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by Alexander Berzin
April 2003
from
BerzinArchives Website
Badmaev’s Proposals
for Russian Annexation of Tibet
The Manchu Qing Dynasty of China (1644-1911) declined during the
nineteenth century. Many countries sought to take advantage of its
weakness to gain either trade or territorial concessions. They
included not only Britain, France, Germany, and Portugal, but also
Russia and Japan.
For example, in 1893, the Buryat Mongol physician Piotr Badmaev
submitted a plan to Czar Alexander III for bringing parts of the Qing Empire under Russian sway, including Outer and Inner Mongolia
and Tibet. He proposed extending the Trans-Siberian Railway from the
Buryat homeland at Lake Baikal through Outer and Inner Mongolia to
Gansu, China, next to the Tibetan border. When completed, he would
organize, with Buryat help, an uprising in Tibet that would allow
Russia to annex the country. Badmaev also proposed establishing a
Russian trading company in Asia. Count Sergei Yulgevich Witte,
Russian Finance Minister from 1882 to 1903, supported Badmaev’s two
plans, but Czar Alexander accepted neither of them.
Upon the death of Alexander, Badmaev
became the personal physician of his successor, Czar Nicholas II (r.
1894-1917). Soon, the new Czar approved the founding of a trading
company. Its focus, however, was the Pacific coast, where Russia and
Japan competed for control of Port Arthur, an ice-free port at the
southern tip of Manchuria. At first Japan gained Port Arthur, but
soon Russia took over. The Czar extended the Trans-Siberian Railroad
through northern Manchuria to Vladivostok and connected it to Port
Arthur. Nicholas, however, did not take up Badmaev’s proposals
concerning Tibet.
[see
Exploitation of the Shambhala Legend for
Control of Mongolia]
Dorjiev
and Czar Nicholas II
The Buryat Mongol monk Agvan Dorjiev (1854-1938) studied in Lhasa
Tibet from 1880 and eventually became one of the Master Debate
Partners (Assistant Tutors) of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama. He also
became the Dalai Lama’s most trusted political advisor.
The Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 had established Sikkim as a
British protectorate. The Tibetans did not acknowledge the
convention, and were uncomfortable with both British and Chinese
designs on their country. Thus, in 1899, Dorjiev visited Russia to
see if he could secure help to counter these threats. Dorjiev was a
friend of Badmaev and hoped that Russia’s expansionist policy in
Northeast Asia at the expense of China would extend to the Himalayan
region. Count Witte received him on this and his next several
visits. On behalf of the Buryat and Kalmyk Mongols living in St.
Petersburg, Dorjiev also petitioned permission for building a
Kalachakra temple there. Although the Russian authorities were not
interested in either proposal, Dorjiev sent a letter to the Dalai
Lama reporting that the prospects for assistance looked hopeful.
At first, the Dalai Lama and his ministers were hesitant but, on his
return to Lhasa, Dorjiev convinced the Dalai Lama to turn to Russia
for protection. He argued that Russia was the Northern Kingdom of Shambhala, the legendary land that safeguarded the Kalachakra
teachings, and that Czar Nicholas II was the incarnation of
Tsongkhapa, the founder of the Gelug tradition. As evidence, he
pointed to the Czar’s protection of the Gelug tradition among the
Buryats, Kalmyks, Tuvinian Turks in the Russian Empire. Swayed by
his argument, the Dalai Lama dispatched him back to Russia in 1900.
At that time, Prince Esper Ukhtomski was the head of the Russian
Department of Foreign Creeds. The Prince was deeply interested in
“Lamaist” culture and later wrote several books about it. He invited
Dorjiev to meet the Czar, which was the first of several audiences
that Dorjiev had on behalf of the Dalai Lama. In the following
years, Dorjiev traveled back and forth several times between the
Czar and the Dalai Lama. He was never able, however, to secure
Russian military support for Tibet.
