The Future Is Calling
His name is Colonel Edward Mandell House. House was never in the military. The title of Colonel was honorary, granted by the Governor of Texas in appreciation for political services. He was one of the most powerful men in American politics and, yet, virtually unknown to most Americans today. He was the personal advisor to Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt. He was close to the Morgan banking dynasty and also to the powerful banking families of Europe.
He attended school in England and surrounded himself with Fabians. His father, Thomas, was an exporter in the Southern states and also a lending agent for London banks, which preferred to remain anonymous. It was widely believed that he represented the Rothschild consortium. Thomas House was one of the few in the South who emerged from the War Between the States with a great fortune. Colonel House was what they called a “king maker” in Texas politics. He personally chose Woodrow Wilson, the most unlikely of all political candidates, and secured his nomination for President on the Democratic ticket in 1912.
It was House who convinced the Morgan group, and others with power in politics and media, to throw their support to Wilson, which is what enabled him to win the election and become the 28th President of the United States. House was certainly a member of the Round Table and possibly a member of its inner circle. He was a founder of the CFR.
Dru’s socialism, of course, was the Fabian version. It was to have gentle and humane qualities to soften its impact and set it apart from the Leninist version called Communism.
1 Philip Dru, Administrator (New York: Angriff Press, 1912) p. 45.
Speaking through the fictional character of Senator Selwyn, House says:
He seldom takes the trouble necessary to form the Government to suit his views.
The truth is he has no cohesive or well-digested views, it being too much trouble to form them; therefore, some such organization as ours is essential.1 Philip Dru foments civil war, leads an uprising against the old order, captures control of the government, becomes a dictator with the grateful support of the people, is given the title Administrator of the Republic, scraps all constitutional restrictions against government power, establishes a progressive income tax, creates a national banking cartel, 2 annexes Canada, conquers Mexico, invites European nations to participate in world government, and ushers in a glorious new age of collectivism.
This was not just a fictional story for entertainment. House described this book as an expression of his own “ethical and political faith.”3 The reason this is important is that the ethical and political faith of Col. House now is the ethical and political faith of American leadership - and it started with Woodrow Wilson.
In his memoirs, President Wilson said:
George Viereck was an admiring biographer of Colonel House and approved of almost everything his did. This is what Viereck said:
pp. 199, 200.
Charles Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (New York:
Houghton Miffflin Co., 1926), Vol. 1, p.114.
THE WAR TO MAKE THE WORLD SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY
As we contemplate a member of the Rhodes secret society, occupying two rooms in the White House, virtually in control of American foreign policy, our time machine finally brings us to World War I.
Since our main topic today is war, we must prepare now to comprehend the events we are about to see in terms of the strategy for using war to smash the world to bits and then remold it closer to the hearts desire. The sinking of the Lusitania was the event that, more than any other, motivated the American people to accept the necessity and the morality of getting into World War I. Prior to that time, there was great reluctance to participate in a war that had little to do with
The House of Morgan was happy to do that, and it floated approximately $1.5 billion in war bonds on behalf of England and, to a lesser extent, for France. Morgan was also the contract agent for these countries when they purchased materials and supplies from American firms.
That means he had a wonderfully profitable revolving door in which he received a piece of the action as the money went out of the country as loans and again, when it came back into the country, for the purchase of materials.
But on the American side, there was a different agenda. What would happen to that $1.5 billion in war loans if Britain and France lost the war? The only time war loans are repaid is when the nation borrowing the money wins the war. Losers don’t pay off their bonds. So Morgan was in a terrible fix. Not only were his friends in England in dire danger, he and all his investors were about to lose $1.5 billion! A very serious situation, indeed.
Page sent a telegram to the State Department, and this is what he said,
Money was not the only motivator for bringing the United States into war.
We must not forget that the American players in this drama dreamed of world government based on the model of collectivism, and they saw war as a great motivator to move society in that direction.
They looked forward to the creation of the League of Nations when the fighting was over and knew that the only way for the United States to play a dominant role in shaping that world body was to be a combatant.
The only ones who divide the spoils of war are the victors who fight the war, and it was that reality that fired the imaginations of House, Wilson, and even J.P. Morgan.
