April 1954

extracted from Eisenhower’s 1954 Meeting With Extraterrestrials by Michael Salla



The uncertainty over the motivations and behavior of the Grey extraterrestrials appears to have played a large role in the government decision not to disclose the extraterrestrial presence and the treaty Eisenhower signed with them.


The following passage from an ‘alleged official document’ leaked to UFO researchers describes the official secrecy policy adopted in April 1954, two months after Eisenhower had ‘First Contact’ with extraterrestrials who were spurned by the Eisenhower administration:

Any encounter with entities known to be of extraterrestrial origin is to be considered to be a matter of national security and therefore classified TOP SECRET (click below images).


Under no circumstances is the general public or the public press to learn of the existence of these entities. The official government policy is that such creatures do not exist, and that no agency of the federal government is now engaged in any study of extraterrestrials or their artifacts. Any deviation from this stated policy is absolutely forbidden.

Penalties for disclosing classified information concerning extraterrestrials are quite severe.


In December 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Army-Navy-Air Force publication 146 that made the unauthorized release of information concerning UFOs a crime under the Espionage Act, punishable by up to 10 years in prison and a $10,000 fine.


According to Robert Dean, this draconian penalty is what prevents most former military servicemen from coming forward to disclose information.














Special Operations Manual 1-01

by Jan Aldrich

Dec 1996

from VirtuallyStrange Website

recovered through WayBackMachine Website



Special Operations Manual 1-01 - Part 1

During a visit to Washington, D.C. I stopped off at Richard Hall’s home and during my stay there he showed me a copy SOM 1-01. I noticed a number items in the publication atypical and unusual in military writings.

The next day I discussed this manual with Don Berliner. Since it appeared to have the US Army seal on the cover, I urged him to send it to the Army for security determination which I thought might prove very interesting; especially any comments they might make. He said he had given it to the GAO Roswell investigators and felt that was the best place to get further information on it.

Don Berliner can certainly speak for himself. However, my impression was that his attitude towards the authenticity of the manual was ambivalent. He had after all presented a talk at a MUFON symposium about how a recovery team would retrieve crashed saucers.

Berliner mentioned that he had consulted with several experts and came away with some conflicting opinions. (I didn’t extensive notes at the time so I am relying on memory for the following.) He asked someone from the government printing office if they produced a manual like this and was told that it appeared a sloppy job, but it well might have come from them. He consulted some military officers about the manual, and they disagreed about whether it could be authentic.


He had also asked archivists at Carlisle Barracks about the manual, and they had pointed out that the publications list in the manual was correct for the date of the manual. However, just shortly after the manual date the publications cited had changed, and the list would have contained incorrect references just a month or so later.

Berliner and I heatedly disagreed about some of the problems in the manual. He told me that the manual had come in the mail from an unknown source. He did not feel that necessarily reflected on the authenticity. He pointed out that the news media in Washington, DC live on leaks. We also disagreed on the effect of the espionage laws in this case.


He felt, as an aviation writer, that he was a member of the press and had no responsibility to try to help the authorities identify the source of the document - which since purported to be a security document of the US, a security violation had occurred.

The Special Operations Manual tells retrieval teams how to conduct such operations. Manuals of this type would be used by the commander or team leader (or whatever the designation) to develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), Operational Plans (OPlans) which would contained detailed instructions and tasks on retrieval, and Operation Orders (OPORD), which would apply the plan to a specific operation.


Oplans can easily become OPORDs. OPORD are used in specific situations: if the thing came down in a swamp, this would require special techniques and equipment and be addressed in the OPORD. Of course, once the location is known, the specifics of the area, (ie local population, terrain, communication, etc., etc.) would be addressed in the OPORD.

To make sure that all necessary actions are accomplished correctly, manuals are written to establish guidance and standards.


It is too late when the event has taken place to research what should be done. The guidance on this is set out long in advance by people who careful consider all aspects of the problem. This guidance is used to craft Oplans and OPORDs for specific situations and develop training. When unforeseen developments happen, there is feed back and the manuals are revised as necessary.

Oplans and OPORDs address Administrative and Personnel, Security and Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Communications and Electronics and other areas of concern as necessary. (For example all modern Oplans and ORORDs address Safety as a separate area - not so, of course, in 1954.)

So any reviewer of this document should keep in mine that it should establish minimal standards for the tasks and goals planned.

Generally all publications in the military and other agencies solicit recommendations for improvements and corrections of errors. Drafts of new publications are generally sent to activities having some interest or expertise on the subject for coordination. Generally such coordinations improves the final product. I worked in offices that received such publications and from time to time and was tasked to critique these publications. The result was a long list of discrepancies, errors, comments, and recommendations which was submitted to the proponent agency.