In Sturm ьber Asien (Storm over Asia) (1924), the German secret
agent Wilhelm Filchner wrote that between 1900 and 1902 there was a
large drive in St. Petersburg to secure Tibet for Russia. This
drive, however, seems to have been restricted to the efforts of
Dorjiev, with the support of Badmaev and Witte. The Swedish explorer
Sven Hedin, an ardent admirer of Germany, had an audience with Czar
Nicholas II on route back to Europe from his Second Tibetan
Expedition (1899-1902). Later, he wrote that he had the impression
that Prince Ukhtomski was pushing the Czar to make Tibet a Russian
protectorate. The Prince’s writings, however, reveal no such
interest.
Intrigues between Japan, Russia, Britain, and China, and Their
Effect on Tibet
The Japanese Zen priest Ekai Kawaguchi visited Tibet from 1900 to
1902 to collect Sanskrit and Tibetan Buddhist texts. On his return
through British India, he falsely reported a Russian military
presence in Tibet to Sarat Chandra Das, an Indian spy for the
British who had visited Tibet in 1879 and 1881. Japan, at the time,
was preparing for war with Russia over Manchuria. It had recently
signed with Britain the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-1907), under
which both sides agreed to remain neutral if the other were at war.
By fomenting discord between England and Russia, it seems as though
the Japanese priest was trying to insure that Britain would not
support Russia in the upcoming war. He probably also was hoping that
British protests over Tibet would distract Russia’s attention from
Manchuria.
In his book, Three Years in Tibet, published in Benares by the
Theosophical Society in 1909, Kawaguchi reported that he had heard
of Dorjiev’s pamphlet in Tibetan, Mongolian and Russian claiming
that Russia was Shambhala and the Czar was the incarnation of
Tsongkhapa. He, however, had never personally seen it. Kawaguchi
also spoke of a Japanese-Tibetan Buddhist Coalition, but neither
side ever drew plans to implement it.
Kawaguchi’s report and later his book became well known among the
British authorities in India. Sir Charles Bell, British Political
Officer in Sikkim, for example, cited it in Tibet Past and Present
(1924). He wrote that Dorjiev had swayed the Dalai Lama to Russia’s
side by telling him how Russia controlled and protected part of
Mongolia (Buryatia), how increasingly more Russians were embracing
Tibetan Buddhism, and how the Czar was likely to embrace it too.
Lord Curzon, the British Viceroy of India at the time of Kawaguchi’s
report, was extremely paranoid of the Russians. Fearing a Russian
takeover and monopoly of the Tibetan trade, he ordered the British
invasion of Tibet with the Younghusband Expedition (1903-1904).
Together with Dorjiev, the Dalai Lama fled to Urga (Ulaan Baatar),
the capital of Mongolia. After suffering defeat, the Tibetan Regent
signed the Lhasa Convention in 1904, acknowledging British control
of Sikkim and granting the British trade relations and the
stationing of troops and officials in Lhasa to protect the trade
commission.
A few months later, the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) broke out in
Manchuria, in which the Japanese defeated the Czar’s forces. The
Dalai Lama stayed on in Mongolia, since in 1906 the British and
Chinese signed a convention reaffirming Chinese suzerainty over
Tibet. The Convention quickly prompted a Chinese attempt to annex
Tibet. The Dalai Lama sent Dorjiev once more to the Russian court to
seek military aid.
In 1907, Dorjiev submitted a report to P. P. Semyonov-Tyan-Shansky,
the Vice-President of the Russian Geographic Society, entitled “On a
Rapprochement between Russia, Mongolia and Tibet.” In it, he called
for the unification of the three states to create a great Buddhist
confederacy. The Russian authorities flatly rejected it.
In the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, Britain and Russia agreed
to stay out of Tibet’s internal affairs and deal only through China.
Undaunted, Dorjiev petitioned the Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in 1908 at least to build a Kalachakra temple in St.
Petersburg, which the authorities had rejected when he first had
proposed it in 1899. This time, however, the Czar approved the plan.
That was in 1909.
The Dalai Lama returned briefly to Lhasa at the end of 1909, but
Chinese troops soon arrived. In early 1910, the Dalai Lama fled to
India, where he stayed in Darjeeling, just south of Sikkim, under
British protection. There, he befriended Sir Charles Bell, who
influenced him about modernization.