Colonel House became the coordinator for all of them. He went back and forth across the Atlantic and consulted with the Round Tables in both England and America. He arranged a secret treaty on behalf of President Wilson to bring the United States into the War.
The reason for secrecy was that the Senate would never have approved it. There was still strong public opposition to war and, had it been revealed that Wilson was engaging in a secret - and unconstitutional - treaty to get the U.S. into war, it would have been politically disastrous to his Administration.
J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page (Garden City,
NY: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1923), p. 11 (Internet edition),
How did they do it? How did these wolves in sheep’s clothing maneuver the United States into war?
It was not easy, and it came about only after extensive planning. The first plan was to offer the United State as a negotiator between both sides of the conflict. They would position the U.S. as the great peacemaker. But the goal was just the opposite of peace. They would make an offer to both sides that they knew would not be acceptable to Germany.
Then, when the Germans rejected the offer, they would be portrayed in the press as the bad guys, the ones who wanted to continue the war. This is how the plan was described by Ambassador Page in his memoirs. He said:
AGGRAVATE, INSULATE, FACILITATE
They were: aggravate, insulate, and facilitate.
The merchant ship would be expected to stop its engines and it would be given time for the crew to get into lifeboats before the ship was sunk. It was a small humanitarian gesture in the middle of warfare.
That is the way it was done until Churchill, as Lord of the Admiralty, ordered all merchant ships, regardless of circumstances, to steam full speed directly toward German submarines in an attempt to ram and sink them. This eliminated the distinction between merchant ships and war ships. From then on, all merchant ships had to be considered as war ships, and Germany abandoned the policy of firing warning shots.
When that happened, those seeking to bring the United States in the war had a heyday.
Editorializing through the British and American press, they said:
Churchill ordered British ships to remove their names from the hulls and to fly the flags of neutral nations, especially the American flag, so the submarine captains couldn’t tell what nationality the ships really were.
He wanted Germans to torpedo American ships by accident. It was his strategy to do whatever possible to bring the United States into war, and the sinking of an American ship would be an excellent way of doing so.2
by Viereck, pp. 112–113.
There was plenty of goading from the America side as well. The United States government consistently violated its own neutrality laws by allowing war materials to be sent to Britain and France. Munitions and all kinds of military-related supplies were blatantly shipped on a regular basis. In fact, the Lusitania, on the day it was sunk, was loaded with military arsenal.
The Germans knew all along that this was going on. The people in Washington knew it as well. By openly violating their own neutrality laws, they were doing everything possible to aggravate Germany into an attack.
They placed an advertisement in fifty newspapers, mostly along the eastern seaboard, warning that the Lusitania would be in danger, that it was heading into hostile waters, and that Americans should not be on board. The U.S. State Department contacted all fifty of those newspapers and strongly requested them not to publish the ad, implying that there would be dire consequences if they did. Several papers defied the government and published the ad anyway - which is why we know about it today.
Most passengers never saw it.
That means to make it easy for the enemy to strike and be successful. On the morning of the sinking of the Lusitania, Colonel House was in Britain and recorded in his diaries that he spoke with Sr. Edward Gray and King George. They calmly discussed what they thought the reaction of the American people would be if the Lusitania were to be “accidentally” sunk.
This is what Colonel House wrote:
Four hours after that conversation, the Lusitania entered the war zone where German submarines were known to be active.
Designed and built by the British to be converted into a ship of war, if necessary, she had four boilers, was very fast, and could outrun a submarine. That means she was vulnerable only to subs that were ahead of her path, not those to the side or behind. This greatly improved her chances for survival, especially with a military escort running ahead.
However, this was not to be her destiny. On this voyage she had been ordered to turn off one of her boilers. She was running on three turbines instead of four. At only 75% speed, she was now vulnerable to attack from all sides. The Juno was a British destroyer that had been assigned to escort her through those dangerous waters. At the last minute, the Juno was called back by the British Admiralty and never made its rendezvous.
By the end of the war, $9.5 billion had been sent to the Allies and applied to the Morgan Debt.
