice Bill Clinton. Kissinger, however, as the only surviving member of their *Realpolitik* duumvirate, has run afoul of the forces of global governance intent on prosecuting him for his role in the human suffering caused by the Nixon Administration. At the forefront of this campaign has been the book *The Trial of Henry Kissinger* (2001), by English commentator Christopher Hitchens, which accused Kissinger of direct responsibility for myriad war crimes including "the destruction of civilian populations, the assassination of inconvenient politicians, the kidnapping and disappearance of soldiers and journalists and clerics who got in his way."[148] Hitchens' book has received much adulation in the press worldwide. An "important, engrossing book" commented the *Far Eastern Economic Review*; Hitchens has "done a public service", wrote one reviewer, in "recalling and exposing the killings ordered, and the lies told, in the name of *Realpolitik*" (Slatterly).[149] Others were not so sure. Hitchens "has barely grazed a formidable target", observed *The Economist*; while a reviewer in the *New York Times* damned the book as "philippic pure and simple, a propaganda screed devoid…of balance."[150]

Yet the impact of the allegations have been considerable with Kissinger harangued at numerous venues as the "Milosevic of Manhattan." In April 2002 there was an attempt to have Kissinger arrested in Britain for war crimes. That failed, but courts in Spain, France, Argentina and Chile continue to seek him out for questioning for his alleged complicity in human rights violations in Chile and Latin America more generally.[151] Kissinger, predictably, has dismissed the accusations as being "without a shred of real evidence." Nevertheless, many human rights groups have cited Kissinger as an obvious candidate for trial by the International Criminal Court (ICC), a prospect that inspired Kissinger to recently attack the ICC treaty in the pages of *Foreign Affairs*.[152] It is somewhat incongruous that Kissinger, who is still widely condemned as a master manipulator in service of the New World Order plot, should become one the most prominent subjects of repeated attempts to enforce international law against individuals. Yet, when one considers that his record was actually in service of *Realpolitik* there is no paradox.

For the study of the New World Order, however, the performance of the Nixon Administration has a somewhat different standing. It is Nixon's contribution to the liberal internationalist project, rather than its morality, that should be judged, and here the assessment is (also) negative. It could be argued that Nixon's role was to provide an example of the undesirability of *Realpolitik* to overcome doubts within the Establishment over the desirability of world government. Certainly this theory, at least in a superficial manner, appears to provide an explanation for those who believe a mysterious elite has exercised *absolute* control over the US government since the time of Woodrow Wilson, if not since the days of George Washington. But on closer examination this explanation has a number of flaws.

- First, it fails to account for both Nixon and Kissinger's continuing and consistent advocacy of *Realpolitik* long after they had left office.[153]
- Second, many key aspects of Nixon and Kissinger's foreign policy remained in place through successive Republican and Democratic administrations, often interfering with attempts to implement liberal internationalist plans.
- Finally, a number of Kissinger staffers have revisited the White House, most notably during the first Bush Administration, to pursue their own brand of *Realpolitik*, causing further disruption to liberal internationalist attempts to dominate US foreign policy.

It should also be noted that in the language of both academia and the Establishment, Nixon and Kissinger have always been identified as proponents of *Realpolitik*. In a 1992 article for *Foreign Affairs*, for example, Joseph S. Nye, then an academic at Harvard University, was at pains to point out that Nixon and

Kissinger did not belong to same tradition as Wilson, making this crucial distinction:

> ...the term "world order" is used in two very different ways in discussions of world politics. Realists, *in the tradition of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, see international politics occurring among sovereign states balancing each other's power*. World order is the product of a stable distribution of power among the major states. Liberals, in the tradition of Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy Carter, look at relations among peoples as well as states. They order arising from broad values like democracy and human rights, *as well as from international law and institutions such as the United Nations*.[154]

That this remains unrecognised in almost every mention of Nixon and Kissinger in most, if not all, accounts of the New World Order is a testament, not only to poor research, but also to one of their own more ironic legacies. Distracted by Nixon and Kissinger's "duplicitous diplomacy, public lies and attempts to mislead Congress" (Matlock), all in the name of *Realpolitik*, most researchers seem to have assumed the worst and thus endeavoured to tie them to alleged World Government conspiracy by whatever means necessary.