I proposed to do such a review (a little less formal than when it was an official duty) on SOM 1-01. Some of the discrepancies, etc. are impossible to address since the manual is fragmentary. However, they are included for future reference. Items considered major discrepancies are indicated with an asterisk *.


A short analysis will be included at the end of the list. (Page numbers are those in Berliner’s copy of the document.)


Special Operations Manual 1-01 - Part 2



List of comments

  1. * The word “RESTRICTED” is placed on the cover. Restricted was a security classification that was being phased in 1954. Restricted Data (RD) and Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) are used to refer to nuclear weapons data. Use of the word RESTRICTED, therefore, causes confusion especially since the cover is the only place it is used. Security regulations at the 1954 do not have a special use for the word other than those cited above. Nowhere in the text of the manual is this use addressed.

  2. The classification of “SOM 1-01” on the cover is not indicated. (See below 6)

  3. * The designation TO 12D1-3-11-1 is not explained anywhere in the manual. The Army and the Air Force issued many joint manuals. The Army’s designation would be TM (Technical Manual) and a series of number (and sometime letters.) The Air Force designation TO (Technical Order) was also used in smaller lettering/numbering as in this case. A research item would be to look up the TO-12D1-3-11-1 in the index of Air Force Technical Orders. (A prediction is that it will refer to an unclassified packaging manual.)

  4. What is the security classification of “TO-12D1-3-11-1”? (See below 6)

  5. What is the security classification of the manual title? (See below 6)

  6. There is no short title. The security classification of numerical and title determine the classification of documents that refer to these titles and designations. To allow manuals to be cited in lower classified security documents a “short title” either unclassified or a lower classification is created. While this procedure was not effective in 1954, a modification should have been made later and added to the cover.

  7. “Eyes Only” is not a security classification. It is sometimes used as a communication procedure and sometimes as custom in the military. It sounds very “James Bond.” However, when used in communication it is generally directed to one named individual. I would very much like to see a security manual that covers “Eyes Only.”

  8. There should be on the cover somewhere “copy #---- of----copies.” This was a printed manual. Each copy should be serial numbered. (See below 9)

  9. * There is no Top Secret Control Number. The US Army Europe Supplement to Army Regulation 380-5 has a good designation, not used universally throughout the Army, Continuous Controlled Accountability (CCA), but helpful in understanding the security procedures for Top Secret and other specially classified documents. Top Secret, Communication Security items such as codes and key material (COMSEC), NATO Secret are CCA documents. They must be individual accounted for (that means control and serial numbers), an individual is always signed for them, and they must be under control of that individual or in an authorized security container.


    In addition each person that looks at a Top Secret document is required to sign a form that he has read it. The argument has been made on this list that Top Secret documents have been found in the archives that do not have TS control number. This is argument by exception and is meaningless. Such documents appear to be security violations. A security violation does not negate the regulation - it is a violation of the regulation. Just as someone who commits murder but is never caught does not negate the law against murder. Archived documents also have to a certain extent been demilitarized or sanitized so the argument does not necessarily apply. SM 1-01 does not appear to be an archived document, but an active document. As such, there were almost 40 years to correct this major deficiency, but no one bothered.

    This is extraordinary considering the almost constant admonishment against security lapses in the manual itself.

  10. The manual, issued by the MAJESTIC--12 GROUP, has what appears to be an US Army seal. Army manual from this period carried such seals.

  11. The security warning appears to be incomplete. Most - although I can’t say all - usually enumerate the penalties for security violations.

  12. There is not page count. Most, not all manuals of this time would have a page count so the accountable individual could easily verify that the manual was complete.


Special Operations Manual 1-01 - Part 3

List of comments (Continued)

  1. There is no authentication page. Now if this is an Army manual, as indicated by the seal, there should be a page which states the manual is official by the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of the Army and countersigned or sealed by the Adjutant General’s office.

  2. There is no page to register changes to the publications.

  3. On the content page: The previous statements on the classification of the manual designations, title and short title apply.

  4. It is unusual to have the Chapter 2 as the Introduction.

  5. The text, paragraphs and titles are not portion marked. This was not effective in 1954 but should have been changed later to comply with current regulations that require is paragraph - subparagraph to be classified individually.

  6. Majestic-12, Majestic 12 Group, Majic 12, MJ-12 are not defined. Sometimes they are used interchangeable.

  7. There is no glossary to define these term listed in the Table of Content.

  8. Paragraph (Para) 2, Chapter 1. “MJ-12 takes the subject of the UFOBs...” Procedures require that when an acronym is first used it is defined. (Comment 19 applies)

  9. Para 2a, chapter 1. “The general aspects of MJ-12 to clear up any misconception that anyone may have.” This is a howler. Manual are published to prescribe actions and set standards not “clear up misconceptions..”

  10. Para 3, Chapter 1. “Eyes Only” previous comments apply. The classification of two points above Top Secret is not defined here. A reference is not given for the definition, and finally there is no official publication that makes such a designation.