We must add to that the infinitely higher cost of American blood sacrificed on the alter of collectivism in a war supposedly to make the world “safe for democracy.” It’s a twist of irony that the world really was made safe for democracy - when one realizes that the word democracy is a synonym for one of the pillars of collectivism.
It is the embodiment of the concept that the group is more important than the individual, and it is that rationale that allowed Round Table members on both sides of the Atlantic to plot the death of innocent civilians as a small price to pay for the greater good of the greater number.
The parallels to World War I are striking. Britain, again, was losing the war with Germany. The president of the United States, again, was a collectivist surrounded by Fabians and Leninists. The primary difference was that the center of gravity in the CFR was swinging away from the Morgan group and toward the Rockefeller group. Other than that, things were pretty much the same.
Colonel House was still a presidential advisor, but his rooms at the White House now were occupied by Harry Hopkins. Hopkins was not a collectivist agent of the Fabians; he was a collectivist agent of the Soviets.
The American people were still opposed to war; and, once again, there were secret arrangements at the highest levels of government to maneuver the United States into war without the voters suspecting it. The strategy was to get the Axis powers to strike first, all the while convincing the American people that their leaders were opposed to war. It was almost an exact repeat of the ploy used in World War I.
FDR repeated that pledge many times, all the while working behind the scenes to get the United States into war. The President’s speechwriter at that time was Robert Sherwood, who later became a famous author and playwright.
On this topic, Sherwood said:
Sherwood said that, while they were discussing the contradiction between the President’s words and his deeds, Roosevelt replied:
1 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Bantam Books, 1948, 1950), Vol.1, pp. 235, 247.
There, in a single sentence, was the basic strategy. If the United States could become the victim of an attack, then the American people would respond to patriotic instincts and clamor for war. The only question remaining was how to bring this about.
At the end of World War II, he was among those who were imprisoned and sentenced to death at the Nuremberg Trials for war crimes. The prison psychologist was Gustave Gilbert, a German-speaking intelligence officer in the U.S. military.
In his book, Nuremberg Diaries, Gilbert describes a conversation with Goering in which he explained this classic hallmark of collectivism:
As FDR was deceiving the voters about his war plans, the American and British military staffs were meeting secretly in Washington D.C., working out the details of a joint strategy.
They planned, not only how to get the United States into the war, but how to conduct the war afterward. The resulting agreement was called the ABC-1. It was incorporated into a Navy war plan and given the code name Rainbow Number Five.
We now have a great deal of information on this plan although, at the time, it was highly secret. The key for getting into the war was to maneuver the Axis powers to strike first to make it look like the U.S. was an innocent victim. Their first hope was that Germany would attack. If that didn’t work, the fallback plan was to provoke Japan.
This policy was summarized in a memorandum to FDR by Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations.
1 G.M. Gilbert, Nuremberg Diaries (New York: Farrar, Straus and Co., 1947), pp. 278, 279.
Sherwood, Vol. 1, p. 461.
When Germany refused to take the bait, he ordered U.S. ships to actually get into the middle of sea battles between British and German war ships. The strategy was simple. If you walk into the middle of a barroom brawl, the chances of getting slugged are pretty good.1
Ten days later, FDR delivered his annual Navy Day speech in Washington and said:
When it became known that the Kearny had aggressively sought combat, the public lost interest, and FDR dropped the rhetoric. It was time to involve Japan, and it was clear that the drama had to involve more than one ship.
Fehrenbach, F.D.R.’s Undeclared War 1939 to 1941 (New York: David
McKay Company, 1967), pp. 252–259.
3 Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress (Washington, D.C., 1946), Part 11. p. 5421, as cited by Prang. The reference is Part 11, p. 5433, as quoted by Kimmel, p. 1. Also quoted by Stinnett but with no reference, p. 179.
How was it done? It was accomplished exactly as in World War I: aggravate, facilitate, insulate.
For many years, the government denied any knowledge of the impending Japanese attack.
But, gradually, the pieces of the puzzle began to bubble up out of the mire of secrecy and, one by one, they have been assembled into a clear picture of the most monstrous coverup one can possibly imagine. The smoking gun was discovered in 1995. Author Robert Stinnett found a memo in the Navy Archives written by Lt. Commander Arthur McCollum, who was assigned to Naval Intelligence. The memo was dated October 7, 1940.