Nevertheless, it is a fact that one outcome of their time in office was to motivate the liberal internationalist faction of the Establishment to try to reverse Nixon's *Realpolitik*. This took the form of a new agenda for global governance, which was being put together by a number of upcoming academics, policy-makers and career diplomats. Its appearance would mark the beginning of a new phase in liberal internationalism in the 20th century, one that is still with us today. It would not seem unreasonable to expect that Nixon would perhaps be regarded more favourably by NWO researchers, in view of his clashes with the Establishment and his rejection of liberal internationalism. The preferred "truth" for NWO researchers, unfortunately, is that Nixon was but a minor figure, little more than a Rockefeller stooge at worst and a victim of the "Elite" conspiracy at best.

* * * * *

References

1 *Encarta Book of Quotations*, (St Martin's Press: New York, 2000), p.697.

2 Quoted in Peter Collier and David Horotwitz, *The Rockefellers: An American Dynasty*, (Holt Rinehart and Winston: New York, 1976), p.339.

3 See Gary Allen with Larry Abraham, *None Dare Call It Conspiracy*, (Concord Press: Rossmor CA, 1971), pp.108-111, 113-123; Gary Allen, *Nixon's Palace Guard*, (Western Islands: Boston, 1971); Gary Allen, *Richard Nixon: The Man Behind The Mask*, (Western Islands: Boston, 1971); Gary Allen, *Kissinger: The Secret Side of the Secretary of State*, ('76 Press: Seal Beach, CA, 1976); and Gary Allen, *The Rockefeller File*, ('76 Press: Seal Beach, CA, 1976), pp.56-58, 171-189.

4 Allen, *Richard Nixon*, p.126.

5 James Perloff, *The Shadows of Power: The Council on Foreign Relations and the American Decline*, (Western Islands: Appleton, WI, 1988), pp.141-149.

6 William F. Jasper, *Global Tyranny…Step By Step: The United Nations and the Emerging New World Order*, (Western Islands: Appleton, WI, 1992), p.125; David Icke, *The Biggest Secret: The book that will change the world*, (Bridge of Love: Scottsdale AZ, 1999), pp.268-269; Icke, *…and the truth will set you free: The most explosive book of the 20th century*, (Bridge of Love: Cambridge, 1997) p.185; Dr John Coleman, *Conspirators' Hierarchy: The Story of the Committee of 300*, (America West Publishers: Bozeman MT, 1992), pp.156, 208-217.

7 Allen, *Rockefeller File*, pp.172-174.

8 Robert D. Schulzinger, *Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy*, (Columbia University Press: New York, 1989), p.23; Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, (Simon & Schuster: New York, 1999), p.49; Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, (Little, Brown and Co.: Boston, 1979), pp.7, 11.

9 Nixon and Butterfield quotes in Anthony Summers with Robbyn Swan, *The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon*, (Phoenix Press: London, 2001), p.17.

10 Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*, (Arrow Books: London, 1978), p.761.

11 ibid, pp.100, 246, 352, 509-510, 738, 762.

12 Herbert S. Parmet, *Richard Nixon and His America*, (Smithmark: New York, 1990), 239-241, 259-286; Kirkpatrick Sale, *Power Shift: The Rise of the Southern Rim and its Challenge to the Eastern Establishment*, (Random House: New York, 1975), pp.214-15.

13 Nixon, *Memoirs*, pp.167, 169.

14 Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush*, (HarperCollins: New York, 1995), p.350.

15 Nixon quoted in Stephen E. Ambrose, *Nixon: The Education of a Politician, 1913-1962*, (Simon & Schuster: New York, 1987), p.671.

16 ibid, p.351.

