Chapter 3

Cold War, Biological Weapons, and World Health

THE Francis Countway Memorial Library is a stone's throw from Harvard's School of Dental Medicine where I had served on the faculty. A modem structure of glass and concrete, the building looks somewhat misplaced amid the grandeur of its centuries old Gothic marble neighbors. What seemed ironically amusing about the building is that this tribute to health science learning would be diagnosed as a "sick building."


After a couple of hours in the Countway, people commonly became ill. Headaches and dizzyness were the most frequent symptoms. The graduate students next door at the School of Public Health always joked that the library was contraindicated for women in their third trimester of pregnancy. Nevertheless, here's where I conducted most of my post-doctoral research.


Access to Countway from Boston's Northshore was relatively painless. An hour's train-ride dropped me off at the old Boston Garden. Two transfers and a half-hour later I disembarked the Huntington Avenue street car on Harvard medical turf. A brief trek through two concrete corridors, a pair of glass doors, and a guarded gate, and I was at work. The first floor of Countway is mostly administrative offices, reference books, and on-line services. Computer literature searches are easily conducted here.


The Index Medicus and current stacks are located down an open stairway on the first lower level. Current periodicals are neatly arranged on display shelves filling the south side of the gymnasium-size floor. Work desks line the walls and are in greatest demand on the same sunny side of the room. The older stacks and copy machines are all in the basement.


There is no natural light here and barely any oxygen. At the heart of this floor are eight high-speed copiers. All are almost always in use filling the room with heat and noise. Faculty and students alike await their turns seated uncomfortably at the center of the room on cracked black vinyl love seats. The lights flicker like a strobe. This is Countway's dungeon-where I accessed the scientific literature dating to the late 1960s.


Sweat and time quickly disappeared here.

Prelude to a Protocol

After our cursory review of early 'WHO Chronicle' reports, my search was on for articles about biological warfare (BW). There were many.

In February 1967, as international protests resounded against the Vietnam War, more than 5,000 domestic scientists petitioned President Lyndon Johnson (and soon thereafter Richard Nixon) to "reexamine and publicly state" the government's research and deployment policies on chemical and biological weapons. Their request was met with stoic silence. Notes from White House science adviser Donald Hornig to correspondents simply said,

"thank you for your interest in national security." [1]

The official government position on chemical and biological warfare (CBW) had been articulated by Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus Vance a year earlier:

"I have indicated that we seek international understandings to limit chemical and biological warfare and that we have not used weapons of the sort condemned by the Geneva protocol. [Though "agent orange," the powerful defoliant, was being used heavily in Vietnam at that time, only later was it acknowledged to be highly toxic to humans as well.] I should also point out that we have at the same time maintained an active chemical and biological program. In the last few years we have placed increasing emphasis on defensive concepts and material.


As long as other nations, such as the Soviet Union, maintain large programs, we believe we must maintain our defensive and retaliatory capability. It is believed by many that President Roosevelt's statement in 1943 which promised "to any perpetrators full and swift retaliation in kind" played a significant role in preventing gas warfare in World War II. Until we achieve effective agreement to eliminate all stockpiles of these weapons, it may be necessary in the future to be in a position to make such a statement again." [1]

Worldwide Protests

Between 1967 and 1972, debate raged over whether America's CBW industry should be scrubbed [2-5] or bolstered.[6,7] Dr. Joshua Lederberg relayed the consensus of protesters in a 1971 'Science' article. [8]

"Germ warfare" he wrote, "... has been universally condemned as a vile perversion of scientific insight. This emotional reaction is buttressed by a rational consideration of the strategic and political instabilities that would follow from threatened uses of biological weapons and of the possibilities of worldwide spread of infectious disease. In the interest of world order and to reduce the possibilities of igniting world conflict, the development, stockpiling, and general accommodation of biological weaponry must be controlled by international agreement."

Lederberg, a professor of genetics at Stanford University's School of Medicine described work in synthetic small gene assembly. He warned that very soon through "chemical operations on DNA components," researchers would be able to synthesize small viruses and engineer their design "to exquisite detail."


He argued that biological weapons stand,

"apart from all other devices in the actual threat that it poses to the health and life expectancy of every human being whether or not he is politically involved in belligerent actions." [8]


"In a word, the intentional release of an infectious particle, be it a virus or bacterium, from the confines of the laboratory or of medical practice must be condemned as an irresponsible threat against the whole human community..."