It was directed to two of FDR’s top naval advisors: Captain Dudley Knox and Capt. Walter Anderson, who was head of Naval Intelligence. This memo was approved by both men and forwarded to FDR for action. The full text is now public information, and a photo of it appears in Stinnett’s book, Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Peal Harbor.1
The McCollum memorandum contained an eight-point plan of action to implement a two-point strategy.
The two points were:
At the conclusion of the last point of strategy, the memorandum said:
B. Stinnett, Day of Deceit; The Truth about FDR and Peal Harbor (New
The necessity to insulate the victims from any foreknowledge of the attack was not mentioned in the memorandum, but it was not necessary to do so. Obviously, this plan could not succeed if the targeted victims were warned in advance. So, once again, there was the familiar strategy: aggravate, facilitate, and insulate.
Consider these facts.
In other words, the strategy advanced by Lt. Commander McCollum was followed in every detail. There was a deliberate assault against Japan’s economy and an insult to her national honor.
This was the logical consequence of its ideology of barbarism in which might makes right. However, we must not lose sight of the role played by American leaders embracing the ideology of collectivism.
It was a case of one totalitarian ideology goading another totalitarian ideology into a war that supposedly would lead to the greater good of the greater number.
There is massive evidence to support that conclusion, but we have time here for only a few examples. A Japanese spy by the name of Tadashi Morimura was sent to Pearl Harbor under the cover of a phony political assignment at the Japanese embassy. The FBI knew that his real name was Takeo Yoshikawa and that he had been trained as a military officer. He had no political experience, so they knew his assignment to a political post was a cover. They photographed him as he came off the ship.
They tracked him everywhere he went. They bugged his telephone. They knew what he was doing every minute of the day.
Often he would take a car to the top of a hill overlooking the harbor and photograph the location of ships. Then he would use a clandestine radio to send coded messages to Japan giving the exact grid locations for all the ships, the times of their movements, how many soldiers and sailors were on duty, what time they reported, and what time they left the base. All of this information was clearly of military importance and pointed to the possibility of a surprise attack.
The FBI wanted to arrest Yoshikawa and send him home, but the Office of Naval Intelligence intervened, with White House approval, saying:
J. Edgar Hoover, who was head of the FBI at that time, objected strongly, and it almost erupted into a contest of inter-agency authority between the FBI and Naval Intelligence. In the end, Naval Intelligence had its way, and Yoshikawa was allowed to continue his mission without even knowing he was being watched.1
Just four days before the attack, U.S. Navy Intelligence intercepted this message from Yoshikawa:
On December 6, just one day before the attack, this message was intercepted:
It was bizarre. Here was an enemy agent gathering strategic information in preparation for a surprise attack on American forces, and people at the highest levels of the United States government were protecting him.
They deliberately allowed the flow of information to continue so the Japanese would be successful in their mission.
For many months, the Navy had known from what direction the Japanese were likely to approach, what sea corridor they would use to launch their attack. They even had conducted maneuvers simulating it themselves. One was called Exercise 191 and the other OPORD1.
Because of weather patterns, sea currents, location of commercial ship lanes, demand on fuel supplies, and other factors, they knew that the Japanese would approach from the North Pacific Ocean in an operational area between 157 and 158 degrees west longitude.3
This presented a special challenge. If the crew of any ship had seen a Japanese armada steaming toward Hawaii, they undoubtedly would have used the radio to send word ahead.
They would have said:
That, of course, would have spoiled everything. Also, if the Japanese knew that their approach had been detected, they would have lost the advantage of surprise and might have aborted their plan. American intelligence was well aware of every stage of Japanese preparations.
It was already known that Admiral Nagumo was outfitting his carrier strike force at Hitokappu Bay on the Japanese island of Etorofu. His progress was monitored closely, and daily reports were sent to Washington. His ships departed from Japan and headed for Pearl Harbor on November 25.4
the complete story, see Stinnett, pp. 83–118. Also John Toland,
Infamy (New York:
Within hours, Navy headquarters in Washington initiated the Vacant Seas directive that all military and commercial ships must now stay out of the North Pacific corridor.
