Eisenhower’s 1954 Meeting With Extraterrestrials
by Michael Salla
The uncertainty over the motivations and behavior of the
extraterrestrials appears to have played a large role in the
government decision not to disclose the extraterrestrial presence
and the treaty Eisenhower signed with them.
passage from an ‘alleged official document’ leaked to UFO
researchers describes the official secrecy policy adopted in April
1954, two months after
Eisenhower had ‘First Contact’ with
extraterrestrials who were spurned by the Eisenhower
Any encounter with entities known to
be of extraterrestrial origin is to be considered to be a matter
of national security and therefore classified TOP SECRET (click
Under no circumstances is the general public or
the public press to learn of the existence of these entities.
The official government policy is that such creatures do not
exist, and that no agency of the federal government is now
engaged in any study of extraterrestrials or their artifacts.
Any deviation from this stated policy is absolutely forbidden.
Penalties for disclosing classified
information concerning extraterrestrials are quite
In December 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued
Army-Navy-Air Force publication 146 that made the unauthorized
release of information concerning UFOs a crime under the
Espionage Act, punishable by up to 10 years in prison and a
Robert Dean, this draconian
penalty is what prevents most former military servicemen from
coming forward to disclose information.
Special Operations Manual 1-01
Special Operations Manual 1-01 - Part 1
During a visit to Washington, D.C.
I stopped off at Richard Hall’s home and during my stay
there he showed me a copy SOM 1-01. I noticed a number items in
the publication atypical and unusual in military writings.
The next day I discussed this manual with Don Berliner. Since it
appeared to have the US Army seal on the cover, I urged him to
send it to the Army for security determination which I thought
might prove very interesting; especially any comments they might
make. He said he had given it to the GAO Roswell investigators
and felt that was the best place to get further information on
Don Berliner can certainly speak for himself. However, my
impression was that his attitude towards the authenticity of the
manual was ambivalent. He had after all presented a talk at a
MUFON symposium about how a recovery team would retrieve crashed
Berliner mentioned that he had consulted with several experts
and came away with some conflicting opinions. (I didn’t
extensive notes at the time so I am relying on memory for the
following.) He asked someone from the government printing office
if they produced a manual like this and was told that it
appeared a sloppy job, but it well might have come from them. He
consulted some military officers about the manual, and they
disagreed about whether it could be authentic.
He had also asked
archivists at Carlisle Barracks about the manual, and they had
pointed out that the publications list in the manual was correct
for the date of the manual. However, just shortly after the
manual date the publications cited had changed, and the list
would have contained incorrect references just a month or so
Berliner and I heatedly disagreed about some of the problems in
the manual. He told me that the manual had come in the mail from
an unknown source. He did not feel that necessarily reflected on
the authenticity. He pointed out that the news media in
Washington, DC live on leaks. We also disagreed on the effect of
the espionage laws in this case.
He felt, as an aviation writer,
that he was a member of the press and had no responsibility to
try to help the authorities identify the source of the
document - which since purported to be a security document of the
US, a security violation had occurred.
The Special Operations Manual tells retrieval teams how to
conduct such operations. Manuals of this type would be used by
the commander or team leader (or whatever the designation) to
develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs),
Operational Plans (OPlans) which would contained
detailed instructions and tasks on retrieval, and Operation
Orders (OPORD), which would apply the plan to a
Oplans can easily become OPORDs. OPORD are
used in specific situations: if the thing came down in a swamp,
this would require special techniques and equipment and be
addressed in the OPORD. Of course, once the location is known,
the specifics of the area, (ie local population, terrain,
communication, etc., etc.) would be addressed in the OPORD.
To make sure that all necessary actions are accomplished
correctly, manuals are written to establish guidance and
It is too late when the event has taken place to
research what should be done. The guidance on this is set out
long in advance by people who careful consider all aspects of
the problem. This guidance is used to craft Oplans and OPORDs
for specific situations and develop training. When unforeseen
developments happen, there is feed back and the manuals are
revised as necessary.
Oplans and OPORDs address Administrative and Personnel, Security
and Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Communications and
Electronics and other areas of concern as necessary. (For
example all modern Oplans and ORORDs address Safety as a
separate area - not so, of course, in 1954.)
So any reviewer of this document should keep in mine that it
should establish minimal standards for the tasks and goals
Generally all publications in the military and other agencies
solicit recommendations for improvements and corrections of
errors. Drafts of new publications are generally sent to
activities having some interest or expertise on the subject for
coordination. Generally such coordinations improves the final
product. I worked in offices that received such publications and
from time to time and was tasked to critique these publications.
The result was a long list of discrepancies, errors, comments,
and recommendations which was submitted to the proponent agency.
I proposed to do such a review (a little less formal than when
it was an official duty) on SOM 1-01. Some of the
discrepancies, etc. are impossible to address since the manual
is fragmentary. However, they are included for future reference.