"We have learned in recent years that viruses undergo constant evolution in their own natural history, not only by mutations within a given strain, but also by the natural cross-hybridization of viruses that superficially appear to be only remotely related to one another. Furthermore, many of us carry viruses in our body cells of which we are unaware for years and which may be harmless - though they may eventually cause the formation of a tumor, or of brain degeneration, or of other diseases. At least in the laboratory, we can show that such latent viruses can still cross-breed with other viruses to give rise to new forms..."

"We are all familiar with the process of mutual escalation in which the defensive efforts of one side inevitably contribute to further technical development on the other, and vice versa... And the potential undoubtedly exists for the design and development of infective agents against which no credible defense is possible, through the genetic and chemical manipulation of these agents." [8]

'Nature,' 'Science,' and 'Lancet' published dozens of articles expressing grave concerns over the fate of humanity should biological weapons research continue. One such article entitled "The Biological Bomb," written by an anonymous author, discussed the ethical implications of biological weapons research - an industry that lay "at the heart of the cellular nucleus, ticking us to destruction." [9]


Dr. V.W. Sidel, a Boston physician, declared that not only should medical personnel refuse to participate in such activities, but physicians "must actively protest against the development, production, and use of biological weapons." Failure to do so, he argued, represented an insult to the medical profession, complicity, and one of the greatest dangers to society. [9]

Scientists could not "retain public esteem if they did nothing about the present state of the world," declared another protestor. The delicate balance between good and evil was "changing rapidly" and the "present juncture" was seen as crucial. [9] In Britain, several groups frustrated by the secrecy surrounding experiments conducted at Porton, England's CBW research facility, lobbied their government too.


Protestors included Nobel Prize winners Professor Sir Cyril Powell, Professor H.F. Wilkins, and Dr. F. Sanger. All desired to have the Ministry of Health assume responsibility for Porton from the Ministry of Defense to assure that 'all CBW research would be strictly defensive.' [10] Another English notable, Lord Ritchie-Calder, summoned support for an international biological weapons accord and haled one group of scientists who were devoted to preventing diseases over another who was busy "devising man-made epidemics." [9]


Likewise, another anonymous author published in 'Lancet':

"The whole field [of biological warfare] bristles with difficulties. Organisms for biological warfare can be produced quickly, cheaply, and easily; many are required in ordinary and perfectly legitimate ways for production of vaccines; clandestine research could easily be conducted; storage is scarcely necessary, for chemical plants and even breweries could be quickly switched to producing harmful microorganisms in enormous quantities; and delivery systems are multiple..."

"The Government could give a sound basis to its Geneva proposal by declaring all future work carried out at Porton declassified... This would carry especial conviction if... it were linked to participation with WHO... In 1963 Prof. Roger

M. Herriott of the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, suggested that the United States should offer to place its biological laboratories under WHO if Russia and other countries agreed to do the same. The risks to national security in this procedure are a good deal less than might be thought, for despite all the secrecy, it seems to be difficult for any country to steal a march on another in this sphere where the essential basic knowledge is so readily obtainable."

"These large and frankly political questions may hardly seem of pressing concern to the medical profession. But biological warfare implies a misuse of medical science for which doctors cannot evade responsibility. Medical knowledge and medical participation are inherent in most of its projects, and the profession's silence on this issue is liable to be interpreted as consent. The secrecy demanded is also contrary to the principles of medical ethics and is totally rejected in every other medical activity. If the fetters of secrecy were discarded and an international orientation adopted, more immediate and constructive thought could be given to feeding the world's 1000 million under-nourished citizens." [12]

Though this author's heart was in the right place, I thought it naive to think that placing all "biological laboratories under the WHO's control," would have made any difference. Americans were sharing secrets with the Russians through the WHO network anyway. Moreover, the WHO made it clear that security wasn't an issue.