17 Quoted in Summers, *The Arrogance of Power*, p.18.

18 Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.49.

19 Godfrey Hodgson, "The Establishment", *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1973, p.25; Letter quoted in Allen, *Richard Nixon*, p.83; and Peter Grose, *Continuing the Inquiry: The Council on Foreign Relations from 1921 to 1996*, (Council on Foreign Relations: New York, NY, 1996), Chapter. 6, note** at www.cfr.org.

20 Perloff, *Shadows of Power*, p.143; Allen, *Richard Nixon*, p.84.

21 Earl Mazo and Stephen Hess, *President Nixon: A Political Portrait*, (MacDonald: London, 1968), pp.220-27; Ambrose, *Nixon, 1913-1962*, pp.550-53; Allen & Abraham, *None Dare*, p.109; and Parmet, *Richard Nixon*, pp.372, 388.

22 Perloff, Shadows of Power, p.144.

23 Stephen E. Ambrose, *Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician 1962-1972*, (Simon & Schuster: New York, 1989), pp.21-22; Nixon, RN, p.248; Mazo and Hess, *President Nixon*, pp.284-289.

24 Joseph E. Persico, *The Imperial Rockefeller: A Biography of Nelson A. Rockefeller*, (Simon & Schuster: New York, 1982), p.66, 242-243; Stanley I.Kutler, *Abuse of Power: The New Nixon Tapes*, (The Free Press: New York, 1997), pp.173-174; Nixon quote in Peter Collier and David Horowitz, *The Rockefellers: An American Dynasty*, (Holt, Rinehart and Winston: New York, 1976), p.406; Kissinger, *White House Years*, p.13.

25 Persico, *The Imperial Rockefeller*, pp.99-106; Collier and Horowitz, *The Rockefellers*, pp.405-406.

26 See David Rockefeller, *Memoirs*, (Random House: New York, 2002), pp.

27 Quoted in Summers, *The Arrogance of Power*, pp.46-47; Irwin F. Gellman, *The Contender: Richard Nixon The Congress Years 1946-1952*, (The Free Press: New York, 1999), pp.59-60.

28 Summers, *The Arrogance of Power*, pp.17-18; Sale, *Power Shift*, p.116.

29 Sale, *Power Shift*, p.119.

30 ibid, pp.228-232; Kirkpatrick Sale, "Yankees and Cowboys - the World Behind Watergate", in Steve Weissmann, ed., *Big Brother and the Holding Company: The World Behind Watergate*, (Ramparts Press: Palo Alto, CA, 1974), pp.281-282; and Summers, *The Arrogance of Power*, pp.46-47.

31 See G.William Domhoff, *The Bohemian Grove and Other Retreats*, (Harper & Row: New York, 1974); and Kevin Wehr, "The Power Elite at the Bohemian Grove: Has Anything Changed in the 1990s?", *Critical Sociology*, 1994, pp.121-124.

32 Nixon quoted in Parmet, *Richard Nixon*, pp.123-124; and Gellman, *The Contender*, p.394; Nixon, *Memoirs*, pp.80-81, 283-285.

33 Allen, *Say "No"*, p.77.

34 Perloff, *Shadows of Power*, p.145. In all the populist NWO books consulted by this author much is made of Kissinger's CFR membership, but few, if any, researchers have shown much interest in the substance of Kissinger's ideas. While those who actually have examined his works seem unable to understand them. David Icke, for instance, asserts that Kissinger is a "leading figure in the New World Order," and that his foreign policy approach while in power "followed the tried and trusted British approach for centuries - maintain the balance of power under the rule which says 'My enemy's enemy is my friend'" (*...and the truth shall set you free*, p.307). Icke seems incapable of realising that this approach is very much at odds with what he claims is the aim of New World Order "Global Elite" of setting up a "world government" (p.xviii).

