
	October 2004
	
	from
	PBS 
	Website
	
	 
	
		
			| 
			 
			Donald Rumsfeld's contentious 
			battle inside the Pentagon to reshape the way America's military 
			thinks and fights.  | 
		
	
	
	 
	
	
	With the United States Army deployed in a dozen hotspots around the world - on 
	constant alert in Afghanistan and taking casualties almost every day in 
	Iraq - some current and former officers now say the army is on the verge of 
	being broken. 
	
	 
	
	The man responsible, according to those officers, is a 
	secretary of defense who came into the Pentagon determined to transform the 
	shape of the military. 
	
	In "Rumsfeld's War," FRONTLINE and The Washington Post join forces for the 
	first time to investigate Donald Rumsfeld's contentious battle with the 
	Pentagon bureaucracy to assert civilian control of the military and remake 
	the way America fights.
	
	This report traces Donald Rumsfeld's career from his time as an adviser to 
	President Nixon to his rise as the oft-seen and well-known face of the 
	George W. Bush administration during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
	
	 
	
	In 
	interviews with key administration officials, military leaders, and 
	reporters from The Washington Post, the documentary examines how a secretary 
	of defense bent on reform became a secretary of war accused of ignoring the 
	advice of his generals.
	
		
		"He came in determined to reassert civilian control over the Joint Staff and 
	the rest of the military and it was a pretty tough process, a lot of 
	friction in those first months, with Rumsfeld saying, 'No, I don't think you 
	heard me clearly. I'm the boss. I want it this way,'" reporter Thomas Ricks 
	of The Washington Post tells FRONTLINE.
	
	
	In the early months of the Bush administration, Rumsfeld saw his biggest 
	enemy as the outdated Cold War thinking of the troops he commanded. 
	
		
		"Donald Rumsfeld wanted to build a smaller, nimbler, and more networked military 
	that could respond swiftly to threats anywhere in the world. He came into 
	the Defense Department where the forces were heavy and slow, took months to 
	deploy and worked best when used in massive numbers," says Professor John 
	Arquilla of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
	
	
	Former Secretary of the Army Thomas White says that when Rumsfeld tried to 
	push for a reduction in the number of troops in the army, the secretary 
	found himself clashing with General Eric Shinseki, the army's respected 
	Chief of Staff.
	
		
		"There were very strongly held views, myself and General Shinseki and others 
	in the room, that this was not the right answer," White says of one meeting 
	with Rumsfeld. 
		 
		
		"The secretary, he just got up and walked out, which was a 
	signal to all of us that he wasn't terribly happy with the results of the 
	meeting."
	
	
	To the Pentagon generals, Rumsfeld's sharp elbows and strong views on the 
	military came across as insulting. 
	
	 
	
	But those who know him best say that Rumsfeld's unorthodox style is hardly a surprise. 
	
	 
	
	Robert Ellsworth, longtime 
	friend, former ambassador to the UN and also former deputy to Rumsfeld, says 
	that as a wrestler in college, Rumsfeld learned to always stay on the move.
	
		
		"He has a very sharp tongue as well as sharp elbows. And he knows how to use 
	salty language. And he didn't hold back even against these senior 
	bureaucrats, senior officers. He let them have it because he was in a 
	hurry," Ellsworth says.
	
	
	By the eve of 
	September 11, 2001, Rumsfeld's sharp tongue and tough attitude 
	had gotten him into plenty of fights and created a number of enemies.
	
		
		"Inside the beltway, there are all these discussions about `Well, who's 
	going to be the first cabinet secretary to leave this administration?'" 
	defense analyst Andrew Krepinevich tells FRONTLINE. 
		 
		
		"And the early betting 
	line is it could be Don Rumsfeld. And of course then 9/11 happens, and as 
	the saying goes `That changes everything.'"
	
	
	As the United States prepared to respond to the attacks of September 11, 
	Rumsfeld pushed a reluctant military to think unconventionally about going 
	to war in Afghanistan. 
	
	 
	
	Dissatisfied with the plan for a large-scale invasion 
	that he received from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Rumsfeld turned to 
	the Pentagon's Special Operations forces.
	
		
		"He is willing to start military operations in Afghanistan before most of 
	the military thinks that we're ready to do so. And [a] small number of 
	special forces soldiers combined with CIA support for indigenous Afghan 
	resistance forces brings about spectacular results," Krepinevich says.
	
	
	When the president's attention turned towards Iraq, Rumsfeld pushed his war 
	planners to think outside the box. 
	
	 
	
	Emboldened by his success in Afghanistan, 
	the secretary once again pushed aside Pentagon critics and demanded an 
	unconventional war plan.
	
		
		"Rumsfeld thinks you can re-invent [the] war plan," The Washington Post's 
	Bob Woodward tells FRONTLINE, "And anything that smacks of the old way or 
	something that looks conventional to him, he asks questions about. Doesn't 
	necessarily oppose it, but will ask questions about it, and is looking to 
	make this quicker, with less force and with less casualties."
	
	
	Now, the secretary's critics allege that Rumsfeld's push for unconventional 
	thinking effectively marginalized advice about troop strength, post-war 
	planning, and the treatment of prisoners.
	
		
		"I think to a degree, he's stubborn. Being stubborn, holding to your 
	convictions is good to a point, but when the evidence around you indicates 
	your position is not tenable, then you ought to start adapting to the 
	situation," says retired USMC Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper.
	
	
	That stubbornness, some officers say, led Rumsfeld to put the military in 
	the difficult position of fighting in simultaneous conflicts against an 
	unconventional enemy. 
	
	 
	
	With mounting casualties in Iraq and without a clear 
	exit strategy in either Iraq or Afghanistan, Rumsfeld's critics charge the 
	secretary has pushed too far. The danger, they say, is a military incapable 
	of effectively fighting the next major conflict.
	
	Former CENTCOM Commander-in-Chief General Joseph Hoar (Ret.) tells 
	FRONTLINE, 
	
		
		"Today we find over fifty percent of the United States Army, the 
	regular army, ten divisions, committed overseas. It's not sustainable."
	
	
	Rumsfeld, however, has stood firm in his assessment that U.S. fighting 
	forces are more than capable of handling these or future conflicts, recently 
	telling the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee that with over 2.5 million 
	Americans already enlisted, the military's problem is management of 
	resources, not recruitment.
	
	 
	
	 
	
	 
	
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