They expressed their objections to safeguarding DNA research this way:

"The requirements for high security laboratories may be an inordinate burden (who, in fact will pay for them?) in relation to the prospective gains. The best strategy here seems to be the development of safe vectors: plasmids and bacteria engineered to have little chance of survival outside the laboratory. In fact, in the long run this is a safer procedure than relying upon uncertain human compliance with fixed rules and regulations." [13]

Discussing the "remaining controversies" in the field of genetic splicing and hazardous germ development - techniques that require "rather complicated analyses of the remotest kinds of risks," WHO reported:

"Those who regard themselves as guardians of the public safety must count not only the speculative hazards of these marginal situations, but also the costs to the public health of impeding their investigation."

"This partly voluntaristic [recommended] approach will not satisfy a demand for absolute assurance that no foolish experiment is ever attempted. But the history of human institutions should suffice to show that no system of sanctions can have such a perfect outcome." [11]

These were the WHO's reservations to safeguarding hazardous gene research despite the fact that the one who brought the issue of increasing security to the floor of WHO debate was Professor Lederberg. The world renowned geneticist, Lederberg, at the time, was serving as a member of the WHO's Advisory Committee on Medical Research. [13]

The Proponents of CBW Research

My computer search also revealed that though opponents of CBW research appeared to outnumber proponents by at least three to one, the typical BW advocacy position was expressed in numerous publications.


Donald McCrary in Science, for instance, wrote:

"What is apparently overlooked and totally ignored by these petitioners is that [the war in Vietnam] ... is not an academic exercise divorced from life and death. It is a very real exercise in how to achieve a goal, however distasteful, with a minimum of casualties among our own combat personnel. I believe that any technique, weapon, tactic, or strategy that will minimize casualties among our combat personnel is right, and any technique, tactic, or strategy that preserves the combat effectiveness of our opponent is wrong." [14]

But in March 1970, even WHO consultants noted that all biological agents permit the danger that if a disease capable of spreading widely is produced, it may get out of control and become "a source of disaster to the attacker as well as the attacked."

"The viral infections suitable for use in warfare include yellow fever, tick-borne encephalitis, Japanese encephalitis, dengue, Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE), chikungunya, O'nyongnyong, Rift Valley fever, influenza, and small-pox. Tick-borne encephalitis may be taken as an example of the agents belonging to this group. Susceptibility is almost universal, and the ease with which the Far Eastern virus can be grown in the laboratory and its high infectivity and lethality by the aerosol route make it likely that a case fatality rate of 25% would be achieved..."

"The attacking country could, of course, attempt to protect itself, e.g., by immunization, but... more virulent forms of the organism concerned might develop or the massive doses used might be such that ordinary levels of immunity would be useless.

Thus it is possible that biological agents may be used tactically, rather than strategically, to achieve the simultaneous infection of key groups of people, and the military consequences might well be of major importance... A decision to develop chemical and biological weapons implies that they will ultimately be used." [emphasis added]

The consultants even predicted "a virulent mutant" that could "spread rapidly to produce an uncontrollable epidemic on a large scale." In addition, they warned, if mutants were deliberately produced, there was the "ever-present risk of an accidental escape." [15]


Psychosocial Consequences

WHO consultants additionally predicted grave psychosocial consequences of such an escape, including mass hysteria:

"They thus present a real danger that is conducive to both anxiety and fear. Anxiety in particular may result from the fact that many chemical and all biological agents are undetectable by the senses, so that there are no warning signs to enable people to defend themselves. In addition, with biological agents, there is the latent period between infection and illness and the fact that the extent to which an infection may spread through a community is unpredictable. As a result, an exposed person cannot be sure whether he has been infected or know how ill he will be or when the danger has passed. A further confusing factor is that many of the symptoms of illness are also symptoms of emotional stress." [15]

That sounded remarkably similar to the "fear of AIDS epidemic" I had frequently written and talked about. [l6-I8]


In the event of an attack, the researchers added:

"Panic... may be so great that... those who have not been affected will view those who have as potential agents of disease. The response to a chemical or biological attack may require precautionary or other measures on such a scale that extraordinary means of social control will have to be introduced and these may remain in force long after the need for them has passed. Thus, an attack may lead to social changes out of all proportion to the actual damage done."

Isn't that interesting, I thought. They even predicted social changes like the need to legislate AIDS as a disability rather than a disease, and requiring infection control measures that have yet to prove their value in saving costs or lives. WHO consultants further predicted that the masses would try to avoid anything that would bring them in contact with deadly germs.