  11. Para 4d, Chapter 1. “...secret locations...” This could be confusing. The proper terminology would be at... classified locations...

  12. Para 6b, Chapter 2. Appendix I contain a list of reference that is completely inadequate to support this manual. (See below)

  13. Para 6c, Chapter 2. Appendix II is said to contain a list of Majectic--12 personnel. (Not in the manual available to Berliner.) Note that nowhere is a clear chain of command and support relationships discussed for the MJ-12 teams

  14. Para 7, Chapter 2. Forms and Records. This Appendix (Ia) is not available in the Berliner material.

  15. Par 12c, Chapter 3. “down satellites” is listed as one of the cover stories. Since the mission stated in paragraph 12, is a press blackout down satellite in 1954 will not work. It will only reinforce the press’s effort to get information. Arguments that there were mystery satellites, searches for natural satellites, etc. completely miss the point. A story from the military that they were recovering a downed satellite in 1954 would cause a sensation. There would be no possibility of a press blackout.

  16. Para 13a, Chapter 3. The solution to security concerns is to form a perimeter. Maintaining a perimeter requires large number of personnel. Are all these personnel to be cleared? Solution to this problem of course well known to military personnel. Set up an exclusion area within the perimeter. Keep all the unclear military personnel out of the exclusion area. You can then keep the number of cleared personnel to a minimum. Exclusion areas are used for communication facilities, tactical operation centers, command posts, nuclear weapons areas, and actually ordinary crash sites. Seems unlikely that MJ-12 people couldn’t think of this.

  17. Para 13ª, Chapter 3. Just what type of electronic surveillance existed in 1954. Ground radar. Then, maybe the manual should be included references in Appendix 1. (See item 24.) However, I don’t think there was really much in the way of electronic surveillance that was effective in 1954.

  18. Para 13ª, Chapter 3. Personnel are going to be issued live ammunition for perimeter duty. There is no discussion here of the use of deadly force. No publications are cited. There are not regulations on the use of the deadly force in Appendix I. There are no references to qualifications with weapons. Neither are there an publications cited in appendix I. This borders on gross negligence!

  19. Para 13d, Chapter 3. Situation Evaluation. What information does MJ-12 want and in what format? Notice that is not discussed. Nor is there a reference cited in Appendix I.

  20. Para 13, Chapter 3. Under “Secure the Area” no provisions are made to prevent observation from the air. No provisions are made to prevent observations from higher ground. Tentage and camouflage would nets seem to be the answer. No guidance and no publications cited.

  21. Para 14ª, Chapter 3. How is the site to be documented? Is aerial photography to be used? Is a grid system to be established on the site? Is the area to be surveyed in? No guidance, no publications which might help are cited.

  22. Para 14ª, Chapter 3. The area will be checked for radiation. What type? What type of monitoring equipment should be used? Should radiation exposure records be kept on personnel? Should dosimeters (sp?) be issued? Decontamination procedures and monitoring of exposed personnel are not discussed. No guidance and no publications are cited.

  23. Para 14ª, Chapter 3. Check for toxic agents. How? With what? What are recommended procedure, protective clothing, decontamination procedures? No guidance and no publications are cited.

  24. Para 14ª, Chapter 3. Documentation. It does not seem that the person who wrote is familiar with Technical Intelligence procedures. (Maybe we fell asleep in that class?) No forms, procedures, guidance, or publications are cited.

  25. Para 13ª, Chapter 3. No guidance is given on special containers, material handle equipment, etc. No publications are cited.

  26. Para 14b, Chapter 3. No much is said about “Red Team.” What support is required from the site commander, etc.?

  27. Para 14c, Chapter 3. Contamination is mentions, but no protective gear or procedures are recommended.

  28. Para 15, Chapter 3. Cleansing the Area. Extraterrestrial technology, in light of modern technology, would be thought to included some very small items. The method for cleaning the area is apparently visual inspection. Should the soil be checked? Too what depth? Should the top soil be striped and screened? There is no guidance. Here is definitely a place where minimum standard can and should be established. It is left to the discretion of the officer in charge. The site commander should have the area checked and certify in writing that nothing was left there.

  29. Para 16, Chapter 3. Special or Unusual Circumstances only anticipates a crash in a populated area. There is a publications cited here. Once again the “Eyes Only” comment applies. However, other special situations like recovery from lakes, swamps, mountain tops are not addressed.

  30. Para 17, Chapter 3. This is not a multipart serial numbered form. Even bills of lading were that way in 1954.

  31. Para 18ª, Chapter 3. Note once again the idea of tagging each item as standard procedures in technical intelligence is ignored.