35 See Phyllis Schafly and Chester Ward, *Kissinger On The Couch*, (Arlington House: New York, 1975).

36 Joan Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered*, (Basic Books: New York, 1994), p.11.

37 Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography*, (Touchstone: New York, 1992), pp.18-20, 37.

38 ibid, pp.69-73.

39 ibid, pp.83-85, 88-89; Stephen R. Graubard, *Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind*, (W.W. Norton & Company: New York, 1973), pp.55-54; and Henry Brandon, *The Retreat of American Power*, (The Bodley Head: London, 1973), p.28.

40 Isaacson, *Kissinger*, pp.110-114; Schulzinger, *Henry Kissinger*, pp.12-15.

41 Kissinger and Bundy quotes in Kai Bird, *The Color of Truth, McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy: Brothers in Arms, A Biography*, (Simon & Schuster: New York, 1999), pp.143-144; McCloy quoted in Kai Bird, *The Chairman: John J. McCloy: The Making of the American Establishment*, (Simon & Schuster: New York, 1992), p.614.

42 Isaacson, *Kissinger*, pp.90-93; Henry Kissinger, "Nelson Rockefeller – In Memoriam", Eulogy given at the funeral of Nelson Rockefeller, 2 February 1979, in Henry Kissinger, *For the Record: Selected Statements, 1977-1980*, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph: London, 1981), pp.167-171; Graubard, *Kissinger*, pp.108-110; Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp.4-5.

43 Quoted in Isaacson, *Kissinger*, p.93.

44 Christopher Hitchens, *The Trial of Henry Kissinger*, (Text Publishing: Melbourne, 2001), pp.11-15; Isaacson, *Kissinger*, pp. 129-132; and Nixon, *Memoirs*, pp.323-324

45 Kissinger quoted in Isaacson, *Kissinger*, p.127-128; Schulzinger, *Henry Kissinger*, p.23; Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered*, p.151; and Kai Bird, *The Chairman*, p.614.

46 Nixon, *Memoirs*, p324.

47 ibid, p.340.

48 Allen and Abraham, *None Dare Call It Conspiracy*, pp.122-123.

49 Nixon, *Memoirs*, p.45.

50 Gellman, *The Contender*, pp.120, 123, 125, 146-147. See also *Congressional Record*, Vol. 93, Part 7, (July 3, 1947 – July 19, 1947), p.8567; *CR*, Vol. 4, Part 3, (March 16, 1948 – April 8, 1948), p.2985; and *CR*, Vol. 96, Part 10, (August 21, 1950 – September 6, 1950), p.13529.

51 Gellman, *The Contender*, pp.300, 314.

52 ibid, pp.148, 271-272.

53 Ambrose, *Nixon 1913-1962*, pp.273, 251; Gellman, *The Contender*, pp.121, 144-145, 149.

54 Ambrose, *Nixon 1913-1962*, pp. 590-593, 615-616.

55 Nixon, *Memoirs*, pp.279-283; Parmet, *Richard Nixon*, pp.494-495.

56 Quoted in Mazo and Hess, *President Nixon*, pp.309-310.

57 Richard M.Nixon, "Asia After Viet Nam", *Foreign Affairs*, October 1967, pp.121, 123.

58 Nixon, *Memoirs*, p.283.

59 Sale, *Power Shift*, p.243.

60 Kissinger's PhD dissertation is ignored by most NWO researchers except for Icke, who alludes to it with this bizarre interpretation of its significance: "Castleraegh...was a nineteenth century British Foreign Minister who handed over Europe to the New World Order bankers, particularly the House of Rothschild...A devout student of this man's methods was...Henry Kissinger" (*...and the truth shall set you free*, p.261). While the Rothschilds', albeit peripheral involvement in the Congress of Vienna has been documented in recent works, such as Niall Ferguson's *The House of Rothschild*, the same cannot be said of Kissinger's *A World Restored*, which not only fails to mention the Rothschilds, but makes no observations about the influence of European banking at all.