They were diverted hundreds of miles on a trans-Pacific route through the Torres Straits so there would be no encounter that might alert the intended victims or cause the Japanese to abort their mission.1
The next stage in the strategy was to bring the ships of the 7th Fleet home from sea duty and bottle them up inside Pearl Harbor. That would make them easy targets because they couldn’t maneuver. To accomplish this over the strong objection of Admiral Kimmel, who was in charge of the Fleet, his superiors in Washington cut back on deliveries of fuel. Without fuel, Kimmel had no choice.
He had to curtail training exercises at sea and bring his ships back into port.
In his memoirs, published in 1955, he said:
A Congressional investigation in 1946 revealed that, just a few days before the attack, Navy headquarters in Washington ordered twenty-one of the most modern ships in the 7th Fleet to leave Pearl Harbor and deploy at Wake and Midway Islands.
The aircraft carriers, Lexington and Enterprise were among those ships. This not only left the remaining Fleet with drastically reduced protection, it also meant that the ships anchored in the harbor were primarily old relics from World War I, many of which were already slated to be scrapped.
As Secretary of War Stimson had stated in his diaries:
Sacrificing only the old and marginally useful ships was the solution to that problem.3
The answer to that question is not a pleasant one.
Stinnett, pp. 44, 144, 145.
For three months prior to the allegedly surprise attack, Navy Intelligence knew everything in minute detail. Yet, not one of those messages was ever sent to the commanders at Pearl Harbor.1
In his memoirs, Admiral Kimmel said:
The most important intercept of the Japanese coded messages was obtained on the night before the attack.
That message made clear even the exact hour that the strike would come. It was to be 1:00 PM Washington time. The intercept was decoded 6½ hours before that. It was rushed to President Roosevelt and his top military advisors for immediate action. Their response was to do absolutely nothing. They sat on it and deliberately let the clock run out.3
The military Chief of Staff at that time was General George Marshall, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Marshall claimed that he was on horseback that morning, riding in the park. The reason he did not take immediate action, he said, was that he didn’t know about the intercept until he arrived at his office at 11:25 A.M. However, even then he still had 1½ hours before the attack.
He could have picked up the telephone and spoken to the Hawaii commanders directly. He could have used any one of several military radio systems designed for exactly such kinds of urgent communications, but he did none of those things. According to witnesses, he read and re-read the intercept and shuffled the paper from one side of his desk to the other while another half hour ticked away. Then, at 11:52, he finally sent a warning to the commanders at Pearl Harbor. The method?
It was a commercial telegram sent through Western Union! It arrived six hours after the attack! 4
1 There was a serious disagreement between Admiral Richard Turner and his staff over this very issue. When Captain Alan Kirk, Chief of Naval Intelligence, objected to withholding the intercepted messages from Kimmel and Short, he was relieved of his command. See Toland, pp. 57–60.
Kimmel, pp. 2,3.
4 Stinnett, pp. 225–237. Also Toland, pp. 10, 11.
AN ACT OF STATESMANSHIP
For many years after World War II, Roosevelt’s admirers denied that neither he nor anyone in his administration had prior knowledge; but the evidence now is so clear that he even facilitated the attack, no one tries to deny it anymore.
The new line of defense is that he was justified in doing so. It was an act of great statesmanship, you see, because, otherwise, Europe would have been overrun by Hitler and, eventually, even the United States might have been attacked. Furthermore, we had a moral obligation to come to the aid of our British and French brethren.1
It took great courage and wisdom, they say, for Roosevelt to foresee this and confront totalitarianism before it became stronger. The American people were too stupid to realize how important it was. They were too ignorant to understand. They were too isolationist in their thinking to realize they must accept a leadership role in the affairs of the world.
So, what is a collectivist to do? You can’t leave it to the ignorant voters to decide such important matters.
There was no choice but to lie, to deceive the American people, and ruin the careers of loyal military officers by making them scapegoats. We had to violate our Constitution and our laws.2 It was statesmanship to kill thousands of Americans in order to bring the stupid voters to the correct point of view. Don’t you see? The only way to stop totalitarianism in Europe was to establish totalitarianism in America.
