by Gordon Corera

page last updated 10 November 2008
BBC News Security Correspondent, Northern Greenland

from BBC Website


The United States abandoned a nuclear weapon beneath the ice in northern Greenland following a crash in 1968, a BBC investigation has found.

Its unique vantage point - perched at the top of the world - has meant that Thule Air Base has been of immense strategic importance to the US since it was built in the early 1950s, allowing a radar to scan the skies for missiles coming over the North Pole.

The Pentagon believed the Soviet Union would take out the base as a prelude to a nuclear strike against the US and so in 1960 began flying "Chrome Dome" missions. Nuclear-armed B52 bombers continuously circled over Thule - and could head straight to Moscow if they witnessed its destruction.

Greenland is a self-governing province of Denmark but the carrying of nuclear weapons over Danish territory was kept secret.


'Darker story'

But on 21 January 1968, one of those missions went wrong.

We reunited two of the pilots, John Haug and Joe D'Amario, 40 years on to tell the story of how their plane ended up crashing on the ice a few miles out from the base.

In the aftermath, military personnel, local Greenlanders and Danish workers rushed to the scene to help.

Eventually, a remarkable operation would unfold over the coming months to recover thousands of tiny pieces of debris scattered across the frozen bay, as well as to collect some 500 million gallons of ice, some of it containing radioactive debris.

A declassified US government video, obtained by the BBC, documents the clear-up and gives some ideas of the scale of the operation.

The high explosives surrounding the four nuclear weapons had detonated but without setting off the actual nuclear devices, which had not been armed by the crew.

The Pentagon maintained that all four weapons had been "destroyed".

This may be technically true, since the bombs were no longer complete, but declassified documents obtained by the BBC under the US Freedom of Information Act, parts of which remain classified, reveal a much darker story, which has been confirmed by individuals involved in the clear-up and those who have had access to details since.

The documents make clear that within weeks of the incident, investigators piecing together the fragments realized that only three of the weapons could be accounted for.

Even by the end of January, one document talks of a blackened section of ice which had re-frozen with shroud lines from a weapon parachute.

"Speculate something melted through ice such as burning primary or secondary," the document reads, the primary or secondary referring to parts of the weapon.

By April, a decision had been taken to send a Star III submarine to the base to look for the lost bomb, which had the serial number 78252. (A similar submarine search off the coast of Spain two years earlier had led to another weapon being recovered.)

But the real purpose of this search was deliberately hidden from Danish officials.

One document from July reads:

"Fact that this operation includes search for object or missing weapon part is to be treated as confidential NOFORN", the last word meaning not to be disclosed to any foreign country.

"For discussion with Danes, this operation should be referred to as a survey repeat survey of bottom under impact point," it continued.



But the underwater search was beset by technical problems and, as winter encroached and the ice began to freeze over, the documents recount something approaching panic setting in.

As well as the fact they contained uranium and plutonium, the abandoned weapons parts were highly sensitive because of the way in which the design, shape and amount of uranium revealed classified elements of nuclear warhead design.

But eventually, the search was abandoned. Diagrams and notes included in the declassified documents make clear it was not possible to search the entire area where debris from the crash had spread.

We tracked down a number of officials who were involved in dealing with the aftermath of the incident.

One was William H. Chambers, a former nuclear weapons designer at the Los Alamos nuclear laboratory who once ran a team dealing with accidents, including the Thule crash.

"There was disappointment in what you might call a failure to return all of the components," he told the BBC, explaining the logic behind the decision to abandon the search.

B52 bomber
The US was flying so-called Chrome Dome missions over Greenland


"It would be very difficult for anyone else to recover classified pieces if we couldn't find them."

The view was that no-one else would be able covertly to acquire the sensitive pieces and that the radioactive material would dissolve in such a large body of water, making it harmless.

Other officials who have seen classified files on the accident confirmed the abandonment of a weapon.

The Pentagon declined to comment on the investigation, referring back to previous official studies of the incident.