Events
Following the Chinese Nationalist Revolution of 1911
In 1911-1912, the Manchu Qing dynasty of China fell. The new
president of the Chinese Nationalist Republic, Yьan Shih-k’ai (Yuan
xi-kai), continued the Manchu expansionist policy toward Tibet and
welcomed the Dalai Lama to join “the Motherland.” The Dalai Lama
refused and cut off all ties with China. He created a War Department
to lead an armed rebellion against the Chinese. Due primarily to the
chaotic situation in China, the Chinese troops soon surrendered. As
soon as the soldiers left Tibet in early 1913, the Dalai Lama
returned to Lhasa.
Later in 1913, the first public ceremony took place at the St.
Petersburg Kalachakra Temple – a long-life prayer to celebrate the
300th anniversary of the House of Romanov. The Dalai Lama sent
congratulatory gifts and a rumor spread that he had recognized
Alexis, the Heir Apparent, as a bodhisattva who would enlighten the
non-Buddhists of the North. Still, however, no military aid was
forthcoming from the Romanovs.
After driving back the Chinese forces from some sections of Kham
(southeastern Tibet), the Tibetans negotiated the Simla Convention
of 1914 with the British. Since the British would not support the
complete independence of Tibet, the Dalai Lama compromised. The
British guaranteed Tibetan autonomy under only nominal Chinese
suzerainty. The British also agreed that they would not annex Tibet
and would not allow China to do so either.
The Chinese never signed the convention and, in continuing border
skirmishes with the Chinese in Kham, the British never came to the
aid of the Tibetans. The Dalai Lama began to look elsewhere for
support.
Tibet
Receives Japanese Military Guidance
The Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War had impressed the
Dalai Lama. He now became interested in the Meiji Restoration and
modernization of Japan as a model for the modernization of Tibet
within a Buddhist framework. Therefore, in the face of a continuing
Chinese military threat and lack of Russian or British support,
Tibet turned to Japan to update the Tibetan army. Especially keen on
establishing a close connection with Japan was Tsarong, the head of
the Tibetan mint and armory and the Dalai Lama’s favorite.
Yajima Yasujiro, a veteran of the Russo-Japanese War, came to Lhasa
and, from 1913 to 1919, trained troops and advised on defense
against the Chinese. Aoki Bunkyo, a Japanese Buddhist priest,
translated Japanese army manuals into Tibetan. He also helped design
the Tibetan National Flag by adding to traditional Tibetan symbols a
rising sun surrounded by rays. This motif comprised the Japanese
cavalry and infantry flags of the day and later became the design
for the Japanese Navy and Army Flag during World War II.
 
Japanese Navy and
Army
Flag Tibetan National Flag
The Dalai Lama was unsuccessful,
however, in securing further Japanese military support. In 1919, the
Japanese army became deeply engaged in suppressing an independence
movement in Korea, which Japan had annexed in 1910. Then, in the
1920s, Japan turned its attention more toward Manchuria and Mongolia
and remained interested in Tibet only for Buddhist scholarly
studies. The last Japanese left Tibet in 1923, when the Great Kanto
Earthquake destroyed Tokyo and Yokohama.
The next year, the British established a police force in Lhasa. A
clash occurred between the police and the Tibetan military,
resulting in the death of one policeman. Tsarong severely punished
the murderer, but the antimodernization faction in the Tibetan
government used this as a pretext to turn the Dalai Lama against
him. They pointed out that Tsarong had acted without the Dalai
Lama’s consent and they accused the military of plotting to take
over the government. The Dalai Lama demoted Tsarong in 1925 from his
position as commander-in-chief of the army and dismissed him from
the cabinet in 1930. Thus, the main Tibetan proponent of Japanese
alliance was silenced.
In December 1933, the Dalai Lama passed away. Tibet did not resume
contact with Japan until 1938, when Tsarong reemerged to play a role
in dealing with an official expedition from Japan’s allies against
the spread of international Communism, the Germans.
Efforts
to Win Communist Tolerance of Buddhism in Russia and Mongolia
The Russian Revolution of 1917 established the Soviet Union. Lenin,
at first, did not enforce the Communist antireligion policy. In the
face of widespread civil war, consolidating his power had greater
priority. Even when Communist rule became stable, the state lacked
the infrastructure in the 1920s to replace the educational and
medical systems that the Buddhist monasteries were providing in
Buryatia, Kalmykia, and Tuva. Therefore, the Communist Party
tolerated Buddhism during this period.