One of the men who made sure that Admiral Kimmel and General Short never knew about the decoded Japanese messages was Lieutenant Commander Joseph Rochefort, head of the Navy’s Mid-Pacific Radio Intelligence Network.
Rochefort got right to the point. He said:
1 That part is true, but it was an individual moral obligation, not a group obligation. In other words, anyone who felt deeply about this was perfectly free to go to Europe and volunteer for the British or French armies or to organize a volunteer American brigade, but no one had the right to use force of law to conscript others into the American armed services and send them into battle for that purpose. It is important to note that none of the master planners of this infamy ever felt a moral obligation to put themselves into combat. That honor was reserved for others.
2 Unfortunately, it is sometimes necessary to ignore laws in time of war, especially in the heat of battle, but the purpose of these deeds was not to win a war, it was to get into a war. The difference is as night unto day.
Stinnett, p. xiii. It is undoubtedly because of this message that
Stinnett’s book was accepted for publication by Simon and Schuster
and given wide distribution. Readers of the author’s book,
Creature from Jekyll Island: A Second Look at the Federal Reserve,
will recall a parallel situation in which Simon and Schuster
published Secrets of the Temple, by William Greider. Greider did an
excellent job of critiquing the Federal Reserve but, when it came to
offering a solution, his message basically was to relax and forget
about it. The Fed, he said, had made plenty of mistakes in the past,
but no sweeping reforms are needed. All we need, he said, are wiser
men to run it. It makes no difference if you expose a corrupt
monetary system if your solution is to do nothing about it. And it
makes no difference if you expose the infamy at Pearl Harbor if your
conclusion is that it was an act of statesmanship. Collectivists do
not care about how much the public knows if they have no realistic
plan of action to bring about change. That is why they offer false
leaders (including authors) who will point with alarm at the
problems of collectivism but then lead exactly nowhere.
Listen well, Ladies and Gentlemen. That is the voice of collectivism: 2,388 people killed, another 1,178 wounded5 - mostly Americans –and it’s a pretty cheap price to pay for unifying the country.
Anything can be justified merely by claiming that it is the greater good for the greater number.1
1 A significant portion of the financial support for Nazi industry, including military production, came from Wall Street investment houses controlled by CFR members and others who shared their collectivist mindset. For this part of the history, see the author’s World without Cancer; The Story of Vitamin B17, Part II (available from www.realityzone.com).
When it is realized how those collectivists in the United States who were beating the war drums against Hitler were also heavily investing in the Nazi war machine, it becomes even more clear that the war was not about stopping Hitler. It was about smashing the world to bits so it could be remolded to the heart’s desire. It is sad to realize that hundreds of thousands of Americans gave their lives in this war thinking they were fighting for freedom; but they were betrayed by their leaders.
The purpose of the war had nothing to do with freedom. It was a contest to determine which group of collectivists would dominate the world. Soldiers were pawns on the global chessboard. Their patriotism was used against them. They eagerly rushed into battle to defeat Nazism and Fascism, never suspecting they were fighting on the side of Fabianism and Leninism, forces that are essentially the same as those they fought.
As it was in WWI, the American leaders in World War II were focused far beyond the war itself.
Even before Pearl Harbor, Fabians and Leninists were drafting the structure for a world government. It was to be called the United Nations; and, at the end of the conflict, it would be offered to a war-weary world as “our last best hope for peace.” Most of this work was done in the State Department Post-War Foreign Policy Planning Division, under the direction of Alger Hiss, who actually was in both camps at the same time.
Not only was he an advisor to FDR and a former President of the Carnegie Endowment Fund (which puts him squarely in the Fabian camp), he also was an undercover agent for the Soviets. Hiss was the man who personally delivered the newly drafted UN Charter to the founding meeting of the United Nations in San Francisco, and he became the first Secretary General of that organization.
If you are wondering about the significance of these facts, it is this:
A surface view of World War II is that it was a struggle for freedom against totalitarianism.
A deeper and more realistic view is that it was a war between three branches of collectivism fighting for global dominance. The Fabians and Leninists teamed up against the Fascists (with the Japanese Imperialists as a tactical secondary target). The Fascist branch of collectivism was defeated. Ever since then, the world has been in the grip of a struggle between the two remaining branches. It is not a battle for freedom against totalitarianism.