61 Schulzinger, *Henry Kissinger*, p.11; David Landau, *Kissinger: The Uses of Power*, (Houghton Mifflin Co: Boston, 1972), pp.26-30.

62 Gregory D. Cleva, *The Continental Statesmen and the Island Power: Henry Kissinger and the American Approach to Foreign Policy*, (The Catholic University of America: Washington D.C., 1983), pp.78-80 (including Kissinger quote).

63 Henry A. Kissinger, "Reflections on American Diplomacy", *Foreign Affairs*, October 1956, pp.42-43 (emphasis added).

64 Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, (Council on Foreign Relations/Harper & Brothers: New York, 1957), pp.219-221 (emphasis added); and Henry A. Kissinger, "Arms Control, Inspection and Surprise Attack", *Foreign Affairs*, July 1960, pp.558-59 (emphasis added).

65 Kissinger, "American Diplomacy" p.41.

66 Henry A. Kissinger, "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy", in Henry A. Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy: Three Essays*, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson: London, 1969), p.95.

67 Kissinger, "American Diplomacy", p.42.

68 Landau, *Kissinger*, pp.31-32.

69 Kissinger, "Central Issues", p.56-58.

70 ibid, p.97; Graubard, *Kissinger*, pp.243, 250-252, 258-259.

71 It is worth observing that Gary Allen's small book, *Kissinger: The Secret Side of the Secretary of State* (pp.19-20), mentions Kissinger's earlier academic writings only in passing. Allen makes some specious observations about his first two CFR books, before implying a pro-Communist intent in Kissinger's alleged plan in *The Troubled Partnership* to merge the US with the "increasingly socialist nations of Europe." Setting the pattern for future researchers, Allen resorts to innuendo and guilt-by-association to damn Kissinger as a "paid agent of the House of Rockefeller" and a supporter of their goal of "World Government" (pp.133-134), without being able to quote a single word of support from Kissinger for such a goal. The reason for this crucial absence of evidence, which has plagued most researchers, is because Kissinger has never supported world government.

72 Hodgson, "The Establishment", p.25.

73 Schulzinger, *Henry Kissinger*, pp.24-25; Tad Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years*, (The Viking Press: New York, 1978), pp.12-13; Isaacson, *Kissinger*, pp.195-196; and Kissinger, *White House Years*, p.26.

74 Szulc, *Illusion of Peace*, pp.156, 200-201, 210-211; Schulzinger, *Henry Kissinger*, pp.31-32, 101, 197.

75 Perloff, *Shadows of Power*, p.145.

76 Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, (Touchstone: New York, 1994), p.705.

77 Quoted in Szulc, *Illusion of Peace*, pp.126-127 (emphasis added).

78 Quoted in Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Reagan*, (Columbia University Press:New York, 1983), pp.326-327.

79 Szulc, *Illusion of Peace*, pp.127-128.

80 Brown, *Faces of Power*, pp.327-328; Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.91; Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered*, pp.164-165.

81 Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1982), p.280.

82 Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered*, pp.158, 164-165 (including quotes).

83 "An Interview with the President: 'The Jury Is Out'", *Time*, 3 January 1972, p.9 (emphasis added).

84 *Department of State Bulletin*, 21 January 1974, p. (emphasis added).

85 James Chace, "The Five Power World of Richard Nixon", in Lloyd C.Gardner, ed., *The Great Nixon Turnaround*, (New Viewpoints: New York, 1973), pp.262, 263, 265 (emphasis added).

86 Nixon, *Memoirs*, p.344; Kissinger quoted in Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, p.284.

87 Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, pp.285, 289.

88 Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, pp.721-724.

89 Richard M. Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Building for Peace*, A Report to the Congress, 25 February 1971, p.105-106 (emphasis added).

90 Isaacson, *Kissinger*, pp.336-354 (including Kissinger quotes); Nixon, *Memoirs*, p.580.

91 Quoted in Nixon, *Memoirs*, p.566 (emphasis added).

92 Matthew Lee, "East, West played Russian roulette", *The Australian*, 12 January 1999, p.7; Jim Mann and Tyler Marshali, "Kissinger played triangular ping-poing", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 12 January 1999, p.9; and Oliver August, "Kissinger told China 'you can claim Taiwan'", *The Times Online*, 1 March 2002.