But the crash, clear-up and mystery of the lost bomb have continued to haunt those involved at the time - and those who live in the region now - with continued concerns over the environmental and health impact of the events of that day in 1968.



The Story of America's Missing Nuclear Bomb





The Case of The "Missing" Nukes
by minidish
12 January 2008

from YouTube Website

A Minot-assigned bomber inadvertently carried five nuclear warheads during a cross-country flight to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana on August 30th 2007, raising concerns about weapons safety and accountability.

There's something a bit strange about this Drudge-trumpeted story, concerning the Air Force's "temporary loss" of five nuclear warheads. As reported by the Military Times papers, the warheads were mounted on advanced cruise missiles being flown by a B-52 bomber from Minot AFB, North Dakota to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. Both Minot and Barksdale are B-52 bases; the movement is part of an effort to decommission 400 of the cruise missiles.


The warheads were supposed to be removed before the missiles left Minot, but the error wasn't discovered until the "Buff" touched down in Louisiana last Thursday.

According to the Times, that left the weapons "unaccounted for" during the 3 1/2 hour flight from North Dakota to Louisiana. However, that's a specious claim, at best. As Air Force spokesman Lt Col Ed Henry noted, the weapons were in the service's custody and control at all times. He also reported that all other nuclear weapons at Minot have been accounted for.

What's more disconcerting is the (apparent) break-down in the nuclear chain of custody. Readers of my profile know that I spent portions of my career around nukes, both as an operational intelligence officer and a targeteer. My duties didn't involve the actual handling or loading of those weapons, but you learned quickly that nukes are governed by a completely different set of rules, for obvious reasons.


Those regulations are strictly enforced, with "no tolerance" for mistakes.

First, nuclear weapons are segregated from "ordinary" munitions, with additional layers of security and access control. All personnel involved in the protection, storage, handling and loading of the weapons are carefully vetted through the military's Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). Anyone whose loyalty, judgment or stability comes into question loses their PRP certification, and they're no longer allowed to work around nuclear weapons.

Other safeguards are built into the system as well.


There's a very tight chain of control; the device is literally "signed for" at every step of the journey from the weapons storage area to the aircraft, and the two-man "rule" is strictly enforced. An individual pilot or load crew member is never allowed to "control" the weapon on the ground.


In combat, the pilot of a single-seat fighter would be permitted to launch with a nuclear weapon - and use it in combat - but only if the pilot was certified for the mission, and the "tasking" had been properly authenticated through the chain of command, beginning with the President, or in tactical scenarios, the theater commander - under authority granted by the POTUS.

MSNBC is now reporting that a B-52 squadron commander at Minot has been relived of his duties, because the service has "lost confidence" in his ability to handle nuclear weapons.


That move is hardly surprising, given the obvious emphasis that the Pentagon places on nuclear safety and control. And, it's likely that other heads will roll as the Air Force continues its investigation. As we noted in the preceding paragraphs, the movement, loading and protection of nuclear weapons is a carefully regulated process, involving a number of specialists.


All could be found culpable in this incident.

But that still doesn't explain how nuclear-tipped cruise missiles were loaded onto a B-52, flown 1450 miles across the United States, and the mistake wasn't discovered until the bomber reached its destination in Louisiana.


With most of the Advanced Cruise Missile fleet (AGM-129) is being retired from operational service, we can assume that Minot crews had been through this drill before. Remove the warhead from the missile, then fly the inert weapon to Barksdale for decommissioning. Retiring the warhead - if that's part of the plan - entails a separate (and completely different) process which does not require a B-52 flight.

Given the elaborate safeguards, security procedures and chain-of-control associated with nuclear weapons, it's difficult to fathom how five warheads made their way onto that Buff and they weren't noticed until it arrived at Barksdale.


It would be interesting to know how the 5th Bomb Wing (Minot's B-52 unit) fared on its last Nuclear Surety Inspection (NSI), which evaluates unit procedures for controlling, handling and safeguarding those weapons.


Other related reports:



The Case of the "Missing" Nukes
by minidish
January 12, 2008

from YouTube Website