Items considered major discrepancies are indicated with an
A short analysis will be included at the end of the
list. (Page numbers are those in Berliner’s copy of the
Special Operations Manual 1-01 - Part 2
List of comments
* The word “RESTRICTED” is
placed on the cover. Restricted was a security
classification that was being phased in 1954. Restricted
Data (RD) and Formerly Restricted Data (FRD)
are used to refer to nuclear weapons data. Use of the word
RESTRICTED, therefore, causes confusion especially since the
cover is the only place it is used. Security regulations at
the 1954 do not have a special use for the word other than
those cited above. Nowhere in the text of the manual is this
The classification of “SOM 1-01”
on the cover is not indicated. (See below 6)
* The designation TO 12D1-3-11-1
is not explained anywhere in the manual. The Army and the
Air Force issued many joint manuals. The Army’s designation
would be TM (Technical Manual) and a series of
number (and sometime letters.) The Air Force designation TO (Technical Order) was also used in smaller
lettering/numbering as in this case. A research item would
be to look up the TO-12D1-3-11-1 in the index of Air Force
Technical Orders. (A prediction is that it will refer to an
unclassified packaging manual.)
What is the security
classification of “TO-12D1-3-11-1”? (See below 6)
What is the security
classification of the manual title? (See below 6)
There is no short title. The
security classification of numerical and title determine the
classification of documents that refer to these titles and
designations. To allow manuals to be cited in lower
classified security documents a “short title” either
unclassified or a lower classification is created. While
this procedure was not effective in 1954, a modification
should have been made later and added to the cover.
“Eyes Only” is not a security
classification. It is sometimes used as a communication
procedure and sometimes as custom in the military. It sounds
very “James Bond.” However, when used in communication it is
generally directed to one named individual. I would very
much like to see a security manual that covers “Eyes Only.”
There should be on the cover
somewhere “copy #---- of----copies.” This was a printed
manual. Each copy should be serial numbered. (See below 9)
* There is no Top Secret Control
Number. The US Army Europe Supplement to Army Regulation
380-5 has a good designation, not used universally
throughout the Army, Continuous Controlled Accountability
(CCA), but helpful in understanding the security
procedures for Top Secret and other specially classified
documents. Top Secret, Communication Security items such as
codes and key material (COMSEC), NATO Secret are CCA
documents. They must be individual accounted for (that means
control and serial numbers), an individual is always signed
for them, and they must be under control of that individual
or in an authorized security container.
In addition each person that
looks at a Top Secret document is required to sign a form
that he has read it. The argument has been made on this list
that Top Secret documents have been found in the archives
that do not have TS control number. This is argument by
exception and is meaningless. Such documents appear to be
security violations. A security violation does not negate
the regulation - it is a violation of the regulation. Just as
someone who commits murder but is never caught does not
negate the law against murder. Archived documents also have
to a certain extent been demilitarized or sanitized so the
argument does not necessarily apply. SM 1-01 does not appear
to be an archived document, but an active document. As such,
there were almost 40 years to correct this major deficiency,
but no one bothered.
This is extraordinary considering the almost constant
admonishment against security lapses in the manual itself.
The manual, issued by the
MAJESTIC--12 GROUP, has what appears to be an US Army seal.
Army manual from this period carried such seals.
The security warning appears to
be incomplete. Most - although I can’t say all - usually
enumerate the penalties for security violations.
There is not page count. Most,
not all manuals of this time would have a page count so the
accountable individual could easily verify that the manual
Special Operations Manual 1-01 - Part 3
List of comments (Continued)
There is no authentication page.
Now if this is an Army manual, as indicated by the seal,
there should be a page which states the manual is official
by the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of the Army and
countersigned or sealed by the Adjutant General’s office.
There is no page to register
changes to the publications.
On the content page: The
previous statements on the classification of the manual
designations, title and short title apply.
It is unusual to have the
Chapter 2 as the Introduction.
The text, paragraphs and titles
are not portion marked. This was not effective in 1954 but
should have been changed later to comply with current
regulations that require is paragraph - subparagraph to be
Majestic-12, Majestic 12 Group,
Majic 12, MJ-12 are not defined. Sometimes they are used
There is no glossary to define
these term listed in the Table of Content.
Paragraph (Para) 2, Chapter 1.
“MJ-12 takes the subject of the UFOBs...” Procedures require
that when an acronym is first used it is defined. (Comment
Para 2a, chapter 1. “The general
aspects of MJ-12 to clear up any misconception that anyone
may have.” This is a howler. Manual are published to
prescribe actions and set standards not “clear up
Para 3, Chapter 1. “Eyes Only”
previous comments apply. The classification of two points
above Top Secret is not defined here. A reference is not
given for the definition, and finally there is no official
publication that makes such a designation.