93 Nixon, *Memoirs*, p.344.

94 Steve Reilly, "Détente", in Alan Bullock ed., *The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought*, Second Edition, (Fontana Press: London, 1988) p.220.

95 Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Isolated America", *Foreign Affairs*, October 1972, pp.5-6.

96 Allen, *Kissinger*, p.111.

97 Armstrong, "Isolated America", pp.4-5.

98 Quoted in Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made*, (Touchstone: New York, 1986), p.717.

99 Kingman Brewster Jr, "Reflections on Our National Purpose", *Foreign Affairs*, April 1972, p.413 (emphasis added).

100 ibid, p.414.

101 J.William Fulbright, "Basic Aspects of the National Interest", in Fred W. Neal and Mary K. Harvey, eds, *Pacem In Terris III: Volume I The Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Contradictions*, (Fund for the Republic: Santa Barbara, CA, 1974), pp.18, 27, 36-37.

102 Stanley Hoffmann, "Weighing the Balance of Power", *Foreign Affairs*, July 1972, p.631.

103 ibid, pp.632-35 (emphasis added).

104 Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Half Past Nixon", *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1971, pp.12-13; Brzezinski, "The Deceptive Structure of Peace", *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1974, pp.53, 55.

105 Richard N.Gardner, "The Hard Road to World Order", *Foreign Affairs*, April 1974, p.576.

106 Richard A. Falk, *What's Wrong with Henry Kissinger's Foreign Policy*, Policy Memorandum No.39, Center of International Studies, (Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Studies: Princeton University, July 1974), pp.6-7.

107 Richard A Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds*, (The Free Press: New York, 1975), pp.167-68 (emphasis added).

108 ibid, p.168 (emphasis added).

109 Jeff Frieden, "The Trilateral Commission: Economics and Politics in the 1970s", in Holly Sklar, ed. *Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management*, (South End Press: Boston, 1980), p.66; Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered*, pp.138-144;

110 Frieden, "Trilateral Commission", p.66.

111 Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered*, pp.168, 396n (including quote).

112 C.Fred Bergsten, "The New Economics and U.S. Foreign Policy", *Foreign Affairs*, January 1972, pp.199, 200, 205, 204, 221 (emphasis added).

113 Quoted in Friedan, "Trilateral Commission", p.67.

114 Richard M.Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: The Emerging Structure of Peace, A Report to the Congress*, 9 February 1972, p.96.

115 "Who Pays What at the U.N.", *Time*, 4 December 1972, p.15.

116 Nixon, *Structure of Peace*, p.98.

117 See Martin Schifff, "The United States and the United Nations: On a Collision Course", *Orbis*, Summer 1974, pp.553-581; and Hollis W. Barber, "The United States vs. The United Nations", *International Organisation*, Winter 1973, pp.139-163.

118 Nixon, *Structure of Peace*, p.97.

119 For examples of Yost's liberal internationalism see Charles W. Yost, "The United Nations: Crisis of Confidence and Will", *Foreign Affairs*, October 1966, pp.19-35; and Yost, "World Order and American Responsibility", *Foreign Affairs*, October 1968, pp.1-14.

120 Allen, *Nixon's Palace Guard*, pp.159-160.

121 See ibid, p.163 and Yost, "United Nations Crisis", pp.27, 35.

122 "A New Stripe at the U.N.", *Time*, 20 September 1971, pp.24-25.

123 "Advance Men Advance", *Time*, 25 December 1972, p.15.

124 Richard N. Gardner, "Can the United Nations Be Revived?", *Foreign Affairs*, July 1970, p.661.

125 ibid, p.672.

126 William P. Lineberry, *The United States in World Affairs 1970*, (Simon & Schuster/Council on Foreign Relations: New York, 1972), p.20.