Much of this avoidance was expected to be disproportionate to the actual risk. In my role as a health professional AIDS educator, I recalled several similar experiences. One had occurred a few weeks earlier following a television interview in Rockford, Illinois. A viewer called me at the station to express her concern about leaving her house. The last time she went shopping, she said a storekeeper handed her a box of laundry detergent. She noticed a few cuts on his hands and refused to touch him or the box.


She just panicked, left the store, and hadn't gone shopping since.

"Even though casual contact can't transmit HIV," I said to the station receptionist, "people are still afraid-especially of shaking hands with AIDS patients or HIV carriers."

Exactly what was predicted, I reflected. Besides this, the consultants even envisioned extensive health and medical emergencies as a consequence of a biological attack, "including mass illnesses, deaths, and epidemics."


They expected that,

"WHO might be called upon to furnish technical assistance in dealing with allegations that chemical or biological weapons had been used... and in achieving disarmament." [15]

The authors concluded:

"As long as research on the military use of chemical and biological agents is continued... new agents of even greater destructive power [may be discovered]... It is clear, therefore, that the best interests of all Member States, to say nothing of mankind in general, require that the development and use of chemical and biological agents as weapons of war be outlawed in all circumstances. The nations of the world must renounce the use of such weapons, in accordance with the resolutions on chemical and biological warfare adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the World Health Assembly." [15]

Sadly, I realized, their notice fell before blind eyes. Army medical scientists allegedly wanted vaccines and diagnostic methods developed quickly in the event of a viral attack. [19] Between 1967 and 1968, the Johnson administration languished amid cries for America's withdrawal from Vietnam. Richard Nixon was then propelled to the White House and soon thereafter, toward détente. Superficially, under Nixon, the world seemed safer. But in the viral research laboratories of the NIH, the "cold war" raged.


During this time, the NCI, under NIH administrative direction, provided the CDC with prototype "reagents" - viruses, vaccines, antibodies, and cell lines - as the American and international viral research program advanced. [21-23]

Who Bit First, the Texan or the Simian?

Once we considered the cold war climate in which bioweapons research advanced, we reviewed the WHO's written accounts of the NIH's and NCI's primary role in manufacturing human "prototype" viruses, including new strains of simian viruses, for world distribution and testing. [21-23]


In 1969, the WHO Chronicle reported:

"Representative working stocks and... [vaccines] for the various viruses are being prepared and tested. The distribution of these reagents will be through WHO or the National Institutes of Health, or on their instructions. Obviously certain limitations must be imposed on distribution, as it will be impossible to produce sufficient amounts of the reagents to send them out indiscriminately.


Reference reagents also have been prepared in the centre [the WHO immunology laboratories at Lausanne], as well as in other cooperating laboratories under the auspices of the Research Reference Reagents Branch and National Cancer Institute, U.S. National Institutes of Health, [emphasis added] for many of the prototype human viruses and, to a more limited extent, for simian viruses. Reagents prepared against newly recognized simian viruses will be distributed only to recognized investigators in primate research." [21]

Another WHO report added:

"As additional means of providing advanced training, three meetings on the joint activities of WHO virus reference centers and national virus laboratories have been held, one in Atlanta in 1967, one in Prague in 1968, and one in Dakar in 1968. At these meetings most of the time was devoted to laboratory bench work. They were designed not only to disseminate information on recent advances and on new techniques but also to foster closer relations between regional reference centers and national laboratories." [23]

"Isn't that nice," Jackie observed, "'closer relations' and germ warfare method and material exchanges between NATO allies and communist bloc countries at the height of the cold war," After another hour of reading, Jackie said "I'm going to bed. Are you coming?"


"Wait till you read this," I replied, "Haven't you had enough for one day?"


"You know the theory that a simian monkey bite caused an African to get AIDS," I said, "well here's a report by two doctors from San Antonio that suggests that the simian may have first been bitten by a Texan,"


"What?" I showed her the article and pointed to the section that explained that in 1969, WHO encouraged researchers to use simian monkeys as "animals phylogenetically close to man," [21]

They recommended establishing,

"bio-medical systems that will permit the evaluation of different zoonoses [infections or infestations shared in nature by man and lower animals to] ... yield information on human disease," [21]