Para 4d, Chapter 1. “...secret
locations...” This could be confusing. The proper
terminology would be at... classified locations...
Para 6b, Chapter 2. Appendix I
contain a list of reference that is completely inadequate to
support this manual. (See below)
Para 6c, Chapter 2. Appendix II
is said to contain a list of Majectic--12 personnel. (Not in
the manual available to Berliner.) Note that nowhere is a
clear chain of command and support relationships discussed
for the MJ-12 teams
Para 7, Chapter 2. Forms and
Records. This Appendix (Ia) is not available in the Berliner
Par 12c, Chapter 3. “down
satellites” is listed as one of the cover stories. Since the
mission stated in paragraph 12, is a press blackout down
satellite in 1954 will not work. It will only reinforce the
press’s effort to get information. Arguments that there were
mystery satellites, searches for natural satellites, etc.
completely miss the point. A story from the military that
they were recovering a downed satellite in 1954 would cause
a sensation. There would be no possibility of a press
Para 13a, Chapter 3. The
solution to security concerns is to form a perimeter.
Maintaining a perimeter requires large number of personnel.
Are all these personnel to be cleared? Solution to this
problem of course well known to military personnel. Set up
an exclusion area within the perimeter. Keep all the unclear
military personnel out of the exclusion area. You can then
keep the number of cleared personnel to a minimum. Exclusion
areas are used for communication facilities, tactical
operation centers, command posts, nuclear weapons areas, and
actually ordinary crash sites. Seems unlikely that MJ-12
people couldn’t think of this.
Para 13ª, Chapter 3. Just what
type of electronic surveillance existed in 1954. Ground
radar. Then, maybe the manual should be included references
in Appendix 1. (See item 24.) However, I don’t think there
was really much in the way of electronic surveillance that
was effective in 1954.
Para 13ª, Chapter 3. Personnel
are going to be issued live ammunition for perimeter duty.
There is no discussion here of the use of deadly force. No
publications are cited. There are not regulations on the use
of the deadly force in Appendix I. There are no references
to qualifications with weapons. Neither are there an
publications cited in appendix I. This borders on gross
Para 13d, Chapter 3. Situation
Evaluation. What information does MJ-12 want and in what
format? Notice that is not discussed. Nor is there a
reference cited in Appendix I.
Para 13, Chapter 3. Under
“Secure the Area” no provisions are made to prevent
observation from the air. No provisions are made to prevent
observations from higher ground. Tentage and camouflage
would nets seem to be the answer. No guidance and no
Para 14ª, Chapter 3. How is the
site to be documented? Is aerial photography to be used? Is
a grid system to be established on the site? Is the area to
be surveyed in? No guidance, no publications which might
help are cited.
Para 14ª, Chapter 3. The area
will be checked for radiation. What type? What type of
monitoring equipment should be used? Should radiation
exposure records be kept on personnel? Should dosimeters
(sp?) be issued? Decontamination procedures and monitoring
of exposed personnel are not discussed. No guidance and no
publications are cited.
Para 14ª, Chapter 3. Check for
toxic agents. How? With what? What are recommended
procedure, protective clothing, decontamination procedures?
No guidance and no publications are cited.
Para 14ª, Chapter 3.
Documentation. It does not seem that the person who wrote is
familiar with Technical Intelligence procedures. (Maybe we
fell asleep in that class?) No forms, procedures, guidance,
or publications are cited.
Para 13ª, Chapter 3. No guidance
is given on special containers, material handle equipment,
etc. No publications are cited.
Para 14b, Chapter 3. No much is
said about “Red Team.” What support is required from the
site commander, etc.?
Para 14c, Chapter 3.
Contamination is mentions, but no protective gear or
procedures are recommended.
Para 15, Chapter 3. Cleansing
the Area. Extraterrestrial technology, in light of modern
technology, would be thought to included some very small
items. The method for cleaning the area is apparently visual
inspection. Should the soil be checked? Too what depth?
Should the top soil be striped and screened? There is no
guidance. Here is definitely a place where minimum standard
can and should be established. It is left to the discretion
of the officer in charge. The site commander should have the
area checked and certify in writing that nothing was left
Para 16, Chapter 3. Special or
Unusual Circumstances only anticipates a crash in a
populated area. There is a publications cited here. Once
again the “Eyes Only” comment applies. However, other
special situations like recovery from lakes, swamps,
mountain tops are not addressed.
Para 17, Chapter 3. This is not
a multipart serial numbered form. Even bills of lading were
that way in 1954.
Para 18ª, Chapter 3. Note once
again the idea of tagging each item as standard procedures
in technical intelligence is ignored.
Para 18, Chapter 3. A copy of
the inventory is not placed inside the inner box.
Para 18, Chapter 3. Packing of
unusual, toxic, liquid or other items is not discussed.