127 Yost quoted in "The U.S. and the U.N.", *The Nation*, 5 June 1972, p.709.

128 Fulbright, "Basic Aspects", p.37.

129 Charles W.Yost, in Fred W. Neal and Mary K. Harvey, eds, *Pacem In Terris III: Volume III American Foreign Policy in the Age of Interdependence*, (Fund for the Republic: Santa Barbara, CA, 1974), p.211.

130 Nixon, *Memoirs*, pp.769, 764.

131 Fred Emery, *Watergate: The Corruption and Fall of Richard Nixon*, (Jonathan Cape: London, 1994), pp.47-48, 79.

132 Kutler, *Abuse of Power*, p.3.

133 ibid, p.17.

134 ibid, p.24 (emphasis added).

135 Emery, *Watergate*, p.27, 219; Stanley I.Kutler, *The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon*, (Alfred A. Knopf: New York, 1990), pp104-106.

136 Noam Chomsky, "Watergate: Small Potatoes", *American Report*, 13 August 1973, p.3.

137 Paul Hoffman, "The Politics of Abortion", *The Nation*, 5 June 1972, pp.712-13; Kutler, *Abuse of Power*, p.143; *Newsweek* quoted in Allen, *The Rockefeller File*, p.172.

138 Quotes in Hodgson, "The Establishment", pp.26-27; Isaacson, *Kissinger*, p.280; and Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.52.

139 Kissinger quoted in Isaacson, *Kissinger*, p.275.

140 Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p.95.

141 Emery, *Watergate*, p.xii.

142 Magruder quoted Summers and Swan, *The Arrogance of Power*, p.441.

143 Allen, *Rockefeller File*, pp.171-189; Icke, *...and the truth shall set your free*, pp.308-309.

144 Scott Milson, "Expletives undeleted", *The Weekend Australian Review*, 5-6 December 1998, p.12. See also James Warren, "Nixon, Billy Graham Anti-Semitism on Tape", *Chicago Tribune*, 1 March 2002; Leonard Garment, "Richard Nixon, Unedited", *New York Times*, 19 October 1999; and Karen Gullo, "Tapes Reveal angry, worried Nixon", *Boston Globe*, 6 October 1999, p.A03.

145 Sale, *Power Shift*, pp.276-277.

146 Nixon, *Memoirs*, p.493.

147 Kissinger quoted in John-Paul Ferguson, "Our Own Private Pinochet: Prosecuting Henry Kissinger", *SAIS Review*, Winter-

Spring 2002, p.245.

148 Hitchens, *The Trial of Henry Kissinger*, p.5.

149 Velisarios Kattoulas, "Kissinger and Asia's Wars", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 August 2001, p.63; and Luke Slatterly, "The Jury's Still Out", *The Weekend Australian*, 21-22 July 2001, p.R11.

150 "Oh, Henry", *The Economist*, 21 April 2001, p.80; and Matlock, "Re-Assessing Nixon and Kissinger."

151 Christopher Hitchens, "Kissinger Wanted for questioning", *The Age*, 30 April 2002, p.13.

152 "Tatchell loses battle for Kissinger's arrest", *BBC News*, 24 April 2002; Flora Botsford, "Spanish judge targets Kissinger", *BBC News*, 18 April 2002; Daniel Nelson, "Anti-Kissinger Protestors Welcome Legal Moves", *OneWorld.net*, 19 April 2002; Kissinger quoted in Olivia Kelleher, " 'War crimes' protest as Kissinger visits Cork", *Irish Times*, 28 February 2002. See also Henry A. Kissinger, "The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction", *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2002, pp.86-96.

153 See for example Richard Nixon, *Beyond Peace*, (Random House: New York, 1994); Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, (Simon & Schuster: New York, 1994); and Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, (Simon & Schuster: New York, 2001).

154 Joseph S. Nye Jr, "What New World Order"?, *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1992, p.84 (emphasis added).

return to the third section index