At the end of 1919, several Mongol princes renounced the autonomous
status of Outer Mongolia and submitted themselves to Chinese rule.
Chinese troops entered Mongolia on the pretext of protecting it from
the Soviets. In late 1920, the fanatical anti-Bolshevik Baron von
Ungern-Sternberg invaded Mongolia from Buryatia, overthrew the
Chinese, and reinstated the traditional Buddhist leader, the Eighth
Jebtsundampa, as head of state. He proceeded to slaughter
indiscriminately any remaining Chinese and suspected Mongol
collaborators he could find.
In 1921, the Mongolian revolutionary Sukhe Batur established the
Mongolian Communist Provisional Government in Buryatia. The
Kalachakra teachings had a long history of popularity in Mongolia.
Taking advantage of the Mongols’ faith in them, Sukhe Batur twisted
its teachings and told his followers they would be reborn in the
army of Shambhala if they fought to free Mongolia from oppression,
With the help of the Soviet Red Army, Sukhe Batur drove Ungern from
Mongolia later in 1921. He limited the powers of the Jebtsundampa
and allowed the Soviet Army to keep control. The Russians used the
pretext that the Soviet Union was guaranteeing the independence of
Mongolia and protecting it from further Chinese aggression. The
Soviet Army remained until the Jebtsundampa’s death in 1924 and the
declaration of the People’s Republic of Mongolia shortly thereafter.
During this period, Barchenko, a Russian scholar of parapsychology
with connections to the Soviet Politburo, spent several months in
Mongolia. There, he learned something about Kalachakra. He became
convinced that its emphasis on material particles and its discussion
of historical cycles and the battle between the Shambhala army and
the invader forces foreshadowed the Communist teachings of
dialectical materialism. He wanted to introduce this to the higher
Bolshevik functionaries and so, upon his return to Moscow, organized
a Kalachakra study group among some of its members. Most influential
among the participants was Gleb Bokii, the Georgian head of a
special department of the Soviet Military Intelligence Service (the
OGPU, forerunner of the KGB). Bokii was the chief cryptographer of
the Service and employed deciphering techniques connected with
paranormal phenomena.
Other Russians also felt that Communism and Buddhism could
accommodate each other. Nikolai Roerich (1874–1947), for example,
was a Russian Theosophist who traveled through Tibet, Mongolia, and
the Altai region of Central Asia between 1925 and 1928 in search of
Shambhala. He conceived of the legendary home of the Kalachakra
teachings as a land of universal peace. Due to his connections with
Barchenko and their shared interest in Kalachakra, Roerich broke his
journey in 1926 and visited Moscow. There he dispatched a letter,
through the Soviet Foreign Minister Chicherin, to the Soviet people.
Reminiscent of Blavatsky’s letters from mahatmas in the Himalayas,
Roerich said the letter was also from the Himalayan mahatmas. The
letter praised the Revolution for eliminating, among other things,
“the misery of private property,” and it offered “help in forging
the unity of Asia.” As a gift, he delivered from the mahatmas a
handful of Tibetan soil to sprinkle on the grave of “our brother,
Mahatma Lenin.” Although there is no mention of Shambhala in this
letter, it continued the theosophical myth of benevolent help from
the masters of Central Asia to establish world peace, this time in
accord with the messianic mission of Lenin.
[see
Mistaken Foreign Myths about Shambhala]
Through Bokii’s influence, the OGPU sponsored Roerich to return to
Central Asia to continue his contacts. The OGPU also sponsored two
expeditions to Lhasa, later in 1926 and in 1928, led by Kalmyk
Mongol officers in the guise of pilgrims. Its main purpose was to
gather information and explore the possibilities for further
spreading international Communism in Central Asia and for extending
the sphere of power of the Soviet Union. Thus, the Kalmyk officers
proposed to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama that, in return for his
alliance, the Soviet Union would guarantee Tibet’s independence and
protect the country from the Chinese.