"WHO scientists were concerned about the potential risks of introducing 'a new group or species' of such animals into research since this might be 'potentially dangerous' for both the animals and the investigators," I explained, "They noted that an 'exchange of organisms' might occur from the laboratory into nature affecting both animals and man that, 'in most instances, result in in apparent and latent infections rather than in overt illness,' Here, read this,"


"No, I'm tired, Read it to me in bed," We marched off to the bedroom, got settled, and then I began to read, "It says here that 'overt human and non-human illness is possible,' as it apparently occurred with 'Herpesvirus simiae disease, Yaba-like disease, and hemorrhagic disease, the outbreak in Germany associated with African green monkeys, and the spread of a number of bacterial infections,' " [21]


"This is nightmare material," Jackie protested, "Wait," I continued to read:

"The importance of such occurrences is enhanced by the fact that simians come from diverse geographical areas. A possibility exists, therefore, that new and exotic agents may be transported internationally, introducing an unrecognized clinical syndrome into the animal colonies and perhaps into the human population as well. Thus, while the use of non-human primates in certain experimental studies is to be commended, disregard for the potential problems would be foolhardy indeed." [21]

"The report goes on to say that despite their concerns, the authors reported working with various governmental agencies as well as commercial firms to obtain 'reference seed virus and specific antisera' for dozens of monkey types and related diseases. With funding from the NIH and methods and materials from the NCI, the doctors continued to grow their simian monkey viruses until the WHO ordained them the 'WHO Collaborating Laboratory on Comparative Medicine: Simian Viruses.' They're located at the Southwest Foundation for Research and Education [currently called the Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research]."


"Listen to their 'specific aims:'"

  1. the development of a working repository for simian viruses

  2. the provision of a source of reagents such as certified reference seed virus strains and specific antisera

  3. the provision of consultation services, including serum survey data, on the existence of antibody to various viruses of human and simian origin in various genera and species of primates

  4. the provision of diagnostic services, including the identification and characterization of viruses for primate research workers unable to identify isolates obtained from their primates (this would also include screening for human viruses)

  5. the provision of information and the organization of exchanges of organisms between primate centers and other health organizations

  6. the training of interested students in virological laboratory procedures associated with primate investigations. [21]

"And here again, they stated they received their 'working stocks' of viruses and antisera from the NIH's Research Reference Reagents Branch as well as from the NCI, and that they were now creating their own new forms of viruses and vaccines."


"Sounds like a 'clearinghouse' for simian viruses," Jackie responded with one eye open. "Just what the world needed. Now can we go to sleep."


"Not yet. Consider the financial payoff. They already acknowledged working with private companies. In the late 1960s and early 1970s they stockpiled everything that might be needed, and undoubtedly lucrative, in the event of a future simian virus outbreak. They clearly acknowledged the Marburg virus outbreak in Europe and Africa as a sign of times to come. It also says they would continue their 'present cooperation with investigators using primates in cancer studies.'


"What's interesting," I continued, "is that they blamed the monkeys for transmitting these newly discovered viruses which they most plausibly isolated, cultured, and then inoculated into the animals. Here's how they closed:"

"Perhaps it should be reemphasized that there is a very practical, important side to this programme. Recent outbreaks of human and simian disease in several centers handling simians indicate that these animals are responsible for the transmission of the etiological agents." [21]

"How treasonous," Jackie chuckled. "The monkeys asked to be jailed so they could later be held responsible for their crimes against humanity. How dare they transmit deadly viruses back to the humans who were infecting them."


I joined in the comic relief. "Yeah. Maybe instead of three monkeys symbolizing denial, it should be three NCI virologists with their eyes, ears, and mouths covered.


"The last thing it says is that:"

"It is highly probable that more such incidents can be expected. The work to be done at the centre will do much to evaluate and elucidate the situation, and the centre may be called upon for assistance." [21]

"That's the best example I think I've ever heard of successful entrepreneurs creating their own niche market," Jackie chided.