  32. Para 18, Chapter 3. A copy of the inventory is not placed inside the inner box.

  33. Para 18, Chapter 3. Packing of unusual, toxic, liquid or other items is not discussed.

  34. As there are several page missing only packing is the inner box is described. In the removal process procedures are from other wooden contains are described in detail.

  35. Chapter 4 talks about Extraterrestrial Biological Entities (EBE). If alive, they are to be handle by the OPNAC - BBS team which is never explained. Nor is the type of support expected from the cite commander discussed.

  36. Contact with EBE. Generally no protective gear is recommend although it thought that they there is a possibility of contamination.

  37. Although the front of the manual apparently has an Army seal, chapter 6 talks about squadrons which expect for the calvary exist in the Air Force.

  38. The Appendix on publications is completely inadequate. See above.



Special Operations Manual 1-01 - Part 4

Finally, for a wrap up, some general comments.

  1. Nowhere in this manual is the prevention of taking souvenir discussed. If this is as serious of as the manual says, everyone would deposit their clothing in a container on leaving the exclusion area and a body cavity search should be considered, and then receive new clothing. For morale and dignity sake this could be part of a “decontamination procedure.” (Unfortunate that the MJ12 personnel did think of an exclusion area, isn’t it?)

    Those of you that have been in the military may remember that as you left the firing range you came to inspection arms in front of a commissioned officer and were required to say, “No brass or ammo, sir.” You might have thought that this was some quaint military ritual. However, as some decided to disobey the written and verbal orders against taking live or spent ammunition off the range would later find out, this little exercise sealed their guilty at legal proceedings. Of course, SOM 1-01 is much more serious. So we probably would have each member of sign a certificate that he did not remove anything.


  2. There is a planning process for military manuals. It is long and complicated. One of the NCOs where I worked diagramed it out on a flow chart for a presentation he was required to make. It stretched half way around the room. SOM 1-01 would be one in a series of planned manual since as can be seen from the foregoing the operation is more complicated than meets the eye. In the Appendix I we should see SOM 1-02, SOM 1-03, etc. with the dreaded term everyone in the military hates “TBPTo be published. However, nowhere in the manual are future publications mentioned.

    One must remember that these guys are supposedly the best and brightest and have unlimited “black” resources. If this is the best they can do in the planning cycle, maybe it’s time for the president to junk MJ-12.


  3. The format of this manual is sloppy. The way to get covered with spit and bad breathe is to hand in a manual manuscript which has a section one, but no section two or that has a subparagraph 21ª, but no 21b. If the outline format does not have two items, then they are not numbered. That is basic.


  4. The manual fails to address what the basic equipment each team should have. Specialized equipment that might be required should be discussed. The Appendix I should bulge out with references to authorization documents, technical and field manuals. The location of units and equipment that recovery teams can call on should be discussed in the manual. (Dec 8, 1941 is too late!)


  5. The manual fails to address the composition of recovery teams: what specialties are required, what certifications and credentials should they have, what specialized team training is required, how will this be done.


  6. How does some one become an MJ-12 team member. In the nuclear weapons program there is the Personal Reliability Program (PRP). The individual’s administrative, medical, dental, etc. status is constantly screened. When you visit the dentist, the first place to go after your return is to the commander’s office (or the PRP officer if the commander is a full colonel.) and tell him what treatment you received. The person’s character, personnel status, any legal infractions are constantly monitored.


    All records of all PRP personnel checked at least quarterly. SOM 1-01 is silent on this. If you think about it, this program is more vital than nuclear weapons. A break through in technology in this era means the owner could rule the world. Of course, the PRP evolved over the years. However, the start did exist in 1954. The anticipated counter argument is that the individual will received Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmentalize Information (SCI) clearance and be indoctrinated into the program. Then the old broken record starts up again: this should be mentioned in the manual and Appendix I should reference these documents concern SCI indoctrination.


  7. The only operation that the manual addresses in detail is the simple packing and unpacking of material for routine military shipment. (BTW Nowhere is the military specification -MIL-SPECS- for the packing material discussed -i.e. material strength, heat resistance, etc.- nor are the Federal Stock Numbers of the packing material provided.....)


  8. The most important thing about this manual it fell out of the sky. It is supposedly written by some of the best brains in the country or people who can get the best brains. The military is in the middle of this, but the manual is full of military gaffes. It was not sent (that we know of) to Peter Jennings or Jack Anderson, but to Don Berliner. So we are to believe that someone somewhere in a highly classified facility risked it all to send to this bomb shell to someone with little media influence.



Is it possible that this manual is real? Possible yes, but highly unlikely.

How about an alternate more likely possibility. An Air Force buck Sgt. with some intelligence training (but who probably fell asleep in technical intelligence class) and some friends cut and pasted this little number from a military packing manual. The buck Sgt. was too young to have been around in 1954 so there are so many anachronisms.


I have no proof, of course. Just a little possibility.....