During this period, Buddhist leaders in the Soviet Union and
Mongolia also tried to accommodate Buddhism to Communism by showing
similarities between the two systems of belief. From 1922, the
Leningrad (St. Petersburg) Kalachakra Temple became the center of
the Revival of Faith Movement. Led by Dorjiev, the movement was an
attempt to reform Buddhism to adopt to Soviet reality by
communalizing the lifestyle of the monks in accordance with early
Buddhism. At the First All-Union Council of the Buddhists of the
USSR in 1927, Dorjiev further emphasized the similarity of Buddhist
and Communist thought in working for the people’s welfare. Thus, as
a follow-up to the first OGPU expedition to Lhasa, Dorjiev sent a
letter to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama praising Soviet policy toward
its minority nationalities. It said that Buddha was actually the
founder of Communism, that Lenin had held a high opinion of Buddha,
and that the spirit of Buddhism had lived on in Lenin. Dorjiev was
once more trying to use his influence to convince the Dalai Lama to
turn to the Soviet Union, as he had previously tried by associating
Russia with Shambhala and Czar Nicholas with Tsongkhapa.
Dorjiev’s main concern, however, was undoubtedly the protection of
Buddhism in the Soviet Union and the Peoples’ Republic of Mongolia.
Buddhist leaders in Mongolia, such as Darva Bandida and the
Buryat
Jamsaranov, were following Dorjiev’s lead in also trying to
reconcile Buddhism with Communism. Thus, Dorjiev created a
Mongol-Tibetan Mission at the Leningrad Temple in 1928, in
conjunction with his aim of safeguarding Buddhism. In the same year,
OGPU sent its second expedition ot Lhasa.
Communist Persecution of Buddhism and the Rise of Japan as a
Buddhist Patron
By the end of 1928, Stalin consolidated his control over the Soviet
Union. He began his collectivization and antireligion program in
1929, extending it to his Buddhist population as well. Mongolia soon
followed suit, but implemented Stalin’s policy in an even more
fanatic and aggressive manner. Dorjiev informed the Dalai Lama of
all that took place, convincing him not to trust the Soviets. Many
monks in Mongolia rebelled against the persecution and instigated
the so-called Shambhala War of 1930-1932. Stalin sent in the Soviet
army in 1932 to put down the rebellion and to temper the “leftist
deviation” of the Mongolian Communist Party.
The Japanese conquest of Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia
earlier that year and the establishment there of the Puppet State of
Manchukuo also prompted Stalin’s decision. He was worried that Japan
would try to rally the Buddhists of Buryatia and Outer Mongolia to
its side as parts of a Buddhist empire. Moreover, Stalin needed
Mongolia as a buffer state between the Soviet Union and the growing
Japanese Empire. Thus, for the next two years Stalin ordered the
Mongolians to relax their antireligion program so as not to drive
their Buddhist population into the Japanese camp. Under the New Turn
Policy, the Mongolian Communist Party even permitted the reopening
of several monasteries. Armed with propaganda from this official
sanctioning of Buddhism, the OGPU planned another expedition to
Tibet in the winter of 1933–1934. The expedition, however, never
took place because Stalin soon changed his mind and gradually took a
more severe position toward Buddhism.
In 1933, Japan expanded Manchukuo by annexing Jehol (Chengde) to the
south. Jehol had been the summer capital of the Manchus, who had
tried to make it the center for Tibetan and Mongolian Buddhism under
the rule of their Qing Dynasty. At the end of that year, Stalin
closed the St. Petersburg Kalachakra Temple for public ceremonies.
Stalin began his persecution in earnest, however, in both the Soviet
Union and Mongolia, when his second-in-command, Kirov, was
assassinated in 1934. This marked the start of the Great Purges.
When border skirmishes between Japanese Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia
broke out in 1935, Stalin made his first arrests of Buddhist monks
in Leningrad. In 1937, Japan captured the rest of Inner Mongolia and
northern China. To gain Mongol allegiance, the Japanese proposed to
reinstate the Ninth Jebtsundampa, the traditional political and
religious head of the Mongols, and to establish a pan-Mongol state
that would include Inner and Outer Mongolia and Buryatia. In their
effort to win the Mongols to their side, they even claimed that
Japan was Shambhala. Faced with Communist oppression, many monks in
Mongolia and Buryatia spread the Japanese propaganda.