Early Cancer Research Under WHO

The next morning after getting Alena, now three, off to day care, Jackie and I reviewed the last of the WHO's viral research reports. We immediately learned that the WHO's intensified interest in viruses dated from around 1950 with the initiation of their "smallpox eradication programme." Initially, a number of countries "generously donated smallpox vaccine to the WHO Special Account for Smallpox Eradication," and by 1971, more than 37 million doses had been distributed with Russian contributions outpacing America's by more than two-to-one. [29]


Yet, despite such international investments, the mammoth undertaking, we learned, returned only mixed results since many vaccinated countries experienced repeated outbreaks of deadly smallpox. [25-29]  Besides smallpox, the WHO Chronicle stated the importance of viral infections on cancer as early as 1965. The WHO's Scientific Group on Viruses and Cancer met in Geneva that year to plan a common research agenda. The Group, comprised of international representatives, including three from the United States and one from Russia, cited the need to study viruses since cancer cells maintained altered genetic material. [30,31]


Consequently, they recommended attempts be made "to determine the structural alterations in cellular nucleic acids," that is, the basic chemical building blocks of all life. They desired to search for all parts of the virus genome, the genetic makeup or reproductive blueprint of the viruses, their chemical reaction triggers, or enzymes, or other "virus-associated intracellular substances."


They ordered study of the "specific changes in the metabolism" of virus infected cells, and wrote:

"Any genetic structure peculiar to viruses suspected of causing cancer should be identified and mapped out. Immunological methods might prove of value, since virus-transformed cells carry antigenic [that is, foreign chemical] markers... A rust step in such research would be to induce transformation [cancers] in various experimental animals with viruses that commonly infect man..." [30]

"The Group also suggested that, although there is no reason at present to suspect transmission of animal cancer viruses to man, any possible relationship that might exist between bovine [cow] lymphosarcoma [cancer of the lymphatic cells and tissues] or other mammalian leukemias and human leukemia should be explored, both by epidemiological studies and by laboratory research on suspected etiological agents." [31]

"That's exactly what Strecker alleged brought on the AIDS epidemic," I said.

Could this research have really created HIV and AIDS-related diseases like lymphomas and sarcomas?

Hot Viruses During the Cold War

It soon became obvious that by the late 1960s, the WHO's viral research program shifted into hyperdrive. [32-35] After reading several papers about their major advances, my attention focused on additional written confirmation of the USPHS's and the NCI's leading role in the WHO's viral and cancer research program. Perhaps not coincidentally, at the exact time the DOD petitioned Congress to fund their AIDS-like virus project, the WHO announced its center for viral research and development was the NCI. [36-39]


By 1968 - ten years into their viral research program - the NCI and WHO reference centers in Copenhagen, Denmark, and Lausanne, Switzerland, had served as authorized technical advisers and suppliers of "prototype virus strains, diagnostic and reference reagents [e.g., antibodies], antigens, and cell cultures" [22] for more than "120 laboratories in 35 different countries." [23]


Within a year of this announcement, this number increased to "592 virus laboratories... [O]nly 137 were outside Europe and North America." [24]


Over these twelve months, four of the most active centers, including the CDC and NCI, distributed,

"2,514 strains of viruses, 1,888 ampoules of antisera mainly for reference purposes, 1,274 ampoules of antigens, and about 100 samples of cell cultures." [22]

More than 70,000 individual reports of virus isolations or related serological tests had been transmitted through the WHO network. [23]

"This sounds like something out of a James Bond novel." Jackie responded. "I expect to read the word SPECTRE any minute now."

Instead, we read that the NIH in Bethesda and the National Communicable Disease Center in Atlanta, the predecessor of the CDC, had made great progress in testing vaccines produced in large quantities in horses.


We soon learned that the horses were actually stabled and tested in Frederick, MD at Fort Detrick, America's premier biological weapons testing center.


[1] Langer E. Chemical and biological weapons: Once over lightly on Capitol Hill. Science 1967. 156;778:1073-5.

[2] Anonymous. War on chemical and biological warfare. Nature 1968 218;145:905-6.

[3] Lesse S. Editorial: Poison and the United States Public Health Service-a study of medical perversion. American Journal of Psychotherapy 1975;29;4:463-5.

[4] Beckwith J. Science for the people. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1972 196;4:236-40.

[5] Anonymous. Can biological war be stopped? Nature 1968219;155:665-6.

[6] Crozier D. and Woodward TE. Report on research activities of the Commission on Epidemiological Survey. Military Medicine 1967 132;8:609-13.

[7]Wallach DP. Deterrent value of CB research. Science 1968 161;842:631.

[8] Lederberg J. Biological warfare: a global threat. American Scientist 197159;2:195-7.

[9] Anonymous. The biological bomb. Lancet 1968;1;540:465.