It is a contest to see which branch of collectivism will rule the world. While that may have been difficult to see in the early stages of conflict, it is painfully obvious today.
The exact date is August 8. It is sixteen months after the Kennedy Administration had been embarrassed by a botched invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. We find ourselves now at the Pentagon, in the offices of General Lyman Lemnitzer who is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
We are watching as the general signs a top-secret document destined for the Secretary of Defense who, at this time is Robert McNamara, a member of the CFR. The most important 16 part of this document is contained in the Appendix to Enclosure A, and the subject line of that section reads: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba. In the eight pages that follow, there is a detailed proposal for a covert military action called “Operation Mongoose.”
Its purpose is to create an acceptable justification for the United States to invade Cuba. The preferred scenario is to convince the Cuban government that it is about to be attacked and, thereby, goad it into some kind of military action, which then could be pointed to as aggression against the U.S. It is the old, familiar strategy to AGGRAVATE an opponent into a first strike. If that should fail, the secondary scenario is to stage phony attacks against the American base in Guantanamo and against civilian commercial aircraft, making it look like the work of the Cuban military.
The strategy also calls for a U.S. fighter pilot to fake being attacked by Cuban MIGs and to radio that he has been hit and is going down. Then he is to fly to a secret installation where the tail number of his plane will be changed so the plane genuinely will be missing from the roster.
Meanwhile, a U.S. submarine is to disperse aircraft parts and a parachute into the waters near Cuba where they will eventually be found by search and rescue teams. In addition to these phony attacks, covert agents are to launch real terrorist attacks against civilians in Miami and Washington DC - with genuine casualties.
The plan is to make the U.S. appear to be a victim of unprovoked attacks by a ruthless enemy, and this will prepare world opinion to accept an all-out invasion of Cuba as justified retaliation. As we stand here listening to the details of this plan, we would find it impossible to believe that such treachery is actually being contemplated by high-ranking U.S. military officers - were it not for the fact that we are looking at the document with our own eyes.
By the way, Operation Mongoose has since been de-classified as a result of the Freedom-of-Information Act and, if you want to read it for yourself, it can be downloaded from the National Archives web site. 1
1 This document can be downloaded from http://www.archives.gov. Click on “Research Room,” then on “Archival Research Catalog (ARC),” then on the ARC SEARCH button, then type in “Northwoods” in the search box, then click on “Digital Copy Available” on entry #1. The key information will be found on images 136 through 142.
Here are a few excerpts taken from that document:
In action item number eight, Operation Mongoose proposed an incident designed to convince the world that Cuban MIGs had shot down a civilian commercial aircraft as it flew near Cuba on its way from the United States to someplace in South America.
It was to be a 18 chartered flight utilizing one of the air services in the Miami area that are secretly operated by the CIA. An aircraft at Elgin Air Force Base was to be painted and numbered as an exact replica of the commercial craft.
The duplicate would be substituted for the original and loaded with passengers who were carefully selected government operatives using false names. The original aircraft would be converted to a drone and flown by remote control.
The blueprint for Operation MONGOOSE is much too long to quote in its entirety, but I think this gives you a pretty good idea of its nature.
Even though the plan was never put into action, the fact that it was even theorized and sent to the Secretary of Defense with a recommendation for consideration is highly significant. Some will say that plans like this should be of no concern to us. They are just paper war games, and military people are expected to dream up all sorts of scenarios to cover every conceivable event so as to have a prepared response ahead of time no matter what happens.
That may be true, but Operation Mongoose is not in that category. It is not a plan to react to an aggressive move by a potential enemy. It is a plan to be the aggressor, and to conceal that fact from the world. It undoubtedly was justified by the argument that Communist Cuba is a threat to the security of the American people, and whatever it takes to eliminate that threat is acceptable.
It is a classic example of collectivist morality, a philosophy that declares anything to be ethical so long as it can be said to be for the greater good of the greater number.
We will not be conquered by enemies from abroad but we
will be enslaved by enemies from within.
– End of Part 3 –