The Soviet Communist Party newspaper Izvestiya blamed the tactic on
Dorjiev and accused him of being a Japanese spy. Stalin had Dorjiev
arrested later in 1937, all the remaining monks at the Leningrad
Temple shot, and the Mongol-Tibetan Mission there closed. Dorjiev
died in early 1938.
[see
Exploitation of the Shambhala Legend for the
Control of Mongolia]
Chinese
Efforts to Gain Tibet and British Ineffectiveness in Offering
Protection
Kept informed by Dorjiev, the Tibetans watched on warily during this
period of Communist oppression of Buddhism in the Soviet Union and
Mongolia. They were also worried about Chinese designs on their
land. When the Chinese Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek was
inaugurated in late 1928, it continued to claim Tibet and Mongolia
as parts of China. One of its first acts was to establish the
Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. It also supported the
Ninth Panchen Lama’s position in his dispute with the Tibetan
Government. The Panchen Lama had been living in China since 1924. He
was insisting on relative autonomy from Lhasa, exemption from taxes,
the right to have his own armed forces, and permission to be
escorted back to Tibet by the soldiers the Chinese Government had
provided him. The Dalai Lama did not accept his demands.
Between 1930 and 1932, the Tibetans and Chinese fought for control
of parts of Kham. The Dalai Lama asked the British to petition China
for a cease-fire and Britain made overtures to Chiang Kai-shek with
no result. Only when Japan conquered Manchuria and eastern Inner
Mongolia and established Manchukuo did China declare a truce in Kham,
so as to turn its attention to the northeastern front. Once more,
the British proved themselves ineffective protectors of Tibet,
despite the Simla Convention of 1914.
The Thirteenth Dalai Lama died in December 1933 and Reting Rinpoche
became the regent. The Chinese sent a delegation with lavish
offerings to see if Tibet was now willing to join the Chinese
Republic. The Tibetan Government declined the offer and reasserted
Tibetan independence. One of the Tibetan ministers recommended
seeking Japanese military assistance to keep the Chinese at bay, but
the National Assembly ignored the suggestion for the time being.
The Reting Regent was willing to compromise on some of the Panchen
Lama’s demands, but refused to allow the Chinese escort. When he
asked the British for military help in case the Chinese forces came
anyway, the British declined. They would only request the Chinese to
withdraw the troops, and Chiang Kai-shek refused.
Early in 1936, the Panchen Lama left for Tibet with his Chinese
military escort. Fighting between the Nationalist forces and the
Chinese Communists insurgents during their Long March prevented his
progress through Kham. During the ensuing months, complex
negotiations took place between the Tibetan, Chinese, and British
Governments over the Panchen Lama’s case. In the end, Reting agreed
to allow the Chinese escort provided that the British guaranteed
that the Chinese troops would leave through India immediately after
their arrival. China objected strongly to the idea of a foreign
guarantee and the British hesitated. A stalemate ensued.
In 1937, Japan captured the rest of Inner Mongolia and northern
China. Fully engaged now in war with Japan, China suggested that the
Panchen Lama wait in Chinese-held territory, which he did. At the
end of that year, the Panchen Lama fell ill and died, thus ending
the incident. Its continuing legacy on the Tibetan Government,
however, was deep distrust of the Chinese and conviction that
Britain was a totally unreliable source of support.
Renewed
Tibetan Interest in Japan and Contact with Nazi Germany
Hitler became chancellor of Germany in 1933, the same year as the
death of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama. In the face of border skirmishes
between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia and the stationing of Soviet
troops in the latter, Japan signed the Anti-Commintern Pact with
Germany in November 1936. The Pact declared their mutual hostility
toward the spread of international Communism. They agreed that
neither would make a political treaty with the Soviet Union and, if
the Soviets attacked either, they would consult on what measures to
take to safeguard their interests.
In 1937, Japan took the western half of Inner Mongolia and northern
China. Germany annexed Austria and part of Czechoslovakia in the
same year. With Stalin’s purges at their height, Chinese intentions
of a military presence in Tibet as a prelude to annexation, and
British diffidence to offer substantial help, Tibet once more looked
elsewhere for military assistance and protection. The most
reasonable alternative was Japan. Thus, in 1938, the Tibetan
Government, controlled now solely by the Reting Regent, resumed
contacts.