As there are several page
missing only packing is the inner box is described. In the
removal process procedures are from other wooden contains
are described in detail.
Chapter 4 talks about
Extraterrestrial Biological Entities (EBE). If alive, they
are to be handle by the OPNAC - BBS team which is never
explained. Nor is the type of support expected from the cite
Contact with EBE. Generally no
protective gear is recommend although it thought that they
there is a possibility of contamination.
Although the front of the manual
apparently has an Army seal, chapter 6 talks about squadrons
which expect for the calvary exist in the Air Force.
The Appendix on publications is
completely inadequate. See above.
Special Operations Manual 1-01 - Part 4
Finally, for a wrap up, some general comments.
Nowhere in this manual is the
prevention of taking souvenir discussed. If this is as
serious of as the manual says, everyone would deposit their
clothing in a container on leaving the exclusion area and a
body cavity search should be considered, and then receive
new clothing. For morale and dignity sake this could be part
of a “decontamination procedure.” (Unfortunate that the MJ12
personnel did think of an exclusion area, isn’t it?)
Those of you that have been in the military may remember
that as you left the firing range you came to inspection
arms in front of a commissioned officer and were required to
say, “No brass or ammo, sir.” You might have thought that
this was some quaint military ritual. However, as some
decided to disobey the written and verbal orders against
taking live or spent ammunition off the range would later
find out, this little exercise sealed their guilty at legal
proceedings. Of course, SOM 1-01 is much more
serious. So we probably would have each member of sign a
certificate that he did not remove anything.
There is a planning process for
military manuals. It is long and complicated. One of the
NCOs where I worked diagramed it out on a flow chart for a
presentation he was required to make. It stretched half way
around the room. SOM 1-01 would be one in a series of
planned manual since as can be seen from the foregoing the
operation is more complicated than meets the eye. In the
Appendix I we should see SOM 1-02, SOM 1-03, etc. with the
dreaded term everyone in the military hates “TBP” To be published. However, nowhere in the manual are
future publications mentioned.
One must remember that these guys are supposedly the best
and brightest and have unlimited “black” resources. If this
is the best they can do in the planning cycle, maybe it’s
time for the president to junk MJ-12.
The format of this manual is
sloppy. The way to get covered with spit and bad breathe is
to hand in a manual manuscript which has a section one, but
no section two or that has a subparagraph 21ª, but no 21b.
If the outline format does not have two items, then they are
not numbered. That is basic.
The manual fails to address what
the basic equipment each team should have. Specialized
equipment that might be required should be discussed. The
Appendix I should bulge out with references to authorization
documents, technical and field manuals. The location of
units and equipment that recovery teams can call on should
be discussed in the manual. (Dec 8, 1941 is too late!)
The manual fails to address the
composition of recovery teams: what specialties are
required, what certifications and credentials should they
have, what specialized team training is required, how will
this be done.
How does some one become an
MJ-12 team member. In the nuclear weapons program there is
the Personal Reliability Program (PRP). The
individual’s administrative, medical, dental, etc. status is
constantly screened. When you visit the dentist, the first
place to go after your return is to the commander’s office
(or the PRP officer if the commander is a full colonel.) and
tell him what treatment you received. The person’s
character, personnel status, any legal infractions are
All records of all PRP personnel
checked at least quarterly. SOM 1-01 is silent on this. If
you think about it, this program is more vital than nuclear
weapons. A break through in technology in this era means the
owner could rule the world. Of course, the PRP evolved over
the years. However, the start did exist in 1954. The
anticipated counter argument is that the individual will
received Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmentalize Information
(SCI) clearance and be indoctrinated into the program. Then
the old broken record starts up again: this should be
mentioned in the manual and Appendix I should reference
these documents concern SCI indoctrination.
The only operation that the
manual addresses in detail is the simple packing and
unpacking of material for routine military shipment. (BTW
Nowhere is the military specification -MIL-SPECS-
for the packing material discussed -i.e. material strength,
heat resistance, etc.- nor are the Federal Stock Numbers of
the packing material provided.....)
The most important thing about
this manual it fell out of the sky. It is supposedly written
by some of the best brains in the country or people who can
get the best brains. The military is in the middle of this,
but the manual is full of military gaffes. It was not sent
(that we know of) to Peter Jennings or Jack Anderson, but to
Don Berliner. So we are to believe that someone somewhere in
a highly classified facility risked it all to send to this
bomb shell to someone with little media influence.
Is it possible that this manual is
real? Possible yes, but highly unlikely.
How about an alternate more likely possibility. An Air Force
buck Sgt. with some intelligence training (but who probably fell
asleep in technical intelligence class) and some friends cut and
pasted this little number from a military packing manual. The
buck Sgt. was too young to have been around in 1954 so there are
so many anachronisms.
I have no proof, of course. Just a