[10] Staff writer. War on chemical and biological warfare. Nature 1968;218:905-906.

[11] The incomplete reference was given as "Hersh SM. Chemical and biological warfare. Indianapolis, N.Y., 1968.

[12] Anonymous. Control of microbiological warfare. The Lancet 1968;2;564:391.

[13] World Health Organization. Biomedical research: WHO's commitments examined. WHO Chronicle 1975;29:417-422.

[14] McCrary DI. Letter to the Editor: Moral issues of CB warfare. Science 1967 156;780:1307-8.

[15] WHO Group of Consultants. Chemical and biological weapons: The hazard to health. WHO Chronicle 197024;3:99

[16] Horowitz LG, Lewis PL, and Cohen P. AIDS-related fear: Beliefs, attitudes and behaviors. Chicago Dental Society Review 1993;86;2:18-23.

[17] Horowitz LG and Kehoe L. Fear and AIDS: Educating the public about dental office infection control procedures. Journal of the American Academy of General Dentistry 1993;41 ;5:385

[18] Horowitz LG and Lipkowitz RD. Survey on AIDS, Fear and Infection Control: Attitudes affecting management decisions. Journal of Clinical Preventive Dentistry 1992;14;6:31-34.

[19] Crozier D and Woodward TE. Report on research activities of the Commission on Epidemiological Survey, AFEB. Military Medicine 1967 132;8:609-13.

[20] Covert NM. Cutting Edge: A history of Fort Detrick. Maryland 1943-1993. Fort Detrick: Head-quarters U.S. Army Garrison Public Affairs Office (HSHD-PA), 1993.

[21] Kalter SS and Heberling. The study of simian viruses. WHO Chronicle 1969;23;3:112-117.

[22] World Health Organization Report. Communicable diseases in 1970: Some aspects of the WHO programme. WHO Chronicle 1971;25;6:249-255.

[23] World Health Organization Report. Five years of research on virus diseases. WHO Chronicle 196923;12:564-572.

[24] World Health Organization Report. Recent work on virus diseases. WHO Chronicle 1974;28:410-413.

[25] World Health Organization Report. Communicable diseases in 1970: Some aspects of the WHO programme. WHO Chronicle 1971;25;6:249-255.

[26] World Health Organization Report. The smallpox eradication programme. WHO Chronicle 1968 22;8:354-362.

[27] World Health Organization Report. Smallpox eradication: the first significant results. WHO Chronicle 196923;10:465-476.

[28] World Health Organization Report. The smallpox eradication programme. WHO Chronicle 1975 29:134-139.

[29] World Health Organization Report. The eradication of smallpox. WHO Chronicle 1968. 22;12:523-527.

[30] In other words, cancerous cells that have been presumably "transformed" by viral infections can be identified by specific foreign proteins (called antigens). Interestingly, The Group noted that these foreign proteins may enter a cell and thus be demonstrated regardless of the species or animal used as an infected host.

[31] WHO Scientific Group on Viruses and Cancer (1965) Report, Geneva (Wid Hlth Org. techno Rep. Ser., 1965, No. 295).

[32] Mathews AG. WHO's influence on the control of biologicals. WHO Chronicle 1968;23;1:3-15.

[33] WHO Scientific Group on Human Viral and Rickettsial Vaccines. WHO Chronicle 1966 20;7:255-261.

[34] Gillette R. VEE Vaccine: Fortuitous Spin-off from BW Research. Science 1971 ;173;995:405-8.

[35] WHO Respiratory and Enterovirus Centres. WHO Chronicle. 197428:410-413.

[36] The Directors of WHO Respiratory and Enterovirus Centres. Recent work on virus diseases. WHO Chronicle 1974;28:410413.

[37] Tyrrell DAJ. The common cold research unit: WHO International Reference Centre for respiratory virus diseases. WHO Chronicle 1968;22;1:8-11.

[38. Kalter SS and Heberling RL. The study of simian viruses-work of the WHO collaborating laboratory on comparative medicine: Simian viruses. WHO Chronicle 1969;23;3:112-117.

[39] WHO Report (Based on the 1969 report The medical research programme of the World health Organization, 19641968, Geneva.) Five years of research of virus diseases. WHO Chronicle 1969;23;12:564-572.

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