Many Tibetans admired Japan as a Buddhist nation that had become a
world power and new patron of Buddhism, especially in Inner
Mongolia. Moreover, the Japanese had helped to train the Tibetan
army twenty years earlier; the Tibetan army manuals were
translations from the Japanese. Japan, in turn, had a strategic
interest in Tibet. As it expanded its Greater East Asian
Coprosperity Sphere, it saw Tibet as a useful and necessary buffer
against British India. This fit well with the Tibetan wish to remain
independent from China.
The Nazi
Expedition to Tibet
Because of the Japanese-German Anti-Commintern Pact, Tibet also
thought to make official contact with the German Government. The
decision had nothing to do with support for Nazi ideology or policy,
but was due to practical necessity and the vicissitudes of the
times. The conservative Tibetan government, however, proceeded
cautiously. It invited an exploratory delegation from the Nazi
Government to visit Tibet for the Losar (New Year) celebration,
which led to the Third Tibet Expedition of Ernst Schдffer in
1938-1939. The British objected, but the Tibetans ignored the
protest.
Schдffer was a hunter and biologist. His two previous expeditions to
Tibet, 1931–1932 and 1934–1936, had been for sport and zoological
research. This third expedition, however, was sent by the Ahnenerbe
(Bureau for the Study of Ancestral Heritage). The Germans were not
interested in offering military assistance or protection to Tibet.
This is obvious from the choice of the members of the delegation. In
addition to Schдffer, the team included an anthropologist, a
geophysicist, a filmmaker, and a technical leader. Its primary
mission seems to have been measuring the skulls of Tibetans in order
to establish them as ancestors of the Aryans and therefore
acceptable as an intermediary race between the Germans and the
Japanese.
According to Nazi occult sources, the expedition was also seeking
support for the Nazi cause from the masters of Shambhala who were
the guardians of secret psychic powers. Shambhala refused to help,
but the occult masters of the underground kingdom of Agharti agreed
and thousands of Tibetans went to Germany. These claims do not,
however, seem to be fact. Although the Germans brought back with
them numerous skulls for further study, none of their reports
indicates that any Tibetans accompanied them to Germany. Moreover,
no further German expeditions followed.
[see
The Nazi Connection With Shambhala And Tibet]
Developments Subsequent to the Schдffer Expedition
Within a few months of the Schдffer Expedition, the political and
military landscapes changed dramatically. In May 1939, Japan invaded
Outer Mongolia, where it faced stiff resistance from the Soviet
army. While the battle was still raging in Mongolia, Hitler broke
the Anti-Commintern Pact with Japan in August 1939 and signed the
Nazi-Soviet Pact to avoid war on two European fronts. The next
month, he invaded Poland, at about the same time as Japan was
defeated in Mongolia. The events demonstrated to the Tibetans that
neither Japan nor Germany was a reliable source of protection
against the Soviets. Moreover, because Japan was making little
headway in conquering the rest of China, it turned its attention
instead to Indochina and the Pacific. Japan did not appear anymore
as a protector against the Chinese. Thus, Tibet was left no choice
but the British and the weak protection that the Simla Convention
afforded her.
In September 1940, Germany, Japan, and Italy signed a military and
economic alliance. In September 1941, Hitler broke his pact with
Stalin and attacked the Soviet Union. Neither event, however, swayed
the Tibetans to reconsider seeking protection from the Axis Powers.
Tibet remained neutral during the Second World War.
Japan’s interest in Tibet, however, continued and grew even stronger
after its invasion of Burma at the start of 1942. Planning to enter
Tibet through Upper Burma, the Japanese Imperial Government
organized a Greater Asian Bureau. As its advisor for Tibetan
affairs, the Government appointed Aoki Bunkyo, who twenty years
earlier had translated Japanese army manuals into Tibetan. Under his
guidance, the Japanese prepared maps and Tibetan-Japanese
dictionaries. They even printed Tibetan money in anticipation of
including Tibet in its Coprosperity Sphere. With Japan’s defeat in
1945, however, the Japanese were never able to implement their plans
for Tibet.
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